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China–Republic of Korea Relations: An Analysis of the Security Forum, 2002-2009 Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University for award of the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY KIM JIN WOOG CHINESE STUDIES DIVISION CENTRE FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY NEW DELHI–110067 INDIA 2013
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- 2 - 10 December, 2012 DECLARATION I declare that the thesis entitled, “China – Republic of Korea Relations: An Analysis o f the Security Forum, 2002-2009” submitted by me for the award of the degree o f DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any othe r university. …………………. KIM JIN WOOG CERTIFICATE We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation. …………………………………. ………………………………… Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli Chairperson, CEAS Supervisor, CEAS
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- 3 - ABSTRACT This is the case study about China-South Korea Security Forum which has been held in Beijing and Seoul from the year 2002 to 2009. China-South Korea Security Forum (CSKSF) was introduced by two civil institutions of the two countries in 2000. It was organised and co-hosted by Chinese People’s Association for Friendly Contact (CPAFC) and Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs (KRIMA). An innovative civil approach between China and South Korea has been developed in Annual Security Forum involving participation of high incumbent officials from both sides. CSKSF has played a role to provide an important network for the cooperation and confidence-building of security specialists and for the exchange of security information between the two countries. As an attempt to facilitate the improved relationship between the two countries, the Security Forum organized several rounds of formal and informal meetings during the period with the participation of high policy makers. The Forum has brought various security issues in the Korean peninsula and its surroundings into debate. The result has been reported to both the governments and applied to the policy making. The events involved various people including security experts both incumbent and retired in the military services of both countries, and civilian experts and researchers in this field totaling around 100. Some of the high ranking personalities who took part in the meetings were then Ministers for Defense Cao Gangchuan, Chi Haotian and Liang Guanglie from Chinese side, and ex-Ministers Cho Sung Tae, Lee Sang hee, Yoon Kwang Woong, Kim Dong Sin from the Korean side. This alternative framework has initiated a new approach in improving China-South Korea security relationship. China-South Korea security relationship was not so vibrant even after the normalization. There were two factors that have prevented China and South Korea
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- 4 - coming together. For China, North Korea was sensitive issue and South Korea could no t bypass the US easily. So, it was not comfortable for both to vitalize security relationship overnight. Many deliberations and mediations are needed for the ice break. In this circumstance this unofficial dialogue organised by the Security Forum has been beneficial. The study has tried to explain and evaluate the role played by the China-South Korea Security Forum in improving relations between China and South Korea. The research focuses on the period from 2002 to 2009. It has explored the difference of the role played by the civilian institution when the government organs have been ineffective . The study used the personal interviews with key officials and participants in differen t meetings organized by the Forum at Beijing and Seoul. The major thrust of the research was on qualitative study and it investigated 60 o f the papers presented at the Forums. The papers were categorized as per their topics and year of presentation. The study tried to apply deductive and inductive method to analyze and understand the dynamics of China-South Korea relations in the context of the proceedings of the Forum so that it became easier to decipher their changing viewpoints with the passage of time. Furthermore, the role of Korean Diaspora in China (including full-star Korean ethnic general Cho Nanchi who served in the Chinese military) were searched to study China-South Korea relations. The researcher especially used the information acquired from formal and informal talks, personal interviews, seminar debates etc. So, this study endeavored to be useful for actual policy making with the scholarly objectiveness in the end. The work has discovered that the CSKSF has contributed a lot to the promotion o f security relations between China and South Korea. The former and incumbent defense
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- 5 - ministers as well as senior policy-makers in the military of the both countries deem this Forum a crucial one to promote security relations between China and South Korea. It can be one of the contributions to the promotion of Korea-China security relationship. They are much interested in how this dialogue can be continued encompassing the think-tanks of both countries in this process. The achievement and contribution of the Forum can be explained by how much scholars and experts as well as policy makers and practitioners of both countries are taking advantage of this Forum. Party members and workers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Defense policy and practitioners of National Information Agency, members of Department of Policy and Information from the Ministry o f National Defense were observers in the seminars and meetings of this Forum. Sometimes they have been utilizing this mechanism to solve their problems. In short, China and South Korea, two rising countries located in Northeast Asia, the formal conversation between them was difficult in the past era because of North Korean factor for China and the US factor for South Korea as well as the ideological barriers. The limits of the conversation in the official channels find a new outlet and it is the birth of the CSKSF. CSKSF has played a positive role for promoting the security relationship between both countries and still going on.
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- 6 - ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am grateful to Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli for his supervision. Had I not got his insights and friendly encouragement I would surely have given up my efforts. He guided me so wisely with helpful and supportive advice, critical comments, and intellectua l freedom. CEAS/SIS in JNU has been literally my “Centre” of academic life. I pay respec t to the former Chairperson, Prof. Lalima Verma and all other faculty members. I appreciate administrative support from our Centre staff and others. I developed my basic ideas on my research topic with the help of many specialists participated at the programme of the China-South Korea Security Forum (CSKSF). I am very much appreciative for the thoughtful encouragement from Ex. Minister Cho Sungtae, Ex . President of LG Ki-Jun, Ex. Vice-minister Hwang Kyusic, General Song Youngun and other consultants of KRIMA (Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs). At Seoul National University I learned much about public policies from my supervisors Prof. Jung Junggil and Prof. Lee Dalgon who became later ministers o f Korean Government. Their guidance was very helpful for me to write this thesis at thi s time. I could be much lonesome here in India without help of Chairman Hyun Dongwha , President Lee Junghun and Secretary General Mr. Harry Shin of Korean Association India. Advocate Vijay Prakash who passed away in November last year, Professor Rakesh , Professor Uttam and other friends in India supported me in many ways. Special grea t thanks to Mr. Sudhakar Vaddi, Mr. John Jojin, Mr. Charan Dass and his wife. My wife and my daughter Kim Jiye gave me indispensable support to complete my study and this Ph.D thesis. My son Kim Taeyang who is also pursuing his Ph. D. in Germany has often cheered up for my writing. I was supported much by my good batch , students and friends, special thanks to Mr. Tara Prasad Joshi, Dr. Mahendra Prakash, Mr . Arpit, Mr. Satyendra Kumar Uttam and Mr. Thangkhal. Thank you.
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- 7 - LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ACCP Association of Chinese Culture Promotion APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations CACDA China Arms Control and Disarmament Association CAIFC China Association for International Friendly Contact CAMIR Chinese Academy of Modern International Relations CAMS Chinese Academy of Military Science CCMR Citizens' Coalition for Media Reform CNDU Chinese National Defense University CPIIA Chinese People’s Institute of International Affairs CSKSF China-South Korea Security Forum EAS East Asian Summit FEM Federation for Environmental Movement GKU Green Korea United KEDO Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
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- 8 - KIDA Korean Institute for Defense Analysis KNDU Korean National Defense University KRIMA Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs NDU National Defense University NGO Non-Governmental Organization NK North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) NPM New Public Management NPO Non-Profit Organization NPS New Public Service PLA People's Liberation Army PRC Peoples Republic of China OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe SK South Korea (Republic of Korea) USFK United States Forces in Korea
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- 9 - LIST OF TABLES, MAP & GRAPH Table #1 Meeting Schedules of the Security Forum ……………15 Table #2 PRC five major campaigns during the Korean War... 46 Table #3 Summit Talk Diary ………………….………………….53 Table #4 North Korea Nuclear / Missile tests and Responses from China & South Korea ……………………………….…55 Table #5 Defence Minister talk diary ……...….…………………56 Table #6 China’s Think Tanks on International Relations ….…89 Table #7 Korean Think Tanks in Relations with Chinese Think Tanks …………………………...……………………….94 Table #8 Main Subjects of the CSKSF Meetings ………..…….109 Table #9 East Asia Summit ………….…….…………………....135 Table #10 East Asia Foreign Minister Talks ……………...……..135 Table #11 Six Party Talks and Agreements ……………………..156 Table #12 Ministerial Level–Meetings and Personnel Exchange in Training …………………………………………...…..224 Map #1 PRC five major campaigns during the Korean War... 47 Graph #1 Sino-South Korea Trade (1992-2008) ………………...87 Graph #2 Comparing the Reciprocal Visits before and after CSKSF …………………………………..……………..241
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- 10 - TABLE OF CONTENTS Declaration and Certificate .………………….......……………..………..2 Abstract ……………………………………………………………………3 Acknowledgements ……………………………………………….……….6 List of Abbreviations ……………………………………………..……….7 List of Tables, Map & Graph …………………………………….…....….9 CHAPTERS 1: INTRODUCTION ……...……………………………………………………..…….11 2: CHINA-SOUTH KOREA RELATIONS SINCE 1992 NORMALISATION……28 3: THE SECURITY SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: THE ROLE OF NGO AND NPM …………………….…………………………....64 4: EVOLUTION AND EFFECTS OF THE SECURITY FORUM 2002-2009….....86 5: ANALYSIS OF THE PAPERS, DEBATES AND THE RELEVANCE OF THE CSKSF……………………………………………………………………………….109 6: CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………..243 APPENDIXES ………………….……………………………………………….….251 REFERENCES ……………………………………………………………….……315
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- 11 - CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Throughout the Cold War there were no official relations between China and Republic of Korea (South Korea), whereas China maintained close relations with North Korea, South Korea maintained formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan). This hindered trade and economic relations between Beijing and Seoul because both countries were unable to protect economic and social interests without bilatera l agreements. However, because of cultural and geographic proximity, China and South Korea were keen to develop trade relations since 1980s. In the late 1980s, Chinese–South Korean individual contacts 1 have been encouraged between China and South Korea; however, significant barriers to strong trade and bilateral relations persisted. The absence of any protections granted by official relations had still remained. China had been politically closer to Pyongyang, and South Korean’s relations with North Korea remained tense and distrustful. Since August 1992, China has been trying to end the uncomfortable relationship with South Korea with the establishment of diplomatic ties. And, China has been broadening the scope of its external cooperation with countries of free market economy with its neighbour–South Korea. With the changed international scenario after 1990s, South Korea was willing to build and promote a new amicable relationship with China as well. It was in China’s strategic interests to cooperate with South Korea, not only to promote economic relations (Goodman and Segal, 1994: 364), but also to establish peace and stability in the Korean peninsula for its economic development without any territorial disputes. 1 People from both countries have done individual trade which mainly happened on the bordering oceans using the ships.
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- 12 - The relationship between China and South Korea has been related to the North East Asian security dynamics involving neighbouring states. Both countries were largely influenced by the security framework 2 of Cold War since 1945. The Cold War blocs and mindset have compelled policy-makers, security specialists and researchers of both countries to follow a certain perception promoted by Eastern and Western blocs in which they choose to take side with. Therefore, after the collapse of the then Soviet Union, the Cold War existed between China and South Korea till early 1990s, which remains common to the extent that both countries tend to approach international issues from the Cold War perspectives based on their preferred ideology; even though, there were many common interests between China and South Korea in the improved relationship, their relations were constrained to a limited degree of official cooperation. In the post-Cold War era, China has been constrained by North Korean factor and South Korea has been restricted by the US factor in their bilateral political and security relations. This situation initiated China- South Korea Security Forum as the non-governmental channel talk. In spite of the remaining problems between both Koreas and the China-Taiwan problem after Cold War, there have been various developments of multilateral cooperation, dialogues between the governments in North East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region especially after the late 1980s. Regionalism in the Asia Pacific has been evolving in various forms such as security to trade, finance and economy. Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific involves various countries and participants from government officials to various non-governmental scholars and specialists. The ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) has acted as mediator through ASEAN-led multilateral regimes and institutions. In the security realm, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 3 was established in 1993. It has enhanced dialogues 2 It was so called Northern triangle for China, Soviet Union and North Korea and Southern triangle fo r U.S.A, Japan and South Korea. 3 The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is a formal, official, multilateral dialogue in Asia Pacific regio n.
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- 13 - through various annual conferences to discuss about the security issues in the Asia - Pacific. This regionalism and multilateralism has been developed after rigorous dialogues among the member countries and, further they are too concerned about the security of the region especially after increased terrorist activities worldwide. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has been the main forum since its formation in 1989 to facilitate trade, business, investment, technology and economic cooperation in the region involving twenty-one Pacific Rim countries. At new regiona l groupings, since 1997, the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and the Republic of Korea ) cooperation has included diverse areas of cooperation. Cooperation is now being pursued in twenty areas, ranging from political and security, transnational crime, economic , finance and monetary, agriculture and forestry, energy, minerals, tourism, health, labor , culture and arts, environment, science and technology, information and communication technology, social welfare, rural development and poverty eradication, disaste r management, youth, women, and to the other tracks. The East Asian Summit (EAS) has been held since 2005 involving China, South Korea, Japan and others, nonetheless excluding the US, Russia and North Korea till 2010 . The member states of the region are keen to solve the security challenges either due to North Korean nuclear advancement or due to terrorist acts, climate change and othe r issues with consensus. The relation between China and South Korea on security issue is having an important role in the region for peace and cooperation. Both countries have developed the strategic relations since 1992 and dialogues on the security issues have been taking place. On contrary to the growing economy, trade, development and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, however, the existing various security frameworks and forums have achieved little or close to nothing to solve the security situations surrounding two Koreas . Those frameworks have not been able to improve the North East Asian security affairs As of July 2007, it is consisted of 27 participants. ARF objectives are to foster dialogue an d consultation, and promote confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the region.
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- 14 - due to the extreme and persistent mistrust, perception-gaps among the parties reinforced by their rigid governmental policy-decision-making process, inflexibility, narrow and short-term national interests (Tanaka and Cossa, 2007). In analytical terms the East Asia Security Forum would be a mere redundancy given the existence of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an organisation already tasked with managing security issues in the region. Such individuals would argue that an attempt to create another security forum is tantamount to an attempt to destroy the ARF . However, such critics would fail to realise two key points: 1) the limits of the ARF’s capabilities; and 2) the potential for an East Asia Security Forum to complement, rathe r than substitute for, the ARF (Tanaka and Cossa, 2007). Despite its designation as “Asia’s leading security forum” the ARF has not been able to accomplish much outside of conference room since its establishment almos t thirteen years ago. It proved itself ineffective when faced with either specific threats to regional stability, such as the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, the crisis requiring a specific and quick response, such as the December 2004 tsunami. The former has been primarily handled in the context of the Six-Party Talks while the latter was more or less handled by a “coalition of the willing” whose main members included the United States , Japan, Australia, and India. Given these prevailing constraints surrounding the China-South Korea relationship in the North East Asia, “the China-South Korea Security Forum (CSKSF)” was introduced by two civil institutes of both the countries in 2000. Those meetings o f the CSKSF were organised and co-hosted by the China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC) and the Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs (KRIMA). This innovative and new alternative approach has been developing a platform such as ‘Annual Security Forum’ involving high-level official’s participations. The CSKSF holds annual meetings at non-governmental level since 2002. The annual meetings of the Security Forum have been held seven times from 2002 to 2009 except 2003 (1 st , 3 rd , 5 th and 7 th meetings were held in Beijing, and 2 nd , 4 th and 6 th meetings took place in Seoul).
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- 15 - The meeting was cancelled in 2003 due to the outbreak of SARS). The eighth meeting was held in October 2010 in Seoul. Table #1 Meeting Schedules of the Security Forum Security Forum Dates Places Remarks 1 st CSKSF 2 nd June, 2002 Beijing, China Signed MOU for the Forum 2 nd CSKSF 2 nd June, 2004 Seoul, Korea Cancelled in 2003 due to SARS crisis 3 rd CSKSF 25 th April, 2005 Beijing, China General Tang New Representative 4 th CSKSF 20 th June, 2006 Seoul, Korea 5 th CSKSF 21 st April, 2007 Beijing, China 7 days tour 6 th CSKSF 28 th October, 2008 Seoul, Korea 5 days tour 7 th CSKSF 3 rd November, 2009 Beijing China Minister Kim New Representative Recently, this Security Forum has grown up to provide an important platform for the cooperation and confidence-building of security specialists and for the exchange of information between China and South Korea. This unofficial security forum at non- governmental level involves various participants including security experts from military general-level to lower-level, both active and reserved, as well as military experts and military researchers from both the countries. The CSKSF has debated various security issues surrounding North-East Asia, two Koreas and China-Korea relationship: the critical challenges against Peace of North East Asia; the China-South Korea cooperation
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- 16 - for peace of Korean peninsula; the role of US forces in Korea for North East Asian Security; and the Six Party Talks linked with North Korean Nuclear programmes. Besides this, the other informal meetings along with the Security Forum have been organised separately involving major high-level official participants from both China and South Korea. The high profile participant’s lists includes acting and former National Defense Minister such as Cao Gangchuan, Chi Haotian, Cho Nanchi, Tang Tianpyao from China and Lee Sang hee, Yoon Kwang Woong, Kim Dong Sin, Cho Sung Tae from Korea. Whereas there have been seven talks of China-South Korea defense minister and some other non-periodic security scholars meetings. This Security Forum is very unique and significant as most of the acting and ex-ministers participate in active debates together with security scholars and specialists from both the countries. This alternative security framework established as the ‘Security Forum’, has played a constructive role in improving China-South Korea relationship and the two Koreas with a long term objective of bringing peace and stability in East Asia. The Forum also aims to build an “alternative multi-lateral security scheme” in East Asia. Despite some expectations that on-going Six Party Talks could develop into a more comprehensive and effective multi-lateral security regime in the North East Asian security regime, nevertheless this six-party talks are not held regularly. Although the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) held annual meetings since 1993 , this multilateral forum has focused on the South East Asia and the Pacific. Thus there are no other regular regional security related meetings with focus on the North-East Asian region except CSKSF; even though it is a non-governmental forum. In spite of the significant role in the region, this Security Forum has not been able to pay enough attention; given the serious security dynamics and minimal roles of the existing security frameworks in the North East Asia, it is important to focus, analyse and examine tha t how this Security Forum has contributed to the improvement of bilateral China-South Korea security relationship.
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- 17 - REVIEW OF LITERATURE The thematic review of literature presents the historical background and overview o f the security of China, South Korea and their bilateral relationship in the East Asian region . It reviews the role and limitations of the existing regional security frameworks including the ASEAN Regional Forum in the Asia Pacific and the Six-Party Talks in East Asia. I t will further introduce about how China-South Korea Security framework has been evolved out and consultation between the former defence ministers from both countries has taken place through the form of interview as the primary source. a. The Chinese Security and Foreign Policy since 1990s China is facing complicated and diverse security threats and challenges which are interwoven and interactive with the traditional and non-traditional security threats; the domestic and international security challenges. Being in a stage of economic and socia l transition, China is encountering new problems and issues in maintaining social stability . The damages caused by non-traditional security threats like terrorism, natural disasters , economic insecurity and information insecurity are on the rise. Impact of uncertainties and destabilising factors in China’s outside security environment on the national security and development is growing. (MND PRC: 2008) 4 China, faced with the superiority of the developed countries, wants to focus its energy on the economic development without being interrupted by accidentally igniting an all-out war especially in the Korean peninsula. That’s why China has been trying to establish a safety valve to prevent tensions in this region through various methods. The six party talks is one of the alternatives. (Information Office of the State Council 2011) 4 China’s National Defense is the white paper published by Chinese Ministry of National Defense (MND). Before Chinese MND started to publish official white paper, it presented its perspective on defense policy through China: Arms Control and Disarmament in 1995. Chinese white paper is the primary source that shows China's recognition on international security circumstances and its policy directions. However, according to Kiselycznyk and Saunders (2010), China has never disclosed any information about its R&D part, weapon acquisition, prospect for future budget. For the assessment of MND white paper from Korean's point of view, see Park (2011).
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- 18 - The China-South Korea Security Forum has also initiated to probe the peace keeping measures. Two civilian institutes in both the countries analyzed the situations in thi s region and started to make a Forum to find ways to prevent any possibility of war in the region. b. China-South Korea relationship in the North East Asian security dynamics Since the end of the Cold-War, the US has been consolidating on its role as only super power in the international community. In East Asia, China is emerging as a powerful country both economically and militarily at steady pace. Against this background, the US has been acting cautiously with China, carrying out a series o f strategic campaigns, depending on the situations dictating China as a competitive State. Yan Xuetong, a foreign affairs specialist at Qinghua University in Beijing, writes tha t China’s fast growth in political and economic fields will dramatically narrow its powe r gap with the United States. In an article “China’s global role” in “China Journal o f International Politics”, published in December 2006, Yan argues that China has already surpassed Japan, Russia, Britain, France, Germany and India in terms of economic , military and political power. The evolution and process of China-South Korea Security Forum is deeply related to this growth of China’s role in the East Asia involved with the two-Koreas, the US, Russia, and Japan in this environment. Victor D. Cha, the former Director for Asian Affairs in the White House’s Nationa l Security Council, wrote in his paper ‘Seoul-Beijing Detente and Korean security ’ published in 1999, that the dramatic transformation of the relationship between China and South Korea in the 1990s is the most successful case of ‘engaging China’ in the East Asia . This case provides framework on the likely effectiveness of the American and South Korean efforts to engage North Korea. He envisions that as “the Agreed Framework” threatens to loosen and another potential crisis appears over the Peninsula, the China - South Korea axis acts as a balance and a stabilizing factor. It could be partially not righ t to assess that China can control North Korea easily. The research will examine why
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- 19 - China cannot control North Korea easily and how difficult it is for China to manage North Korean affairs; through first-hand knowledge from the CSKS Forum. Actually, Hans J. Morgenthau has already said in his article “To Intervene or Not To Intervene,” Foreign Affairs, April 1967 that we are faced not with one monolithic communist bloc controlled and used by the then Soviet Union, but with a variety o f communisms, whose relations with the Soviet Union and China change from country to country and from time to time whose bearing upon the interests of the United States requires empirical examination in each concrete instance. Communism has become polycentric, that is to say, each communist government and movement, to a greater o r lesser extent, pursues its own directions and national interests within the common framework of communist ideology and institutions. It was quite right in the case of North Korea. Thomas Fingar in the presentation ‘Enhancing South Korea's Security: The U.S . Alliance and Beyond’ on 20 March 2009 in a conference at Stanford University, said tha t South Korea unexpectedly faces a new constellation of significant threats to its security from both the traditional and non-traditional sources. China’s rise presents not only opportunities but also the challenges for South Korean security. He peculiarly argues tha t the ROK has one of the world’s lowest birth rates; resulting in the lack of young people and the aging of the society. This will have major implications for South Korea’s long - term security considering the huge Chinese population. The research will study those kinds of opportunities and challenges of China’s rise for Korean security. Dr. Denny Roy writes in his paper ‘China and the Korean peninsula: Beijing’ s Pyongyang problem and Seoul hope’ that Beijing and Seoul enjoy warm relations and great potential for economic cooperation. Based on the current trends, the Chinese have reason to hope that in the long term Seoul will have a closer and stronger relationship with China. He argues that the Chinese generally fear the risks and uncertainties of the transition to a united Korea and are not inclined to campaign for a dramatic change in the status quo. Does China want a united Korea or not? It is a big suspicious question to al l
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- 20 - the IR (international relations) researchers. The study will also try to answer that question through the analysis of presentations and free debates at the China-South Korea Security Forum 2002~2009. A book titled ‘Power and Security in Northeast Asia; Shifting Strategies’ published in October 2008; authored by Byung-Kook Kim and Anthony Jones, in which they wrote that the region is witnessing an ongoing process of democratization, possibly inviting an unpredictable future. While realistic predictions tell us that these dynamic changes will bring about armed conflicts among nations, however they conclude that power politics in Northeast Asia indicates ‘an uneasy but resilient equilibrium of spatially and temporally asymmetric power relations (p.279)’. 5 The research will evaluate the proposition that the economic development and democratization in China will be an important factor for improving the relations between South Korea and China. It will testify whether ongoing process of democratization in China may bring about armed conflicts among nations in the region or not. In another book entitled ‘Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency’ published by Stanford University Press, 2004; the co-author J.J. Suh argues the durability of the US–Korea alliance despite the fact that the balance of power seems to have shifted to South Korea. Suh further clarified that ‘the alliance constituency, a domestic coalition of officers, officials, and merchants whose existence stemmed from and grew through the alliance, had an existential interest in bringing about this reversal of the alliance’s fortunes…. The hegemonic discourse perpetuated the identities of North Korea as the irrational dangerous other … And that hegemonic status of the dangerous North Korea made it possible for the alliance to win the war of survival without fighting a battle.’ The research will look into the dynamics between the Korea-US alliance and the China-South Korea relationship in this respect. 5 The book highlights the shifting power structure of Northeast Asia. It writes that the impact of rising China on the power balance of the region is substantial, and the dynamic growth of the economy and the resulting growth of interdependence are the distinguishing characteristics of the region.
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- 21 - Theoretical Perspectives and Assumptions The proposed research has both empirical and normative concerns. The basic theoretical, epistemological and methodological assumption of this research is close to neo-liberalism and social constructivism of international relation theories. Realists assume that states are the most important actors in anarchical international politics; tha t national defence and security are the highest priority; that states seek relative gains and maximum power; that conflicts are inevitable; that international regimes and institution s are not significant in security area (Carr 1946; Morgenthau 1948; Grieco 1997 ; Mearsheimer 2003). Neo-liberals counter-argue that not only states but also non-state, non - governmental actors and individuals are salient actors in a globalizing world; that security should consider people at grass-root level from traditional to non-traditional agenda; tha t states seek absolute gain; that peace and prosperity are possible; that internationa l regimes and institutions are significant to improve security for states and people in the world community (Hoffmann 1987; Keohane and Nye, Jr. 1972). Keohane and Martin (1995), explain that international regimes and institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible , establish focal points for coordination and, in general, facilitate the operation o f reciprocity. Social constructivism assume that identities and interests are socially constructed through culture and practice in our social world and that internationa l relations can be changed by learning, understanding, norms, ideas and practice. Track theory will be used for the analysis of China-South Korea Security Forum . Track theory is often used for the case which has common goal and two routes to it . Bilateral relations and decision-making process between two countries involve both governmental level (1.0-track) and civilian level (2.0-track). The actors at both levels on both sides are influencing and influenced by each other. The theory can be applied to China-South Korea relations effectively. Although China is widely regarded as
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- 22 - Communist Party-led authoritarian political regime, in other track Chinese foreign policy-decision-making process has become more flexible and multi-dimensional since its economic liberal reform in the 1980s. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) is a good case of 2.0-track security dialogue whose mission is to prepare studies on security matters for their governmental 1.0-track counterparts in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) . Sheldon W. Simon 6 studied CSCAP activities and their impact on the ARF. Simon argues in his paper “Evaluating 2.0-track approaches to security diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific” (2002) that the CSCAP has achieved some noteworthy successes, including a definition of ‘preventive diplomacy’ adopted by the ARF. On balance, 2.0-track epistemic communities are playing a significant role in 1.0-track security deliberations in the Asia- Pacific. In spite of various study and surveys on China-South Korea relationship and existing security regimes such as ASEAN Regional Forum and Six-Party Talks, there is a dearth of literature focusing on the promising role of non-governmental level dialogues in the improvement of China-South Korean bilateral security relationship. Therefore it is important to analyze the role of China-South Korea Security Forum and evaluate its impact on the improvement of China-South Korea relationship. This research investigates the roles of Annual China-South Korea Security Forum during 2002–2009 in China- South Korea security relations. The research will also examine over sixty papers presented in the course of six Annual Forums and at the same time free debates and informal meetings around the conference will be investigated. 6 Sheldon W. Simon is a Professor of Political Science and Faculty Associate for the Center for Asia n Studies and Program in Southeast Asian Studies at Arizona State University. He consults with the Sta te Department, Department of Defense, and the U.S. Information Agency.
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- 23 - DEFINITION, RATIONALE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY China-South Korea security relationship is associated with the North East Asian region. The concept of the North East Asian security mainly indicates security of states , society and people in the two Koreas, China and Japan. The US and to far lesser exten t Russia also are major factors in the dynamics of the North East Asian security. The research will focus on the period 2002-2009, as China-South Korea Security Forum was formed in 2002. However, the research analyses the historical background and the general trends of China-South Korean bilateral security relationship in the North East Asian security dynamics before the normalisation 1992. China-South Korea Security Forum is non-governmental level dialogues initiated between China and South Korea civil institutions. The aim of the Forum is to enhance security interests in people and the states of both countries. China-South Korea Security Forum has been held since 2002 with participation by various levels of security specialists from civilian scholars to government officials. It was very limited for either o f countries to fully satisfy its interests through official channels because China was sensitive to North Korea factor and South Korea was sensitive to US factor. In areas where official coordination or 1.0-track dialogue is impossible, unofficial coordination o r 2.0-track dialogue is expected inevitably. This is where the so-called ‘2.0-track ’ coordination between both countries emerged. Track theory involves official and unofficial channels in the matters o f diplomacy. Generally speaking, an official coordination channel is called ‘1.0-track’, and a private-level unofficial coordination channel in support of official channels is called ‘2.0-track’. ‘1.5-track’ referred here is a hybrid, semi-governmental or half-governmenta l and half-private coordination channel. This study intends to suggest ‘1.5-track’, a hybrid of ‘1.0-track’ on governmental level and ‘2.0-track’ on private level as a subject for the research.
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- 24 - China witnessed the necessity of an intermediary to bridge the gap between its planned economy system and the free market economy system, and in 1984, established China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC) under the umbrella of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. CAIFC is a semi- governmental organization designed to promote international exchange and to serve as a conduit between China and the Western block. Huang Hua, Chinese former foreign minister classified CAIFC as an NGO (Non-Governmental Organization) and writes in his autobiography ‘since the opening-up and reform policies were adopted in late 1978, China’s exchanges with the outside world have increased rapidly and at the same time NGOs have been appearing in large numbers. The China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC) is one among them’ (Huang, 2008) This association is also well-known in South Korea as an effective diplomatic channel because of the pivotal role it has played in providing Roh, Tae Woo, the former Korean President, access to communicate his ‘northern policy’ with China. During this time, China chose to utilize this so called non-governmental organization considering the strategic environment of its strong ties with North Korea. The researcher has maintained a close, regular contact with CAIFC over ten years, through such activities as annual security forum. Therefore, present research will be enriched with the first-hand experience of the researcher. The Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party has considerable influence on China’s national and foreign strategy. In China, Vice Chairman or member of the Central Military Commission is appointed to serve in the position o f Chinese Minister of National Defense, meaning that the Minister is just a symbolic position to represent the Ministry of Defense affairs externally. In other words, the Ministry can be said to be under the supervision of the Commission. (中国网 2003) Thus, it is important to investigate China’s military policy considering the status of the Commission, and this effort deserves a primary attention in serving the purpose of this research.
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- 25 - Factors that shape the dynamics between the South Korea-US alliance and the China-South Korea relationship are the national strategies and foreign policies of the US and China. This necessitates the analysis of strategic changes in both countries and their linkages, through which choices for South Korea can be determined. Against this backdrop, it is of a great significance to pursue what position South Korea can take, not from the Cold-War perspective but from a different, neutral and independent perspective. The present study intends to analyze perceptions over stability and security in East Asia and a peace structure in the region, by presenters who participated in seven rounds of Annual China-South Korea Security Forum from a neutral perspective, and seeks to develop a mechanism for peace in the region. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES The proposed research work has the following hypotheses: 1. China-South Korea Security Forum has contributed to the improvement of the bilateral security relations between China and South Korea to the extent that both countries exchange military personnel in their training academy and regular minister level– meetings. 2. China-South Korea Security Forum has provided alternative 1.5-track policy process to existing 1.0-track level relation. RESEARCH METHODS The analytical and elaborative research will use the personal interview with key officials and participants of the forum, as methodology for proposed study. The key ex- defense ministers Chi Haotian and Cho Sungtae who started military relations between China and South Korea, will also be interviewed. Other persons of high repute such as acting defense ministers, political leaders would also be approached. Moreover, military attaches of both the countries including all the scholars and specialists who participated at
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- 26 - China-South Korea Security Forum 2002-2009 will be questioned. The data collection on the basis of questionnaires would be used to examine the outcome of the present study. The major thrust of the research would be on qualitative study and conten t analysis of sixty papers presented at the Forums. In content analysis, first the arguments will be categorized according to the theme and the presentation year. And it will describe free debates according to the countries and its forums. It will seek to apply deductive and inductive method of analysis to understand the dynamics of China-South Korea relations in the context of Security Forum proceedings. Hence it could become easier to deciphe r their changing points of view with the passage of time. Furthermore, the study also investigates the role of Korean diaspora in China . The researcher will especially use the information acquired from formal and informa l talks and private conversations including presentations and debates at the Forum. Hence the research will endeavor to be useful for actual policy making with the scholarly objectiveness in the end. It also analyses the similarities and dissimilarities between the 1.5 track channel (informal meeting) and 1.0 track channel (official meeting) and find ou t which one is more effective in pursuing the practical interest at certain stages and how to cooperate both ways in the end theoretically and empirically. From the comparative analysis of both countries’ papers presented at China - South Korea Security Forum study through 2002-2009, the study will try to find out wha t potential intention each country has and how it is reflected to the outside world in different manner. Then it will investigate how these intentions could be manifested in a 1.5 track meeting and how to convert these ideas to 1.0 track meeting of both the countries. The research will rely upon both primary and secondary data sources. In addition, other sources acquired from unofficial contacts will also be analyzed in thi s research. It probes journals such as Korea Defense Review; Diplomacy etc. Materials published in Chinese and Korean Languages will also be surveyed. The research also considers India’s academic debates and perspectives on the issue.
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- 27 - The outcome of the study would be, to analyze the factors which are playing a significant role in improving the relations between China and South Korea. Secondly, it evaluates how far CSKSF(China-South Korea Security Forum) has been playing a role in strengthening the cooperation between China and South Korea; thirdly, it also asses and predict the Security Dynamics of East Asian Region. So the next chapter will analyse the historical background of the China-South Korea security relations before and after 1992 normalization, particularly in the military aspect. In the Chapter Three, the concepts and models for 1.5 track channel meetings will be introduced and they will be compared with the roles of Government, NGO (Non- governmental Organization) and NPM (New Public Management). After reviewing general theories and practices about NGO and NPM, I delve into non-governmental activities between China and South Korea to describe that NGO activities would be more effective in pursuing the practical interest at certain stages between the both countries and how their activities are coordinated and co-operated with governments. In the Chapter Four, it will be introduced the detail of the hosting institutes of China-South Korea Security Forum; Chinese People’s Association for Friendly Contact (CPAFC) and Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs along with the evolution of CSKSF. CSKSF was planned by two hosting institutes mutually to keep in close contact with government level talks. So the statement from the retired or incumbent high ranking officers from both countries’ governments will be also quoted to find the relevance o f government’s policy making and civilian activities. In the Chapter Five, around sixty papers presented in six forums will be analysed and the improvement of the relations between China and South Korea will be traced in accordance to these exchanges. Finally it will be stated that the relevance between the improvement of China-South Korea relation and CSKSF itself.
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- 28 - CHAPTER 2 China-South Korea Relations before and after Normalisation Ⅰ . Relations between China and South Korea before the Normalisation The relation between Korean and Chinese people can be traced back to time immemorial due to geographical proximity, even before the establishment of modern nation-states in 1945 and 1949 respectively. The relationship between the two nations has not changed much from the repeated pattern of formation extending for long history. In modern era, Korea and China established relation with western countries; however, those relations were officially initiated after the western power came to the eastern colonies . Koreans and Chinese have much longer history of relationship in political and socia l exchanges. Therefore, a study of the contemporary relation between South Korea and China requires review of historical aspects for in-depth research. It is important to perceive that the Koreans and Chinese originated anthropologically as different groups. The relationship between two differen t communities can be established only when the peoples recognise each other as differen t entities. It is widely considered that Chinese founded an ancient kingdom in Korean Peninsula. However, considering that ‘Korea has its ancestors from an ancient kingdom which was founded by Chinese rulers’ it is impossible to reach to the conclusion tha t people in Korea and China established relationship from ancient period as ‘differen t political entities’. For that reason, Chapter 2 begins with the review of the history abou t the races of Korea and China. The framework of the contemporary international relation between Korea and China can now be understood from the anthropological background which has been passing on from ancient period. In ancient period, kingdoms in Korean Peninsula and China existed in the system of coordination. However, after Silla unified the three kingdoms of Korean Peninsula in AD 676 with the support from Tang ruler in China ,
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- 29 - Unified Silla began to show the tendency of dependence upon Tang Empire. After unified Silla, with a commitment to restore the territory of the Koguryeo Kingdom, Koryo made fairly aggressive policy as a national instrument against China. After the establishment o f the Koryo Kingdom, this region became to be known as Korea. Koryo was very much independent but was invaded frequently from the China. Korean people severely suffered from the invasion of China, Mongol and other Manchurian rulers. After Koryo, the relations between the Chosen Dynasty and China centred on the issues of tribute and king approval again. Chosen could save its expenses on self-defence by participating actively in the status quo of Chinese world order and gained access to products of Chinese civilisation i.e. books, military products, luxury goods etc. It also resulted in strengthening the legitimacy of the royal court and many other incidenta l benefits. The contemporary society of South Korea and North Korea are influenced by policies previously adopted by past kingdoms and empires. Their attitudes toward China are also not much different from their policies. 1. Chinese and Korean Races The common perception that the Korean race is derived from the Chinese is erroneous. Both the races are from different origins, though they have later mixed up and have similar traits. Human beings have evolved from the age of food gathering, hunting and fishing people to develop into farming communities or nomads. While the nomadic people moved in search of pastures for their cattle, the farming people settled down fo r cultivation. Typically, the nomads invaded the farming communities to make a dominan t ruling class. Though nomadic people continued to roam around and did not imbibe the settling culture and customs of farming communities, they got intermixed with them. The Korean race, which was originally a nomadic community, has intermingled with the Chinese race, basically a farming community. The Korean race is derived from the Mongoloid race. The first group of Korean race from the Southern Mongolia primarily got mixed with the Chinese and the second group from the Northern Mongolia
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- 30 - mixed up with the Chinese 13,000 years ago again. Korean and Chinese races were no t the same, but got mixed with each other resulting in the formation of same traits and cultural homogeneity from the early days. The birthplace of humanity is known to be in Africa. The traces by which the first human beings spread from Africa through the South West Asia to other continents are shown in the fossil trail. About 100,000 years ago, new races different from African races evolved in Asia and Europe and they are believed to have separated only abou t 40,000 years ago. Some of human beings evolved in Africa, moved to the Southern Asia and then to the northern regions of China. Their moving path and associations can be traced exactly by the genetic pattern of human beings’ skeletal remains (Duerinck: 2006) . They moved from Central Asia along the coastline of the Indian continent to the Southern region of Asia. Since then, the posterior was discovered to move to the northern part o f China, Siberian Baikal Lake and the America continent. 1) The origin of the Chinese race People of China are believed to have originated from Han zu (漢族) and people of the Korean peninsula from Han zu (韓族). Letters are same in Korean language and different in Chinese characters. The sound is the same in Chinese pronunciation but the ‘ sheng diao’ (Chinese tone) is different. While Han zu signifying Chinese people i s pronounced in the 4 th tone in ending of the letter, Han zu signifying Korean people is pronounced in the 2 nd tone in ending of the letter. Presently, the Korean races are named Chao xian zu (朝鮮族) instead of Han zu (韓族) as in the case of People's Republic of China. As civilization evolved, there were two races in China - one was xia zu (夏族) and the other hua zu (華族) which was also called yi zu (夷族, the origin of hua zu is from southern Mongolia). Xia zu took settled farming, while Yi zu used to lead a nomadic
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- 31 - life. Yi zu got mixed up with Xia zu and moved Far East to Manchuria, the Korean peninsula and Japan evolving into the main races in their respective areas. When Yi zu came down to the Korean peninsula, there were original inhabitant s of Neolothic era, who disappeared later. Currently, the dominant race of People's Republic of China is Xia zu while that of Korea and Japan is Yi zu. In the Chinese history books, it was mentioned that the Emperor (the ancestors of China) advancing to the Eas t concluded the Federation with the Emperor of hua zu (華族) born to huaxia zu (華夏族 ) which is the race of old Chinese kingdom. And it also explains that there was mixing and assimilation with another ethnic races resulting into Han zu (漢族) at Han dynasty. The Chinese developed early farming civilization along the bank of the Yellow river, the most advanced and developed region in Asia. Naturally it became a center o f the civilization of Asia as compared to other nomadic nations. It changed a lot on each era, but usually kept the territory of Empire Qin almost intact in history. The Qin Dynasty was the first imperial dynasty of China, lasting from 221 to 207 BC. The strength of the Qin state was greatly increased by the legalist reforms in the 4th century BC, during the Warring States Period. 2) The origin of Korean race Chinese is one of the branches of Sino-Tibetan family of languages. The Sino - Tibetan languages are a family of some 250 languages of East Asia, Southeast Asia and parts of South Asia including the Chinese, Tibetan, Burma and Bhutan languages. The term Sino-Tibetan languages were introduced in the beginning by Jean Przyluski (Edward 1925). Korean, on the other hand is the branch of Altaic language. Altaic is a language family that includes the Turkic, Mongolic, Tungusic, Manchurian, Japanese and Korean . These languages are spoken in a wide arc stretching from northeast Asia through Centra l
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- 32 - Asia to Anatolia and eastern Europe (Song: 2005) The group is named after the Altai Mountains, a mountain range in Central Asia. Chinese and Korean are same Mongoloid race but their languages are grouped in different families. Chinese do not speak Altaic languages like other Mongoloid races such as Korean, Japanese and Manchurian. They are using Sino-Tibetan language. Altaic and Sino-Tibetan languages are different in word order itself and winding rules. However old Chinese letters follow the word order and winding rules of Altaic language instead of Sino-Tibetan language. So, Chinese letters were rather invented by Altaic races - Hua zu (華族) or Yi zu (夷族) (from which the Korean race originated) not by Xia zu (夏族) (from which the Chinese race originated) in the beginning. It is said, Buryats (Bulargaty) race that lives now in the Lake Baikal shows the nearest original traits of Mongoloid. Anthropologists, who are studying scientific analysis of the genes, also argue that Lake Baikal seems to be the place of origin for Mongoloid race (Novoradovsky AG et. Al: 1993). Mongoloids lived mainly in the northern and the southern parts of the Lake. Northern Mongoloids stayed there for a significant period as it was covered with glacier or other natural obstacles. Historically, the territories around Lake Baikal belonged to Khalkha and the local people, Buryats were subject to Khalkha Tusheet Khan and Setsen Khan. When the Russians expanded into Transbaikalia (eastern Siberia) in 1609, the Cossacks found only a small core of tribal groups speaking a Mongol dialect called Buryat and paying tribute to the Khalkhas. However, they were powerful enough to compel the Ket and Samoyed peoples on the Kan and the Evenks on the lower Angara to pay tribute. The Southern Mongoloids crossed the Himalayan glaciers through narrow passes (Burma passage) which are the stretches made from Bengal seaports to the southern regions of China, Tibet, Thailand, Myanmar and Malaysia between 30,000 to 50,000 years ago. They formed Sino-Tibetan language family. Between 15,000 to 20,000 years ago, the North Mongolians also chose to move into Chinese mainland, Manchuria , Korean peninsula and Japan around 13,000 years ago with the advent of the Alluvial Age .
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- 33 - They have formed Ural Altaic language family. Some of North Mongoloid Neolithic people, which are called as Tongues race or Altaic race, have moved from Siberia through north eastern part of China, Manchuria to Korean Peninsula coastal areas. These people, who settled down farming the crops of the northern hemisphere such as foxtail , millet in the warm climate and fertile lands, supposedly form the origin of Korean race. During the Neolithic Age, people lived not only on farming, but also on hunting and food gathering like the Paleolithic Age people who came from the southern Mongolia. Those from the southern Mongolia had already settled in the Korean Peninsula which is evident in the Paleolithic artifacts that were discovered such as Clam stockings and Arrowhead used for hunting. 3) Mixing of the Chinese and the Korean race Anthropologists in China say that dominant Chinese race came to the southern China some 5,000 to 6,000 years ago. The multitude of Chinese people has been formed at that time. Shryangj ( 徐亮之 ) of Taiwan University says that 4,000 years ago before the Han ( 汉 族 ) came to the Central Plain of China ( 中原 ), the old Korean race East Yi zu ( 东 夷 ) had already managed to dominate the northern and southern part of China. He argues that the two races have contacted each other and have been mixed since Han zu came to China. The ancient Chinese culture and traditions were close to the Koreans rather than the present ones. The remaining ancient Chinese character follows the same word orde r and winding rules of Ural Altaic, which has been used by the Korean language instead o f the Chinese or Tibetan language. Sino-Tibetan languages follow the word order o f subject-verb-object like English, whereas in Ural Altaic, the word order is subject-object - verb. The ancient Korean and Ancient Chinese are of the same roots and, in fact, ancien t Chinese history is the ancient Korean history as well.
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- 34 - The human race has developed and been brought to make the unique genetic feature, personality, society, culture and civilization adapting to variations of the natural environment as a matter of survival in the nature. The Korean-Chinese-Japanese races were formed because of migrations of tribes from North Mongolia, South Mongolia and their inter-mingling resulting in the development of a unique culture in a geographical region although with some degree of differences among themselves. While studying the origin of Chinese and Korean races, it was found that they were mixed and without any significant differences and that they cannot be distinguished through blood strains. Therefore, the distinction is not so much racial, but primarily cultural and linguistic. It would be appropriate to term them as distinct cultural language communities. However, even in languages and cultures, China, Korea and Japan have used Hanjas and Kanji for a long time together and shared same cultural similarities such as Confucianism and Buddhism. Anthropological study between the two countries is important for both to define the desire of the people in the bordering territory and to define the bordering line between both countries. The population of Koreans in China include millions of descendants of Korean immigrants attaining citizenship of the People’s Republic of China, as well as smaller groups of South and North Korean expatriates, with a total of roughly 2.3 million people as of 2009 (MOFAT 2009), making it the largest ethnic Korean population living outside the Korean Peninsula. Recently, quite a number of them move to South Korea every year. If they start to make separation movement from Chinese government, the relations between China and Korea will be deteriorated. Understanding the facts abou t the separate racial identity between both countries was therefore very important in the Security Forum deliberation.
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- 35 - 2. Security Relations between China and Korea in Ancient times 1) Early ancient times International relations in ancient times were mainly military affairs. Many countries in and around China had invaded and influenced each other with military forces . Through the history of ancient times such as Old Chosen, which ‘Dangun’ 7 ; the Founder of Korea has established, several tribal states era, Three Kingdoms period, Unified Silla Kingdom and Koryo Dynasty, Korea and China occasionally resorted to war or kept the military alliance, while maintaining relationships. The first record of war between China and Korea took place during the Han Dynasty (BC 202 ~ AD 220) when its forces invaded Korea’s Old Chosen Kingdom (BC 2333 ~ BC 108) and installed a prefecture in Korea. Through this prefecture, China had tried to influence Korean culture. This invasion remains the oldest historical record of the security relationship between China and Korea. 2) Three Kingdoms Period With the advent of the Sui and Tang Dynasties in China, the period of Three Kingdoms; Koguryeo, Baekje, Silla begin in Korea. Lately, China has argued tha t Koguryeo (which Chinese termed as Koguro) is a Chinese kingdom. Ancient Koguryeo Kingdom was first founded in 37 B.C. in Han Dynasty and fell to the Silla-Tang alliance in 668 A.D. The city was sacked several times until the rise of the 19th ruler king Gwanggae the Great, who greatly expanded Koguro’s territory and made it a formidable power in the northeast Asia. China evaluates Koguryeo Kingdom as the following quotes . (Ra Sungho 2011: 19): 7 ‘Dangun’ is the founder of Old Chosen; the first Korean kingdom, around present-day Liaoning , Northeast China, and the Korean Peninsula. He is said to be the "grandson of heaven", and to ha ve founded the kingdom in 2333 BC.
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- 36 - As an influential power in Northeast China Koguro Kingdom once created glorious history. Large amount of its historic relics have been excavated from Jilin and Liaoning Province of China, most of which are discovered in Hengren and Ji'an, the early political, cultural and economic center of Koguro Kingdom. And all of the relics are of high historical and cultural value. At present, 190 ancient cities of the Kingdom have been excavated, 80 in Jilin, 90 in Liaoning and 20 in North Korea, among which the capital cities and tombs of the ancient Koguro Kingdom are quite valuable. During Three Kingdom’s period, Korea and China had engaged in fierce military campaigns and there are detailed records about these wars. Sui and Tang dynasties in China attacked Koguryeo in Korea several times. Whenever Chinese troops attacked across the border of Koguryeo, they were defeated. In the end, China supported Silla, one of the Three Kingdoms to defeat others and in turn unified Korean peninsula and occupied Manchuria which used to be the land of Koguryeo. The border was initially created which is the international boundary between China and Korea now. Sui’s invasion to Koguryeo Sui Dynasty unified China in AD 581 and expanded its territory towards the neighboring countries triggering conflicts with Koguryeo 8 , which held hands up with Baekje to the south and got along with the Turks against China. Sue in China was associated with Korea’s Shilla. Emperor Moon, who founded Sui in China, declared in 598 year that Sue would conquer Koguryeo and after five months preparations they attacked in July. At that time, Koguryeo was mainly located in Manchuria and the army of Sui gathered at Youngu; the northern strategic point and attacked Koguryeo through Imyugwan, the end spot of the Great Wall of China carrying various weapons and provisions (Ra Sungho 2011:23). 8 Historical disputes remain in the relation between China and South Korea at present and spectrum of discourse is various depend on countries and also respective scholars. North Korea is the stakeholder in this affair since the geographical scope of the conflict spreads the border of North Korea and China. See Lee (2004), Song (2007) and Seo (2008) for Korean perspective, see Chen (2012) and Sun et al. (2012) for Chinese perspective and see Kang (2003) for North Korean perspective. In the security forum, due to two reasons, historical issue was not actively discussed; the forum was organised for upgrading two countries relation regarding security matter, and the historical issue was too sensitive t o deal with.
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- 37 - In the battle fought on the borders of Liao, Koguryeo kingdom defeated the Su i kingdom as the latter had not prepared for the monsoons of July. Interestingly, the soldiers of Koguryeo took the advantage of flood in Liao during that season, which would make the region marshy. Sui’s navy also set off their journey to Dosangdong peninsula and crossed the Daedong River. It plotted an attack on the fort of Pyongyang and ignored a strongly approaching typhoon, which sank their ship even before they could reach the shore. Sui navy could not make the battle and suffered a great loss. I t could not get into the Yodong Palace either and on account of increasing damage , suffered a defeat. King Mun of Sui passed away and later in April, 611, his successor, Yang , made a plan to attack Koguryeo again. Sui’s army outnumbered 1,130,000 soldiers which were divided into 30 units. Out of this, 12 units were commanded by General Umunsul , another 12 units by Umunjung his brother and remaining 6 units by the King. Only one unit moved in one day as distance between the fleet marching was about 40 miles and hence order was released for all the teams to start only after 40 days. First of all, Koguryeo waged the attrition combat at the first front line of Liao and Yodong castle and planned the ambushing tactic in the second front of Ohgol and Ahnsi castle which were located at the east side of Yodong castle. At the last front, at the Yalu River and Pyongyang area Koguryeo waged ‘divide and conquer war’ and Sui army dispersed. For Sui’s naval fleet, Koguryo deployed the ambush at extrinsic castle and dispatched troops pretending to lose for Sui navy having them to move to private housing area. Entering there, Sui navy have filled the blind greed of individual’s desire and the esprit the corps of the military fell to annualize to nothing. Koguryeo military did no t miss this opportunity and raided the Sui navy putting the ambushed troops. Sui navy barely escaped annihilation in the river and fled, as their boat was moored. Because o f navy's defeat when Sui military power was depleted in Koguryeo, General Euljimundeok
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- 38 - sent the envoy to the King Yang of Sui Dynasty with the famous poem "a mysterious plan to pierce the sky, curious strategies and the mastery of geography, now that you have already made enough to have a major turn off and happily want to go back home . (東文選 1478) Tang’s Invasion to Koguryeo When Sui failed in the war against Koguryeo, the second cousin of the King Yang of Sui, Li Yuan killed the King and established Tang dynasty in the year 618. Eigh t years after establishing the dynasty, his son Lǐ Shìmín was crowned the new emperor a t the age of 29 years. Lǐ Shìmín attained the name Taizong 9 on coronation and fought against Koguryeo again in the year 645 with 150,000 soldiers. While crossing the Liao River after Taizong defeated the castle Gaemo of Koguryeo, military of the opponents counter-attacked to regain the territory with 40,000 troops of the castle Kugnae and Shin, which were enforced urgently. Initially, the battle seemed to succeed in getting out Tang troops, however, the horsemen of Tang military appeared and attacked the lateral of Koguryeo troops, who suffered serious casualties. (Ra Sungho 2011:35) Tang Taizong then attacked the castle Yodong. The army approached near the wall of the castle with gun carriage and fired stones into the castle and the city, besides mobilizing the impacting carriage to destroy its wall. Koguryeo army renovated the breached wall with wood fence which was prepared in advance and instantly built the wall to prevent the enemies’ entry into the castle. Over ten days into the onslaught by Tang military, the castle Yodong which had once defeated the millions of troops of Sui military, was not breached. However, over time, overwhelming Tang's forces advanced further resulting in around 10,000 soldiers and 40,000 civilians being captivated and a vast stockpile of provisions of Koguryeo seized. 9 Emperor Taizong of Tang (唐太宗January 23, 599 – July 10, 649), personal name Lǐ Shìmín (李世 民), was the second emperor of the Tang Dynasty of China, ruling from 626 to 649. As he encourage d his father, Li Yuan to rise against Sui Dynasty in 617 and subsequently defeated several of his mo st important rivals.
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- 39 - After the castle Yodong too fell, only the castle Anshi remained at the forefront of forming a defensive fortress. The Koguryeo army kept the lead to defend the castle along with 150,000 troops of Manchurian Malgal tribe. The only way to win over Tang's army was not to confront the grand troops, but demonstrate the time lag to cut off the supply line in the Tang’s rear area and capture the boom. Since Tang’s military started the attack, the Koguryeo governor of the castle Yangmanchun protracted a kind of psychological warfare mobilizing people beating drums and shouting insults against King Taizong and his army. King Taizong threatened to bury alive all the soldiers and civilians of Koguryeo in the castle once it was conquered. The castle governor Yangmanchun provoked the soldiers and people recollecting the precedent that King Taizong had once buried 3,300 Malgal solders alive and cheered up the morale of the soldiers and the people with the attitude of lifelong defense. As the fierce attacks of Tang’s military mounted, the defense of the Koguryeo army also became stronger. As fortress of Anshi was not shaken and casualties of his troops were increasing, King Taizong created a high earth artificial mountain near the castle to attack the Koguryeo troops looking down on them. Koguryeo military also built up a similar one in the castle. Over two months later, when the mountain of Tang was getting higher than that of Koguryeo, they started attacking the enemies. Then the mountain of Tang collapsed abruptly and misfortunes piled up for Tangs after Koguryeo army occupied the land in a sudden attack. With the Koguryeo’s occupation of the land, the troops morale touched the sky, and Tang troops routed back to China. In the year 647, two years after being forced to withdraw from Anshi castle , Tang invaded Koguryeo again and fluctuations in the winds of war once again swept . In defence against re-invasion, Koguryeo built a multi-line of castles in the way and successfully blocked Tang’s troops. Sui and Tang’s forces, though experienced through large campaigns, could not defeat Koguryo and hence they waited until the three Korea kingdoms; Koguryeo, Baekje and Silla conflicted among themselves. Later Tang aligned
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- 40 - with Silla, which had a strong support from the people to unify the Korean peninsula, and helped her attack Koguryeo in the decline of its power and occupied its territory. So , Korea lost most of the territory of Manchuria of that time and later fixed the presen t border between the North Korea and China. 3) China affiliates in Koryo Kingdom era The name Korea was derived from the Koryo Dynasty. Korea-China relations in Koryo Dynasty is the security relations between Koryo and China's five great and 10 small countries including Song, Yo, Kum, Won, Yang, Jin, Han, Chu, O, South Dang , Whal, Min, Cho, Chok, North Han. Koryo named itself as the successor to Koguryeo o f three kingdom periods and tried to restore the old Emperor and the old territory practicing the policy of northward military enlargement. In the spirit of commitment to restore the territory of Koguryeo to Chinese states and Manchuria kingdoms, they made fairly aggressive policy as a national instrument against bordering countries (Ra 2011:81) Through aggressive campaign, Koryo made its name well-known to the world and had a historical chance to announce the name of the state ‘Korea’ to the international community. Koryo recognized the importance to get the recognition from China for the newly acquired area as 'consideration of the Koryo territory' and from the beginning it had tried hard for it. Koryo argued that its territory is based on the history of the treaty between Korea and China on the basis of Chinese internal law. Koryo diplomat ‘Seo Hui’ 10 , who was involved in the border talk with Khitan 11 , one of Manchurian countries, in the year 993, is known to historians as a successfu l trouble shooter in border conflicts. He is even now referred by Koreans as a saying 10 Seo Hui (942–998) was a Korean politician and diplomat during the early days of the Goryeo Dynasty of Korea (918–1392). Seo is best remembered for his diplomatic skills that led 60,000 Khit an troops to withdraw from Goryeo without a battle. 11 The Khitan(契丹) were a nomadic Mongolic people, originally located at Mongolia and Manchuria (the northeastern region of modern day China) from the 4th century. They dominated a vast area in northern China by the 10th century under the Liao Dynasty, but have left few relics that have surviv ed until today.
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- 41 - ‘Tongue is greater than Armed forces’. At that time, Khitan had occupied some part o f Korean peninsula and there were frequent collisions between both the countries. Koryo and Khitan agreed to a territory agreement which instead of rupturing China’s Song , fixed that Khitan will pay tribute to Koryo on the condition that Koryo occupy the south of the Yalu River and Khitan occupy the northern part of Manchuria. The people o f Koryo have recognized clearly the concept of border with Yalu and Tumen River since then. Even now it is the general territorial line of Korea. Not until the end of Koryo Dynasty, there was sharp conflict within on the question of Manchuria. There were strong claims that while Koryo is the successor to the ancient Koguryeo kingdom, they should wage war against Manchuria while others thought that it was well managed by Seo Hui’s diplomatic talk with Manchurian countries and hence there will be no more wars. These two conflicts led to fierce powe r provocations in the Koryo cabinet resulting in the destruction of the Koryo kingdom and rise of a new kingdom ‘Chosen’. Yi Seongae, founder of the new kingdom, was from the section which argued to end the war. He finally persuaded his staffs not to wage wa r against Manchuria and went back to Koryo attacking the last King of Koryo ‘Woo’. This is the famous historic event of Korean history which follows the establishing of new kingdom ‘Chosen’ 3. Security Relationship in the modern era Chosen’s era of 500 years in Korean history is in agreement with China's Ming and Qing Dynasties. The security relation between Chosen and China centered at the issues of tribute, King Approval and kind of toadyism. The first two have been formed in the beginning of establishment of Chosen Dynasty for its interests in the diplomatic relationship that would be judged as a good international diplomacy for managing Manchurian countries. China also established the relationship of a tribute system with Chosen to be administered to foreign interests. Considering the geo-political situation of Chosen, which was indulged in
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- 42 - frequent crisis from the Manchurian countries, its main objective was preventing the intrusion from the north, which was secured by the way of tribute with Ming and Qing . Chosen could save the expenses for self-defense by participating actively in the status quo of Ming’s order as well as to gain access to products of Chinese civilization i.e. book , military product, luxury goods etc. It also resulted in strengthening the legitimacy of the royal court and many other incidental benefits. Chosen did not actively cope with the changes in East Asia, so that by the time the Ming was replaced by Qing dynasty, its position got worsened and resulted in a humiliating surrender to Qing. Chosen proclaimed the Confucianism and the tribute to Ming as two major founding ideology of the dynasty and has formed the relation with Ming on the basis of Confucian value of filial piety to Ming. While this Confucian piety dominated in Chosen, the East Asian international stage around Chosen turned into new order as Qing’s force and diplomatic intervention substantially expanded its reach more than the previous Ming’s order. It then became more powerful than Ming toward the bordering countries resulting in the strongest power in East Asia. In world history, the period from 17th to 19th century is the era of turbulence . The world’s first globalization has happened at this time. However, during this period , Chosen locked their doors and blocked communications with the outside world and continued loyalty to Ming Dynasty which had already vanished. Chosen kept dwelling in the imagination of old order and like a hermit and got isolated seriously from the tumultuous outside world. It tried to fill up the gap between new order of Qing and old tribute piety to Ming in this way living in isolation for almost 200 years from the international turbulent reality. As a result, while the internal order of the dynasty sustained and ruled the people for more than 200 years, on the external front Korea's national competitiveness weakened rapidly resulting in Japan's military domination in the end. Three Korean kingdoms - Koguryeo, Baekje, Silla - have competed with Chinese Kingdoms Sui and Tang for attaining equal power. But Silla unified three kingdoms with
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- 43 - the help of Chinese kingdom Tang. Since then Korea was dependent on China. In reaction to that, Koryo kingdom succeeded by Silla made its diplomacy to China very stubborn and united with Manchurian kingdoms to compete with China. Koryo’s too much stubbornness toward China made General Lee revolt against Koryo government . Lee’s dynasty Chosen governed Korea for 500 years peacefully with the support of China . (Han 2000) It is argued in this thesis that the situation in present Korean peninsula, divided into North and South Korea, is continuum of long historical tendency in Korea. North is very stubborn toward foreign countries in the reaction to Lee dynasty and South is very dependent on foreign countries in reaction to Koryo kingdom. This is whimsical remnan t of the Korean history. 4. Security Relations after the World War II On August 15, 1945 as World War II came to a close, Korea was liberated from the domination of the Japanese military. People of Korea were glad for regaining thei r sovereignty and being independent from Japan. However, because Korea did no t participate as a sovereign nation in the War, it once again was divided into two at the 38th parallel being occupied by the US on the south and the then Soviet Union on the north. China was relatively weak in comparison with the US and USSR in both military and political power especially because of the civil war between Kuomin Party and the Communist Party so that it could not object to residing of foreign military troops in Korean peninsula. Korea has tried to build an independent state quickly in the Korean peninsula burying the colonial past. On the other hand China, because of the historical and cultura l ties with Korea, was keen to establish a pro-China government in terms of nationa l security to prevent the influence of great powers, primarily the US or the Soviet Union and used it as a buffer around her. China, in the name of the recovery of Korea's independence and freedom, tried to establish the pro-Chinese government giving
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- 44 - international legitimacy to Korean exile government which had maintained a close relationship with the Chinese government during Japan’s dominating era. China’s plan was derived from consciousness to preserve the traditional friendly relations with Korean peninsula from a historical view of ‘lips and teeth’ relation (Park 2002: 33-34, Zhou 1984) and regain the past sense of superiority to control the peninsula. However, civil war began in China between the Kuomintang and the Communis t Party and it could not help compromising with the US and USSR. to win the internal war . Beijing expressed consistent support and assistance to Korea to stand independent and argued at the Cairo Conference for the need to solve Korea's post-war problems, in the process of criticizing a split ruling by the US and the USSR. China feared that the spli t ruling eventually would lead to division of the peninsula and when the conflict began to intensify in the Northeast region, it led to destabilizing peace in Asia and resulted in the crisis of the world. But China's military forces could not compete with those of the US and the Soviet Union, and especially due to the civil war, it could not respond actively towards the split ruling. While the Soviet communists ruled North Korea through Russian military majo r Kim Il-Sung in divided peninsula and an armed North Koreans linked to the Communis t Party which was fighting against Kuomintang government engaged in activities of civi l war in China, the Chinese Kuomintang government was clueless on ways to strengthen ties with the US. The intention of China was that even though it could not build pro - Chinese government in Korean peninsula, at least, it could help build pro-American anti - communist government in South Korea which could fight against the Soviet communism in East Asia in collaboration with Kuomintang and the US. Eventually their choice was Dr. Rhee Sung-Man who was in the US. Dr. Rhee was also associated with the Provisional Government of Korea in China and was the best person at that time among the seniors of pro-China and the U.S.A. 5. Chinese participation in Korean War
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- 45 - On June 25, 1950, North Korea declared war and occupied South Korea's capital Seoul in three days and most of the country in less than 2 months. But the invading troops met strong resistance of Pusan defense line in early August formed by Korea-US combined forces. (Roh 2000: 358) It was so worrisome for China which was very optimistic in the beginning about quick and sweeping victory by North Korea, because it had got involved with the US, changing the situation in Korean peninsula. On October 1, Park Heonyoung, the deputy Prime Minister of North Korea, visited Beijing requesting its support and Stalin requested Mao to send the troops through the Soviet ambassador in China. On October 3, China openly proclaimed the possibility of military intervention in Korean peninsula saying "It will never wait and see that the US military cross the 38 lines" (抗美援朝戰爭的戰術經驗總結 1956: 151) through Indian ambassador 12 in China. As the US military ignored China’s warnings and crossed over 38 th parallel line, which was the first border between South and North Korea since 15 October, 1945, China's leadership began a debate at the end to decide sending the troops to finally. Mao renamed the troops of northeastern fringe which was placed on the northern border of the Yalu River as Chinese People's Volunteers and appointed Peng Dehuai as the commander of the unit which was ordered to cross the Yalu River and it entered North Korea on October 15, 1950. On October 19 night, the Chinese People’s Volunteers; China's 12 divisions, shouting the slogan of ‘combatting the US and assisting Korea, defending our home and motherland’ crossed the Yalu River and participated in the Korean War (Huang Hua Memoirs 2008: 130). The first confrontation between the Chinese and the United Nations’ troops took place on October 26, 1950. Chinese army supported North Korean army especially on the mountainous region. They accomplished their mission mostly during night time and bad weather conditions. However, they were very weak in cold winter season because they did not carry any winter clothes and anti-frostbite medicines with them. The have attained their morale and combat capabilities through the long communist political training. They moved quickly and defend their command despite of all the casualties and poor logistics. 12 At that time there were no relations between Eastern and Western bloc. They could communicate only through the channel of India.
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- 46 - American phobia of Chinese soldiers shown in the beginning has been disappeared little by little with successive victories against American Army (Rajubaeb 2002: 223). Table #2: PRC five major campaigns during the Korean War Campaign Period Forces deployed Combat area The 1 st campaign 1950.10.26~11.5 The 13 th Corps 100,000 Unsan, Biho Mount. The 2 nd campaign 1950.11.25~12.8 The 9 th Corps 120,000 Janjinho, Kunuri The 3 rd campaign 1950.12.31~1951.1.8 30 divisions 300,000 Wonju combat The 4 th campaign 1951.2.11~2.15 12 divisions 120,000 Hoiseong, Jipyungri The 5 th campaign(1) 1951.4.22~4.29 4 Corps 300,000 Sachangri The 5 th campaign(2) 1951.5.16~5.21 The 3 rd , 9 th and 19 th Corps Hyunri, Bunker Chinese troops came into Korean peninsula in twilight and kept them concealed with daybreak, the UN forces 13 did not notice them at all. It was the only way for poorly armed Chinese military to surprise the UN forces with an overwhelming force at night. The raid by the Chinese troops was a serious blow to the U.S. forces, which were approaching the north of Ulsan - Onjeong-ri - Huicheon line. The UN troops suffered a blow to the situation and withdrew from Cheongcheon river lines and watched what would happen next. However, because of poor logistics and supplies, Chinese advance was limited (ROK Army 2009: 108). 13 The United Nations command was consisted of 16 countries including the United States, within two months was pushed back to the Pusan perimeter, a small area in the south of the country, before t he North Koreans were stopped. A rapid UN counter-offensive then drove the North Koreans past t he 38th Parallel and almost to the Yalu River.
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- 47 - Map #1: Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) Five Major Campaigns during the Korean War Source: 中國軍事科學院軍事歷史部 (1991), See Table #2 for the scale of forces deployed and respective periods
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- 48 - After the Chinese army stayed in ambush quietly at Deokcheon - Gaecheon - Gunwoori line for the time being, it again surprised the UN and U.S. forces causing a lot of damage. This is called the second campaign by Chinese military history. Eventually, the UN military pulled out all the troops from the front and all the way back to Pyongyang without any decent fight against the Chinese withdrawing to the 38 parallel- line. UN forces had to retreat again and again and camped in the northern part of Seoul. On December 31, 1950, Chinese army attacked the last defense line of Seoul capital of South Korea with overwhelming force. This is called the third campaign by Chinese military history. Chinese and North Korean military were brought back to Seoul again with this third campaign after being expelled by Incheon landing operation by UN Commander General MacArthur on 15 September, 1950. As MacArthur failed in the first campaign against North Korean army and continued to fail against the Chinese in the northern part of the Korean peninsula; he designed some grand operation for annihilation of Chinese massive army in retaliating at the right place in exchange for their failures until then. He thought about the Tannenberg campaign 14 in the First World War with which the German army annihilated the Soviet Union troops or Operation Barbarossa 15 in World War II. Then he thought China would never disparage Korean peninsula again. So MacArthur asked to send the 30 million reinforced American troops as well as Taiwan's 50,000 troops to the Korean peninsula. MacArthur also planned scattering radiation ashes from the reactor on the borders of China and the Korean Peninsula and the mountains which are easy to penetrate for Chinese personnel. In addition, he made a plan to destroy the major facilities in Manchuria by bombing the railways and roads of China and Russia and to have Taiwan troops landing 14 The Battle of Tannenberg was an engagement between the Russian Empire and the German Empire in the first days of World War I. It was fought by the Russian First and Second Armies against t he German Eighth Army between 23 August and 30 August 1914. The battle resulted in the almo st complete destruction of the Russian Second Army. 15 Operation Barbarossa was Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union during World War II that began on 22 June 1941. Over 4.5 million troops invaded the USSR along a 2,900 km (1,800 mi) front wi th 600,000 motor vehicles and 750,000 horses. The operation resulted in 95 percent of all Germ an casualties from 1941 to 1944.
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- 49 - amphibious operation into some coastal areas of mainland China. It was actually like tota l war with China at that time. However, until the requested reinforced troops arrived , certain period of waiting time was needed. He needed wide plains to draw and annihilate the massive Chinese forces. The place which he considered to battle with Chinese army was the plain fields between ‘Han’ and ‘Kum’ River. The region was a major population centre which China could have agreed worthwhile and the area of possible vulnerabilities , where China supporting unit had to cross the river to supply logistics to Chinese troops in the Korean peninsula. But in Washington, they did not agree with General MacArthur. The Pentagon , Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and even the Army came out in denial about US troop’s reinforcement in Korea and the escalation of war against China. They argued tha t the US has no reason to continue to fight killing their young people unworthily in othe r country and wasting high taxes in the war where it has been internationally humiliated . President Truman decided to end this war as soon as possible ahead of the elections which would be affected by the flow of a bad situation. MacArthur requested permission to use nuclear weapons and to attack the Chinese mainland. Truman refused, and the Chinese advance continued. The president's popularity nose-dived, especially after he fired MacArthur. Americans had grown tired o f war. But soon, the tide began to turn. By March 1951, the Americans had pushed the Chinese and the North Koreans back to areas above the 38th parallel. Peace talks began in July. When a weary Harry Truman left office in January 1953, peace had still not been achieved (Harry S. Truman Library 2012). The atmosphere of American leadership was to finish the war in Asia at the appropriate level and having a truce with China before concentrating its forces in Europe for the national interest. Truman instructed the US State Department to appeal to the Chinese side to initiate armistice negotiations and to remove General MacArthur from his post as commander-in-chief of the US army in Korea (Huang 2008: 132). People’s Republic of China also had no reason to oppose the truce in circumstances in which it had to start the inevitable war and already got more than 200,000 killed.
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- 50 - Ⅱ . China – South Korea Security Relations since Normalization 1. New Relations since 1992 normalization On August 24, 1992, Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China signed a joint statement on the establishment of diplomatic relations 16 and opening of a new era to stop the conflict of more than 40 years of Cold War. Establishment of diplomatic relations has brought benefits for Korea and China and effected a very significant change in East Asia also. 17 Korea expected that political changes in China would have important implications for regional security in relationship with North Korea, and it would adjust the position of the positive effects to North Korea’s policy. China has secured a position to exert influence virtually, both north and south of the peninsula, and was accepted as the most significant in the formation of the new order in the Northeast Asia. Since the beginning of diplomatic initiatives, the relations between both countries developed in good pace. Both settled hostile relations in political and military interaction posing North Korea between both countries, promoted the economic exchanges actively and have been working together for peace in Northeast Asia. South Korea improved the environment for economic investment dramatically and helped stabilize the situation in the peninsula. After normalization of relations with South Korea, China's foreign policy was to strengthen political cooperation with North Korea and enhance economic cooperation with South Korea. This was because of the rapid collapse of North Korea as a socialist country and its fallout on the safety of Communist country China politically. The chaos inside North Korea automatically could have led to the chaos inside China and if North Korea collapsed, South Korea would take initiatives for the unification of 1 million ethnic 16 See MOFAT (2009: 338) for “the Joint Statement for the Establishment of Diplomatic Relation between Republic of Korea and People's Republic of China” signed in 1992. 17 Kwon Byung Hyun participated in the negotiation with China as the chief delegate at the time. After retirement, he revealed the behind story of negotiation. Some of China's conservative high officials strongly opposed the relation with South Korea by arguing that North Korea was ‘blood alliance’ for China. (Hankook Ilbo 2007) China also had to comfort North Korea, however, Kim Il Sung was not able to adapt the reality so that the relation between China and North Korea was jeopardised. (Huh 2012)
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- 51 - Koreans in Manchuria. The strengthened solidarity among Koreans could have led to divisive campaign against the Chinese government. China's two largest national interests are economic development and prevention of the separatist movement, and both of them will be affected in case of collapse of North Korea. In 1992, when diplomatic relations between South Korea and China began , there were only 4.3 million visitors who crossed the border of each other but it increased to five million in 2007, eight million in 2008 and accounted for ten million in 2010; thu s registering a whopping 200 times growth in less than a decade. The number of foreign students in China is 57,000 in 2012; the number one multitude foreign country and citizens in China ranked 700,000 right after the Beijing Olympics 2008. As can be seen from Korean Drama 'Dae Jang Geum', there is a boom of Korean culture so-called ‘Hanliu (韩流)’ 18 in China. There were 729 direct-flights as of 2010 (26 percent of total flights in Inchon airport) between Korea’s six cities and China’s 30 cities every week (Ministry of Land and Maritime, 2010). 2. China – South Korea Security Relations since 1992 Normalization China-South Korea diplomatic relations had formed the favourable conditions to develop good relations between the east and west block. The new political and diplomatic development was a crucial instrument to regain the traditional relationship between Korea and China and played a great role to convert the past system of an alliance and league to normalize relationship among the related countries. However, China has limits in actively promoting the relationships with South Korea due to the long political and military relations with North Korea in the security area 19 and South Korea also could not go entirely with China because of the existing 18 ‘Dae Jang Geum’ is the Korean soap opera ‘Jewel in the Palace’ which most of Chinese have watched. Chinese president Hu Jintao was also a great fan of Korean drama ‘Dae Jang Geum’. To p actress Lee Young-ae has created a “Daejangggum Syndrome” in China by starring as a Changgum, a palace maid who becomes a royal physician in the Chosen Kingdom. Hu Jintao had a dinner wi th actress Lee once when he visited Korea (Park 2005). 19 China-North Korea alliance is present progressive. Even after Cold War, China-North Korea alliance has been considered an axis confronting against Korea-US alliance. Their relationship has
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- 52 - confrontations with Pyongyang. Since diplomatic relations, there were roadblocks in promoting security relationships between China because of North Korean affairs, and South Korea because of USA’s affairs (Kim 2005, 117). China Association fo r International Friendly Contact (CAIFC) and Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs (KRIMA), which are semi-governmental and semi-private institutes, had approached fo r founding some think-tank of security talk to solve these problems. On August 25, 2008, just a day after Beijing Olympic Games, Chinese president Hu Jintao visited his South Korean counterpart Lee and held a two-day summit . The two leaders stressed on implementation of a 'strategic cooperative partnership’ 20 agreed before. In a joint statement, they focused on several military and security provisions which were mainly discussed at the China-South Korea Security Forum. The followings are the arrangements of summit talks and defense ministers’ talks since 1992. 21 1) Summit talk diary Summit talk between China and South Korea meant many things at that time. Because of China’s close relationship with North Korea, summit talk between China and South Korea has been delayed even after the end of Cold War. However, both countries were strongly motivated by economic factor. The talk was started out to bridge the gap between the two countries, so that both can benefit politically and economically. Sometimes they could not help meeting outside their capitals due to China’s concern over its relationship with North Korea. been a main factor consisting the dynamics of the Korean Peninsula situation (Choi 2009). 20 The announcement of a “strategic partnership” by Lee followed in a line of South Korean presidents who have claimed a closer relationship with China. From a “friendship and cooperati ve relationship” when relations were normalized in 1992 to a “full-scale cooperative partnership” und er Kim Dae Jung, to a “comprehensive cooperative partnership” during the administration of Roh Mo o- hyun. 21 See Appendix # 4 for China ROK Joint Statement (2008. 05. 28)
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- 53 - Table #3 Summit talk diary Period Place Summits September 28, 1992 Beijing President Roh Taewoo met President Yang Sangkun November 19, 1993 Seattle of U.S. President Kim Youngsam met President Jiang Zemin March 28, 1994 Beijing President Kim Youngsam met President Jiang Zemin November 14, 1994 Jakarta Indonesia President Kim Youngsam met President Jiang Zemin November 13, 1995 Seoul President Kim Youngsam met President Jiang Zemin November 24, 1996 Manila Philippines President Kim Youngsam met President Jiang Zemin November 24, 1997 Vancouver Canada President Kim Youngsam met President Jiang Zemin November 12, 1998 Beijing President Kim Daejung met President Jiang Zemin September 6, 2000 New York U.S. President Kim Daejung met President Jiang Zemin October 18, 2001 Beijing President Kim Daejung met President Jiang Zemin October 27, 2002 Los Cabos Mexico President Kim Daejung met President Jiang Zemin July 7, 2003 Beijing President Roh Muhyun met President Hu Jintao October 19, 2003 Thailand President Roh Muhyun met President Hu Jintao November 19, 2004 Chile President Roh Muhyun met President Hu Jintao
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- 54 - May 8, 2005 Moscow, Russia President Roh Muhyun met President Hu Jintao November 16, 2005 Seoul President Roh Muhyun met President Hu Jintao November 17, 2006 Hanoi Vietnam President Roh Muhyun met President Hu Jintao September 7, 2007 Sydney Australia President Roh Muhyun met President Hu Jintao from China November 20, 2007 Singapore President Roh Muhyun met President Hu Jintao May 17, 2008 Beijing President Lee Myungbak met President Hu Jintao August 9, 2008 Beijing President Lee Myungbak met President Hu Jintao August 25, 2008 Seoul President Lee Myungbak met President Hu Jintao April 30, 2010 Shanghai, China President Lee Myungbak met President Hu Jintao from China November 11, 2010 Seoul President Lee Myungbak met President Hu Jintao In 1999, the first East Asia Summit Talk was held in Manila with the participation of China, Japan, South Korea and other countries. They thought the affairs between China and South Korea could be managed at East Asia Summit Talk at that moment. When North Korea conducted its second nuclear test on June 1, 2009, President Lee was angry and asked China strongly to take the clear stance on it. But, unlike the North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, China did not condemn North Korea. Between both countries, there was the feeling that the summit talk was of no use and was not productive. Neither China nor South Korea was enthusiastic to propose the summit talk at that time. So, summit talk was not held in 2009.
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- 55 - Table #4 North Korea Nuclear / Missile tests and Responses from China & South Korea Dates Nuclear / Missile Tests Remarks 29, May, 1993 Rodong-1 Missile test fire / 1,300Km / East Sea •China: Sino-US relation improved and Sino-NK aggravated •South Korea: Asking for Patriot Missile, Apache helicopter and aircraft carrier to US 31, Aug, 1998 Taepodong-1 Missile test fire / 2,000Km / passed through main land Japan •China: Japan cooperated with China, NK despised •South Korea: Missile test disguising satellite test 2, Oct, 2005 Declaration for possession of nuclear weapon and Boycott for six-party talks •China: Opposed to UN regulation and Pressure, Wang Jiarui, head of CPC International Liaison Department, visited to North Korea •South Korea: NK Nuclear will be serious for Korean Peninsula, Foreign minister Ban Gimoon cooperated with Dick Cheney. 5, July, 2006 Taepodong-2 Missile test fire / Failed Mid- air explosion in 7 minutes / 6,000Km •China: Wu Dawei, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs visited to North Korea •South Korea: President Roh talked to Hu Jintao on the line, cut the relation and tough stance to North Korea 9, Oct, 2006 1 st Nuclear test / 1 Kt •China: Consent with UN resolution 1718, Tang Jiaxuan, State Councilor from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, visited North Korea •South Korea: President Roh visited China and cooperated with Hu Jintao 5, Apr, 2009 Taepodong-2 Missile test fire / Localization of launching site including KSLV-1 (Korea Space Launch Vehicle) •China: NK satellite launching is not against to UN resolution •South Korea: Taepodong-2 launching is Missile test disguising satellite launching 25, May, 2009 2 nd Nuclear test / 2~4 Kt •China: Recovering the traditional relation with NK, sharp increase in trade between both countries •South Korea: Declaration of total participation for Proliferation Security Initiative 13, Apr, 2012 Taepodong-3 Missile test fire / 10,000 Km / Failed an abrupt mid- air explosion with technical problems •China: Persuaded the relavant countries to keep the cool position •South Korea: It is against UN resolution 1874, broke the peace of East Asia Sources: Cho, Min and Jinha Kim (2009) and other sources from the Bibliography
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- 56 - 2) Diary of Defence Ministers’ talks between China and South Korea Since diplomatic relations started between the two countries in 1992, the summi t talk has occurred frequently between the two countries’ leaders, but Defence Ministers ’ talk has happened yearly or once in two years in Beijing, except the years between 2001 and 2005 22 . It can be compared with that of defence ministers’ meeting between South Korea and the US or the Joint Chiefs of staffs’ meeting, held more frequently than summit talks. Table #5 Defence Minister Talks Diary Period Place Ministers / Remarks 1999 Aug Beijing Cho Seongtae 23 met Chi Haotian - Invite Chi Haotian to South Korea - Mutual exchanges of military high officials, naval ships, military student officers for Defence, Army, Navy, Air force college 2000 Jan Seoul Cho Seongtae met Chi Haotian - Understanding strategic common interest - Promoting the relation between both Koreas with Chinese support - Presentation of Chinese defense policy 2001 Dec Beijing Kim Dongshin met Chi Haotian - Invite Jiang Zemin former General Secretary to 2002 World Cup - Anti-terrorism cooperation for 2002 World Cup 22 There was no Defence Ministers’ talk between 2001 and 2005 as China’s Defence Minister cannot make decision of his own to visit South Korea without getting the permission of the party leaders. China also feels that South Korea being a small and weaker power country should visit China rather than the other way round. 23 Cho Sungtae, the 35th Defence Minister of South Korea (1999-2001), did a role of midwife for China-South Korea Security Forum.
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- 57 - - Mutual exchanges of Air Force cargos - Invite Chinese naval commanders to South Korea 2005 Mar Beijing Yoon Gwangwoong met Cao Gangchuan - Promote desk officers talks between two countries - Construct Air Force and Navy cooperation in the Yellow Sea - Cooperation in civilian fishing between two countries - North Korean defecting POW returning to South Korea 2006 Apr Seoul Yoon Gwangwoong met Cao Gangchuan - Observation for Taiwan military operation - Cooperation in North Korea nuclear issue - Evaluate military cooperation between two countries - Hot line between both Navies and Air Forces - Presentation about South Korean Defence Reform 2020 2007 Apr Beijing Kim Jangsoo met Cao Gangchuan - Mutual presentation about each countries’ defence policy - Cooperation in North Korean defectors' problem - Discussion on Chinese illegal civilian fishing in Yellow Sea - Cooperation in rescue operation exercise 2009 May Beijing Lee Sanghee met Liang Guanglie - Preparedness for North Korea’s 2nd Nuclear test - Understanding on PSI and MD - Signing MOU for Defence interchanging cooperation - Establishing defense strategic conference - Facilitation the retired military officers - Cooperation for Somalia naval operation 2011 Jul Beijing Kim Gwanjin met Liang Guanglie
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- 58 - - Cooperation in International Peace Keeping operation - Understanding the Taiwan affairs - Discussion on Cheon'an corvette attack - Explain Korea-US combined Military exercise in the Yellow Sea - Cooperation in North Korean defectors. Source: Lee (2012) and several sources as in the Bibliography section 3) Upgrade to a level of security diplomacy The security relationship between China and South Korea is still relatively on slow pace when compared with growth in other areas like those of South Korea - U.S and South Korea - Japan. Since 2000, military leaders’ mutual visits and the regular meetings have been increased and various security exchanges, including China-South Korea Security Forum implemented. However, substantial security cooperation between the two countries has not yet been getting on the track. It is because of the China-North Korea traditional security relations and US-South Korea alliance. In addition, there are potential security conflicts between both the countries about the North Korean factor and existing exchanges between South Korea and Taiwan. More aggressive exchanges such as military exercise and personnel exchanges in high-level could make the practical security cooperation possible. The day before President Hu Jintao’s visit to Korea after the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China’s official news agency Xinhua reported ‘Hu's visit will finalize the direction of the future relationship between China and Korea’ (Xinhua News 2008). As the summit visit happened shortly after the most important event in China, Hu's visit was highly anticipated in South Korea. President Hu mentioned about the unification o f Korean peninsula, the international human rights, refugees, etc. which have been a taboo so far to talk in a summit and it improved bilateral relations between both countries significantly in security area.
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- 59 - In the summit talk, the direct hot line between Navy and Air Force of both countries has been discussed. Further, Hu offered the strengthening of military exchanges between Korea and China; ranging from opening hot line, mutual observance at military training; joint rescue training and broadly both agreed to promote military cooperation . Military Hotline 24 was discussed for the first time; when Cao Gangchuan Chinese Defense Minister met Yoon Kwang-ung, Korean Defense Minister for the 4 th Defense minister talk in 2006. Minister Yoon has suggested hotline between both Sea Fleet Headquarters in the Yellow Sea and both air defense units in Air Force for joint search and rescue training at the humanitarian base in the Yellow Sea. Although there were technical problems, they discussed installing hotline between Naval Operations Control Room of Korea Navy Command Headquarters and the Operation Center of the North Sea Fleet Headquarters Qingdao as well as Central Pyeongtaek Air Defense Center in Korea and Air Defense Command Center of the Air Force Beijing or the Air Defense Center of Jinan corps in the Shandong Province. Professor Ou Yang Wei from Strategic Research Department of Chinese National Defense University, at the 5th China-South Korea Security forum held on April 21, 2007 said, "I was informed that Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan is very eager to open hotline between South Korea and China’s high placed department, but it has technical difficulties so that it should be studied to solve the current roadblock.” The hotline connection has been discussed for about last six years between both the militaries. Negotiators between Korea and China have to access specific psychological issues directly which seems to be getting better now. The solution is reached when a positive attitude to scrutinize the problem between the two countries exists; especially for technical part of the project. 24 Hotline means a point-to-point communication linked to the preselected party directed without any additional action to avoid misunderstanding during any moments of crisis and emergency. It is normally installed as a confidence measure in the beginning of improvement between hostile countries. South Korea and China have hotline system in both Navies, Air Forces and Defence Ministries. China and US set up a military hotline between Beijing and Washington in 2007 (Miles 2007). China has proposed setting up a maritime emergency hotline with Japan, 2010 (Hannon 2010).
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- 60 - 4) Exploring ways to expand security exchanges President Hu Jintao suggested increasing the military personnel exchanges between the two countries for the effectiveness of the strategic partnership at the 2008 summit talk. The reason why military exchanges were poor was that there were strong straps of the military alliance between the US and South Korea as well as a strong military relation between China and North Korea. Both the summits concluded that the senior and working-level personnel exchanges, military educational exchanges and mutual observation of military exercises as well as mutual observation of military facilities could develop security cooperation in a great way. Including the agenda of strengthening military contacts between South Korea and China; summit meetings explains the urgency of need for the promotion of the security relationship between both the states. Peace in the Korean peninsula and in the Northeast Asia will be the main benefits from the progress of South Korea-China relations and it could help to solve the nuclear issue of North Korea as well as improve the relations between South and North Korea. In the long-term, both the countries could try strategic cooperation, including the expansion of military exchanges, for maintenance of peace in East Asia. Both the countries should study and research about the alliances between the US and South Korea , the relations between China and North Korea as well as North Korea’s nuclear issue fo r peace in the Northeast Asia and the resilience according to the dynamics of security situation in a wide range. There were specific projects at the 2008 summit on maritime delimitation between South Korea and China. The summits acknowledged that the maritime delimitation could be an important factor in the future. Both the countries expressed the
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- 61 - will to solve border disputes from the Northeast Project 25 in Manchuria, and tried to provide alternatives for solving the maritime boundary problem. 5) Security Dialogue at civil level Expanding of military exchange between China and South Korea inevitably needs to be understood by China's ally North Korea and South Korea’s ally the United States. Under these circumstances, the military exchanges between China and South Korea do not irritate North Korea and the United States. There can be a higher level of understanding among these countries which would help promote security talks between South Korea and China. If these assumptions may not materialize, expanding military exchanges between China and South Korea will probably end up in habitual slogans. To enable expansion of military exchanges between South Korea and China to establish a strategic relationship, it needs to be understood that U.S.A. must work in parallel with South Korea, North Korea and China and each of the military alliance system in South Korea. China's military system and personnel exchange policies are not like the South Korean. Military personnel exchange in South Korean is too frequent and it is less binding on incumbent decision makers if military personnel are retired. So it is difficult for new military personnel to keep policy consistent; while the Chinese troopers even i f they are retired, can affect military decision making and thus maintain continuity in the policy. It was difficult to maintain the same pace in conversations on the issues o f security cooperation because they have differences on personnel system. 25 The Northeast Project (东北工程), which is short for the Northeast Borderland History and the Chain of Events Research Project (东北边疆历史与现状系列研究工程), was a 20-million-yuan (2 .4 million US dollars) project launched by the Chinese government in 2002 and finished in 2006, conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Science. This project applies the ideology of Zhonghua Minzu(中和民族) to ancient ethnic groups, states and history of the region of Manchuria and northern Korea. Under the Zhonghua Minzu ideology, it is assumed that there was a greater Chinese state in the ancient past. Accordingly, any pre-modern people or states that occupied any part of what is now the People's Republic of China are defined as having been part of that greater Chinese state.
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- 62 - 3. The prospect of military relations between China and South Korea While China's role in the international community is continuously growing, in reality, it is useful for South Korea to develop the 'strategic cooperative partnership’ with China and maintain the alliance with the U.S.A. China will also gain friendly forces through the development of strategic partnership and economic cooperation with South Korea to face the political social and diplomatic challenges. On developing the military relationship between South Korea and China, the former cannot help but be influenced by the US. Policies of China and the United States on the East Asia, appear to be revolving in the viscosity of contradictory interests on major issues. Though there are different strategic interests, both the countries could share the common strategic interests in the course of solving the problems of the region. Since Barack Obama became the president of America, China has strengthened its role as a responsible state in the international community. During the Obama administration, both the countries shall be deemed to take joint steps without a majo r conflict for world peace and development. Either contradictory in the interests or both share the common interests; South Korea objectifies those matters related to its interes t and expresses its opinions actively to both the countries searching for an intermediary role. So the development of military relations between South Korea and China with the South Korea-U.S.A. military alliance will be able to exert a multiplier effect. On the one hand both countries could extend bilateral military cooperation in the area of non-traditional security threats or comprehensive security area, and on the other hand they could try to work together for the emergence of the security apparatus in East Asia just like OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). These are the approaches for maintaining the alliance with U.S.A. as well as develop security relationships with China. While both countries expand mutual strategic consensus through solving North Korea Nuclear issue, the division of the Korean peninsula issue
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- 63 - and the issues of the East Asia Peace, they could explore their roles and functions fo r building the peace and the new order in the East Asia. South Korea does not want to distance its relations with the United States while developing relations with China. China might not also want strengthening relations between the two countries if it resulted in aggravating the relations with North Korea . The development of security relations between China and South Korea would be helpfu l to the security interests of the United States, at the same time China could understand tha t South Korea–U.S.A. alliance is helpful for keeping peace in the peninsula and help stabilize Northeast Asia. In this chapter, the historical background was described and the background o f military relations between both countries has been analysed specifically. It was discovered that Korean and Chinese races originated from different anthropologica l groups. The relations between two countries could have been started when the two peoples recognised each other as different entities. In ancient period, kingdoms in Korean Peninsula and Chinese Empire existed in the system of coordination. But because Silla was helped by Tang in China for unification of Korean peninsula, Korea began to show the tendency of dependence upon China. Since then the modern-nation state of South Korea and China established the similar pattern of foreign relations. China-South Korea Security Forum has sought to re-establish this almost 5,000 years of relationship between both countries and believes that, through the common culture of the long history they can overcome the 50 years severance easily.
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- 64 - CHAPTER 3 The Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula: The Role of NGOs and NPM Ⅰ . Government Failures and Alternatives After becoming independent from Japan, the Korean Peninsula separated into two Koreas and two governments in South and North Korea, supported by US and Sovie t Union respectively. There were two different leaders for South and North Korea: Lee Sung Man for South and Kim Il Sung for North. There would have been less possibility of conflicts between two Koreas ended up Korean War, if there were no leaders like them who were held up by super powers. Korean people’s desire to construct one nation collapsed owing to their leaders backed up by external powers. More than one million people were killed during Korean War, which is the clear example of ‘governmen t failure’. Antagonism between two Koreas has continued since it was devastated by offensive and aggressive leaders. Still, China utilises North Korea issue, and US uses South Korea for hegemony competition. Even though South Korea and China have necessitated establishing the new stage of relationship, historical background and conservative atmosphere in two countries distressed the new relationship between South Korea and China. China had to have taken care of the relationship between North Korea, and South Korea was required to do the same toward US’s opinion (Kim 2006). The China-South Korea Security Forum can be considered to be an emerging alternative to compensate the limitations of government activities for protecting the security interests of the people. In economic aspects, the limits of government actions are relatively defined as 'government failure'. But the government’s perceived failure in the security interests of the people, which is actually more important than the economic ones ,
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- 65 - are not defined. People’s security interest means their right to get a peaceful and secure life, to protect life and property which are collectively called sovereignty and territoria l integrity. Government’s security failures are shown in various patterns in each country. Barry Buzan argued in an interview that international relations theory is a theory by and for the West, and ‘rests on an assumption that Western history is world history ’ He criticises western perspective of IR theory: “The supposedly ‘timeless and universal’ perspective of IR is based on a Euro - centric understanding of the past, the present and future, and it does not take into account nearly enough the cultural syncretic processes by which the west itself was and still is made. While the idea of international society is not for someone in particular, it tends to be made by the great powers of the day. In a sense, ‘international society’ can be understood mainly as the international projection or extrapolation of what the great powers agree to construct as the international order in which they want to operate—like most else in IR, it is a great power centered theory, but it has wider potentialities. As Hedley Bull constructs it, the concept evolves around international order, and everybody has an interest in a certain kind of order as opposed to chaos or anarchy. You might or might not like any particular order, and at any given point you can find people who are opposed to or supportive of the reigning order. Right now, we live in a liberal order, so it suits people and societies of that disposition while it is hostile to people and countries who are not of that disposition—which is also one reason why we see this regionalising tendency. Yet within this normatively ‘agnostic’ analysis, one can argue that it seems to be the first order that has constructed values such as ‘all humans are equal’, an assumption we have only operated with for the last 60 years. It’s a very big principle that delegitimises racism, slavery, genocide, and empire. So there have been some transformations under this order which seem not only to reflect the interests of the great powers, but also of people.” (Schouten 2009) Ken Booth also defines the differential concept of the security between the state and the society: “During the Cold War Western security specialists were particularly deferential to the definitions and agendas of governments. Politicians, diplomats and military establishments have their own identities and interests which are not always shared by those for whom they supposedly speak. This is particularly the case where `state' and ` society' do not coincide. This is why the growth of civil society is so important fo r security, cooperation and development, whether regionally or globally (YCISS Occasional Paper No. 26 October 1994).”
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- 66 - In the Korean peninsula, influenced by superpower neighbours, the government’s security failure has taken on structural aspects. How to escape from the big powers' interests and guarantee people's security interests? How the country can have committed political or military leaders representing interests of the people and security of the nation rather than their own selfish interests or their party’s? These questions are basic to government’s activities in security area and if not the foundation of the premise in question. Even if the government makes a good strategy and shows fantastic policy activities, there might be a distortion as experienced in the killing of a million people in the Korean War. In order to understand this dynamics of the above questions it is imperative to look/ study some of the major theories in the field of Public Administration. Thomas Woodrow Wilson 26 , the master of government affairs, pointed out the management of government organizations saying "The most important principle of government officials is serving not for their own leaders and organizations, but for the community and the states” (Wilson, 1887). According to him the most desirable way for disciplining of the government organizations and management is centered on the efficiency through the introduction of private sector management practices. In other words, Wilson's claim is that the government based on hierarchic system, efficiency and scientific approach will provide a good public service. His study with a focus on efficiency and rationality is the important trend throughout the 20th century in government affairs (Shafritz & Hyde, 2011). 27 The efficiency-centric adventure of government affairs during the last century has been very helpful to improve the organization of the government, however, it has 26 Thomas Woodrow Wilson (1856~1924) was the 28th President of the United States, from 1913 to 1921. As a leader of the Progressive Movement, he served as President of Princeton University fro m 1902 to 1910. Because he has reformed so many government affairs such as Federal Reserve Ac t, Federal Trade Commission Act, Clayton Antitrust Act, the Federal Farm Loan Act, income ta x, Keating–Owen Act and the Adamson Act, he is called the master of government affairs. 27 They have analyzed Woodrow Wilson and today's government activities in their book ‘Classics of Public Administration (Jay M. Shafritz, Albert C. Hyde, Wadsworth Pub Co: 2011) which w as originally aiming to introduce students to the principles of Public Administration.
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- 67 - created a hierarchical organizational structure to degenerate the government becoming an administrative authority and utilitarian power (a power tool) to the people; the rea l targeting customer for the adventure of efficiency (Morgan 1997). Government based on the power of authority and axiomatic might provide efficient administrative services bu t cannot take care of the substantial interests of people. Greenleaf (1991) criticises large service organisations such as the inhumanity of the government about the characteristics of asylum-hub and explained government failure in its quotes: Caring for persons, the more able and the less able serving each other, is the rock upon which a good society is built. Whereas, until recently caring was largely person to person, now most of it is mediated through institutions - often large, complex, powerful, impersonal, is not always competent and sometimes corrupt. If a better society is to be built, one that is more just and more loving, one that provides greater creative opportunity for its people, then the most open course is to raise both the capacity to serve and the very performance as servant of existing major institutions by new regenerative forces operating within them. 28 The only way to solve the problems to increase capacity and performance is to help each other as servants. Greenleaf is finding the clues of an alternative possibility for the government failure and he noted that it is something in common with the democratic values of society and government. He argues, in his study, that organizations, which are responsible to the community, should be organized to contribute to the citizens and the members of the organization continue to develop into servant leaders. According to him, the organization's leadership basically should possess the ability to be named the qualities of servant leadership. 29 Another important research in the area of alternative for the government’s failure is the theory ‘The New Public Service’ presented by Denhardt & Denhardt (2000). They have focused on the participation of citizens arguing that the administration of government agencies and government officials should ensure the people to ensure the 28 For more details see http://www.greenleaf.org/whatissl/ 29 Servant leadership is a philosophy and practice of leadership, coined and defined by Robert K. Greenleaf (1904–1990) and supported by many other leadership and management writers. Servan t- leaders achieve results for their organizations by giving priority attention to the needs of the ir colleagues and those they serve. Servant-leaders are often seen as humble stewards of the ir organization's resources: human, financial and physical.
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- 68 - participation on implementing the policies in the process. They argue that people should grab the oars and paddle the key of the vessel called government rather than governmen t officials. Government employees are just playing an auxiliary role for the people paddling the vessel of government. The theory argues that not government officials, bu t people should be central to create and manage their own government as well as participate in implementing the policy in the process. Concurrently, the alternatives for government failure have turned into two approaches. One is the way to transform the government itself and the other is citizens ’ direct participation in the policy decision making directly. The former approach, which is the attempt of transforming government itself, was so-called NPM (New Public Management), NPS (New Public Service) and the latter approach, in which people participate directly for the national interest and the benefit of the people, has emerged in the form of NGO (Non-Governmental Organization) and NPO (Non-Profit Organization) . 1). New Public Management and New Public Service Since the late 1970s, one of the alternatives for the government failures is the theory of new public management (New Public Management). (Ferlie 1996) 30 Ferlie has categorized the form of the new public management into four types. The first one is efficiency model, the second is reduction model for the size of organization (downsizing) and decentralization, the third one; the pursuit of excellence (in search of excellence) model and finally the service-oriented (public service orientation) model. Efficiency model is the first type appeared in the new public management through which private scheme was introduced to public sector. Second model seeks reducing the size and number of unnecessary hierarchical organization to prevent waste of government budget and to increase flexibility and diversity. The third type is the 30 Ferlie identifies six features of the new public management. Those are privatization; introduction of market mechanisms into the public sector; a separation between core, or policy, activities an d peripheral, or service delivery, activities; the outsourcing of service delivery activities; enhanc ed management, including the use of performance management; and labor market flexibility.
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- 69 - pursuit of excellence affected by Peters & Waterman who attached the theory of human relations to the government organization. Excellence-seeking model emphasized organizational culture, institutional change and renewal of the government. (Peters & Waterman 1982) Finally, service-oriented model mainly focuses on the quality o f government services, citizenship and social learning. In particular, citizens’ participation and responsibility are being emphasized. In New Public Management the public sector does not provide the goal of the community, rather than granting a consensus among interested parties to set the vision . (Lee Myengsuk 2001) The roles and responsibilities are set accordingly and strategic challenges are proven for the achievement of shared objectives. What is important is tha t after setting the vision, enforcement is achieved by all the stakeholders and not just the officials. For effective participation of people, citizens' civic consciousness and a sense o f responsibility must be accompanied. (Kim Taeroyng 2000) Therefore, the role of politica l leaders and bureaucrats is required to educate and retrain citizens for enhancing the civic consciousness and responsibility of community. The role of government is only supportive to strengthen civic participation and community spirit. (Kim Hungryul 1998) The theory of the New Public Service is the evolution of New Public Management, which is a more developed concept with involvement of citizen participation. (Bae Youngsu 2000) New Public Service criticized that New Public Management reduced citizens passive and negative in the process of highlighting customer satisfaction. New public service theory claims that citizen is not a governmen t customer, but the host of government and government officials are in a position to serve the citizen; the principle of government. Government officials should build a relationship of mutual trust and cooperation with the citizens rather than respond to the needs o f citizens as customers. New Public Service theory argues that government officials serve citizen as the manager of public funds, the upholder of public organization, the creator of citizenship and democratic discourse, the catalyzer of building community and the leader of fron t
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- 70 - official works (Terry 1995; Denhardt & Gray 1998; Vinzant & Crothers 1998). Denhard t & Denhardt (2000) claims that the principles of the New Public Service are better suited to the basis of public administration than the principles of New Public Management . Denhardt (1993) is referring the reader as follows: “The concept of leadership is no longer related to controlling concept, but the associated result of effective collaboration . Leadership is not a privilege of top people, but the influence to participate at differen t times to different people, each other, in the organization.” 31 New Public Service is based on the theory of so-called servant leadership. Laub has defined the theory of the servant leadership as follows: On understanding and doing the leadership, Servant Leadership leads the members in the right direction beyond self- interest. (Laub 1999) It develops members, enhances values, builds community, establishes confidence, provides authority, divides power, erects the public good of each individual and serves to the entire members throughout the organization. The principles of servant leadership provide a highly effective leadership model to the government which pursues the New Public Service. In South Korea, unlike China and North Korea, NPM and NPS have been typically practiced in government sector and the society for a long time. The professors from Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University have played a major role for that accomplishment. They participate as the chairman of consulting committee for the President in the beginning and later they participate as the Secretary General for the President and the ministers. Their theories of NPM and NPS have great influence on the real Korean politics. During the Presidency of Roh Moo-hyun 32 who has named his administration 31 Denhardt is best known for his work in public administration theory and organizational behavior, especially leadership and organizational change. In ‘The New Public Service: Serving, not Steering’ he developed a new model of governance that stresses the need to engage citizens in governance of their communities. 32 Roh Moo-hyun was the 16th President of South Korea (2003–2008). The rate of increase in defence budget remained in a single digit, however, there was 11.4% increase
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- 71 - the ‘Participatory Government’, NPM and NPS was consummated in its achievements . As his policy for eradicating corruption inside the government had included many administrative reforms, he had to face high oppositions from the prosecutors. To resolve the opposition he chose to draw the people’s participation and suggested a TV forum . The prosecutors insisted that President Roh appoint the major positions of the prosecutor’s office without consulting the personnel committee. Roh’s reply was that , “The current members of the personnel committee themselves represents the old prosecution which has to be changed, if we do not change now, it would sustain the old prosecution.” Roh set the tone of his administration with a number of adventurous policy related to NPM and NPS. 2) Non-Governmental Organization and Non-Profit Organization The activities appeared to solve the government failure as the substantial alternatives are Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) or Non-Profit Organization (NPO). The NGO is the civilian activities organized by citizens without getting interference from the government. Sometimes NGOs receive funds from the government or international organizations such as the UN, but they attempt to preserve the property of the characteristics as private organizations by excluding government officials from the membership. The number of international non-governmental organizations reaches an estimated four million. If you counted national NGOs to work internally, the number will far surpass ten times. There are many civic organizations in South Korea such as Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice, Environment and Human Rights Movement, Sarang Bang, Anti-Corruption National Solidarity and South Korea Women's Associations United. Further if we include non-profit corporations, foundations and institutes like Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs, hosting China-South Korea Security Forum, the number of NGOs or NPOs would be almost 20,000. In India, an estimated 1 million to 2 million NGOs activities have been reported . in the tenure of Roh, 2010 (MND 2010). Nevertheless, in the tenure of the President Ro h, the relation between South Korea and China went smoothly.
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- 72 - China has the Association of International NGO Promotion, which encourages NGO activities in the country and there are many other NGOs under the umbrella of ministries such as China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC) hosting China - South Korea Security Forum with Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs. Various groups began to be organized in the mid-19th century such as Anti - Slave Movement, Women's Rights Movement, Disarmament, etc. However, the term NGO began to be used in 1945 with the founding of the United Nations Organisation (UNO) for differentiating non-state organizations from the states’. There arose many problems from all over the world which one country alone cannot solve due to globalization of the 20th century. Activities of treaties such as free trade agreements and international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been limited to the economic sector, but there is a need to emerge new types of organizations which can resolve various social problems and safety issues caused by globalization. In order to meet the needs of the times, activities of NGOs have been focused on human rights, development issues, security issues and emergency relief on the details. In Korea, numerous NGOs were established since 1980 as a result of the democratization movement. They were categorized into various areas of activities such a s environment, political social, economic justice, education, women, religion, science , security, media, arts and culture, human rights, youth, health and residents' autonomy . Nationwide big organizations are YMCA, YWCA, Heungsadan, CCEJ, Federation fo r Environmental Movement, Women's Associations United, Green Korea United, Citizens ' Coalition for Media Reform etc. The central-centered middle size organizations include Parent Education Trust, Human Solidarity, Citizens’ Education Trust and Citizens ' Alliance for Making City to Walk. Locally, an estimated 10,000 grassroots NGO are being developed. NGOs in South Korea have attained their goals taking advantage of a variety o f ways and means in several areas where the government cannot do much. Civic groups have been developed and applied in institutional and non-institutional and professiona l and popular means based on the experience of over 10 years. Sometimes they use the
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- 73 - mass media to inform citizens of their claims for review, including a statement to the nation so that their activities are developed and known to the people. The most typica l type of activities of them used to be a direct action such as collective meetings and demonstrations, but in recent years they developed an entirely new format such as cybe r protest using the internet and mono demonstrations. It is a remarkable point to use the internet for the activities of NGOs more actively. The internet became increasingly the essential domain for the activities of the civil movement. NGOs have tried to propose the alternatives based on their specialized knowledge gained through debates and hearings about the issues raised and they have been increasing their power through legal means such as litigation or prosecution by the utilization of NGO specialists. Ⅱ . Distortion and failure of security services Trials to protect life from wild animals and extreme climatic conditions made unique residential conditions for human beings from which the concept of family community evolved. The family community was created to meet the instinctive desire on the basis of kinship and the extending family community formed the clan society . Although the clan society organizations were formed around kinship, the society was sharing the profit between members and thereby organizations were bound through the medium of benefit. There were parameters of interest beyond the blood and the clan society created political power, which must manage the kind of profit. The clan elder or elected head of the clan was a highly respected figure among the members and they voluntarily submitted themselves to the authority. But it did no t have the power to control unlike the state, and members were able to escape from the power. Even though they resisted the authority, the benefits were not misappropriated . Lack of resources or preparing accumulation for lack of resources created inevitable competitions and clashes among the clans and when they should fight among themselves , the members engaged in armed combat. This is a point of departure for the military organization. Of course, the military of the clan society was a voluntarily organization ,
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- 74 - which could be distinguished from the nature of a professional military organization such as the national armed forces these days. Competitions and conflicts among the clans formed a tribal society to have greater power through the process of dissolution and union. Tribal society was formed on the basis of the region rather than the kinship. Such societies competed among themselves and, at times, went to war with troops and dominated members of othe r societies, leading to emergence of the era of tribal state. While tribal state strengthened the military, enslaved the members of conquered tribes and enhanced the dominance o f country, our human societies created the system of nation. In fact, birth of a nation was generated as the ability to manage military organization. Does the state use the military power properly? Doesn’t the government use the army for the benefit of any individual or some groups? Isn’t the military corrupted politically in the name of security interest of the people? Does the state manage the military organization properly for the security interests of the people? Reflection on these questions explains the government’s failure in the security area. Likewise, in the area o f economy, in the security area also there emerged NGO, NPO or the new public management and new public service concept to complement government failure. NGO is very important in controversial areas of civil society such as security. Participation o f private sector in security area is growing because of civil development of technology and the effectiveness of policy making in the security. 1. The characteristics of security service The normal market where the price for the goods are determined by supply and demand can be established when those who do not pay for the goods must not consume . Otherwise individuals will select the 'free-ride' and refuse to pay. However, one canno t rule out a man who doesn’t pay for his spending authority security commodities. This is a phenomenon which exists in certain economic areas such as roads commodity , environment commodity and security commodity etc. It is called the principle of non -
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- 75 - excludability and the men who do not pay for the expense of the security cannot be excluded from the consumption of the benefit. Security commodity is also non-rivalry goods. Here non-rivalry means tha t another person's consumption of goods does not interfere with other's consumption. The marginal cost (MC) of non-rivalry goods when added to another person to use them wil l be counted 0. In economics, the most efficient price should be equal to the marginal cost , so (P=MC), if the marginal cost of the goods is 0, then the price is 0 which means you can get them free. Because the security commodity as non-rivalry goods can also be shared by many people at the same time, it is always available for every person so called ‘joint-use for goods’. The security commodity or service has some different features from othe r goods or services in the market as mentioned; which is also functioning as a factor to cause the government failure. Security service is difficult to measure in amount and inadequate to define the lot of it, so that there is no way to evaluate it in quantity and quality. For this reason, it is to be measured in a way of the value of inputs used in production, for example, the number of troops, the number of weapons, systems of forces and the degree of high quality; instead of results and effectiveness of security services. Security services like monopoly commodity cannot go to the market o f competition because its exclusive jurisdiction is fed by a single authority by law . Continued exclusiveness and the absence of competitive environment make it difficult to assess the quality of security service. In each country, as the security realm is secret, its quality and quantity are usually not well known to the people, and even if known, it wil l be uncertain and ambiguous. This environmental situation makes the powerful politica l officials to adopt inefficient methods of production and incentive to pursue their own interest, instead of the interest of the people and in the end the government failure necessarily occurs.
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- 76 - The features summarized to cause the failures of government security services are as follows. First, the definition of services, i.e., measuring the quantity and quality of output is difficult to judge. Therefore, the input is often substituted by the commitment of the output. Second, security services are generally produced by a public authority and therefore have legal monopoly in many cases. Because of no competition, inefficiency is likely to occur in the supply. Third, the quality of security services is not well known. In other words, the causal relationship between policy objectives to achieve government’s goods and services and the means is not clear.Fourth, there is the lack of mechanisms to evaluate its achievements in security services; therefore, there is no reliable mechanism to terminate the conclusion. 2. The reason for the failure of security service Let us look at factors which cause failure of security services more specifically. The government also has limited information to judge the security affairs. It is often inadequate for officials to identify various security threats and all the signs and make judgments appropriately. Decision-making processes of security services need political agreement through the Congress, which can also cause failures. As Congress has a group of diverse backgrounds and interests, it is often difficult to decide the rational decision purely on the basis of interest of people. Further as representatives, who are elected by vote of their constituents, would be willing to listen to their feedback and because representatives, who are involved with interest groups, would be willing to listen thei r political interests and on the process of compromise national security, policies can diver t in the wrong direction. Imperfect control of military organization, such as its excessive enlargemen t and inefficiencies or wrong attitude of officials’ passion for promotions and assignments , would lead to failure of security services. When the government is not predicting the response of the people, while it is practicing the policy, failure occurs often . Confidentiality is necessary for national security so when the government tries to increase or decrease security service while maintaining a secret, people do not have enough
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- 77 - information to criticize constructively. People’s inappropriate appreciation on the security policy of the government's determination becomes bigger and the distrust between government and people get severe leading to distortions of security interest for the people . When politicians participate in the decision-making process of security policy, they consider their political position more importantly rather than the interests of society as a whole. They say they are working for the society but actual impact on their behavio r is always their collective interests or their political beliefs. In some cases, apparen t unreasonable security policies are created by conspiracy among political leaders. Security policy is produced in relation with its allies, neighboring countries and super powers. I f political leaders are colluding with Super Powers in this process, then a serious security inefficiency and distortion would follow. Government’s failure in security area such as inefficiency and distortion can be mitigated to some extent through the establishment of democratic political systems, but i t is very difficult to get complete resolution. Because of the expertise and confidentiality o f its own security issues, it is difficult to form a correct opinion among ordinary citizens and control politicians' behavior. Because the men who execute security policy are high military professionals and government officials, including political leaders, their attitude determine the success or failure of services. Even though the policy itself is very reasonably produced when senior commanders or officials take uncooperative attitude o r try to exploit them, inefficiency or adverse effects may occur. Sometimes, when their role as professional soldiers which they need to perform will be different from their persona l interests and they pursue their own interests rather than practice their role, the failure o f security services aggravates. Ⅲ . Security Failure of the Government in Korea After the World War II, since the security decision in the Korean Peninsula was determined by the interests of great Powers around, rather than the security interests of it s
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- 78 - own people, security policy and services were inevitably distorted. The security failure in Korea is characteristic of a combination of internal and external factors. The researche r came to India and had read several papers related to the peninsula written by loca l scholars. The efforts confirmed that there took place some distortion in security concep t and systems, in other words security administration has been executed regardless of the interests of the people in the region. Since the World War II, India has opposed the power blocs and chose a non - aligned line so that it was the only country capable of academic activities free from the influence of eastern and western blocs. The Korean War was the most attention - concentrated war after the World War and hence there were a lot of papers in India abou t what led to the War, its course and the post-War peninsula. As we have a saying in Korea 'Help from outsider reads better than the player of Changgi' 33 , it is true that an outsider without interests in the Peninsula can find out the facts better and read the historical context better. To the researcher, the objectivity of the external party was much more useful than expected. 1. The essence of security failure in Korean peninsula Since the unification of Germany and USSR President Michael Gorbachev’s declaration of the dissolution of the Communist Party in 1991, the Cold War which divided the East of communism and West of capitalism into blocs and confronted each other, ended. All the countries around the world competitively entered into a new order quickly. Ironically, the Korean peninsula which had suffered the maximum damage from the old world order only rejected the new order and decided to adhere to the old order structurally. Why there is no change in the political landscape of the peninsula since Panmunjom truce talk in 1953 and even after Gorbachev’s declaration in 1991? What are the reasons for the persisting unrest and antagonism between North and South Korea and the hostilities that would harm the security interests of the people? This is a classic case 33 Changgi (or Jangki or Tjyang Keui) is the Korean Chess, a variant of chess played in Korea. The Korean Chess can be played with a Chinese Chess Set, pieces and board are similar, but with rules a re different.
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- 79 - of government failure for people’s security interests. If the reasons of security instability in the peninsula were the Cold Wa r ideological conflict - countries like Germany and Eastern Europe – then the antagonism between the two Koreas should have ended definitely since then. But it was not the case in Korean peninsula. This is due to the government’s failure in security services and the distortion of security in the region. The biggest factor is remaining partisan struggles derived by the Super Powers and political factions. Once formed, the members of each party would do violent struggles for survival of their lines or organizations. Presently, the subjects of this struggle are forming similar political dominance comparatively both in the South and North Korea. Their goal is not maintenance of peace in the peninsula o r people's security interests, but maintaining power of their political factions. Factional political power struggle, which is in reality unrelated to security interests of the people, will continue in the future as it did in Korea just after its liberation from the Japanese domination unless people wake up. When people’s security - consciousness enlightens up, this issue will be resolved. The divided system of the peninsula is still being affected by external structural environment since Cold War . Another important factor, which is also affecting current security landscape and its sustainability, is fighting the hegemony of the internal political power and struggles o f political leaders. Korean people should analyze the government failure and distortion in security area caused by Super Powers and factional struggles. They should clarify the rea l security interests to resolve the division and peace affairs in the peninsula. 2. The reality of People’s security interest (Kim Gu’s case) On August 15, 1945, when Korea was liberated from Japan, it was divided into two independent countries. It had been one country for 1000 years and has had one language, one culture and one religion. While Korean people did not want their country divided, it was bifurcated by the United States and the Soviet Union as well as politica l leaders puppetted by them. If there was no outside influence after the liberation, it was
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- 80 - clear for the people to make one Republic. As the realist says, Korea was divided according to the interests of major Powers only to break into a war just five years later , killing a million of innocent people. Every country has the right to choose their own social system according to thei r own will and the right to maintain their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity . No country has the right to carry out aggression, subversion, control or interference against another country. Korea was against the imperialist and colonialist theory of big powers being superior to small nation (small countries being dependent on big powers) . Korea was against the hegemonic power politics of the big bullying the small and the strong bullying the weak. The affairs of any country should be governed by its own people (Huang 2008: 255). The political struggles affected by international power politics in the peninsula were very severe to make the tragic situation inside Korea. There was Kim Il Sung in North Korea puppetted by the Soviet Union, there was Rhee Syngman in South Korea embraced by the United States and there was also a political leader Kim Gu (Do 2007 ; Lee et al. 2009) 34 , who opposed the division till the end. Kim Gu was strongly opposed to such provisions as trusteeship and division. But despite his desperate effort, Korea was divided and then he accepted the trusteeship. Why Kim Gu was strongly objected to the terms of the trusteeship in the beginning and why thereafter he accepted it? What is his rationale? The reason for his change in attitude, according to the situation explains what were the real security interests and the nature of security situation in the peninsula. Kim Gu considered the trusteeship or division matter as one of the means. It was of utmost importance for him that people can live in peaceful environment. He could 34 Kim Gu (1876~1949), the leader of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, was a Korean politician, educator, leader of Korean independence movement against the Japanese occupation of Korea. He had struggled for the independent reunification of Korea since its national division. Kim Gu was assassinated in June 26, 1949. The assassination of Kim Gu has been a continuing controversy for long time. After the assassinator’s confession (Hankyoreh 1991; Hankyoreh 1992; Donga Ilbo 1992), it was revealed through declassified US documents that the assassinator was a member of US intelligence agency in 2001, causing a big controversy in Korean society surrounding the wirepuller of the assassination. (Yonhap 2001)
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- 81 - take a flexible attitude depending on the circumstances under such firm values withou t losing the concept of objectives for peoples’ interest. What he cherished the most is neither the political system nor the unification of the North and South Korea but the ideas of loving people and that there should not be any more bloodshed. We can notice wha t true patriotism is, who is truly representative of the interests of national security and who realized the real meaning of peoples’ interests through his change of attitude on the different stages. What he pursued was the pure patriotism, the real loving or the people o f Korea and the value of the emphasis on security interests of the people not based on partisan political interests. Kim Gu opposed the trusteeship of the Powers in the beginning and afterwards changed his mind on deteriorating conflicts among political factions in North and South Korea. People criticized him for changing his attitude, but it is needed to look at closely what his intention for change in position was. He has recognized security failure in the peninsula; the failure in peace and the security benefit of the people. He pondered over which are better for the security interests of the people. He met Kim I l Sung in North Korea and Rhee Sung Man in South to try founding one state in the Korean peninsula. And he judged if division is inevitable, trusteeship could be well - represented better for security interests of the people. He differentiated the goal from the means finely. What is the goal and what is the means for the goal? The goal is definitely people’s interest. Ideology such as communism or capitalism and political systems are just means, which can be changed fo r the goal. Because of partisans such as Kim Il Sung and Rhee Sung Man, the goal was los t by means at the Korean War and peoples’ real security interest was lost with a million killed to protect their ideologies and political systems. It was a serious security failure and distortion created by bad governments. The liberation what Kim Gu has shown us in the process is now very thought-provoking. His flexibility was his consistency for the people’s security interests and the benefit of the people in the peninsula.
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- 82 - 3 . Overcome for Government Failure in Korean Security There had been fierce competition between both the Koreas over decen t authority and political representativeness (Kim 1990; Han 2011; Jeon 2011). During king’s rule, the Crown had all the decent authority and representativeness. Decen t authority and political representativeness should have been created by people as in othe r counties while being shifted to a republic after the Japanese colonial era. But politica l power was transferred by external forces in the peninsula and decent authority and political representativeness were very weak. As a result, there had been continuous competition between both Koreas and confusion among the people. There was no justification from people for the formation of political powe r when installing government in both Koreas. Therefore, both Koreas have argued and collided frequently with each other because of the competition for decent authority and representativeness for the people throughout the Cold War era, including the Korean Wa r and the post-Cold War era. When founding each government, North Korea did not get the permit from the United Nations and in South Korea, first president Rhee Sung Man directed officials of the Japanese colonial period again for the new bureaucracy o f independent government (Kim 1991; Park 2006, Kim 2009). That President Rhee recruited people, who have served under the Japanese dictatorship, means no decen t authority for him inherited from the patriots of the Provisional Government who have fought against Japanese military during the colonial era. How can we accredit the decent authority and national representativeness? Can we do that by general elections in both Koreas? It had emerged as an alternative just afte r the liberation, but it was not real. Can we judge it by the support and recognition of the UN and countries around the world? Is it the superiority of the economic or military sector? Is it the welfare and freedom of the people? The reality of the decent authority and national representativeness in the present and future of the peninsula ought to be the security interests of the people and peace in the region. People who want a more peacefu l state of separation rather than the unification of the conflict have been increasing. People
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- 83 - don’t care the political systems or unification, but peace in the peninsula. This thought is a good starting point for the people to recognize what the real security interests should be . China officially argues that it supports the peaceful unification in Korean Peninsula, however, it does not say the unification should be initiated by one side, here which realistically means South Korea. There are two reasons here; first, mainly China’s traditional foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula is ‘ 脣亡齒寒 ’ which literally means ‘without lips, teeth getting chilly’ and implies that Korean Peninsula, especially North Korea’s security is critical to China’s eastern border security. Secondly, Korean minority people in three eastern provinces – Jilin, Heilongjiang and Liaoning provinces – will be shaken and they would require more independence from China (Kim 2005; Jeong 2011). 35 The idea that Korea can be unified if whichever side takes the initiative on the process or even by way of forces are being seen as a strange thing by many foreign scholars. Is it right that the side which would take leadership towards unification would try to destroy the other entity? In the beginning, many never accepted the fact that Korea can be divided into two separate countries. Recently, the concept of ‘One Nation and Two States’ began to be embraced by Koreans naturally. Important thing is not the political system nor the division or unification, but people’s security interest and the peace in the peninsula. North Korea has insisted on unification by its ideology and political system and South Korea by its value and political system. The result of such claims would be conflict which would eventually harm the security interests of the people. The stronger the argument, the stronger proof of harming the security interests of the people is. Even if it is one nation, there could be two countries which also could exploit a win-win effect. 35 However, Chinese Australian scholar You Ji (2011) argued that realistic and strategic option is feasible in Korean Peninsula regards to the unification issue. Given the enormous imbalance of power between the two Koreas and the DPRK’s fragility, unification can only be imagined on Seoul’s terms. If this process is peaceful, it will mostly likely happen through a South Korean absorption of the North according to the German model.
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- 84 - Because it should not have been admitted, there broke out the Korean War. It was a serious government failure in the security realm. If the U.S.A. and the then Soviet Union did not create the governments in both Koreas, there would have never been those miserable casualties in the Korean peninsula. Which is the real security interest of the people? You will be able to sift through the real security interests of the people when devoid of political systems or ideology and partisan interests. Away from black or white and zero-sum game, you could create the objective security strategy for the real security interests in the Korean peninsula. CSKSF (China-South Korea Security Forum) was born through the process o f overcoming this government failure in the realm of security interest. If the curren t governments are obsessed with the past and the order of the Cold War to make rigid policy decisions, the violations of people’s security interests would be getting more serious. Not only political instability in both Koreas but also a new type of instability which violates the security interests of the people will be increasing. If the governments had the structural and fundamental limits to ensure the security interests of the people , then NGOs will have to do something to complement the limits. In this chapter, government’s failures in security area were analysed and the alternatives for that failures were suggested. New Public Management and New Public Service in public administration were introduced and the role of Non-Governmenta l Organization and Non-Profit Organization in security area were examined for those alternatives. The researcher clarified the reasons for the failure of government in security service and specified the security failure in the case of South Korea. The essence of the causes for the security failure in Korean peninsula was power struggles between the Super Powers’ (US and USSR) and internal factional political competitions which are in reality unrelated to security interests of the people. The outcome of government’s failure in security area was shown in the genocides of innocent human beings in Korean War. Around a million were killed o f little worth in Korean peninsula. At the same time, old traditional values and morals have
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- 85 - been collapsed. Many people are of the view that Korean War was inevitable. They fail to connect the casualties of the War to the misdeed of the governments. But it was apparen t that the failure of the government has caused the Korean War and made massacre in Korean peninsula. There is still the possibility of war in Korean peninsula. The governments must not be led to repeat the same stupidity . On this circumstance, China - South Korea Security Forum has started and has promoted to ease the tensions between China and South Korea.
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- 86 - CHAPTER 4 Evolution of China-South Korea Security Forum (CSKSF) Ⅰ. Emergence of China-South Korea Security Forum China-South Korea security forum began to play some crucial roles in overcoming intractable security issues in an informal channel rather than the officia l channel. There were still unpleasant feelings persisting amongst both countries since the Korean War and they were not in a mood to talk thoroughly about security issues o r military issues (Oh 1992; Bang 2004). Ideological difference soon ensued in the wake o f lack of exchange between both countries almost for 50 years. There was always a caution sign among each other during the forum. Chinese side talked frequently about the principle of Qiutongcunyi (求同存异, seek common ground while reserving differences ) and South Korean side understood Chinese diplomatic remarks considering the relations with North Korea. Qiutongcunyi explains that China’s stand for maintaining the diversity of the world and is in favour of promoting democracy in international relations and diversifying development models. Countries having different civilizations and social systems and taking different roads to development should respect one another and draw upon one another's strong points through competition and comparison and should develop side by side by seeking common ground while reserving differences. This is the only way to overcome the differences between the countries (Liu 2006; Yu 2011). In the past, official relations between China and South Korea had worsened and both countries had developed deep antagonism due to the Korean War. While China maintained a very close relationship with North Korea, South Korea had diplomatic relations with Taiwan. With Cold War coming to an end, the informal trade between Korea and China began, but the trade relations between the two shrank because thei r
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- 87 - business interests could not to be protected. While South Korea wanted to build a new relationship with China for solving the current North Korean problem and of unified Korea, China needed a new relationship with South Korea especially for her economic growth. Graph #1 Sino-South Korea Trade (1992-2008) Source: Zhou (2010) After establishing diplomatic relations between South Korea and China in 1992, both countries have been trying to liquidate the odds with each other. South Korea and China sided with the East and the West bloc respectively. During the Cold War, policy makers, security experts and scholars had taken to a biased thinking. The development o f the relationship between both countries went through a very difficult process due to security alliance respectively with the U.S.A. and North Korea. Despite development o f bilateral relations, there were still many difficulties in formal cooperation between the both.
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- 88 - Even though there are organizations such as Six-party talks (Huntley 2005), EAS (The East Asian Summit) 36 and ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) where East Asian countries participate together but they could not make a matured security organization like OSCE (The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). It is because that the memory of the Cold War is still not obliterated fully and the long history of distrust and territorial disputes still persists between the countries in the region. Rigid decision- making process for foreign policy according to each country's domestic political environment, and the narrow, short-sighted pursuit of national interests as well as divisional structure in the Northeast Asia are creating new competition and are going against the hope of residents in the East Asia who have suffered immensely in the past century from the conflicts. To challenge this situation the security cooperation channel named China-South Korea Security Forum was conceived in February 2000 by South Korea and China's non- governmental organizations (CAIFC, China Association for International Friendly Contact from China and KRIMA, Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs from Korea), both institutes held the periodic and non-periodic forums pursuing innovative and alternative oriented approach. Some high-level former and acting security officers have participated at theses forums. From 2002 to 2010 regular meetings have been held eight times among which 1 st , 3 rd , 5 th and 7 th happened in Beijing and 2 nd , 4 th , 6 th and 8 th happened in Seoul. Non-periodic irregular meetings have happened occasionally in both countries. China-South Korea Security Forum has become an important dialogue channel fo r the security cooperation, trust building and information exchange between security professionals of both the countries. The Forum which takes place in non-governmenta l area is the flexible security dialogue channel between acting and retired officers, security scholars and specialists, military experts and senior officials of the ministerial-level and general-levels. The so-called 1.5 track which can be defined as semi-governmental and semi-private dialogue has discussed all the pending problems between China and South Korea, peace and security affairs in the East Asia and critical issues in the Korean 36 See Appendix #10~#16 for East Asian Summits Agreements.
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- 89 - peninsula which has been reflected in the vision of decision makers of the track 1.0 (official diplomatic channels) Ⅱ. Introduction of Organising Institutions 1. CAIFC (China Association for International Friendly Contact) China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC) 37 was founded as a private organization in December 1984 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China as there was the need for organizations in the private sector according to China's Open Reform policy. The mission of CAIFC is the cooperation with international private sector to promote friendly exchanges for international brotherhood and contribute to world peace and development. CAIFC has entertained an average of more than 100 visiting foreign delegations from foreign countries annually for the friendly exchange relationship and the personnel of which have visited overseas more than 30 times annually. Table #6 China’s Think Tanks on International Relations Name (Chinese) Institutional Authority Characteristics Year of Establishment China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, CICIR (中国现代国际关系研究院) Central Committee of Foreign Affairs Office State Council of Ministry of State Security The oldest organisational origins Focus on current intelligence and manufacturing instant analyses 1965 (incepted as an institute) China Institute of International Ministry of Foreign Focus on medium / 1956 37 The China Association for International Friendly Contact was set up on December 22, 1984, with General Wang Shoudao as the president, General Wang Zhen as honorar y president. Huang Hua was elected to be the president in 1992 (Huang Hua 2008).
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- 90 - Studies, CIIS (中国国际问题研究所) Affairs long-term issues of strategic importance Designated as the key 'Track II' by Ministry of Foreign Affairs Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, CPIFA (中国人民外交学会) an arm of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Informal exchanges (past) Principal institutional channel (current) 1949 China Association for International Friendly Contact, CAIFC (中国国际友好联络会) Military counterpart to the CPIFA PLA General Political Department Ministry of State Security Characteristic of duality (General Wang Zhen as its first honorary president / former Foreign Minister Huang Hua as its first president) Involved retired civilian / military personages 1984 Xinhua Centre for World Affairs, XCWA (新华社世界问题研究中心) International Department of Xinhua News Agency Large number of affiliated fellows retired from Xinhua Focus on 'big powers and India' 199 1 Institute of Taiwan Studies, ITS (台湾研究所) CASS State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Central Committee Leading Group on Taiwan Affairs Principal organisation for current intelligence on Taiwan affairs Formulate Taiwan policy 198 4
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- 91 - Ministry of State Security China Society for Strategy and Management, CSSM (中国战略与管理研究会) State Council Foreign Affairs Office Government departments provide it fiscal, administrative and autonomy 1989 Foundation for International Strategic Studies, FISS (国际战略研究基金会) PLA General Staff Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs Claims to be an independent and non- profit institution Many members of active duty PLA colonels 1989 Shanghai Centre for International Studies, SCIS (上海国际问题研究中心) Shanghai Municipal Government's Office of Foreign Affairs Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Formulate policy papers for leaders in Beijing Provide information to Shanghai companies 1985 China Academy of Social Sciences, CASS (中国社会科学院) State Council Massive organization of ministerial status ( 4,000+ total staff) Attached graduate school 1977 Source: Shambaugh (2002) The CAIFC has also connections with the civilian foreign affairs establishment as well as the People's Liberation Army General Political Department. This duality was evidenced in the fact that General Wang Zhen was its first honorary president while former Foreign Minister Huang Hua was its first president. On the military side, it appears that CAIFC is linked to the Intelligence Bureau of the Liaison Department of the
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- 92 - PLA’s General Political Department. On the civilian side, it appears to have ties with both the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its offices today are located in a compound in north Beijing shared by other PLA units. CAIFC was founded in 1984, and is involved in bringing both retired civilian and military personages to China (Shambaugh 2002). CAIFC has been playing a positive role to keep the relationship with many national government agencies, community organizations and politicians for promoting mutual understandings and trusts and creating bilateral interests. CAIFC has promoted foreign companies to invest in China through the exchange of personnel, informing China's economic policies to foreign companies, introducing the market situation in China and finding joint venture partners by cooperating with companies. At the same time CAIFC has also cooperated with Chinese entrepreneurs to facilitate this international exchange actively. CAIFC has been holding various events of cultural exchanges externally in a big way. It has invited personnel and organizations from various fields and various types to visit China such as foreign culture, art, religion and physical education etc. and helped to facilitate cultural and artistic activities such as exhibitions, artistic performances and sports games etc. CAIFC has also led Chinese cultural and artistic organizations to held exhibition in foreign countries and overseas trips. CAIFC is actively engaged in international academic exchanging activitie s emphasized on international issues on education. Under the umbrella of 'Peace and Development Research Center’, CAIFC has substantial number of well-known domestic and foreign researchers. The Centre has published quarterly magazine ‘Peace and Development’ in which scientific papers related to international affairs and issues are addressed and symposiums are also organized. CAIFC was culminated by former foreign minister Huang Hua (黄华). Currently its President is former Foreign Minister Li Zhao Xing and now it is an officially
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- 93 - registered private institute. It has branches and group members throughout China in nearly 30 provinces and cities including Central Metropolitan City and autonomy prefectures. CAIFC headquarter is made up of the Permanent Council, Board of Directors and each functional department. Board of Directors is composed of retired or incumben t government in the administration, diplomats, educators, entrepreneurs, artists and scholars. It links civil activities and government closely to various fields. Huang Hua said in his Memoirs, People-to-people exchanges have become important supplements to governmental exchanges. The CAIFC receives nearly 100 groups or people annually. In 1991 Wang Zhen held a reunion meeting with the delegates of Dixie Mission. The CAIFC makes a fair number of overseas visits. Over a course of several years, I myself led delegations to Thailand, India, Japan, South Korea and the U.S. I was very happy to see my old friend John Service, and paid a visit to President George H. W. Bush. (Huang Hua 2008: 600) CAIFC has been supported by national and regional leaders from various circles in China since its foundation. Chinese leaders continue to give attention to the busines s promoted by CAIFC and grant an audience to the guests whom they often invite. The business of CAIFC has got significant support from the Party and the related departmen t of government. CAIFC has played the role of external representative for the Chinese people, built a bridge between China and foreign countries and an intermediate agency for international cooperation and has especially contributed to private exchanges between China and foreign countries. The Peace and Development Research Institute under the umbrella of CAIFC was founded in 1984 which is an academic institution mainly to study international affairs and national security issues. Since its foundation, the Institute is primarily involved with security issues between China and other major countries. The Institute is composed of 5 Divisions including Asia Pacific Division and editorial Division for publishing security magazine ‘peace and development’(和平与发展). The Institute has been receiving funds from CAIFC or overseas institutions and has exchanged security and military information
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- 94 - with the scholars from many countries at the conferences in China or abroad (CAIFC 2012). 2. Introduction of KRIMA (Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs) There are six think tanks in relations with Chinese think tanks in Korea which are periodically or non-periodically holding conferences and exchanging scholars. Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs (KRIMA, www.military.co.kr) is one of the mos t active NGO think tanks among them. It has been publishing security specialised magazine, Korea Defence Review on a monthly basis and has been renowned for its objectiveness in the last 18 years. KRIMA is a nonprofit corporation which was established in 1995 to get the people’s support for national security and to develop the most effective security strategy for people’s security interests in Korea. KRIMA has been trying to provide the most efficient security policy beyond the interests of specific political parties and leaders or the superpowers around the Korean peninsula (KRIMA 2012; Future Korea 2004). Table #7 Korean Think Tanks in Relations with Chinese Think Tanks Name (Korean) Institutional Authority Characteristics Year of foundation Related Chinese Institute (Chinese) Activity Duration of Relation Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (한국국방연구원) Ministry of National Defense Government- funded research institute 1979 China International Institute for Strategic Society (中国国际战略学会) Regular visiting Annual forum 1992~ Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (외교안보연구원) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Affiliated to Korea National Diplomatic Academy Think tank for long/medium term foreign policy 1976 China Institute of International Studies (中国国际问题研究所) Annual forum 1992~ China Reform Forum (中国改革开放论坛) Strategic talks Two times since 2008
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- 95 - Korea Institute for National Unification (통일연구원) Ministry of Unification (before 1999) Prime Minister's Office (after 1999) Unification policy research institute 1990 China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (中国现代国际关系研究院) Workshops Roundtable China Institute of International Studies (中国国际问题研究所) China Association for International Friendly Contact (中国国际友好联络会) Sejong Institute (세종연구소) Independent body Research institute in foundation 1986 China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (中国现代国际关系研究院) Annual Forum 1994~ China Institute of International Studies (中国国际问题研究所) Roundtable Korea Retired Generals and Admirals Association (성우회) Independent body Consultative body consisted of retired General 1989 China International Institute for Strategic Society (中国国际战略学会) High-level talks Meetings 2009~ Korea Research Institute for Military Affairs (21세기군사연구소) Independent body a non-profit corporation approved by the ROK Ministry of National Defense 1994 China Association for International Friendly Contact (中国国际友好联络会) Annual forum 2002~ Source from respective official websites mentioned in Bibliography section KRIMA has been contributing to the enhancement of the national security and developing the national defense science and technology through the various security meetings and exchange of technology information through forums, seminars, debates and events among the general public and the security communities. It has also promoted relations between the people and the military to make consensus about security affairs and draw the creative ideas from the people based on professional research studies related to defense polices and technologies.
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- 96 - KRIMA comprises six legal directors’ board, the advisory panel of a few forme r defense Ministers, consulting team comprising around 40 retired generals and more than 70 researchers who are doctorate and specialists in pool system. The Institute has been publishing a monthly magazine Korea Defense Review (KDR). KDR launched in Apri l 1995 and has been published total volume 211 basically about military affairs, defense policies and security issues. KDR is a general public magazine which is registered by Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Besides, it has also published many policy reports and other military books. (KRIMA 2012) KRIMA has received the official accreditation as a non-profit foundation from Ministry of National Defense in Republic of Korea at February 1, 2000 and the Missions of KRIMA were as follows:- ① In order to achieve public support and cooperation which is absolutely critical to national security, the will of the people should be reflected on the national security policy or strategy. KRIMA will play a pivotal role in the improvement of relations between the military and the people in order to fulfill the needs and expectations of the people toward the military. ② In case of emergency, all the national resources and technology should be mobilized. Even, during peacetime, the potential resources should be secured and fostered in private sector. Whenever needed, it should be mobilized instantly. On the basis of requirement, KRIMA will facilitate civil technologies, information and practical military knowledge immediately. ③ KRIMA will contribute to the military development for the improvement of professionalism in the defense policy, science and technology. It anticipates defense technology and forecasts military power demanded by the research groups to provide information to the military and consults defense companies accordingly. ④ KRIMA constitutes an informational exchanging channels among the security communities to form a strategic consensus and also suggests the idea and wisdoms to the foreign and security sectors of the related agencies through the joint research, study and academic seminars with the help of national or the international defense-related agencies and organizations.
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- 97 - Ⅲ . Architecture for mutual academic forums and exchanging information On June 2, 2002 KRIMA from South Korea and CAIFC from China have signed ‘the Letter of Joint academic exchanges’ contents of which is mainly about the seminars on regular basis, exchange of personnel visits and the exchange of academic information. Lee Changsoon, the senior vice chairman 38 of CAIFC, suggested at the signing ceremony “We cannot see each other just for one meeting so we will have these meetings continuously to understand each other better and accomplish the development of mutual relations". He said "South Korea and China should not be the enemy. We have more important value than the mutual strategic interests. It is same culture, same traditions and same letters which indicate that we have long shared history together.” Cho Sungtae, former Defense minister South Korean delegation headed, praised "Korea and China share the same strategic interest so it is useful for mutual side to talk about the details. It is much appreciated to CAIFC providing a forum for the discussion at this time. Both organizations had a really great job.” Cho; the chief adviser of KRIMA said "On the occasion of this signing today, these events do not end with a one-off but if the two countries continue military exchanges together then it will be the deciding factor for the future of both military” After the greetings of Lee Changsoon, Vice President from CAIFC and Cho Sungtae, the chief advisor from KRIMA and President Kim Jinwoog from KRIMA and Chae Munjung, the director of ‘Peace and Development Research Center’ from CAIFC have signed at 'Joint letter of academic exchanges'. Chae Munjung: Director of ‘Peace and Development Research Center’ from CAIFC told "KRIMA and CAIFC looked as if both have got married. There were the allowance from the defense minister Chi Haotien and a witness at wedding ceremony ; 38 Huang Hua, the then Chairman of CAIFC, was not present, they explained his health was not good. Therefore the senior vice Chairman; Lee Changsoon presided the meeting instead of him.
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- 98 - Cho Sungtae whom people of Korea like very much as well as thankfully Lee Changsoon; Vice chairman of CAIFC host the banquet at luxury hotel. May KRIMA and CAIFC long live together and give the birth of many descendants.” Both parties have signed Memorandum of Understanding accredited by Ch i Haotien; Chinese defence minister and Cho Sungtae; the former Korean defence minister . Lee Changsoon; vice chairman of CAIFC hosted the celebration dinner at the signing ceremony. As Chae Munjung; director of ‘Peace and Development Research Center’ said , “Both parties have got married and so both vowed trying to live longer and love each other forever”. Both institutes have held the Security Forum 12 times, 4 times in Beijing , 4times in Seoul and 4 times in other places. Ⅳ. Contents of Cooperation between KRIMA & CAIFC 1. Status KRIMA and CAIFC will try to promote friendly relationship between Korea and China. In military science both drive a wide range of mutually beneficial co-operation and dispel mutual distrust with promoting mutual understanding so that they wil l contribute enhancing mutual interest between people and military relations. In military science, both sides, respect, trust and agree the equality based on long-term business recognizing the importance of partnership and mutual benefit. 2. Purpose The purpose of the memorandum of understanding on the relationship between the two institutions is to grant every details of the official status. Cooperation parties wil l comply with the principles of mutuality, related to international law, Korean law and Chinese law based on the contents of a memorandum of understanding. Both institution s will run the best efforts to increases bilateral cooperation abiding by the agreemen t
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- 99 - between South Korea and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense and the pre - agreement with the spirit of the guidelines in the field of Military Science. 3. The form and contents on mutual cooperation To achieve the above objectives, the two sides will visit, have conferences, ask consultations, and exchange information related to the joint collaboration in the field o f Military Science. In order to realize the contents of the MOU both institutions organize and execute the following details:- A. China-South Korea Security Forum will be held once a year. B. Both institutes will prepare the presenters and debaters with scholars and specialists in military science and policy area for annual Forum. C. Both will exchange all the published papers, reports, assessments and other military - related data. In addition, in case of one side asks other side the formal request, the other side wil l respond readily for the purposes of the MOU and its contents and if the provision s detailed in a Memorandum of Understanding is not enough to cooperate in good faith , both will cooperate each other sincerely. 4. The practice on mutual cooperation Funding on the basis of realistic considerations of the validity, both sides should apply the following common principles according to memorandum of understanding with regard to the policy enforcement budget. A. Visiting party will pay the cost to the point of entry for the country such as transportation and personal costs associated with Forum participants. (Same applies when they return).
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- 100 - B. Hosting party will pay all the costs for visiting party since they arrived at the territory of the hosting country such as accommodations, transportations, tourism-related costs and medical expenses etc. C. In case, one side suggests non-planned cost, the decision will be taken in accordance with the spirit of Memorandum of Understanding and will appropriately be determined by the two sides. 5. The procedure of information exchange Both sides, if requested, provide information on the public nature each other to realize memorandum of understanding. Both sides guarantee protection of information provided by either side in accordance with memorandum of understanding and practice the bilateral cooperation in the process of providing information. The information obtained in the course of mutual cooperation should not be misused for the third party countries' interests in any of measures. 39 Formal exchange of information for the purpose of achieving mutual cooperation, in the process of policy, trade and military, based on Memorandum of Understanding will be run directly through the diplomatic channel. 6. Intellectual Property 'Intellectual property' within the framework of this Memorandum of Understanding means intellectual property rights in Article 2 concluded at the International Convention on the July 14, 1967 in Stockholm. Royalty of provided materials, the independent intellectual property rights by participants at Forum will be preserved by the bilateral cooperation memorandum of understanding. Both sides preserve adequate and effective guarantees for intellectual property rights without discrimination about the information 39 The researcher could not fully open all the information and materials due to this clause but only for scholarly purpose.
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- 101 - obtained from the results of the activities of Forum in accordance with Memorandum o f Understanding. Based on the two sides of the Memorandum of Understanding and country's laws/regulations, when it is violated in accordance with the entire data except the recognition or pre-arrangement, return can claim and the offender shall take all necessary measures for prohibiting the material distributed and publicized. When a natural person is designated and stipulated as the author of the materials by the two sides of the country, he shall have the right to receive bonuses, grants or other awards by both sides in accordance with the procedures. 7. Duration and Expiration Memorandum of Understanding will come into effect from the moment of the representatives of the both sides signed into two years if one party of the two side s formally promulgates stopping the effect in six months. The effect of a memorandum of understanding is automatically extended unless one of the parties formally notifies the other to be expired the effect of that six months ago . According to an international treaty, Memorandum of understanding does not infringe on the rights and obligations of other party. Ⅴ. Interviews during the Forum Meetings Even though China-South Korea Security Forum was held at the level of civilian institutes, the purpose of the Forum itself was to influence the decision makers of the formal channel. So, the participation of the former or incumbent high military officials a t the Forum was very essential. Actually they are promoting to strengthen the Forums by themselves. The statement from them will show how this forum has been evolved and contributed to the improvement of the bilateral security relations between China and
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- 102 - South Korea. What they indicated indirectly was the plan of CSKSF and what they evaluated was the effect of CSKSF. The most important figures in this forum were ex-Defense Minister Chi Haotien and Cho Sungtae. Both figures had held the first Defence Minster talk in 1999 and promoted this CSKSF forum in 2002. Especially Minister Cho has played a great role as the representative of Korean delegations at every Forum for last 10 years. During three times of interview with Chi Haotien – including the period of his tenure –, it was possible to ask his opinions about the Forum and the security relations between the two countries. These materials were gathered directly from them in personal meetings which were exclusive for CSKSF. 1. Ex-Defence Minister Chi Haotien Ex-Defence Minister Chi Haotien has led the 1st defense minister talk between South Korea and China along with Cho Sungtae, the Minister of National Defense from South Korea, and made a major contribution to the development of today's military relationship. Since the 1st Defence Minister talk, he has observed the development of the military relationship between both countries. He has visited South Korea for the 2 nd Defence Minister talk. He stated at the first Security Forum 2 June, 2002: The agreement signed at the 1st defense ministers’ talk is still practicing now in China. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, the two countries actively cooperate in political, economic, trade, culture and military fields and had a great development. Cooperative partnership now has entered a new phase of cooperation, the so called ‘overall cooperation’. With issues related to Korea, China consistently focused on maintaining peace and stability in Korean peninsula and hopes sincerely to work improving the inter-Korea relations to be continued. It has passed five years to visit South Korea, however, I still have the vivid memories about that. Wherever I went Seoul or Jeju Island, whoever I met soldiers or people, they all welcome us wholeheartedly so I felt a deep friendship from them. I was impressed much to find that South Korea has had a long history
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- 103 - and brilliant culture and people are very industrious. China and South Korea have a similar history and culture and had suffered the pain from being dominated by Japanese militarism. They have overcome a difficult impasse of the financial crisis in 1997 along with people all together. Minister Chi Haotien has also mentioned about TMD in East Asia promoted by the US, the alliance between South Korea and the US and the military exercises being conducted at that time at the third Security Forum 26 April, 2005. In his words: Military exercises between South Korea and the United States will have an adverse effect on the relations between both Koreas. According to the secret report of the US about North Korea and China, it narrated that America undermined Chinese sentiments due to excessive action and it pointed out mistakes of Bush and his administration. TMD is targeted by the US to China. The US President George Bush does not like South Korean President Kim Dae- jung's engagement policy towards North Korea. ‘Axis of Evil’ speech by President Bush is a manifestation of the stupidity of the US. 2. Ex-Defence Minister Cho Sungtae Ex-Defence Minister Cho Sungtae has held the first South Korea-China Defense Minister talk with Chi Haotian. He visited China for attending the 1 st CSKSF Forum in 2 June, 2002. This is his reminiscence. And he also mentioned the way how to develop CSKSF Forum, thus: Defence Ministers from both the countries shared common agenda that first of all peace and safety should be established in Korean peninsula, second, the stress was on the necessity for regime transition from truce system to a new peace system through the dialogue between the two Koreas, third, inhibiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the Korean peninsula. In January 2000 I visited China officially and Chi Haotien (迟浩田) visited South Korea in the following year. The chapter of Defense Minister’s mutual visit has formed and it made the opportunity for higher dimensions in the development of bilateral military exchanges. It is very wonderful to discuss military affairs between South Korea and China by military veterans from both the countries at the level of private organizations. Because there are some common strategic interests between both the militaries and it is available for them to discuss some topics. We can observe the activities
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- 104 - between KRIMA (Korea Research Institute for Military Affairs) from South Korea and CAIFC (China Association for International Friendly Contact) from China in that respect. If the Forum between both institutes persists continuously, it would be a crucial factor for military cooperation between both countries. At the 3 rd Security Forum, 28 April, 2005 Minister Cho said that one of the objectives of CSKSF Forum was preparing ground to persuade North Korean military leadership to be open. North Korean military was in the midst of reforming. And he thought the Chinese military leadership could play some roles towards North Korean military reforming. He stated: Six-party talks are stalled due to North Korea’s nuclear programme and there is no progress on the military confidence-building measures between the Koreas. North Korean military is the major cause of the stalemate. Whenever China's high-ranking military personnel meet their North Korean counterparts, they could ask and persuade whether it is right or not to develop nuclear weapons when people are starving, why is it important to build military confidence between the two Koreas and promote it early, how it is helpful to people of North Korea and its military and government to promote reform and introduce an open market policy learning from the Chinese experiences. 3. Ex-Defence Minister Cao Gangchuan Ex-Defence Minister Cao Gangchuan has mentioned about China’s role towards a peaceful solution for North Korean nuclear affairs and the maintenance of peace and stability in the peninsula at the 3 rd Security Forum 29 April, 2005. And he also mentioned about the future role of CSKSF Forum, thus: I have talked to North Korea military strictly about Principles of Denuclearization in Korean peninsula, a peaceful solution for North Korean nuclear affairs and the maintenance of peace and stability in the peninsula. There is a thick wall between U.S. and North Korea with mutual suspicion and it is required to have the patience for resolving the conflicts between both peacefully. Whenever I have the opportunity, I will deliver Minister Cho’s suggestion to North Korean friends. However, it is very hard to persuade them. I never forget the event of meeting South Korean friends. We have to maintain friendly relations between both the militaries in the area of politics and military. It is a very effective way that both the countries hold periodic and non-periodic
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- 105 - security conferences at which specialists share the information about the situation, promote understanding among each other and feel the commonness in strategy. While the situation is changing rapidly, it is necessary to share the opinions. At the 5 th Security Forum, Minister Cao Gangchuan stated about the movements of Japanese rightists which were a matter of concern to the people of Korea and China at that time, as follows: While Korea and China suffered under the Japanese invasion, we now see that Japanese militarists are coming back and rising again. They are revising the history books distorting the history of their invasion of Asian countries. We know the bad effects of such initiatives on the Japanese youth. Justifying the invasion, the students are misguided to believe that Japan invaded Asian countries to expel western countries. We will make some joint efforts to rectify the Japanese mistakes. 4. Ex-Defence Minister Yoon Kwangwoog At the 4 th Security Forum 23 June, 2006 ex-Defence Minister Yoon Kwangwoog stated some Chinese role for the changes in North Korea. He said: In the 21 st century, China is estimated to be more extended so that the constructive role of the country is essentially required to maintain peace in the world. I think it is not a good idea that North Korea invests a lot of money for preparing for war and developing ballistic missiles unlike China and Vietnam which are engaged in reforms and opening up of the market. I think South Korea and China together will help the development of a stable society in North Korea. I heard China is inviting North Korean military personnel to Beijing annually. I hope China use these opportunities to deliver our peaceful intention. 5. Ex-Defence Minister Liang Guanglie At the 5 th Forum there was the notable presentation which was related to cooperation for disaster management and collaborative exercise for the disaster in North Korea to keep the capacity for the safety in this area. The humanitarian approach to keep security cooperation between China and South Korea for helping North Korea would be effective. Minister Liang Guanglie mentioned about that.
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- 106 - Non-traditional security cooperation is very useful and important for friendly cooperation between both the countries. Recently, the issue of natural disaster is being raised around the world constantly. General disasters such as SARS in 2003 and swine flu need multilateral cooperation so that military from collaborating countries have to co-operate and play some crucial role for multi-national cooperation. Natural disasters are relatively frequent in China. So the Chinese army has played a major role for the relief in disaster. On May 12, 2008 when earthquake rocked Sichuan province, around 100,000 people were affected. Chinese People's Liberation Army engaged all resources for the relief works. I hope that ROK military and Chinese military could work together for the relief of the people in disaster. At the 7 th Security Forum in Beijing 5 November, 2009 both participants have debated the security alliance between South Korea and the US. It was astonishing that participants from both the countries have discussed the topics so frankly to feel breathtaking enough. CSKSF Forum has contributed to talk each other this much freely and it is estimated that strategic cooperative partnership between South Korea and China has been developed with these kinds of endeavors. The Korea-US alliance would be the key issue in future in the security area between China and South Korea. Ex Defense Minister Liang Guanglie stated about the alliance between South Korea and the US. In terms of the alliance, the two countries are assumed to have a special bilateral relationship. I hope that relations could contribute to regional peace and development. And I also hope that you need to have attention on other countries when you do some activities in the region which will affect the national interest significantly. The 60 th anniversary parade of PLA founding at the 1 st of October 2009 was enough to show that PLA has developed much since 1999. Minister Liang Guanglie mentioned the plans for Chinese military reform at that time as follows. China's party has put the emphasis on construction of the army. Growth in military has been evident at the latest parade of the 60 th Anniversary of October 1, 2009. Military construction should be done under the premise of the national economy and the development in military should be maintained in harmony with economic growth. There are always issues that Chinese military buildup is raised
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- 107 - 10 percent annually, but I'm assuming that it is unsuitable to overestimate the development. China has a large army; but the per capita military expenditure is too incomplete when compared to the US military. Chinese defense budget is allocated to the training cost of soldiers, the lives of professional officers and veterans’ replacement costs. Some budget is assigned to equipment purchases as well as for military modernization. The goals of the military required by the Party and the State rose since Deng Xiaoping are the Chinese military modernization and normalization. Chinese military modernization construction is being built according to the informational operations. Modernization is considered to be effective on the local campaign. The military informatization construction will be developed in three stages. While in the year 2010, the focus is on implementation of a strong foundation for informatization construction, by 2020, achievement in the field of mechanization and informatization will be promoted and by 2050 Chinese military is expected to have realized informational military. The military is being built towards a defensive dimension. In particular, the informatization construction is the big challenge because it should be constructed according to the needs of the modern information. Development of China is influenced by the growth of its army. 6. Ex-Defence Minister Lee Sanghee At the 8 th Security Forum 29 th of October 2008 Ex Defense Minister Lee Sanghee has assessed the Security Forum as follows: I was told that the Security Conference has been held between Korea and China since 2002 and former military leaders and researchers from both countries have reached mutual understanding on security issues. I think it has contributed greatly to the development of personal networks between both the countries. The vision of future security relations between two countries is well reflected in a joint statement of two leaders’ summit talk. I hope the areas of bilateral defense exchanges would be larger than the largest and the Security Conference would give a greater role for that. 7. General Tang Tian Pyao Since the third Forum 23 June, 2006 General Tang Tian Pyao has participated in the conference headed by the Chinese side. He stated the future direction of the Forum and its implication in security relations between both the countries.
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- 108 - CSKSF Forum has already been successfully held four times. Qualitatively, it is very advantageous to promote cooperation enhancing mutual understanding and trust between the two countries as the root of the only private high-ranking dialogue for peace in Northeast Asia. The theme of this third forum is to secure the peace measure of Northeast Asia and the role of China-South Korea cooperation which further promote friendship through presentations and discussions commemorating the 15 th anniversary of diplomatic relations.
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- 109 - CHAPTER 5 Analysis of the Papers and Debates at the Security Forum Ⅰ. Main stream of the Forum 2002-2009 This thesis is a case study about China-South Korea Security Forum held from 2002 to 2009. Although it may describe the story of relations between China and South Korea, it basically concerns how the Forum started, proceeded and effected. The main contents of this case study are to just show what they talk and what they discuss at the Forum. And it has tried to find out how this Forum functioned for the improvement of relations between China and South Korea rather than the relations itself. Table #8 Main Subjects of the CSKSF Meetings CSKSF Meetings Main Subjects 1 st CSKSF 9.11 Terror and the Security Situation in East Asia 2 nd CSKSF Security Cooperation Regime in East Asia and China-South Korea Cooperation 3 rd CSKSF Cooperation for Peaceful Resolution of North Korea’s Nuclear Problem
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- 110 - 4 th CSKSF The US Strategy with Asia and Strategic Repositioning of the USFK 5 th CSKSF North Korea Problems and its Impact on Security Situation in East Asia 6 th CSKSF South Korea-China Strategic Cooperation Partnership (Direction and Challenges) 7 th CSKSF Inter-Korea Relations and Outlook for Korean Peninsula On June 3rd, 2002 at Beijing hotel the 1st China-South Korea Security Forum was held. Secretary General Li Ning (李宁) from CAIFC (China Association for International Friendly Contact) declared that the security seminar will be held for the first time between Korea and China in terms of 1.5 track diplomacy which includes incumbent and retired high officials. There had never been any civil society contacts or NGO meetings held between the two countries in this format. There were opening remarks by Lee Chang Shun (李长顺), Vice Chairman of CAIFC from China side and Cho Sungtae, the senior advisor, Chairman of China study association in KRIMA from Korea side. The 1 st China- South Korea Security Forum was the starting point in civil-military relations between China and Korea.
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- 111 - The 2nd CSKSF Forum was held on the 2 June 2004 Seoul Korea. Working Group meetings in both countries agreed to seek a role with the security situation in Northeast Asia and form a consensus on discussion topics ‘Peace of Northeast Asia and Cooperation between China and South Korea’ . Through the preparation for the advancement of the Forum, they also agree to analyze the U.S. national strategy in Northeast Asia and learn about pending issues between both countries in order to co-ordinate for solving disagreements in the northeast Asian security situation as well as changes that occur in many aspects in near future. During the free debates, participants from South Korea were much interested in the role and its influence of China-North Korea relations; participants from Chinese side were interested in the alliance between U.S. and South Korea and USFK's role in northeast Asia. Both sides have talked about the various aspects raised in the region and decided to focus on security issues about Korean peninsula and how South Korea and China would have to co-operate each other. The 3rd Forum was held four nights and five days from 25th to 29 th of April in 2005 at Beijing with the topic "the task of six-party talks after North Korea’s declaration of Nuclear experiment". On April 26, there were presentations and discussions being divided session 1, 2, 3 and a general comprehensive discussion for another one and half hour. On April 27, there was a congratulatory dinner at Diaoyutai (钓鱼台) 40 invited by Chi Haotian; ex Defense Minister and on the 28 th in the evening at 8.1 Building Korean delegation was invited welcoming party with acting defense minister Cao Gangchuan. The retired generals and security experts from Korea and China had discussed in depth at the 3 rd CSKSF about current situation in Northeast Asia and cooperation between China and South Korea. Through the forum both countries 40 The Diaoyutai (钓鱼台) is the State Guesthouse which welcomes visiting heads of state or governments and international celebrities.
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- 112 - had agreed to have the patience in the peaceful resolution to North Korea nuclear issue. In addition to that, specialists from both countries discussed the security cooperation among related countries in Northeast Asia as well as cooperation between both countries. The 4 th Forum was held in Seoul Korea from June 20 to June 27 in 2006. In the 4 th Forum participants had analyzed challenges impacting Northeast Asian security one by one and had sought the way for cooperation between Korea and China for the peace of Northeast Asia. Issues raised included nuclear factors in the Korean peninsula, bilateral disputes between China and Taiwan, Japan-US alliance concerns and the impact of the changes of Korea-US military alliance system. Although there were some differences between China and South Korea, both sides exchanged mutual opinions frankly and sincerely. Participants from both sides had formed a consensus on the importance of balanced security awareness and security cooperation which starts with the recognition of removing the elements that could hurt the security environment. In addition to this, there were two discussion topics; one on encouraging North Korean military groups which help North Korean government to move ahead on the road of reform and the other one on the issue of the USFK(United States Forces in Korea)'s strategic flexibility and possible war in cross-strait in case of intervention by US ground forces. There were also collected opinions about building the Northeast Asia regional security mechanism to maintain peace and cope with urgent situation in the area. The 4th Forum was much progressed with development presentation and more serious discussion comparing to the former meetings and the attitude of participants from both sides were open so that personal opinions ware freely discussed. The 5th Forum was held from the 20 April to the 27th 2007 in China. During the forum, Korean delegation were invited to Zhengzhou City, Henan Province; home of Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan, and at Hunan Changsha;
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- 113 - home of Tang Tian Pyao Representative of Chinese side. It was a good opportunity to meet the state leaders through a long journey and form a network of senior personnel’s of each state. The 6th Forum was held from October the 27th to November the 1st, 2008. Forum discussed “strategic cooperative partnership between South Korea and China " agreed by bilateral summit talk of two countries to realize military personnel’s mutual exchanges and cooperation as well as academic research activities. Forum was consensus-intensive about the military diplomacy between both countries and the role of China's active and retired military generals for the peace of Peninsula and Northeast Asia. It was the honest discussion among the experts to clarify the threats and challenging elements in the area of East Asia. Also, there were dinner on board at Han River hosted by Lee Sanghee; the Minister of National Defense from Korea after the Forum ends. Around 70 delegations from the both side attended at the boarding party on the River and had the opportunity to socialize with each other. The 7th Forum was held in Beijing China from the 3 rd of November to the 6 th throughout the six days. Non-traditional security cooperation between China and Korea and consensus of sustainable development for CSKSF for that purpose was highlighted during the Forum. The participants co-formed a consensus on the need for countering the challenges of terrorism and unconventional threats as well as they stressed the role of the army in Korea and China to accomplish that mission. Ⅱ. Key Arguments depending on the countries by the subjects In order to improve the bilateral relations between China and South Korea, firstly the conflicts between both countries have to be lessened. Without clarifying
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- 114 - the interests of both countries they cannot understand each other and improve the relations. Through the forums, the participants from both countries have cleared the differences of the interests between both countries and understood each other. How China-South Korea Security Forum has contributed to the improvement of the bilateral security relations between China and South Korea is how participants from both countries find out the differences between both at the forums and to mitigate the arguments. In that way China-South Korea Security Forum has provided alternative 1.5-track policy process to existing 1.0-track to improve the relations. So many presentations and debates are executed through the Forums during the period 2002-2009. While in the beginning, there was some hesitation to show frank opinions with each other but by meeting year by year, participants became comfortable and bold to say their frank opinions. There were some typical subjects which were frequently presented and discussed such as ‘North Korean Nuclear Issue’, ‘USA-South Korea Military Alliance’, Strategic Repositioning of the USFK (United States Forces in Korea) and China-South Korea Security Relations and so on. Those were key issues or arguments between both countries to solve for improving the relations. The difference between both countries can be highlighted subject-wise in the following. And the change of them will be recognised depending on polices of both countries at that moment. For example, the status of North Korean Nuclear issue was quite different between 1 st Security Forum at 2002 and 7 th Security Forum at 2009, one of which U.S. was very aggressive to make a plan of pinpoint bombing against North Korea and the other of which U.S. has changed its policy to peaceful negotiation influenced by changing policy of South Korea and Japan at that moment. Chinese participants at the Forum have shown its pro-South Korea attitude at the 1 st CSKSF but pro-North Korea at the 7 th CSKSF frankly. They have released their genuine thought through the Forums toward both Koreas.
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- 115 - 1) North Korea Nuclear Issue Through the ‘Agreed Framework’ of 1994 adopted by US and North Korea, the North Korea's nuclear facilities (plutonium facilities) have been frozen for years. But there were different intentions on agreement between US and North Korea. US regarded the Agreed Framework primarily as a non-proliferation agreement, whereas North Korea placed greater values on measures for normalising relations with US (Hecker, Lee, Braun: 2010). As new allegations on North Korea's uranium nuclear programme which was raised in 2002 could not find a solution in consultation between the US and North Korea, North Korea eventually lift the freeze of existing plutonium nuclear facilities and the Agreed Framework was actually disposed of. Then the Six-party talks began in 2003. Two years later, the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005 and a subsequent agreement of 2007 among members of Six-party talks were adopted, some plutonium facilities in North Korea were disabled. But the matters of declaration and verification for execution are not narrowed among the participating states; finally, Six-party talks were suspended in December 2008. North Korea did the first nuclear test in 2006 and the second nuclear test was carried out in 2009 and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors were expelled. In addition, it opened uranium enrichment facilities in 2010. Countries involved in the Six-party talks persuaded North Korea at the end of the 2011. There were denuclearisation talks between US and North Korea twice and talks between South Korea and North Korea twice. After the death of Kim Jong-il on December 17, 2011, there was still no dialogue. So countries concerned are trying to resume the denuclearisation dialogue process as soon as possible from various angles.
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- 116 - About North Korean nuclear issue, there are mainly six points mentioned by Chinese participants. First, a researcher from the Chinese Academy of Military Science) said, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, first and foremost, the United States defined North Korea as included in the “Axis of Evil” and designated it as a target for nuclear attack, thereby further strengthening the hawkish policy on Pyongyang. Nevertheless, the South Korean government incessantly maintains a conciliatory policy on North Korea and takes new measures to improve inter-Korean reconciliation. (KRIMA 2002) Another researcher from the Chinese People’s Institute of International Affairs mentioned that diplomatic efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through six-party talks had continued to be relatively optimistic. Therefore, in so far as the countries concerned continue to discuss real issues with a more earnest and flexible attitude, they will have an absolute possibility to achieve the ultimate objectives of a non-nuclear peninsula and peace and stability in the region in the near future. (KRIMA 2004) In the same forum, it was said by a researcher from the Chinese Academy of Modern International Relations that, when it comes to Pyongyang’s intentions behind the development of nuclear weapons, there exist a variety of speculations. However, the first and most important intention is to defend against external threats including those posed by the US by leveraging asymmetric deterrents. The war in Iraq caused North Korea to learn that the US was able to attack Iraq because she had confirmed beforehand that Baghdad didn’t have nuclear weapons. (KRIMA 2004) During the 2006 forum, the Chief Manager from Inter-Korean Issues Research Team of Fudan University revealed his opinion on this issue. When it
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- 117 - comes to her nuclear issue, historically North Korea has been using both hands. One involves establishing nuclear development as a strategic objective and utilizing “nuclear possession” as the most important guarantee to obtain national security. The other involves acquiring security and material gains through dealing with the US by leveraging “nuclear abandonment” as a nuclear bargaining chip. If the US and North Korea were to normalize their relations while admitting to North Korea’s limited possession of nuclear weapons, China would face the serious issue of worsening circumstances. As for security conditions, Korea would be challenged by security-related asymmetry between North and South Koreas and would have to live under North Korea’s nuclear clouds. (KRIMA 2006) In the 7 th forum, there was an opinion of the former Attaché to the Chinese Embassy in South Korea. The US has made a policy of carrying forward NK-US bilateral dialogue within the framework of six-party talks and fulfilling “complete, (verifiable) and irreversible denuclearization” through six-party talks. North Korea has clearly acknowledged the Maginot line of the US policy that “NK-US dialogue is possible only within the six-party talks framework.” Yet, North Korea still emphasizes and insists that the purpose of its nuclear development is to deter threats from external forces and fulfill nuclear balance. Hence, it is expected that many difficulties lie ahead for the process of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula. (KRIMA 2008) In the same forum, a retired Major General of the Chinese Academy of Military Science said China’s basic position on the North Korean nuclear issue is to promote the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and maintain peace and stability there. However, the true meaning of a non-nuclear Korean peninsula is diluted because it is claimed even in South Korea that Seoul should set out processing nuclear fuels and assert nuclear sovereignty. The bottom line is that
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- 118 - denuclearization is not only an inter-Korean issue but also a concern for the international community that advocates and respects the denuclearization of the peninsula. (KRIMA 2008) About North Korean nuclear issue, there are also mainly five points underscored by South Korean participants. According to a professor from the Korean National Defense University, South Korea and China should utilize diplomatic wisdom to translate such bilateral alignment to positive force towards a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. Besides, both Seoul and Beijing should continue to respect each other’s interests and diplomatic autonomy. A non-nuclear Korean peninsula serves the common interest between SK and China only when it is peacefully resolved under the conditions of stability in the peninsula. (KRIMA 2003) A retired general, Advisory Member of KRIMA, said the North Korean nuclear issue should be resolved in a peaceful manner through dialogue and concession. A pivotal point is that either North Korea or the US should make partial modifications to difficult-to-accept preconditions for talks and come forward to the dialogue table. The international community should serve as a mediator between the parties to ensure that trust between Pyongyang and Washington will help North Korea to be free of anxiety about threats to security assurances and that the US will be convinced of nuclear non-proliferation and a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, thereby setting conditions for resuming six-party talks. (KRIMA 2004) It was said by a professor from the Korean National Defense University that the most pressing task that faces Korea and China in promoting growth and peace in Northeast Asia is that both the countries should earnestly cooperate and
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- 119 - honestly exchange ideas regarding NORTH KOREA’s nuclear abandonment and the establishment of peace in the Korean peninsula in times of emergency. While the establishment of peace should be discussed in conjunction with the resolution of the North Korea nuclear issue, differences in opinions regarding its conditions and directions can be reconciled and discussed among Korea, China, and the US either at the civilian level or through the 1.5 track. (KRIMA 2008) In the same forum, a senior researcher from the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis said, it is necessary that Korea understand China’s role at the international level and sympathize with China’s Asia policy focused on “stability in the adjacent region” and “a non-nuclear Korean peninsula.” China needs to understand the security situation that Korea is faced with due to the continuing military confrontation with North Korea and Pyongyang’s adherence to nuclear ambition as well as the necessity that Korea maintains the alliance with US. Through such mutual understanding, both Korea and China should deepen the depth and width of their dialogue on the North Korea nuclear issue. (KRIMA 2008) A research of KRIMA also mentioned about same issue in the 7 th forum that China as a host country endeavors to mediate and find middle ground between North Korea and other countries participating in six-party talks, because the North Korean nuclear issue has several dual characteristics such as nuclear possession vs. denuclearization and dialogue and nuclear deterrence. But North Korea is stupefying China by making fruitless such efforts made by China since North Korea behaves unexpectedly so that it is not perceived to be manipulated by China’s position. (KRIMA 2008) In the beginning, Chinese participants are evaluating affirmatively South Korean conciliatory policy on North Korean nuclear issue but they changed their attitude even to enumerate South Korean peaceful nuclear fuels and its asserting
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- 120 - nuclear sovereignty. On the other hand, Korean participants in the beginning asked China to go together to serve as a mediator between the parties of Pyongyang and Washington but later they showed the attitude of criticising toward Chinese’ passive approach toward North Korean Nuclear issue. It is mainly because of the failure and disappointment of Sunshine Policy. North Korea has used South Korean money and aid for developing its nuclear bomb and military buildup. China has explained to South Korean participants about the situations of North Korea. There was a difference between China and South Korea on the concept of non-nuclear peninsula. China in the beginning argued tactic nuclear shell in South Korea which has been shifted to America and later even argued South Korean peaceful nuclear fuels and its asserting nuclear sovereignty. South Korean scholars are trying to clarify different interest between both countries related to North Korean nuclear issue. Using North Korea issue, South Korea argues much about the military confrontation with North Korea and China cares much about American threat toward China. Both agree to the peaceful approach to solve North Korean nuclear issue and the establishment of peace in the Korean peninsula. China continuously expressed North Korean nuclear issue should be solved through the six-party talks and South Korea asked China not to be stupefied and manipulated by North Korea with this issue. 2) USA-South Korea Military Alliance China has strengthened its national power as prompted by its open door policy and various reform initiatives. It has become more actively involved in restructuring the international structure in the East Asian region. China and South Korea have been promoting the spirit of ‘Qiucuntongi (求存同异 , Accepting Commonalities Respecting Differences) and with this spirit in mind, they have
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- 121 - been able to pursue epoch-making amicable bilateral relationship as well as carrying out various exchange programmes and cooperative efforts. However military cooperation between China and South Korea has some limits because of Korea’s special relationship with US and that of China with North Korea (Kim 2005: 131) In order to overcome and complement such limits, China-South Korea Security Forum has been initiated. Should any change in the US-South Korea military alliance negatively affect the security and development of China, the China-South Korea military relationship would deteriorate. To improve China- South Korea security relationship while maintaining the US-South Korea alliance, Korea’s role as a balancer should be enhanced. China was much worried about the future of US-South Korea Military Alliance and through the Forums participants from both countries understood the situations at present and in the future. CSKSF was actually helpful to step forward promoting military relationship between both countries. In regards to the issue of USA-South Korea military alliance, the director of the Chinese Academy of Military Science said that the South Korea-US alliance is a legacy of the Korean War, which resulted from oppositions between the West and the East during the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War and the demise of bipolarization, the SK-US alliance has been walking a difficult path of constant changes and attempts to establish an efficient role with regards to security and national defense in new international conditions with the emergence of threats and actors that did not exist during the Cold War. (KRIMA 2004) A researcher from the Chinese Academy of Military Science said that the SK-US alliance with Cold War coloring may be an impediment to maintaining peace and stability in the region. It is because the alliance runs counter to a general trend oriented towards “peaceful cooperation and development and coexistence in the region, which is, at present, prevalent in the Korean peninsula
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- 122 - and in Northeast Asia. Both the Korean and the US governments are applying a strong ideological coloring and a Cold War way of thinking in selecting their security policies. (KRIMA 2006) Another research from same institution mentioned that, while the Lee Myung Bak government emphasizes the strengthening of the South Korea-US alliance, the expansion of ties will have minuscule influence on security in Northeast Asia given the reality that overall advance in Korea-China relations, progress in the complicated NORTH KOREA nuclear issue, general stabilization of security conditions in Northeast Asia, and pursuit of peaceful co-development are becoming the mainstream of the regional situation. (KRIMA 2007) The deputy director from the Chinese Academy of Modern International Relations said, as the US has professed its commitment to providing “extended deterrence” by using all possible military means, the Korea-U.S. alliance is moving towards an exclusive, bilateral military alliance that targets as a possible enemy a specific member country of a future multilateral security mechanism for Northeast Asia. This movement may worsen military confrontations between North and South Koreas and the tension existing in Northeast Asia. (KRIMA 2008) South Korean participants also delivered many opinions about the issue of USA-South Korea military alliance. A professor from Inha University said, expanding economic growth since Deng Xiao Ping implemented economic reforms and open-door policies; China has enhanced its diplomatic and economic status in the Northeast Asian region, thereby adding a new element of change to the alliance between SK and the US. South Korea should consider two strategic aims in order to serve both of its national interests – emphasizing the traditional Seoul -Washington alliance and furthering South Korea-China trade – in a harmonious manner. (KRIMA 2003)
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- 123 - A retired general, an advisory member of KRIMA, said that the ongoing realignment of the United States Forces in Korea (USFK) has become a driving force to make the South Korea-US alliance a more comprehensive and dynamic relationship. A strong alliance and the USFK are tremendous contributors to defusing tension and maintaining peace in the peninsula. In the future, Seoul should further solidify a tripartite relationship among South Korea, China, and the US by leveraging the alliance as a basic axis. (KRIMA 2004) A senior researcher from the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis delivered that, China needs to understand the security situation that South Korea is faced with due to the continuing military confrontation with North Korea and Pyongyang’s adherence to nuclear ambition as well as the necessity that Seoul maintains the alliance with the US. Through such mutual understanding, both Korea and China should deepen the depth and width of their dialogue on the nuclear issue. (KRIMA 2008) It was said by a professor from Catholic University that, if both Korea and the US together with all the countries in the region serve as driving force in accomplishing the missions of the times, that is, to build a peace system in the Korean peninsula, establish a Northeast Asian security community, and institutionalize an organization that facilitates joint responses to supra-national threats, the Korea-US strategic alliance will contribute not only to stability and peace in the region but also to China’s national interests. (KRIMA 2008) Chinese participants in the beginning of the Forum were relatively affirmative to understand the South Korea-US alliance but they have changed their attitude at the Forums for the alliance little by little to be obstacle in promoting the relations between Korea and China. One of Chinese scholar presented South Korea-US alliance to be an impediment to maintaining peace and stability in the region at the first forum. Later, he seems to be criticised within them and changed his attitude. Generally, they prefer President Kim or Rho but
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- 124 - they are very negative about President Lee Myung Bak because of his strengthening of the South Korea-US alliance and the expansion of its ties. On the other hand, Korea tried to explain the traditional South Korea-US alliance and furthering South Korea-China relations in a harmonious manner. They argued that a strong alliance is tremendous contributors to defusing tension and maintaining peace in East Asia. Korean participants explained how Korea-US strategic alliance will contribute not only to stability and peace in the region but also to China’s national interests. Notwithstanding Chinese participants collectively said the strengthening of Korea-U.S. alliance will worsen military confrontations between South and North Koreas and the tension existing in Northeast Asia. 3) Strategic Repositioning of the USFK (United States Forces in Korea) US and South Korea persuade to a mutual agreement on the readjustment of the US-ROK alliance to the world’s changing security environment, discussed and finalised USFK (US forces in Korea) realignment and relocation, US-ROK mutual military capability development, military task transition plan through the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA) and the US-ROK Security Policy Initiative (SPI). Great change in the US worldwide strategy have raised the new concept of strategic flexibility in the employment in the East Asian region beyond the Korean peninsula as well as all throughout the world if necessary, which signals a great shift from its historic roles as a deterrence force against North Korea. China tends to think that the alliance is a product of the Cold War and anything that strengthens the alliance is the outdated Cold War thinking. “The Chinese assumption is coming into conflict with the US assumption. Somehow, South Korean behaviors with the United States have come to be perceived in China as Seoul choosing Washington in ways that comes at Beijing’s expense. That does not necessarily forge South Korea’s foreign policy objectives,” said
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- 125 - Scott Snyder, the director of the Center for US-Korea Policy of the Asia Foundation who advised that Seoul should maintain a strong alliance with the United States, but also form a productive and positive rapport with China (Lee 2011). South Korea agreed to show understanding for US change in global military strategy and respect the need for strategic flexibility with the USFK. US for its part, agreed to respect Seoul’s desire not to get involved in any regional conflicts in Northeast Asia irrespective of the South Korean people’s will. Based on ‘strategic flexibility’ US can plan to operate its forces for rapid maneuvering rather than leaving them as a fixture in any one region. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack, US has pushed for these policy changes in the interest of making effective use of its forces overseas. Its intent is to broaden the scope of the USFK’s placement rather than tying them to the role of deterrent against North Korea according to the Mutual Defense Treaty between US and South Korea. Then the Chinese Ambassador in Korea Ning Fukui said the strategic flexibility of US troops in Korea should remain a bilateral agreement without affecting other countries. He said, “If USFK is exercised on a third country, we cannot help but pay our attention to it. The US troops in Korea have a bilateral purpose to maintain security of Korea, and could also be understood in the same manner (Lee 2006).” Snyder also said “Washington and Seoul have not explained very well to Beijing why that approach has been taken.” His words serve as a good reminder of the importance of communication in an increasingly intertwined world where one’s behavior can trigger unwarranted concerns from a bystander (Lee 2011). South Korea contended that discussions on the strategic flexibility in the employment of the USFK, if they were pursued in times of the reduction and relocation of the USFK, could rupture the military balance set against North Korea and cause security unrest on the Korean peninsula. US contended that the strategic flexibility of the USFK is not a matter of concession and South Korea is
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- 126 - able to ensure sufficient deterrence against North Korea with investment in military forces as proportionate with its economic power (Kim 2005: 130) About the issue of strategic repositioning of the USFK, Chinese participants in the forum revealed their various opinions. A retired Lieutenant General from the Chinese Academy of Military Science said, North Korea is very cautious about strategic flexibility of the USFK. This is a welcome move. President Roh opined that the USFK should not be involved in conflicts that may take place in Northeast Asia without South Korea’s consent. This is a firm principle that is not concessional in any case. It is also to take responsibility for security in Northeast Asia and the well-being of South Koreans. (KRIMA 2006) At the 6 th forum, a researcher from the Chinese Academy of Military Science argued that, although both Korea and China elevate their relationship status to a strategic cooperation partnership and open up space for more broad long-term development, the Korea-US military alliance may interfere with China’s internal affairs if the USFK’s strategic flexibility is strengthened so that the USFK, which has focused only on defending Korea within the region, is readjusted to the status of rapid task forces capable of intervening in regional conflicts. About the issue of strategic repositioning of the USFK, Korean panels also mentioned about their opinion. At the 4 th forum, a retired general, advisory member of KRIMA, said that issues surrounding the USFK have been raised as it is not an exception to the US global strategic requirement. In the past, the USFK principally responded to only one threat. In other words, the USFK prepared against North Korea’s threat. With the coming of the post-Cold War era, however, things have changed. For example, some 3,500 soldiers were deployed for the War in Iraq. Such deployment beyond the Korean peninsula is possible in the future. So, the concept of strategic
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- 127 - flexibility allows for flexible options where the USFK may be deployed to areas of crisis other than North Korea or the US forces other than the USFK may be deployed in the Korean peninsula should events occur surrounding the Korean peninsula. It seems that there is no reason that South Korea should be opposed to this initiative to implement strategic flexibility. (KRIMA 2005) An ex-Minister, senior advisor of KRIMA, said in the 5 th forum that the major idea behind this strategic flexibility is that the US will not operate a built-in military force, but maintain flexibility; and in the worst case respond immediately to an identified terrorist threat through marshaling a force in an area, where terror is likely to happen. Some who have an intention to drive a wedge between China and South Korea are trying to speculate that should an armed conflict take place between China and Taiwan, the strategic flexibility of the US will involve the commitment of the USFK in the affected area. In the worst case scenario, this might happen. However, there is almost no chance. (KRIMA 2006) Chinese participants referred USFK’s strategic flexibility at the forums frequently. China argues that the Korea-US military alliance may interfere with China’s internal affairs if the USFK’s strategic flexibility is strengthened so that the USFK is readjusted to the status of rapid task forces capable of intervening in regional conflicts. So, when President Roh expressed openly that the USFK should not be involved in conflicts that may take place in Northeast Asia without South Korea’s consent, China was very pleased. Korean participants enthusiastically explained that it is not an exception to the US global strategic requirement in Korean peninsula and there is no reason that South Korea should be opposed to their initiative to implement strategic flexibility. Actually the major idea behind this strategic flexibility is that the US will not operate a built-in military force, but maintain flexibility; and in the worst case respond immediately to an identified terrorist threat through marshaling a force in an area, where terror is likely to happen. CSKSF was a good channel to understand the perceptions of both countries on USFK’s strategic flexibility.
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- 128 - 4) China-South Korea Security Relations On May 21, 2012 it was reported that China and South Korea will be working on a plan to forge a military cooperation pact together. China and South Korea have shared the need for a mutual logistical support treaty for years as the two countries have conducted joint maritime exercises for humanitarian search and rescue operations. The pact, known as the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement or Mutual Logistic Support Agreement, calls for exchanging most common types of support, such as food, fuel, transportation, ammunition and equipment, during peacekeeping and other operations (Ministry of Korea National Defense 2012). China-South Korea Security Forum used to study about Non-traditional security cooperation between both countries asked by the then Defence Minister Liang Guanglie. Minister Liang said “Non-traditional security cooperation is very useful and important for friendly cooperation between both the countries. General disasters such as SARS in 2003 and swine flu need multilateral cooperation so that military from collaborating countries have to co-operate and play some crucial role for multi-national cooperation. Natural disasters are relatively frequent in China. So the Chinese army has played a major role for the relief of disaster. Chinese People’s Liberation Army engaged all resources for the relief works. ROK military and Chinese military could work together for the relief of the people in disaster.” In Chinese perspective, Chinese participants said their opinion. A former professor from the Strategy Research Institute of the Chinese National Defense University said, It seems that both China and South Korea are faced with a new real challenge that requires mutual coordination and cooperation on security issues. This challenge concerns how both Beijing and Seoul can exert joint efforts to make sure that Japan’s policy stays away from division and antagonism and steers toward security assurance for each country in the region
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- 129 - and regional stability, and that the security situation in the region works favorably towards cooperation and trust between countries in the region. (KRIMA 2004) A professor from the Military Strategy Research Division of the Chinese National Defense University said, in order to establish a strategic security relationship between Korea and China for the 21st century, the countries should strengthen their bilateral cooperation on security issues in the peninsula on the foundation of their mutual security interest. They should discuss a solution to current issues resulting from their bilateral relations in a mature manner without hostile actions to each other. They should also build mature military relations. (KRIMA 2006) In 2008 forum, a professor from same university said, effective cooperation between Korea and China on non-conventional security issues will help reduce tension on the Korean peninsula, prevent crises and humanitarian disasters, and secure peace and stability at the border and the inland areas, thereby promoting stability in the region and improving inter-Korean relations. (KRIMA 2008) Korean panels delivered their opinion in the issue of China-South Korea security relations. At the 1 st forum, a professor from the Korean National Defense University said, there is no denying that South Korea and China have issue-based conflicts in terms of national interest due to differences in national system, ideology, history and geo-political factors. However the basis of “common interest” is much broader between South Korea and China. Both Seoul and Beijing should make a habit of engaging in dialogue regarding various issues including an outlook on the situation in the Northeast Asian region and security- related current affairs affecting both nations. (KRIMA 2002) In the 2 nd forum, a retired general, an advisory member of KRIMA, said that, so far, the South Korea-China military exchange has witnessed radical exchanges in various areas, including three diplomatic talks between defense ministers of both the countries. Essentially, such military exchanges have touched
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- 130 - off South Korea-China military cooperation conducive to regional security, thereby strengthening friendship and fellowship between them. From now onward, Seoul and Beijing could make an attempt to gradually pursue exchanges of military technology based on mutual agreement within an international multi- lateral framework, starting from less sensitive, more comfortable and non- sensitive areas. (KRIMA 2003) A researcher from the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis said that China should play a leading role for regional and world order in the mid-term and long-term, and collaborate with South Korea to maintain security order in the region and promote peace. The bilateral summits proclaimed that they would work towards development in inter-Korean relations and have an understanding of peaceful reunification. The two summits agreed to make a joint effort to achieve stability and peace in the Korean peninsula, focus on plans to enhance trust between the two countries, and consider the NORTH KOREA nuclear issue, the important security issue for South Korea, as an important area of cooperation that requires mutual understanding. (KRIMA 2006) Both countries agreed with new challenge that requires mutual coordination and cooperation on security issues. It is just natural that bilateral cooperation on security issues should be done on the foundation of mutual security interest. So participants from both countries discussed the topics resulting from their national interest. There were many misunderstandings between both countries due to differences in national system, ideology, history and geo-political factors. The Forum has searched understanding and common interest including an outlook on the situation in the Northeast Asian region. 5) Taiwan Issue With the start of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea in 1992, the diplomatic relations between South Korea and Taiwan has been deteriorating. There were no diplomatic relations between South Korea and
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- 131 - Taiwan for last 20 years, but still 650,000 people visited each other in 2011 and trade volume was nearly amounting to $ 33 billion. Mǎ Yīngjiǔ, President of Taiwan pledged recanalisation of the direct flights between South Korea's Kimpo Airport and Taipei Ssungsan (松山) airport in the last presidential election in 2008. Ma won the presidency by 58.45 percent of the popular vote in the presidential election of 2008, and was re-elected in 2012 with 51.6 percent of the vote (New York Times, January 14, 2012). In 2012, he has reopened the direct flights between both airports in 33 years which was abolished in 1979. South Korea has intentionally avoided Taiwan due to its respect to the relations with China. Whereas China keeps very close exchanges with North Korea, South Korea has followed faithfully ‘one China-policy’ of the principles of Chinese foreign affairs. In these circumstances, the relationship between South Korea and Taiwan was continued eventually through private channels such as businesses, universities and cultural organisations. China often complained those private relationships between South Korea and Taiwan at the Forums. South Korea argued and explained to them that China has maintained a relationship with North Korea and the Korean government cannot control the flow of private sector because Korea is a democratic country. CSKSF has helped China a lot to understand the situations in South Korea with Taiwan. In regards to Taiwan issue, Chinese participants delivered their opinion. An executive secretary of the Association of Chinese Culture Promotion said that, China and Taiwan have been in stand-off since the 1950s and have both professed a “One China Policy.” However, circumstances changed dramatically towards the end of Li Deng Hui’s reign and after the takeover of the government by Taiwanese independence supporters led by Chen Sui Bien. In particular, after Chen was reelected as the President, independence separatists attempted to derail Taiwan from “Becoming China” and sever historical, cultural and blood relations by pushing ahead with the “Name Rectification Campaign” the “Correct
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- 132 - Taiwanese Name Initiative” and “Taiwanese Cultural Independence Policy.” (KRIMA 2005) A former professor from the Strategy Research Institute of the Chinese National Defense University said, There are two aspects of China’s solution to the Taiwan problem. First, conclusively speaking, Beijing’s principle is not to use force right away, but has a strong tendency to lean toward resolving the issue in a peaceful manner. The second aspect is that China intends to attempt at peaceful reunification, but if that does not work, i.e., Taiwan seeks independence, China will not exclude an option to use force. It will be good to understand this principle to mean that China gives the highest priority to peaceful resolution with a focus on peaceful reunification rather than to mean that China intends to mobilize force. (KRIMA 2003) A researcher from China Association for International Friendly Contact said that, as far as the provision that Beijing will not give up the use of force in resolving the Taiwan problem is concerned, much can be inferred from Chinese leaders’ comments on Taiwan’s recent presidential election. First, China will make her best efforts to reunify with Taiwan in a peaceful manner. Second, if Taiwan intends to seek independence, China will make sure that Taiwan will pay the price for it. Two remarks are noteworthy. Currently, the US is pressuring China not to use force against Taiwan. This is an interference with Beijing’s domestic matter. The ultimate decision as to whether China will resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully or by force is up to the Chinese leadership as it is China’s internal affair. (KRIMA 2003) Participants of South Korea also delivered their idea about Taiwan issue. A researcher from the Se Jong Institute said, one of the top priorities for China with respect to security interest is to deter Taiwanese independence and to resolve the issues in its own way. Beijing does not want the status quo but nor
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- 133 - does it want to dramatically disrupt the status quo. In that regard, China can cooperate, to some extent, with the US which prefers the status quo. Thus, cooperation between Washington and Beijing is to be viewed as a temporary relationship aimed at strategic cooperation under the framework of a new international order, and yet allows contradictory positions to exist between them regarding Taiwan issues. (KRIMA 2003) A professor from Han Lim University argued that, the Chinese economy is in a position to influence the global economy. While China-Taiwan issues are important to Beijing, economic issues should be a higher priority over the issues at a time when the Chinese economy goes through overexpansion. It is extremely urgent to resolve issues resulting from China’s expanded economy dubbed as a “bubble”, and those issues may have more substantial impact on neighboring countries than China’s military threat. Hence, China and Taiwan should improve economic exchange and cooperate to resolve issues resulting from China’s bubble economy. As a matter of course, both should refrain from excessively introducing costly state-of-the-art weapon systems, but channel their energy into economic issues. (KRIMA 2005) A professor from the Korean National Defense University mentioned that, in case of emergency involving Taiwan and China, South Korea’s policy decision will have to consider two aspects: on one hand, in accordance with the South Korea-China diplomatic normalization declaration ‘Taiwan is part of China’ and on the other hand, the policy decision requires coordination with the USFK within the framework of the South Korea-US alliance. This is my personal opinion, but South Korea is unlikely to strongly devise plans against this issue. (KRIMA 2003) China especially criticised that South Korea is receiving the Taiwanese students. One scholar had exact data for that. In South Korea, receiving the students just depends on the decision of the colleges themselves. So both sides find difficult to understand each other on that matter. China cares much about
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- 134 - Taiwanese intention to seek independence; it is not only because of Taiwanese separatism but also other Chinese ethnic separatism movement. It never wants the interference of external powers in its internal affairs. Some Korean scholars argue that as China has relations with North Korea, South Korea can also have relations with Taiwan. Actually there are some differences between both relations. North Korea is a member of UN but Taiwan is not a member of UN. Korea sees that the cooperation between China and US is to be viewed as a temporary relationship aimed at strategic cooperation under the framework of a new international order, and yet allows contradictory positions to exist between them regarding Taiwan issues. Korea suggests that China and Taiwan should improve economic exchange and cooperation to resolve issues resulting from China’s bubble economy. South Korea inevitably choose two ways one of which it follows ‘Taiwan is part of China’ in accordance with the South Korea-China diplomatic normalisation declaration and the other of which it is required coordination with the USFK within the framework of the South Korea-US alliance. 6) Japan Issue The talks among China, Japan and South Korea have been hindered specifically by various territorial and historical disputes. In 2004 South Korea proposed the three major economies of East Asia to have a separate talk outside of the framework of the ASEAN (10+3). In November 2007 during the ASEAN (10+3) meeting, the leaders of China, Japan and Korea held their eighth meeting, and decided to strengthen political dialogue and consultations between the three countries, eventually deciding on the regular meeting to be held in 2008. Since 2008 China, Japan and South Korea have held trilateral summit talks annually. The summits talked about maintaining strong international relations, the global economy, and disaster relief etc. (China View, December 13, 2008).
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- 135 - Table #9 East Asia Summit Host country Host Leader Host City Date 1 st Japan Taro Aso Fukuoka 13 Dec 2008 2 nd China Wen Jiabao Beijing 10 Oct 2009 3 rd South Korea Lee Myunng- bak Jeju 29 May 2010 4 th Japan Naoto Kan Fukushima 21-22 May 2011 5 th China Wen Jiabao Beijing 13-14 May 2012 Table #10 East Asia Foreign Minister Talks Host Country Host Minister Host City Date 1 st South Korea Song Min- soon Jeju 3 Jun. 2007 2 nd Japan Masahiko Komura Tokyo 14 Jun. 2008 3 rd China Yang Jiechi Shanghai 28 Sep. 2009
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- 136 - 4 th South Korea Yu Myung- hwan Gyeongju 15 May 2010 5 th Japan Takeaki Matsumoto Kyoto 19 Mar. 2011 6 th China Yang Jiechi Ningbo 8 April 2012 About the Japan issue, Chinese participants revealed several opinions. In the free debate session of the 1 st forum, Yan Xuetong, the Dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations, said that, while it is believed that there are no feasible ways to counterbalance tight relations between the US and Japan, one of the most possible solutions, if any, is to achieve military cooperation between South Korea and China. As much as it has military ties with the US, SK can also build military ties with China. Once South Korea-China military relations are established, South Korea can serve as the axis of these two military ties, thereby playing a proactive part in facilitating military exchanges between South Korea and China. (KRIMA 2002) A member of Board of Directors, the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, said that the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute located north of Tokyo produces nuclear energy at large processing plants in six areas. By the end of 2004, the country possessed 43 tons of plutonium – 1 ton is enough to develop 120 nuclear warheads. If all of this plutonium were used to develop nuclear weapons, Tokyo could have 5,000 such warheads. Experts estimate that Japan can possess 60 tons of plutonium by 2010. The amount of plutonium and military industry and technology possessed by Japan make it a
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- 137 - nuclear power within a short period of time. Ten years ago, Tokyo admitted that she could build nuclear weapons within 183 days, but by now the production time may have shortened. (KRIMA 2005) About Japan issue, South Korean participants also said their opinion. At the 3rd forum, a visiting professor from Seoul National University, said that the role that Japan plays in Northeast Asia is important as well. You hope that the rise of conservative wing in Japan will not go in a wrong direction. Whether we can overcome increasing distrust between China and Japan; and South Korea and Japan will be a key to regional peace and prosperity. (KRIMA 2004) A professor from the Korean National Defense University said, historically China-Japan relations have made a tremendous influence on the order in Northeast Asia. Their relations have deepened more than ever before in terms of mutual cooperation and mutual dependence, while China and Japan have a mixed loading of conflicts and oppositions over the expansion of their influence power in the region and international community. (KRIMA 2005) Participants from both countries at the Forum completely agreed with Japanese historical evil deed and its future threat. Many innocent lives from both countries have been sacrificed during the Japanese domination. China suggested the cooperation between South Korea and China to counterbalance tight relation between the US and Japan. It is quite clear that the amount of plutonium, military industry and technology possessed by Japan make it possible for a nuclear power within a short period of time. But Korea expressed that mutual cooperation and mutual dependence among East Asian countries are valuable for the security of the people in this region.
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- 138 - Ⅲ. Analysis of the papers presented at Forum During the period of 2002-2009 China-South Korea Security Forum has been held seven times in Beijing and Seoul. At seven forums more than 60 papers were presented. Basically the main topic has been always ‘Cooperation between China and South Korea for peace in North East Asia’ but sub-titles are always different at each forum. In the beginning, participants from both countries were very much cautious and hesitating to say their frank opinion. But later they were bold to express what they have had in their mind during the Cold War and now. Here some presentations will be introduced and commented if it is needed. 1) The 1 st China-South Korea Security Forum The first China-South Korea Security Forum was held in Beijing on the 2 nd of June 2002. Because the terror attack in New York took place on the 11 th of September 2001, the topic naturally was decided with, ‘The September 11 Terror and the Security Situation in East Asia’. There were three or four sub-titles such as, ‘The Impact of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks on Security in East Asia, ‘China’s Policy to South Korea Reflected in China-North Korea Relations’ and ‘Security Dialogue between China and South Korea and Future Direction of Development in Military Exchange’. Hereafter some presentations will be summarised and criticised briefly. China: The September 11 Terrorist Attacks and the Security Situation in Northeast Asia (Researcher, Strategy Research Institute, the Chinese National Defense University) In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the American soil, North Korea signaled a very cooperative attitude toward
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- 139 - international coordination on anti-terrorism issues. The Bush administration, however, didn’t proactively respond to North Korea. Rather, they showed an inflexible stance towards it. By the end of November 2001, Washington once again demanded that North Korea should accept inspections of its alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In early December 2001, US political leaders as well as media outlets started to leak information that North Korea would be highly likely to be the next target for the US to attack after the invasion of Afghanistan. Although disagreeing with the US on the alleged claim, North Korea responded to it in a rather rational manner. In November 2001, Nam Soon Paik, Minister of Foreign Affairs, signed five anti- terrorism treaties, which specify that signatories are responsible for prohibiting terrorists from launching violent attacks and securing nuclear materials. North Korea took the initiative to join two additional anti- terrorism treaties binding member signatories not to provide financial funding to terrorists and to prevent terrorists from engaging in kidnapping and hostage-keeping. Such cooperative initiatives by North Korea were well received by the international community. But they didn’t garner positive support from the US. Rather, President Bush went so far as to single out North Korea as a part of the “Axis of Evil.” This assertion was neither fact-based nor logical. Further, such a claim was irresponsible and went against what is right, which would not help muster international cooperation on anti-terrorism. Also, the claim neither helped to improve relations between both the countries, nor did it help to reduce tension in the Korean peninsula. President Bush had singled out North Korea as a part of the ‘Axis of Evil’ when North Korea was very much affirmative to negotiation but he changed his attitude in the end of his Presidency when North Korea returned again to the strong rigid attitude toward US. They were always untimely miss-harmonised and related countries have exploited the situational relations between North Korea and US for their own national interests. Because of North Korea factor for China and US factor for South Korea the Governmental level cooperation between China and South Korea could not go deepen or quickly and the outcomes have been failed. Even though both the countries had shared a wide range of interests they could not exert their efforts to promote their security interests.
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- 140 - New Characteristics of the Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula in the Aftermath of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks (Researcher, Chinese Academy of Military Science) In the aftermath of the Al Qaeda attacks, first and foremost America defined North Korea as included in the “Axis of Evil” and designated it as a target for nuclear attack, thereby further strengthening the hawkish policy on North Korea. Nevertheless, the South Korean government incessantly maintains a conciliatory policy on North Korea and takes new measures to improve inter-Korean reconciliation. First, the South Korean government was opposed to the American labeling of its neighbor and assessed that North Korea wants dialogue. Seoul also maintained that there are burgeoning precursors to change and reform. When President Bush visited South Korea in February, President Kim Dae Jung told him that North Korea wants dialogue with the US and that it would make efforts to comply with the Geneva Nuclear Conventions, while improving relations with Western countries. Second, South Korea does not agree with the view that North Korea poses risks, nor does Seoul believe that Pyongyang is a threat. On the contrary, the US assesses that North Korea is one of the world’s largest militarized countries and its policy objective has an obvious bent in violence. America suspects that NORTH KOREA is involved in alleged activities associated with the delivery and proliferation of WMDs, and believes that it is a serious threat to the security of the US and the Northeast Asian region. But South Korea professed that it is not a “threat” on many occasions and emphasized that the issue of WMD should be resolved through dialogue. Third, South Korea is trying to make progress towards peace by sending an envoy to North Korea. The incumbent government headed by President Kim Dae Jung is attempting to restore inter-Korean dialogue and exchange on multiple fronts by sending Yim Dong Won in order to prevent the Korean peninsula from facing crisis induced by changes in the United States policy on North Korea after the terrorist attacks. The South Korean government is undeterred by the US and holds on to the Korean peninsula policy of pursuing reconciliation with North Korea. This policy is increasingly enhancing Seoul’s diplomatic autonomy from the US as its government and people determine to continue building up diplomatic autonomy. This policy is conducive to easing the tension in the peninsula arising from the changes in the US policy on North Korea and to ensuring peace and stability in the Northeast Asian region.
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- 141 - The September 11 terrorist attacks have changed the existing order of international politics, while influencing, to a great extent, the American foreign policy and also the international environment in Northeast Asia. Recognising the global war on terror as an issue that affects the integrity of its own safety and security, Japan, as an ally of the US, provides strong support for and cooperation with US. By doing so, Japan tried to demonstrate to the international community that the US -Japan alliance was just as strong as the US-United Kingdom alliance. China has expressed active support for the US in waging the global war on terror. Since the October 19 summit talks between China and the US held in Shanghai, the estranged relations between both had been smoothly restored. In the meantime, Russia had been establishing a new, mutually cooperative relationship with the US. As such, the security condition in the Northeast Asia, as it stands today, is at its best condition since the 2001 terrorist attacks. However, as the US continues to label North Korea as a rogue state in those days, no significant improvements had been made in relations between both and between North Korea and Japan. The security environment in the Northeast Asian region was still as unstable as if it were surrounded by murky clouds. Most of all, it is imperative that North Korea should come to the table for dialogue in order to break the shell of isolation and defuse distrust with the international community, and in particular, with the US, while neighboring countries such as China, Korea, Japan, and Russia should make joint efforts to enable conditions for North Korea to take such actions. Security Dialogue between South Korea and China and Future Direction of Development in Military Exchange (Professor, Korean National Defense University) In the fall this year, China is expected to have new political leadership during the 16 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Following the Three Represents, China is reported to admit private entrepreneurs to the Chinese Communist Party. It is anticipated that such
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- 142 - changes in domestic affairs will help augment economic exchange and cooperation with its neighboring countries in concert with its admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) as well as to further expedite friendly relations and cooperation with its neighboring countries. As the civil society becomes mature, South Korea is witnessing the strengthening right to a voice of media and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). In particular, NGO activities are taking place beyond governmental control. The South Korean government has long gone ahead with diplomatic diversification and pluralism. This year South Korea has a presidential election and a new government sets in next year. The new government is expected to further enhance friendly relations and cooperation with its neighboring countries based on the principles of globalization and multi-polarization that previous governments have established. There is no denying that both the countries have issue-based conflicts due to differences in national system, ideology, history and geo- political factors. However the basis of “common interest” is much broader between Seoul and Beijing. Both should make a habit of engaging in dialogue regarding various issues, including an outlook on the situation in the Northeast Asian region and security-related current affairs affecting them. They should first improve relations in areas where mutual exchange and cooperation are rather easy, and then leverage that improvement to shape an environment that could induce both nations to cooperate with regard to sensitive issues for which they have conflicting national interests. Incumbent government officials have difficulty in proceeding with dialogue on sensitive security issues. Accordingly, 1.5 Track, an unofficial dialogue channel developed by former government officials and scholars, can be beneficial as it will help identify disagreements on security issues and devise ways to defuse such disagreements. We hope that such scholarly exchange as this will contribute to enhanced exchange and cooperation on security issues shared by both the nations. Among fundamental policies with respect to the Korean peninsula that the Chinese government proclaims was a policy reflected in a statement, “China wants stability in the Korean peninsula and provides full support for Korean reunification based on autonomy and peace.” This policy was consistent with the political aspiration that South Korea must prevent hostilities in the peninsula and ultimately accomplish reunification. However, most South Koreans remembered the role that China played throughout the Korean War, and there was no denying
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- 143 - that from the South Korean perspective the North Korea-China alliance was a real threat to South Korea’s security during the Cold War. At the same time, most strategists in South Korea knew that one of the reasons why China adopted a policy aiming at stability in the peninsula was that China wanted to take into account the very hope for reunification desired by the Koreans as a whole. Yet, they also knew that such a policy was situated within strategic judgment by the leadership of China that stability in external surrounding environments was essential for China’s national strategy. It is imperative that in the future, China should have the boldness to avoid its current policy in the peninsula as China is content with leveraging influence in the midst of the divide between both Koreas. Furthermore, Beijing should pursue a policy that allows both China and the Korean peninsula to identify and expand common interest. 2) The 2 nd China-South Korea Security Forum The second Security Forum was held in Seoul Korea on the 2 nd of June, 2004. It was supposed to be held in June 2003, but there was a contagious disease named SARS 41 in East Asia. All the passengers are asked not to move country to country in East Asia. In the beginning, the Forum was planned to be held in June 2003, but there was agreement with deferment to next year. The topic of the 2 nd CSKSF was ‘Security Cooperation Regime in East Asia and China-South Korea Cooperation’ and there were sub-titles such as ‘Review of China-South Korea Military Exchange and Search for Future Steps, ‘Future of US-China Relations and Outlook on Security Order in East Asia’ and ‘Impact of the North Korean Nuclear Issue on Stability in Northeast Asia and China-South Korea Cooperation’. 41 It is the short form of the virus disease ‘Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome’ On April 16, 2003, following the outbreak of SARS in Asia and secondary cases elsewhere in the world, the World Health Organization (WHO) issued a press release stating that the coronavirus identified by a number of laboratories was the official cause of SARS.
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- 144 - Japan Factors in the Security Situation in Northeast Asia (Former Professor, Strategy Research Institute, Chinese National Defense University) It seems that both China and South Korea are faced with a new real challenge that requires mutual coordination and cooperation on security issues to be strengthened in present times. This challenge concerns how both Beijing and Seoul can exert joint efforts to make sure that Japan’s policy stays away from division and antagonism and steers toward security assurance for each country in the region and regional stability, and that the security situation in the region works favorably towards cooperation and trust between countries in the region. Since China and South Korea do not have the same position, they differ from each other in terms of policy. However as long as this objective is concerned, China and South Korea are on the same page. Both may play a special role in curbing Japan. Seoul is a critical link in military alliances between South Korea, the US and Japan, and when it comes to Japan, even a single word commented by South Korea could potentially play a critical role that other countries cannot perform in its stead. Meanwhile, Beijing has a close historical relationship with Tokyo judging from a realistic angle, and China’s policy orientation will have a decisive influence on Japan’s interests and attitudes in the region. If China and Korea strive toward overcoming any possible passive elements, we can have an extremely positive outlook on enduring peace and security protection as well as their further development. Challenges Facing the South Korea-US Alliance and South Korea’s Difficult Choice (Director of Asia-Pacific Research Unit, Foreign Military Research Division, Chinese Academy of Military Science) The South Korea-US alliance is a legacy of the Korean War, which resulted from oppositions between the West and the East during the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War and the demise of bipolarization, the South Korea-US alliance has been walking a difficult path of constant changes and attempts to establish an efficient role with regard to security and national defense in new international conditions with the emergence of threats and actors that didn’t exist during the Cold War. However, the military alliance has entered a new transitional phase due to such factors as trends toward multi-polarism and regional diversification, changes in inter-Korea relations and North Korea-US relations. The other factors were changes in relations between South Korea and nations in Northeast Asia as well as the US and nations in Northeast Asia, increased oppositions between South Korea and the US as to the extent to which the South Korea-US alliance is necessary. Release of the Global Defense Posture Review in 2004 and the announcement that 3,600 US soldiers stationed in South Korea are to be deployed in Iraq were other reasons of
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- 145 - change in relations. As such, Seoul has been faced with a dual challenge to make adjustment to her military alliance with the US and to make a series of new and difficult choices. At that time China-South Korea military exchange has witnessed radical exchanges in various areas, including three diplomatic talks between the defense ministers. Essentially, such military exchanges have touched off their military cooperation conducive to regional security, thereby strengthening friendship and fellowship among them. Both countries could have made an attempt to gradually pursue exchanges of military technology based on mutual agreement within an international multi-lateral framework, starting from less sensitive, more comfortable and non-sensitive areas. KRIMA also suggested several ways of tangible military exchanges at the Forum. One among them was to exchange and cross-educate military officers and cadets and institutionalize such initiatives. The other one was to promote military technology cooperation such as military specialist exchanging as well as the research on topics associated with military technology. It was desirable that future military exchanges should be carried out in such a way that transparency might be assured and such military exchange initiatives might be conducive to the cause of peace in the peninsula and security in Northeast Asia. The Future of US-China Relations and the Roles of the USFK (Professor, In Ha University from South Korea) Expanding economic growth since Deng Xiao Ping implemented economic reforms and open-door policies; China has enhanced its diplomatic and economic status in the Northeast Asian region, thereby adding a new element of change to the alliance between Seoul and Washington. South Korea should consider two strategic aims in order to serve both of its national interests – emphasizing the traditional South Korea-US alliance and furthering South Korea-China trade – in a harmonious manner. First, South Korea, as one of the maritime and trade
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- 146 - powers, including Japan and the US would reorganize and update the alliance to one that supports regional peace even after a peace system is established in the peninsula. Second, it should be made sure that the roles of USFK are redefined as a regional balancer so that China may be assured that a new direction of the alliance doesn’t suppose it as an enemy. The roles of USFK based on the realignment of the South Korea-US alliance should not be focused on serving as a means to put pressure on Beijing. Rather, the role should encompass objectives: to deter the WMD build-up, including nuclear weapons, to secure access to sea lines of communication, to contain territorial dispute, and to promote multilateral security cooperation in order to prevent and peacefully resolve regional disputes with regards to race and religion in the Pacific region. Future of US-China Relations and Outlook on Security and Order in Northeast Asia (Researcher, Se Jong Institute from South Korea) The most important thing that factors in future relations between South Korea and China is the US policy on China and Beijing’s reaction to it. The US will continue to pursue an engagement policy on China in order to achieve its stated goal to realign for new world order, as long as Beijing does not infringe upon its critical national interests. In the short- and mid-term, China is likely to focus on recognizing and cooperating on the role of the US as a stabilizer rather than challenging its hegemony, while building a multi-lateral security system. However, a precondition for China pursuing such cooperative policy is that Washington does not intrude China’s critical national interests. One of the top priorities for China with respect to security interest is to deter Taiwanese independence and to resolve Taiwan issues in its own way. Beijing does not want the status quo with respect to Taiwan issues, nor does it want to dramatically disrupt the status quo. In that regard, China can cooperate, to some extent, with the US which prefers the status quo. Thus, cooperation between Washington and Beijing is to be viewed as a temporary cooperative relation aimed at strategic cooperation under the framework of a new international order, and yet allows contradictory positions to exist between them regarding Taiwan issues. At the 2 nd Forum both agreed that China and South Korea should engage in consultation and cooperation as well as close exchange of information and intelligence on the basis of broad common understanding and interest to reach a peaceful resolution of the NORTH KOREA’s nuclear problem. First, China and
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- 147 - South Korea should put forth joint efforts to continue six-party talks. Second, both should devise ways to connect the dismantling of NORTH KOREA’s nuclear facilities with the defusing of North Korean security concerns and make efforts to induce the US, North Korea, and other affected countries to reach a consensus. Third, both should exert joint efforts to dissuade and contain North Korea from worsening current nuclear problems or disrupting stability in the Korean peninsula. China and South Korea should utilise diplomatic wisdom to translate such bilateral alignment to positive force towards a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. Besides, both should continue to respect each other’s interests and diplomatic autonomy. Lastly, a non-nuclear peninsula serves the common interest between China and South Korea only when it is peacefully resolved under the conditions of stability in the peninsula. 3) The 3 rd China-South Korea Security Forum The 3 rd Security Forum was held in Beijing again on the 25 th April, 2005. From the 3 rd Forum, General Tang Tian Pyao headed Chinese delegation. General Tang was recommended as the Representative for Chinese team by the then Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan. The topic of the 3 rd CSKSF was ‘Cooperation for Peaceful Resolution of North Korea’s Nuclear Problem’ and the detailed subjects were ‘Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula and the North Korea Nuclear Issue’, ‘Security in Northeast Asia and the Role of the USFK (United States Forces in Korea)’, ‘Japan Factors in the Security Situation in Northeast Asia’, ‘Challenges Facing the South Korea-US Alliance and South Korea’s Difficult Choice’, ‘The North Korea Nuclear Issue and Prospect of Six-party Talks’ and ‘Direction for Comprehensive Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia’ China-South Korea Relations and the Security Situation in Northeast Asia (Researcher, Chinese Academy of Military Science)
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- 148 - The heads of People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea met in Bali, Indonesia, on October 7, 2003, and announced the Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation among the three nations. The leaders agreed to cooperate in 14 areas of common interest including economic and trade cooperation, cultural and human exchange, politics and security. They also agreed to carry out research, planning, coordination and supervision on tripartite cooperation. On November 27, 2004, the Three-Party Committee adopted the Progress Report of the Trilateral Cooperation in Viang Chan, Laos. The three countries presented accomplishments made in areas such as economic and trade cooperation, cultural exchange, human exchange, and politics and security, and entered into Cooperative Action Strategy of China, Japan, and South Korea. Overall, China and South Korea are the two most vibrant countries in Northeast Asia. They are expected to fulfill themselves in leading progress in regional cooperation, given that they are complementary to each other in terms of economy and have both strong desire and favorable conditions to strengthen cooperation and promote prosperity in the region. The North Korean Nuclear Issue and Prospect of Six-party Talks (Researcher, The Chinese People’s Institute of International Affairs) While the six-party talks were at an impasse, on February 10, 2005, North Korea announced for the first time that it already possessed nuclear weapons and that it would indefinitely stop participating in the six-party talks. This announcement made the prospect of the fourth six-party talks even gloomier. Nevertheless, despite this difficult situation, most participants still have high hopes that six-party talks will resume and have deep trust that ultimately their stated objectives will be achieved through six-party talks. Given such high hopes and deep trust, diplomatic efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through six-party talks continue to be relatively optimistic. Therefore, in so far as the countries concerned continue to discuss real issues with a more earnest and flexible attitude, they will have an absolute possibility to achieve the ultimate objectives of a non-nuclear peninsula and peace and stability in the Korean peninsula in the near future. The Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula and the North Korean Nuclear Issue (Researcher, Chinese Academy of Modern International Relations) It is an important way for North Korea to improve relations with western countries led by the US in order to ensure her own survival and
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- 149 - prosperity. At the same time, under the continued stalemate in relations with the US, the nuclear issue is the only way for North Korea to induce the US to open the door and improve her survival environments. When it comes to North Korea’s intentions behind the development of nuclear weapons, there exist a variety of speculations. However, the first and most important intention is to defend external threats, including those posed by the US by leveraging asymmetric deterrents. The war in Iraq caused NORTH KOREA to learn that the US was able to attack Iraq because she had confirmed beforehand that Baghdad didn’t have nuclear weapons. The second intention is to gain diplomatic, security and economic benefits as needed by leveraging “nuclear” as political bargaining chips against the US. Since North Korea is limited in terms of available resources, “nuclear” is the only capital it possesses in negotiation with US. Since China and South Korea normalised their diplomatic relations, their bilateral relations have made significant progress in all areas. In particular, economic and trade cooperation has deepened rapidly and the countries have become important trading partners for each other. In addition, when it comes to human exchange between them, there was a huge difference between the present and the situation during the time of normalisation. One example was the persistent “China Boom” in Korea and “Korean Wave” in China. However, this did not mean that there was no conflict between China and Korea. Both agreed that each side cannot help but face opposing opinions in some areas. Nevertheless, bilateral relations will further improve undamaged, insofar as both countries cherished a higher-level spirit of China-Korea friendship and adopt consensus of opinion and temporarily excluding differences. Search for Peaceful Resolution of North Korea’s Nuclear Problem (Retired General, Advisory Member, Korea Research Institute for Military Affairs) The North Korean nuclear issue should be resolved in a peaceful manner through dialogue and concession. A pivotal point is that either NORTH KOREA or the US should make partial modifications to difficult- to-accept preconditions for talks and come forward to the dialogue table. The international community should serve as a mediator between them to
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- 150 - ensure that bilateral trust will help North Korea to be free of anxiety about threats to security and that the US will be convinced of nuclear non- proliferation and a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, thereby, setting conditions for resuming six-party talks. One of the key variables in fostering such conditions is the role of China, which should take responsibility for making sure that no disruptions to security and order in the peninsula and in Northeast Asia are caused by the nuclear issue. Making an example of a successful, simultaneous execution of diplomatic appeasement and pressure during the first North Korean nuclear crisis, Beijing should draw out such influential power as demonstrated in the first nuclear crisis to resolve the issue. A non-nuclear Korean peninsula is a status that five countries – Korea, the US, Japan, China, and Russia – sympathize with. As such, they should engage in dialogue aimed at achieving a common interest in Northeast Asia, that is, North Korea’s abandonment of nuclear programs, rather than focusing on extremely nation-centric calculations of interest. The five countries should activate staff-level working groups that will facilitate quick progress in resumed six-party talks in case North Korea comes back to the dialogue table. Security in Northeast Asia and the Role of the USFK (Retired General, Advisory Member, Korea Research Institute for Military Affairs) Since the Bush administration began in February 2001 and terrorists attacked the US on September 11, same year, Washington has implemented the Global Defense Posture Review (GPR) of the US military forces around the world based on changes in security environments and basic strategy. The primary purpose of the GPR is to maintain a posture to rapidly project and concentrate available forces in preparation for terrorist threats and localized conflicts rather than large- scale wars. The GPR is closely related to the outcomes of US military transformation, which has been underway for the past several years. Such US military policy applies, without exception, to the USFK. It is very meaningful that, at this juncture, we evaluate the realignment of the USFK and review how it interrelates with security in Northeast Asia. The ongoing realignment of the USFK has become a driving force to make the South Korea-US alliance a more comprehensive and dynamic one . A strong alliance and the USFK are tremendous contributors to defusing tension and maintaining peace in the peninsula. In the future, Seoul should further solidify a tripartite relationship among South Korea, China, and the US by leveraging South Korea-US alliance as a basic axis.
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- 151 - Direction for Comprehensive Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia (Professor, Seoul National University) It seems that domestic politics in Northeast Asian countries tends towards nationalism. Two good examples are the rise of Japan’s right conservative wing and China’s emphasis on national prosperity and military power. The rise of nationalism, which has domestic political implications, can have detrimental blow to neighboring countries and impede future-centric prosperity. Seoul and Beijing have an absolute common understanding of peace management in the peninsula. Managing smooth relations between South Korea and the US, South Korea and China, and China and the US plays a decisive role for regional peace. The role that Japan plays in Northeast Asia is important as well. We hope that the rise of conservative wing in Japan will not go in a wrong direction. Whether we can overcome increasing distrust between China and Japan and South Korea and Japan will be a key to regional peace and prosperity. It was important to note that tensions between the US and China and potential discord would become direct and indirect causes that should delay the establishment of a peace system in the peninsula and that if hostile relations between China and Japan persist, this could also become a source of tensions affecting security conditions in the peninsula. However, the inter-Korean summit talks in 2000 demonstrated that the destiny of Korea is not always determined by Northeast Asian regional dynamics. Therefore, since South Korea was the only country in Northeast Asia that has maintained amicable and cooperative relations with all the countries in the region through carrying out her northward policy and engagement policy with North Korea which started in the late 1980s, it served as a mediator for cooperation among countries in the region and thereby played a role in shifting toward a security order promoting reconciliation and cooperation. 4) The 4 th China-South Korea Security Forum The forth Security Forum was held in Seoul on the 20 th of June, 2006. From the 4 th Forum, KRIMA was sponsored by government as well as civilian companies. The expense of hosting institute was almost 4 times as much as one of
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- 152 - visiting institute. According to MOU hosting country were supposed to pay all the expenses of conference including lodging of visiting scholars. The topic of the 4 th CSKSF was ‘The US Strategy with Asia and Strategic Repositioning of the USFK’ and Detailed subjects were ‘South Korea-China Security Cooperation in the Emergence case’, ‘Chance of US-Japan Involvement in China-Taiwan Conflict and Its Impact on Security on the Korean Peninsula’, ‘Japan’s Recent Military Trend and Its Impact on Security in Northeast Asia’, Taiwan Independence as Serious Threat to Security in Northeast Asia’, ‘Roles of China and South Korea for North Korea’s Constructive Reform and Open-door Policy’ and ‘Implications of Development in China-Japan Relations for Security in Northeast Asia’. Taiwan Independence as Serious Threat to Security in Northeast Asia (Executive Secretary, Association of Chinese Culture Promotion) China and Taiwan have been in stand-off since the 1950s and have both professed a “One China Policy.” However, circumstances changed dramatically towards the end of Li Deng Hui’s reign and after the takeover of the government by Taiwanese independence supporters led by Chen Sui Bien. In particular, after Chen Sui Bien was reelected as the President, Taiwanese independence separatists attempted, in earnest, to derail Taiwan from “Becoming China” and sever historical, cultural, and blood relations between China and Taiwan by pushing ahead with the “Name Rectification Campaign” the “Correct Taiwanese Name Initiative” and “Taiwanese Cultural Independence Policy.” Besides, Taiwan has maintained commitment to “gradual independence”, established “Taiwanese independent time”, took “legal measures to support Taiwanese Independence” such as “a national referendum” and “constitutional amendments,” thereby intending to gradually separate herself from China. Taiwanese independence separatists have often utilized radical means as used by Germany’s Nazis to launch provocations and instigated emotional conflict between Taiwanese and Chinese people. Besides, these people have been attempting to disrupt exchanges between China and Taiwan in various areas and to sever economic and cultural relations between them including impeding the three links - direct trade, transport and postal ties. The independence movements have become the main
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- 153 - source of tensions as they destroy foundations for promoting peace and pose threats to China’s critical interests of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. As with her stance on terrorism, China, as one of the world’s superpowers, has the obligation to contribute to establishing peace in Northeast Asia. Although special relations between the US and China are to be understood, if Beijing first proactively takes measures to ease military confrontation between China and Taiwan under the banner of economic cooperation, she will not only enhance amicable and cooperative relations with Taiwan and the West, but also receive huge benefits favourable to her economy. The Chinese economy has grown up in a position to influence the global economy. While China-Taiwan issues are important to China, economic issues should also be a higher priority over such issues at a time when the Chinese economy goes through over-expansion. China and Taiwan should further economic exchange and cooperate to resolve issues resulting from the “bubble” economy. As a matter of course, both China and Taiwan should refrain from excessively introducing costly state-of-the-art weapon systems, but channel their energy into economic issues. Japan’s Recent Military Trend and Its Impact on Security in Northeast Asia (Member of Board of Directors, China Arms Control and Disarmament Association) In 1997, the Japanese government declared the principle to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Japan will not process excess plutonium. However, as plutonium materials separated from the nuclear manufacturing industry accumulated, Japan readjusted her nuclear policy and rapidly enhanced her capability to produce and accumulate plutonium. When it is separated and processed, Plutonium is known to be a very sensitive material in the area of nuclear proliferation, and can be used as a material to produce nuclear weapons. The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute located north of Tokyo produces nuclear energy at large processing plants in six areas. By the end of 2004, Tokyo possessed 43 tons of plutonium – 1 ton of plutonium is enough to build 120 nuclear warheads. If all of this plutonium were used to build nuclear weapons, the
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- 154 - country could have 5,000 nuclear warheads. Experts estimate that Japan can possess 60 tons of plutonium by 2010. The amount of plutonium and military industry and technology possessed by Japan make it a nuclear power within a short period of time. Ten years ago, Japan admitted that she could develop nuclear weapons within 183 days, but by now the production time may have shortened. Historically, China-Japan relations have made a tremendous influence on the order of Northeast Asia. Their ties have deepened more than ever before in terms of mutual cooperation and dependence, while they have a mixed loading of conflicts and oppositions over the expansion of their influence power in the region and international community. In particular, close economic cooperation exists between both with respect to trade, investment, and aid. But with the emergence of exclusivist nationalism in China and the implementation of unilateral foreign policy in Japan, bilateral relations have rapidly worsened. This harbours a great potential to escalate into a dangerous and strategic conflict relationship that may negatively influence not only Korea but also Northeast Asia and international order. In the meantime, Korea has been greatly influenced, due to its geopolitical location, by power dynamics involving neighbouring countries including China and Japan. In such power dynamics, the fate of Korean people has been determined by external forces regardless of their will and intent. With the advent of the information and technology age and globalisation, South Korea has broadening latitude in determining her own fate. Such a change means that South Korea is growing to become a dynamic country strong enough to play an influential role in transforming a hostile order in Northeast Asia, including China- Japan relations, into a cooperative order. Depending on the direction in which relations among South Korea, China, and Japan progress in the future, Northeast Asia will be a determining factor in shaping the history of human civilisation.
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- 155 - The US Strategy with Asia and Strategic Repositioning of the USFK (Researcher, Korea Research Institute for Military Affairs) In contrast, the US is trying to respond to terrorism and new security threats in a more effective manner through realignment of her military forces overseas. While on one hand the US is using such military measures to curb China’s challenge to the US hegemony in some degree, she may, on the other hand, take the initiative at diplomatic and military exchanges so that China may be encouraged to act as a responsible member in the international community. The US is reported to take China’s emergence for granted and put a new weight on the fact that military confrontation with Beijing does not necessarily correspond to her national interest. In particular, it is expected that US will prevent “China standing at strategic crossroads” from posing disruptive challenges to the US, while strengthening US-China joint efforts to respond to terrorism and 21 st century security challenges such as natural disasters, including earthquakes, tsunami and bird flu. South Korea-China Security Cooperation Issues in the Event of a Sudden Change (Professor, Kyung Ki University from South Korea) In military terms, South Korea and China should seek a possibility to coordinate directions and means to deter war by discussing differences and similarities between South Korea’s OPLAN 5029 (the combined South Korea-US operation plan that deals with sudden change in North Korea) and China’s emergency response plan in the peninsula to the extent that those plans are made to go public. More specifically, both countries need to review various issues to include regular exchanges of military information and intelligence, military officials’ educational visits, China’s notification of and invitation to joint military exercises such as last year’s China-Russia joint military exercise, strong demand and pressure on North Korea military leadership to abandon nuclear development, condition- based aid of strategic assets to North Korea (such as oil, grains, and cocoastan), and a buffering zone (along the old Korea-Manchuria borderline) to prevent military conflicts between the South Korea-US combined forces and Chinese military in the case of a civil war in North Korea. The current OPLAN 5029 directs that if civil war in North Korea escalates into collision with SK-US combined forces, the military alliance will “go north.” This makes it evitable for Chinese military and the SK-US combined forces to engage in a military collision if Chinese military “goes south”, unless a buffer zone has been established in advance to recognize a South Korea-led war for reunification.
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- 156 - Because South Korea and China have already formed a bond of sympathy to a certain higher degree, and have improved their relations miraculously, they will be able to convince and cooperate with each other to ensure that North Korea may implement a constructive reform and an open-door policy in concert with stability in the Korean peninsula. Both countries have common areas of cooperation when it comes to relations with North Korea. Since they have already been cooperating on various areas for a significant period of time, they will need to proactively implement cooperation on each area in a concrete manner. Officially North Korea has not abandoned her hostile reunification strategy, and continued to engage in “United Front Strategy” by demanding the withdrawal of US Forces in Korea. Only after North Korea gains trust from the Korean government and Korean people, North Korea-US and North Korea-Japan relations should be normalised through restored trust and six-party talks can resume. If North Korea does not act on the basis of trust, but rather continues to use brinkmanship as a bargaining chip, demand economic aid to maximise rewards and pursue the possession of nuclear weapons as fact, it will be difficult to make progress in six-party talks. North Korea nuclear issue can be determined by the logic of international power politics and requires sophisticated diplomatic strategy and negotiation skills. Time table #11 Six Party Talks and Agreements Rounds Period Agreements 27 Aug - 29 no agreement
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- 157 - 1 st round Aug 2003 2 nd round 25 Feb - 28 Feb 2004 Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Peaceful Coexistence of Participating States, stressing the use of mutually coordinated measures to resolve crises and holding the third round of talks with full participation during the second quarter of 2004 3 rd round 23 Jun - 26 Jun 2004 Reconfirming the commitment to denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, stressing specification of the scope and time, interval (between steps of), method of verification and holding fourth round of talks in Beijing before September 2005. 4 th round(1) 26 Jul - 7 Aug 2005 No agreement. U.S. and North Korea have not agreed upon the ‘peaceful’ use of nuclear energy - Verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, observe and realize
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- 158 - 4 th round(2) 13 Sep - 19 Sep 2005 the 1992 Korean Peninsula Denuclearization Declaration, North Korea to agree to abandon all nuclear weapons and nuclear programs and return to the NPT as soon as possible. However, the states still respect North Korea’s stated right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. - The issue of the light water reactors will be discussed “at an appropriate time” - The US and the South Korea formally declare that they have no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. - The US affirmed it has no intention to attack or invade North Korea and will provide a security guarantee to this effect. - The US and North Korea will work to normalize ties, respect each other’s sovereignty and exist peacefully together. - Japan and North Korea will work to normalize relations, in accordance with the Pyongyang Statement by settling historical disputes.
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- 159 - 5 th round(1) 9 Nov - 11 Nov 2005 ‘Words for words’, ‘actions for actions’ for ‘commitment for commitment’ 5 th round(2) 18 Dec - 22 Dec 2006 Separate bilateral talks were made concerning the freezing of overseas North Korean financial assets between the US delegation led by the US Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, Daniel Glaser, and the North Korean delegation led by the President of the DPRK’s Foreign Trade Bank, O Kwang Chol. 5 th round(3) 8 Feb - 13 Feb 2007 North Korea will shut down and seal the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications. In return, the other five parties in the six-party talks will provide emergency energy assistance to North Korea in the initial phase of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, to
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- 160 - commence within 60 days. 6 th round(1) 19 Mar - 22 Mar 2007 The parties restated their commitment to the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 and the agreement of 13 February 2007 and undertook to fulfill their respective obligations under those agreements in line with the principle of ‘action for action’ and five working groups to meet before August to discuss plans for the implementation of the general consensus 6 th round(2) 27 Sep - 30 Sep 2007 Reports from working groups heard and endorsed and Implementation of initial actions of 13 February 2007 Agreement confirmed. List of Second Phase Actions for Implementation of Joint Statement issued 2 October 2007. 7 th round 10 July - 12 July 2008 3 principles related to the system of inspection which are facility visitation, document review and interview with
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- 161 - technicians 8 th round 08 Dec 2008 No agreement because of North Korea’s rejection for sampling test 5) The 5 th China-South Korea Security Forum The 5 th Security Forum was held in Beijing China on the 21 st of April, 2007. The then Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan has invited all the Korean delegations to his hometown Zhengzhou, the capital city of Henan province. All the participants from both countries have toured together almost a week from Beijing through Zhengzhou to Changsha, the capital city of Hunan province, which was the hometown of General Tang Tian Pyao, the Representative of Chinese delegation. The topic of the 5 th CSKSF was ‘North Korea Problems and its Impact on Security Situation in East Asia’ and the detailed subjects were ‘New Trends in North Korea Nuclear Issue and Policy of the U.S.A. for them’, ‘Security Situation in East Asia and South Korea-China Cooperation’, ‘Impact of Strengthening South Korea-US Alliance on Security in Northeast Asia’ and ‘North Korean Nuclear Diplomacy and Six-party Talks’. Security Situation in Northeast Asia and South Korea-China Cooperation (Professor, Military Strategy Research Division, Chinese National Defense University) In order to establish a strategic security relationship between Korea and China for the 21 st century, they should strengthen their bilateral cooperation on security issues in the peninsula on the foundation of their mutual security interest. They should discuss a solution to current issues resulting from their bilateral relations in a mature manner without hostile
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- 162 - actions to each other. Both the countries should also build mature military relations. In order to achieve this goal, they should exchange noteworthy military intelligence, and understand each other’s military strategy and power, and solidify military exchange. Although at present a hotline has been established between their navies, both Korea and China should make efforts to set up a hotline between their defense ministries. Further, they will be able to open a hotline between their military leaderships as they resolve technical issues. Seoul and Beijing are relatively stable, and comparatively speaking, North Korea is unstable. Korea and China should put together their joint efforts to work on unstable factors in North Korea and help each other to respond in a joint manner to contingency situations to include a sudden change of circumstances in North Korea. New Trends in North Korean Nuclear Issue and South Korea-China Cooperation (Chief Manager, Inter-Korean Issues Research Team, Fudan University) As the nuclear issue is going the way that North Korea has intended and planned and the US has made a great turn-around in her policy principle regarding the issue, Korea and China are faced with a new challenge. The US has partially abandoned the multi-lateral principle and restored a bilateral dialogue, which will inevitably result in the worsening and marginalization of six-party talks. North Korea has already fulfilled strategic change in terms of nuclear abandonment. That is, North Korea has moved from realizing security while sticking to nuclear development to exchanging “nuclear abandonment” with security and compensation. When it comes to her nuclear issue, historically NORTH KOREA has been using both hands. One hand involves establishing nuclear development as a strategic objective and utilizing “nuclear possession” as the most important guarantee to obtain national security. The other hand involves acquiring security and material gains through dealing with the US by leveraging “nuclear abandonment” as a nuclear bargaining chip. If the US and North Korea were to normalize their relations while admitting to North Korea’s limited possession of nuclear weapons, China would face the serious issue of worsening circumstances, and as for security conditions Korea would be challenged by security-related asymmetry between North and South Korea and would have to live under NORTH KOREA’s nuclear clouds. Korea-China cooperation has to focus on responding both to the US and North Korea and should prevent North Korea and the US from renouncing six-party talks. Korea and China should also correctly evaluate the situation through more dialogue, and make joint efforts to respond to new issues resulting from a non-nuclear peninsula.
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- 163 - Impact of Strengthening South Korea-US Alliance on Security in Northeast Asia (Researcher, Chinese Academy of Military Science) The Korea-US alliance with Cold War coloring may be an impediment to maintaining peace and stability in the region. It is because this alliance runs counter to a general trend oriented toward “peaceful cooperation and development and coexistence in the region, which is at present prevalent on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Both the Korean and US governments are applying a strong ideological coloring and a Cold War way of thinking in selecting in selecting their security policies. Hence, the Korea-US alliance that should have been weakened and even ceased to exist in the aftermath of the Cold War, rather shows signs of further reinforcement and expansion. Besides, as the Korea-US military alliance expands its scope beyond its current military sector, including non-military sectors and regions outside the peninsula, it is highly likely that this move will become a barrier to peace and stability in the Northeast Asian region. Due to the expansion of the alliance and its potential danger, all neighboring countries in the region may be situated in an unfavorable position. Such a ripple effect will manifest itself more prominently for Korea, who is the party to the alliance, than for any other countries concerned. Eventually, this will not only deliver a blow to strategic mutual trust and advance in long-term relations between Korea and her neighbors, but also make uncertain the achievement of a non- nuclear Korean peninsula and self-reliant and peaceful reunification that the Korea government is pursuing. One of Chinese scholars said that foundations for a stable order to come in Asia include the following: first, establishing peaceful coexistence and co- prosperity; second, canceling overseas military alliances and military bases; third, achieving a non-nuclear Korean peninsula and resolving the issue of North Korea’s security assurance; fourth, resolve disputes in a peaceful manner through dialogue; finally, providing no support for Taiwanese independence by any means. These were typical Chinese arguments. That scholar said only when these objectives are met, enduring peace can be ensured in Northeast Asia. Actually South Korea was also very cautious about strategic flexibility of the USFK. That was very welcomed to Chinese friends. President Roh expressed that the USFK should not be involved in conflicts that may take place in Northeast Asia without
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- 164 - South Korea’s consent. They wanted it could be a firm principle that is not concessible in any case. North Korea Problems and Their Impact on Security Situation in Northeast Asia (Retired General, Advisory Member, Korea Research Institute for Military Affairs) The nuclear issue is an important factor in the Northeast Asian region. Pyongyang aims at achieving a normal relationship with the US by delaying her nuclear abandonment. North Korea’s decision to abandon her nuclear activities will be influenced by progress made in relations with the US. How can we establish a security mechanism in the peninsula and prevent a sudden change of circumstances in the peninsula? This can be achieved through dispelling North Korea’s concerns about system transition to reduce unstable factors and emphasizing to and convincing North Korea’s political and military leadership that China-style reforms and open-door policy are the “best option” to ensure advance in her own system. Both Korea and China should jointly participate in providing positive support to North Korea for her reforms and open-door policy and economic development. Factors that affect stability in the Korean peninsula and the Northeast Asian region include not only the nuclear issue, but also intense military confrontation between the two Koreas, severe economic hardship in North Korea, territorial disputes among countries in Northeast Asia, different views of history in the region, and fierce competition among superpowers in the region. Both China and South Korea have a common interest, that is, stability in the region, and share a broad range of mutual cooperation as they have either similar or identical positions on several important issues. Through discussion at the Forum both side agreed with that; First, both the countries should take joint initiatives towards a peaceful resolution of the North Korea nuclear issue. Second, they should make joint efforts to help North Korea revive her economy. Third, they should jointly suppress Japan’s distortions of history and remilitarisation. Fourth, they should establish multilateral dialogue and negotiation mechanisms in the
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- 165 - region. Finally, they should build a multi-lateral economic cooperation system in the region. 6) The 6 th China-South Korea Security Forum The sixth Security Forum was held Seoul Korea on the 28 th of October, 2008. The sixth Forum was culminated by the Han River boat dinner. At that boat party which was hosted by the then defense minister Lee Sanghee was attended by all the experts from both countries. They talked, drunk and sung together travelling at night on Han River which flows through the Seoul city. The topic of the 6 th CSKSF was ‘South Korea-China Strategic Cooperation Partnership (Direction and Challenges)’ and the detailed subjects were ‘Current Status of North Korea Nuclear Issue, Its Outlook, and Impact on Regional Security’, ‘Inter-Korea Reconciliation and Cooperation Conducive to the Security and Stability in East Asia’ and ‘South Korea-China Cooperation in Non- Conventional Security Areas’. Current Status of North Korean Nuclear Issue, Its Outlook, and Impact on Regional Security (Former Attaché, The Chinese Embassy in South Korea) Six-party talks are the ways that all the participants sympathize with. Also, the baseline has been determined that rewards North Korea according to shutdown of its nuclear programs, or “North Korea’s nuclear shut-down in exchange of rewards.” The participants also strongly sympathize with and adopt the principle of “action for action” and the “verifiable” way, both of which the six-party talks are pursuing. The roadmap for resolving the nuclear issue will continue to progress within the six-party talks framework. As they get into next phases, the six-party talks will face more difficulties and increased uncertain factors. Given the lack of trust between North Korea and the US, either party is likely to drag their feet or run out the clock by artificially controlling the pace of talks. Factors that affect progress in the North Korea nuclear issue are North Korea’s willingness to disable its nuclear programs, US strategy on six-
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- 166 - party talks, a change of government in the US and changes in inter-Korean relations in the peninsula. South Korea-China Cooperation in Non-Conventional Security Areas (Professor, Chinese National Defense University) For the past 20 years China has noticed and researched on the importance of non-conventional security matters, and integrated into the framework of national security in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the SARS events. Non-conventional threats include terrorism, natural disasters and catastrophes, energy security, protection of diplomatic functions and Korean nationals in foreign countries, environmental issues, intelligence threats, international organized crime, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and refuge issues. Since non-conventional security issues complement conventional security issues, studies on non-conventional security issues will help not only expand a viewpoint on comprehensive security issues but also to have accurate judgment on such issues at national, regional and global levels. As for non-conventional security issues, Korea and China share common interests: 1) preventing sovereignty disputes arising from non- conventional security elements, 2) preventing non-conventional security issues that pose threats on economic development and the stability of the people’s living, 3) preventing unexpected situations, 4) establishing a system that handles crisis and ensures security cooperation. Impact of Strengthening South Korea-US Military Alliance and Its Impact on Security in Northeast Asia (Researcher, Chinese Academy of Military Science) While the Lee Myung Bak government emphasizes the strengthening of the Korea-US alliance, the strengthening and expansion of the alliance will have minuscule influence on security in Northeast Asia given the reality that overall advance in Korea-China relations, progress in the complicated North Korea nuclear issue, general stabilization of security conditions in Northeast Asia, and pursuit of peaceful co- development are becoming the mainstream of the regional situation. Although both Korea and China elevate their relationship status to a strategic partnership and open up space for more broad long-term development, the Korea-US military alliance may interfere with China’s internal affairs if the USFK’s strategic flexibility is strengthened so that the USFK, which has focused only on defending Korea within the region, is readjusted to the status of rapid task forces capable of intervening in regional conflicts. While the inauguration of the Northeast security
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- 167 - cooperation system is not based on a precondition of the dissolution of bilateral military alliances, the stronger the Korea-US alliance becomes, the more difficult it may become to maintain mutual trust between countries concerned in the region as well as regional peace and stability. It is because the Korea-US alliance is deeply rooted in a bilateral military alliance during the Cold War era and a particular country among the parties to the multi-lateral security cooperation system is assumed to be a potential enemy. The expansion of the alliance not only strikes a blow to strategic mutual trust and long-term development in relations among Korea and its neighboring countries, but also makes it uncertain to realize the objective of a non-nuclear peninsula and self-reliant peaceful reunification that the Korean government has been pushing ahead with. China argued at the 6 th Forum much about the impact of Strengthening South Korea-US Military Alliance on Security in Northeast Asia. South Korean delegation suggested the role of China in case of a sudden change of events in North Korea. Pan-China Centrism which includes China’s Northeast Asian Project and Southwest Project is often mistaken for Chinese ambition for territorial expansion. It is also claimed that in the case of a sudden change of events in North Korea, China will engage in military intervention, and that China needs North Korea as a buffer zone to avoid direct conflict with the US. In case of a sudden change of events in North Korea, South Korea should be allowed to take the lead in handling the issue since in all respects it is an internal matter within the peninsula, while mass refugee problems, WMD control and international food aid should be dealt with reasonably within an international aid framework including the United Nations. Progress in North Korean Nuclear Issue and Its Impact on Regional Safety (Researcher, Korean Institute for Defense Analysis) The external measures that North Korea took on October 3, 2008, after agreeing to the Second Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement created changes in three aspects: first, to delay the disabling of North Korea’s nuclear programs that Pyongyang promised to implement by December 31; second, for North Korea to report its nuclear
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- 168 - programs and to dismantle its cooling towers; third, to announce the cessation of nuclear disablement and to gain assurance from the US to clear North Korea of the terrorist-supporting country status. As of October 28, 2008, participants of six-party talks including North Korea have reached a consensus on the principle that the North Korea nuclear issue should be resolved peacefully through six-party talks and are satisfied with the current progress. However, there is uncertainty as to whether North Korea will dismantle its nuclear programs completely beyond the “disablement phase.” Three scenarios can be contrived: first, a scenario where the North Korea issue will be resolved completely in a peaceful manner; second, a scenario where a “third implementation discussion” will be at a deadlock, while the parties concerned are satisfied with the “disablement implementation phase”; third, a scenario where six-party talks will end in a rupture and peaceful-resolution efforts will be stranded. If the North Korea nuclear issue goes ahead according to the first scenario, there is a strong chance that China’s foreign influence power will increase and inter-Korea relations will move towards a rapid transition to a peace system, reconciliation and cooperation. If the nuclear issue proceeds according to the second scenario, the US will be able to strengthen its influence on the structure of power dynamics in Northeast Asia. If the nuclear issue proceeds as expected by the third scenario, Northeast Asia will be thrown into chaos. The nuclear issue is likely to face a turning point depending on North Korea’s foreign policies and decisions by a post-Kim regime. The first scenario will be possible only when a single position in the nuclear issue is adopted by all the six-party participants. South Korea-China Strategic Cooperation Partnership (Cooperation Direction and Challenges) (Researcher, Korean Institute for Defense Analysis) China should play a leading role for regional and world order in the mid-term and long-term, and collaborate with South Korea to maintain the security order in the region and promote peace. The summits of Korea and China proclaimed that they would work towards development in inter- Korean relations and have an understanding of peaceful reunification. The two summits agreed to make a joint effort to achieve stability and peace in the peninsula, focus on plans to enhance trust between the two countries, and consider the nuclear issue, the security issue for South Korea, as an important area of cooperation that requires mutual understanding. It is extremely essential to have a mutual understanding of various discussions including high-level talks between Korea and China and to conceive cooperation plans for current issues. In determining plans on military exchange and cooperation, Korea and China should try to improve the level of cooperation in a gradual manner while understanding each other’s situation and position.
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- 169 - With the end of the Cold War era the situation in the Northeast Asian region has treaded the path of dialogue and reconciliation, avoiding the state of confrontation and tension. However, the peninsula as the vestige of the Cold War system still has complex conflict relations between North Korea and the US, both Koreas, and North Korea and Japan. The peninsula, which has long been in armistice, has become an important area which makes a huge impact on the region’s security and its future development. In order to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue, it is necessary to bring together all the countries in the region, and establish a multi-lateral security cooperation mechanism enabling countries in the region to achieve their security interests, thereby strengthening cooperation which considers each country’s security situation. Then, China and South Korea should strengthen cooperation in the future according to a new trend towards strategic cooperation. 7) The 7 th China-South Korea Security Forum The seventh Security Forum was held in Beijing China on the 3 rd of November, 2009. The topic of the 7 th CSKSF was ‘Inter-Korea Relations and Outlook for Korean Peninsula’ and detailed subjects were ‘Direction for Future Development of Inter-Korean Relations’, ‘Non-Conventional Korean Peninsula Security Issues and Inter-Korean Relations’, ‘South Korea-US Strategic Alliance and Stability in Northeast Asia’, ‘The Obama Administration’s North Korea Policy Coordination’ and ‘South Korea-US Alliance Strengthened in the Obama Administration’. Current Status of and Outlook for North Korean Nuclear Issue (Former Attaché to the Chinese Embassy in South Korea)
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- 170 - On October 5, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il conveyed to Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao who was visiting his country that Pyongyang had already modified its position on denuclearization and defined his position to the international community on the denuclearization of the peninsula, while calling for dialogue between North Korea and the US. This was a very important progress towards denuclearization. Such a change of position made by North Korea not only matched the strategy that the US adopted to resolve the nuclear crisis but also concretely revealed the need for China’s responsible and important role. The US has made a policy of carrying forward its dialogue with Pyongyang within the framework of six-party talks and fulfilling “complete, (verifiable) and irreversible denuclearization” through six-party talks. North Korea has clearly acknowledged the Maginot line of the US policy that “NK-US dialogue is possible only within the six-party talks framework.” Yet, North Korea still emphasizes and insists that the purpose of its nuclear development is to deter threats from external forces and to fulfill nuclear balance. Hence, it is expected that many difficulties lie ahead for the process of denuclearization. Comments on North Korean Nuclear Issue (Retired General, Strategy Research Division, Chinese Academy of Military Science) China’s basic position on the nuclear issue is to promote denuclearization and maintain peace and stability in the Korean peninsula. However, the true meaning of a non-nuclear region is diluted because it is claimed even in South Korea that Seoul should set out processing nuclear fuels and assert nuclear sovereignty. The bottom line is that denuclearization is not only an inter-Korean issue but also a concern for the international community that advocates and respects the denuclearization of the peninsula. It should be noted that as for its method and process, denuclearization cannot be achieved through using any non- peaceful, threatening, or violent means, but only through political negotiation within the framework of multilateral and bilateral talks. In addition, it is imperative to establish a new peace system that will replace the Korean War armistice agreement as soon as possible so that a fundamental solution can be reached to the nuclear issue. It is also imperative to abandon hostile relations through the normalization of inter- Korean and North Korea-US relations under such a peace system and establish a new security relationship.
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- 171 - Inter-Korean Relations and Outlook for Korean Peninsula (Deputy Director, Korean Peninsula Research Team, Chinese Academy of Modern International Relations) Since August this year, North Korea has been sending reconciliation messages to South Korea while assuming a peaceful posture towards the neighbor by using a series of appeasement gestures. It is because Pyongyang is hoping to free itself from the sanctions pressured by the international community and see improvements in its external environment. Besides, North Korea must overcome severe economic difficulties to achieve its goal to build “a strong, prosperous and great nation 2012”, which requires close cooperation with Korea and the international community. As a result, Korea is also hoping to break the stalemate by using appeasement gestures. After the end of the Cold War, a bond of sympathy started to develop between two Koreas that neither of them could achieve reunification by force. However, the nuclear issue and constraints caused by the Korea-US alliance have perpetuated regime competition and a struggle for leadership between the two Koreas. Seoul demands Pyongyang to make a promise to abandon its nuclear programs, but North Korea emphasizes that its nuclear issue is not between the two Koreas but between North Korea and the US. President Obama, aiming at a non-nuclear world, flatly professed that one of the preconditions for the improvement of North Korea-US relations is that “North Korea should never develop a nuclear program and engage in further provocations no more.” Accordingly, unless Pyongyang presents a crucial point of compromise, the US will not decrease sanctions on it, nor will it consider normalizing relations with Pyongyang. If South Korea makes a drastic improvement in inter-Korean relations and pushes ahead with bilateral exchanges and cooperation without bearing in mind North Korean’s position and attitude with respect to its nuclear issue, it is inevitable that Seoul will face opposition from the US and see the alliance waver between Korea and the US. Possible Non-Conventional Korean Peninsula Security Issues and Inter-Korean Relations (Professor, Chinese National Defense University) Non-conventional security issues are important factors in ensuring stability in the peninsula, and as such, their influence on security environments should not be underestimated. Idiosyncratic political and military environments and natural and physical conditions can potentially cause a few problems as follows: first, contamination from nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons; second, large-scale contagious diseases; third, food shortage and finally, displaced civilians. Korea and China can ensure their cooperation in non-conventional security areas
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- 172 - while solidifying inter-Korean relations, through strengthening cooperation and dialogue on NBC contamination, enhancing cooperative response systems against large-scale contagious diseases, exchanging expertise, technology and equipment, and providing humanitarian aid. Effective cooperation between Korea and China on non-conventional security issues will help reduce tension in the peninsula, prevent crises and humanitarian disasters, and secure peace and stability at the border and the inland areas, thereby, promoting stability in the region and improving inter-Korean relations. The Obama Administration’s North Korea Policy Coordination (Deputy Director, Peace Development Research Center, China Association for International Friendly Contact) The Obama administration’s North Korea policy faces up to the reality that the previous Bush administration didn’t obtain good results, and tries to handle issues with great agility. Yet, denuclearization is still the central objective of President Obama’s North Korea policy. In particular, while with President Obama’s vision for “a world without nuclear weapons,” the U.S. objective of achieving denuclearization in North Korea is highly unlikely to falter, it is acknowledged that the denuclearization is a difficult objective to achieve. Hence, the US seeks to normalize Washington-Pyongyang relations by adhering to the framework of six-party talks and establishing a direct dialogue channel between them, while targeting the denuclearization as a long-term objective. At the same time, the US intends to push ahead with multilateral cooperation while establishing security order in Northeast Asia through building a hybrid mechanism with other countries. South Korea-US Alliance Strengthened in the Obama Administration (Deputy Director, US Research Team, Chinese Academy of Modern International Relations) As the US has professed its commitment to providing “extended deterrence” by using all possible military means, the Korea-U.S. alliance is moving toward an exclusive, bilateral military alliance that targets as a possible enemy a specific member country of a future multilateral security mechanism for Northeast Asia. This movement may worsen military confrontations between both Koreas and the tension existing in Northeast Asia. Moreover, it influences the efficiency of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia and the prospect of a multilateral security mechanism for Northeast Asia, as it may further destroy trust among a few
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- 173 - countries concerned. The U.S. has made it public that it will continue to provide a “nuclear umbrella” for South Korea, which contradicts its intention to achieve the objective of the denuclearization. This contradiction forces North Korea to assert as a precondition for disbanding its nuclear program the withdrawal of the USFK from South Korea. The most pressing task that faces South Korea and China in promoting growth and peace in Northeast Asia is that both countries should earnestly cooperate and honestly exchange ideas regarding North Korea’s nuclear abandonment and the establishment of peace in the peninsula in time of emergency. While the establishment of a peace system should be discussed in conjunction with the resolution of the nuclear issue, differences in opinions regarding its conditions and directions can be reconciled and discussed among Korea, China, and the US either at the civilian level or through the government level. The promotion of friendship among Korea, China and the US is conducive to security and peace in Northeast Asia, and can serve as a lasting foundation for building a multilateral security system which ensure each country’s safety and growth. Outlook Analysis of North Korea Nuclear Issue (Senior Researcher, Korean Institute for Defense Analysis) It is foremost necessary that Korea understand China’s role at the international level and sympathize with Beijing’s Asia policy focused on “stability in the adjacent region” and “a non-nuclear Korean peninsula.” China needs to understand the security situation that Korea is faced with due to the continuing military confrontation with North Korea and Pyongyang’s adherence to nuclear ambition as well as the necessity that Korea maintains the alliance with the US. Through such mutual understanding, both Korea and China should deepen the depth and width of their dialogue on the nuclear issue. Cultural proximity and economic interdependence between Korea and China will serve as an excellent foundation for extensive dialogue on the nuclear issue.
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- 174 - Direction for Future Development of Inter-Korean Relations (Professor, Korea University) To ensure the future development of inter-Korean relations, it is imperative that policy, legal and institutional frameworks should be established to realize three objectives -- the denuclearization of the peninsula, North Korea’s reforms and open-door policy, and the proper advance of such relations, all of which are required to improve ties and achieve peaceful reunification. It is necessary to adopt a sophisticated approach that organically integrates the reunification objective and the improvement of relations, while making it a higher priority to gradually improve such ties. At the same time, it is necessary to garner understanding and active support from neighboring countries, while pursuing a gradual and stepwise approach to establish conditions for peaceful reunification. China as a chairman country tried to mediate and find middle ground between North Korea and other countries participating in six-party talks, because the nuclear issue had several dual characteristics such as nuclear possession versus denuclearisation and dialogue and nuclear deterrence. But North Korea was stupefying China by making fruitless such efforts made by Beijing since Pyongyang behaved unexpectedly so that it was not perceived to be manipulated by China’s position. Hence, the most desirable plan for both the countries is to cooperate on future changes in the North Korean system, including hereditary succession and to establish a basic cooperation system that prepares against a probable sudden change of events in North Korea. Such efforts could enable more practical and realistic exchanges between the neighbors. If both Korea and the US together with all the countries in the region serve as driving force in accomplishing the missions of the times, that is, to build a peace system in on the Korean peninsula, establish a Northeast Asian security community and institutionalise an organisation that facilitates joint responses to supra-national threats, the Korea-US strategic alliance will contribute not only to stability and peace in the Northeast Asian region but also to China’s national interests.
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- 175 - The China-US Strategic Economic Dialogue as well as tripartite dialogue among the US, China, and Japan led by Washington may have negative influence on the security and fate of the peninsula, if relations become uncomfortable between the US and China or China and Japan. South Korea has no reason to oppose such bilateral or multilateral dialogue among countries in Northeast Asia in that such dialogues promote mutual understanding and improve transparency with regard to military buildup in the region. But considering a historical lesson that the fate of the Korean people was determined by superpowers, such dialogues can also engender negative effects. So, it is desirable that in order to make up for such a shortcoming, the countries directed involved, namely Korea, US and China should pursue a tripartite strategic dialogue. For Korea and the US as well as China, the best strategy is to prevent the occurrence of a sudden change of events in North Korea. However, if for each scenario with respect to a sudden change of events in North Korea, Korea and China had not discussed and agreed to their roles and responsibilities before the occurrence of a sudden change in North Korea, a great chaos and sacrifice would ensue during the actual occurrence of the sudden change of events. Therefore strategic dialogue between China and South Korea is much more needed. Ⅳ. Debates at Security Forum 2002-2009 Each Forum had free debates after presentation. At the debates participants from both countries could talk just freely without themes. In the first Forum Korean participants were very passive to express their opinions. It should be recalled that the Chinese Army and South Korean Army have fought each other at Korean War. Around 400,000 soldiers from China and around a million people in Korea were killed in the Korean War. Almost 50 years, each state has indoctrinated its own people blaming each other’s country bad cruel enemy. So it
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- 176 - was just like talking to enemy at the 1 st Forum. It could not be done to have this sort of free debates between China and South Korea at the governmental level. Therefore, free debates were a good symbolisation to practice the purpose of initiating non-governmental security talks like CSKSF. 1. The 1 st China-South Korea Security Forum China: In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, many factors have surfaced that tremendously impact the international and regional situations. However, since those factors are not yet clear-cut, it remains to be seen how they may influence the stability situation in Northeast Asia. Nevertheless anti-terrorism efforts led by the US have strained inter- Korean relations and caused the emergence of unstable factors. As for South Korea’s engagement policy with North Korea, inter-Korean relations should not be economic transactions, namely, exchanges based on the expectation that money is given in one way and goods are received in another way. Rather, inter-Korean relations should be improved under the notion that we will reap what we sow in the long term, for example, three years. (At the debate of 1 st Forum) It can be understood the circumstances North Korea is situated in. However, when it comes to exchanges with Pyongyang, South Koreans can understand North Korea better than the Chinese. It is because the two Koreas have shared the same culture and wished for reunification for a long time. Seoul has long pursued a “sunshine” policy with Pyongyang, but thinks that North Korea has not reciprocated with expected rewards as a response to South Korea’s “sunshine” policy. It is expected that South Korea will be more understanding to its neighbor instead of changing expectations on or perspectives. In this context, peace and stability in the peninsula can be anticipated only when countries in the region have mutual understanding and make efforts to resolve problems that exist among them in a peaceful way. (At the debate of 1 st Forum) The first Security Forum was hosted by CAIFC (China Association for International Friendly Contact) from China in Beijing. Therefore, Chinese side took part in the masters in conference. At free debates of the First Forum, Chinese
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- 177 - participants led the discussion and expressed their opinions much. Korean participants were not ready to talk and mainly listened to their perspectives. China and South Korea have been involved in cultural and diplomatic exchanges based on the foundation of their mutual cooperation. In particular, economic exchanges and dialogues between both the countries have much grown up than the security talk at that time. South Korea expected that China should pressure North Korea into opening the door to the outside world. South Korea has thought that China can have a unique influence on North Korea, and its uniqueness could have worked effectively. The uniqueness has derived from China’s ability to present realistic proposals based on respect for North Korea’s sovereignty, but it has been slowly discovered by Korean participants through the Forums that it was not so easy for China to tell North Korea what to do. Still US and other Korean specialists are having wrong belief that China can influence North Korea. It was discovered that this perception was wrong. North Korea was too much independent to be influenced even by China. China: Would the US wage a war in the name of anti-terrorism in the Northeast Asian region which has been free of hostilities for the last 10 years? Unless the US ordered a military attack in the region, no hostilities would take place in this region. Seventy-five percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the US comes from services, which are non- physical and derive not from production, but from trust in US Dollars. For this trend to persist, continued trust in USD is needed. The US attracts funding from Asia. When the US remains a formidable force in the region, the USD can have enhanced value. At this juncture, diversification can be an important variable in securing stability in Northeast Asia. (At the debate of 1 st Forum) While it is believed that there are no feasible ways to counterbalance tight relations between the US and Japan, one of the most possible solutions, if any, is to achieve military cooperation between South Korea and China. As much as it has military ties with Washington, Seoul can also build military ties with Beijing. Once the military relations are established, South Korea can serve as the axis of these two military ties,
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- 178 - thereby playing a proactive part in facilitating military exchanges between South Korea and China. This would lead to the following outcomes. First, trust between China and the US would be solidified. Second, the likelihood would be reduced that the US may resort to military force against North Korea. Third, the US could be prevented from attempting to place Japan as a major country. Fourth, economic diversification effects could follow as a result. Fifth, economic and military conflicts would be less likely if such an international system as founded upon a European alliance, an East Asian alliance, and a North American alliance should emerge. Sixth, an economic cooperation system in East Asia could decrease military and economic problems. If a meaningful improvement were not made in establishing a stable security environment in Northeast Asia, maintaining the status quo could be a second-best option. Enhanced military cooperation between South Korea and expanded free economic zones would help to reduce tensions. (At the debate of 1 st Forum) China wanted South Korea to divert from US ties to China ties in military cooperation and they have shown in some way to maintain their perspectives the mindset of Cold War. Even in civil talk like this Security Forum the mindset of Cold War from both sides was serious barriers to exchange the real security interests. It was needed to refresh all the participants from mindset of Cold War and respective government perspectives. There was common ground for criticising Japan, but when it comes to its relations with US there existed big differences. China was much feared from US-Japan ties rather than US-South Korea ties. It was just because of Taiwan involvement with it. China: Neither do we want the US to pursue militarism, nor do we want anti-terrorism to spread to Northeast Asia. Rather, we want the Korean peninsula to be denuclearized. Given that regional conflicts tend to be viewed differently depending on values, it is important to approach them through mutual understanding rather than military engagement. In realistic terms, we can understand and respect Seoul’s strategic decisions to ally with the US in order to ensure its own survival. This strategic position of South Korea should be factored into pursuing military exchanges between South Korea and China. We want South Korea to get involved in military exchanges with China as well as to continue to maintain its alliance with the US, thereby becoming more self-existent. We want China to help
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- 179 - smooth South Korea’s possible initiatives from a larger point of view. (At the debate of 1 st Forum) Progress in inter-Korean relations has tremendous positive effects on the advancement of military relations between Seoul and Beijing. The US pressure on North Korea could also have influence on China’s policy on North Korea. It appears that for several reasons inter-Korean relations have been at a stalemate since the inter-Korean summit talks. We start to have doubt about whether the sunshine policy will persist. It is because the opposing party in Korea is demanding that an amendment be made to the second article of the declaration adopted during the 15 June 2000 inter- Korean summit talks. (At the debate of 1 st Forum) These problems between the two Koreas have undermined China’s influence on the peninsula. Both Koreas are exploiting China as a stronghold to battle over North Korean refugee issues. The North Korean defector problem is causing a stir in China. It is not good to attempt to reduce the influence that the two Koreas can exert by capitalizing on the North Korean defector issue. Rather, Seoul and Beijing should reach solutions to this issue through much negotiation. A dialogue channel is needed to address difficulties that may arise between them. Summit talks between them can increase mutual trust and allay distrust. In addition, the two countries should identify areas of improvement through continuing to provide opportunities for academic exchanges and making sure to engage in a broad range of contacts through exchanging new ideas and perspectives as well as through conducting academic meetings. (At the debate of 1 st Forum) As Chinese participants said, China-South Korea relations, which started off in economic areas, should spread in all directions. The representative of Korean delegation; former Defense Minister Cho Sung Tae laid the foundation for military exchanges between the two countries and in particular, military exchanges in the areas of naval warships were the evidence that military exchanges between South Korea and China have entered a new level of relationship. This Security Forum could become a role model for countries who want to develop relations with all different systems and ideologies. When two countries develop a relationship, this affects all other communities in the countries because it has much to do with each community’s interests. While one should
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- 180 - consider another’s interest based on one’s own interest, at the same time one should not cause harm to another’s interest to further one’s own interest. China: In the early 1950s, China crossed the Aprok River as she committed her army to prevent the invasion of the Korean peninsula by the US. From a geographical and historical point of view on the peninsula, stabilization of peace and building a strong Koryeo race for the future has a lot to do with China. For this reason, China has maintained a consistent position on a peaceful Korean reunification, which is beneficial not only to the Western nations but also to Beijing itself. Both Koreas have been facing a great deal of military confrontation since the Armistice Agreement in the 1950s. Although a 50-year-long Cold War era has ended, there have been no significant changes. (At the debate of 1 st Forum) Yet, some regular changes are observed: in particular, there have been great changes in human exchanges between the two Koreas and economic aid provided by Seoul to Pyongyang. Also, inter-Korean summit talks have made huge influences on relations between the two Koreas. Another difference is that there have been many changes since the solidarity of the Cold War on the peninsula. Especially, China and Korea normalized diplomatic relations and Beijing has secured a unique position with respect to inter-Korean issues by maintaining friendly relations with both Koreas. This was inconceivable during the Cold War. Either from a historical or realist point of view, it is highly unlikely that there may be military conflicts between the two Koreas irrespective of neighboring superpowers. (At the debate of 1 st Forum) It appears to me that for the sake of its interest-seeking, Seoul will not want military conflict with North Korea. At the same time, North Korea is not capable of coping with military conflict by itself. Hence confrontations between the two Koreas should be best understood as a corollary of the Cold War and as a consequence of distrust and misunderstanding resulting from a long division between them. The “sunshine policy” spearheaded by President Kim, Dae Jung is a great way to ameliorate estranged inter-Korean relations and build mutual trust. Human exchanges between them as well as outcomes resulting from South Korea’s economic aid to North Korea will help them deepen mutual trust. (At the debate of 1 st Forum)
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- 181 - It is unlikely that the US will launch military operations against North Korea without negotiation with or support from South Korea. Personally, we are optimistic when it comes to military conflicts in the process of reunification in the peninsula. It will take a long time for one race, which has been separated into two countries and faced with confrontations over half a century, to resolve unfamiliarity between each other with respect to their positions and to build trust with each other. (At the debate of 1 st Forum) Since they normalized their diplomatic relations, China and South Korea have gradually established deepened relations in the context of mutual understanding in the area of politics and much complementariness in the area of economy. Traditionally, both the countries have maintained friendly relations and have signed and upheld the 1961 Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. This treaty is unique in that it is the only treaty of such a nature established by two countries among neighboring countries in the region. China’s aid to North Korea of food and energy as well as mutual exchanges of materials are favorable to improving inter-Korean relations and to easing relations among countries in Northeast Asia. (At the debate of 1 st Forum) Does China want Korea to be reunified? Yes, they are expressing their formal position that way. But many Korean scholars were suspicious of that. Because Korean scholars think that Korean reunification will not be benefiting the Chinese security interest. At the debate of the first Forum Chinese scholar said ‘I believe that ultimately the two Koreas will be able to realise inter-Korean reconciliation and national victory through establishing relations based on mutual respect, understanding and exchange. The Korean race, which is united through reunification, can contribute much to peace and advance in Northeast Asia and the Asian Pacific region as well as make a big contribution to changes in the picture of the region. Eventually, this will benefit China’s safety to a great extent.’ China: I would like to address how the US affects the region as it pursues its own absolutism. Currently, those opposed to President Clinton’s policy
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- 182 - on North Korea are leading U.S. policy and implementing its absolutism in East Asia. Also, all countries around the world are keeping abreast with such a policy. In this respects, the security condition in Northeast Asia can be viewed as stable. However, it can be viewed as unstable in other respects. U.S. policy on East Asia is inaccurate. In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the US has wielded its power, transforming from a military superpower to a political superpower. From a short-term perspective, the US appears to have changed its policy. However, judging from its long-term policy, the US has not changed at all. (At the debate of 1 st Forum) Chinese side worried about that the Korea-US alliance would seek and achieve reunification with North Korea through absorption. Minister Cho said ‘South Korea and China are on an equal footing in pursuing stability in the peninsula, China and South Korea will work together to handle the US move towards shaping its TMD policy’ Talking to US strategy in Korean peninsula, Korean participants now started opening their mouth. Because they felt that there was a need to explain Chinese participants about the fact. South Korea: The core of US security strategy is centered on its policy on China. Washington believes that from now on it has to set up its policy on China because Beijing is likely to outstrip the US in 20 to 30 years not only militarily but economically. How does China evaluate this position and what kind of counter-measures can she take against such a perception as demonstrated by the US? (At the debate of 1 st Forum) China: While other countries predict that China will outstrip the US, China will not have enough time to do so. It will take a long time for such a prospect to be realized, as evidenced by the fact that China only recently made it to the FIFA World Cup. China is a country which is still developing. Although it appears that the core parts of China have made a great advance, visits to the interior and western parts of China would give
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- 183 - you an impression that China is still developing. In my opinion, China, with 1.3 billion people, will not be a country which is most advanced in 20 to 30 years and even in 50 years, but a country which is a little more advanced than are other developing countries. China will have to do its best to continue its advancement, but it also has to ensure close relations with neighboring countries. The US is building a policy that will prevent China from growing to be stronger and increasing its influence in Northeast Asia. As far as we know, instead of waiting to implement such a policy until China becomes a little stronger, which is a more desirable option, Washington is trying to drain China’s energy beforehand by proactively shaping an international environment that will exhaust China’s influence. (At the debate of 1 st Forum) There were always controversies on China growth. China always said that it would take a long time for such a prospect to be realised. They always argued China is a country which is still developing. The Theory of China Threat was discussed within the context that as Japan built up its military forces, China would do the same. They say China as a threat based on the assessment made by the United States. There were also other opinions about that. It was out of concern that military superpowers among neighbouring countries surrounding the Korean peninsula might make false judgments that might create a situation in which the Korean peninsula could be implicated in. In that sense, balance was needed and should be promoted surrounding the Korean peninsula. It was true that China has made a great advance and gave Westerners the strong impression. China argued that she is one of developing countries but she is going totally different speed than other developing countries. Lately, China has shown the incredible speed of advancement in economic and social welfares after 2008 Olympic Games. South Korea was told by US frequently that they would prevent China from growing to be stronger and increasing its influence in Northeast Asia. Both were afraid each other and waste defense expenditure together. South Korea could play some role for that respect. South Korea might have both China and US find the real fact of fear and facilitate the cooperation between both countries.
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- 184 - South Korea: Prior to German reunification, West Germany exerted great efforts to promote amicable relationships with neighboring countries, garnering support from them regarding the necessity of German reunification. One outcome was that Hungary opened its border for the mass exodus of East Germans, and this provided a good opportunity for the two Germanys to achieve reunification. Could China, like Hungary, take a comprehensive and embracing position on North Korean defectors? (At the debate of 1 st Forum) China: North Korean defectors are an issue about which the Chinese government is cautious because three elements intersect, namely, its relations with other countries, its internal stability and international humanitarian significance. Beijing has one relationship with North Korea and another with South Korea, respectively. The question is whether Seoul can accept North Koreans defecting to China in a situation where Pyongyang does not recognize them as displaced and if it did, North Korea would collapse? The increase in the number of defections is attributed to the degree of tolerance by (China’s) policy. The policy is that since defectors are those who had problems in the country, they should be “left alone to go to South Korea if they want to.” As in the past Mr. Hwang Jang-Yup left North Korea defectors alone, China does not bother to arrest defectors. For North Korea, it is not always a bad thing to have defectors, but rather it could be a good thing. (At the debate of 1 st Forum) Therefore, China, while being cautious about this issue, is trying to take proactive actions. If North Korean defectors wanted to go to South Korea and the headcount reached 100,000 or 200,000 people, all of whom wanted to go to Korea in a situation where China didn’t actively prevent them, Beijing could let them go. However we are not certain if South Korea would have enough capacity to accommodate all such defectors. Although Seoul is said to build North Korean refugee centers to accommodate them, we believe that this is not possible. Currently, defectors are smuggling themselves into China due to the economic hardships that they are faced with. Since their primary reasons for defection are money-making and subsistence, Pyongyang doesn’t consider it as a societal problem, and waits for them to come back. Rather, many problems are caused by NGOs in Korea. If we were Chinese government officials, we would tell all North Korean defectors to “go if they want to.” (At the debate of 1 st Forum)
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- 185 - It has been 20 years since China and South Korea established diplomatic relations. It seemed that the relations have grown such that there was no issue that the two countries could not discuss. Given that they were at war in 1950 and military exchanges were limited to North Korea and China on one hand and South Korea and the US on the other hand, it was extremely meaningful that both the countries have gathered together to discuss security issues at this 2.0 track. Now venue has been prepared so that both countries did not need to cover up, but open up to consult each other on any issues of mutual interests. At the first Forum Chinese and Korean incumbent and retired officers convened at the academic conferences to discuss issues on the regional area. Scholars from both South Korea and China have put forth many ideas ranging from military, politics and economics affecting both nations. These scholars’ expertise was conducive to comprehending each other and improving the relations between both. 2. The 2 nd China-South Korea Security Forum At the second Security Forum, 15 papers were presented from China and South Korea. The first theme was the North Korean nuclear issue. Many of them had addressed issues with respect to the nuclear status, i.e., ‘North Korea herself insists that she is a nuclear state and the CIA has made it public that North Korea does possess nuclear weapons.’ Whether or not to recognise North Korea’s nuclear possession was an important foundation for mapping out appropriate measures. And the second theme pertained to China’s role. An increasingly greater perception was spreading across the world that Beijing was playing the most outstanding and biggest role at the six-party talks. After all, it has begun to propose and implement aggressive policies different from the past. So debates between both side’s participants were mainly the role of China for North Korea
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- 186 - Nuclear. Six party talks have pursued a solution to the nuclear issue through the on-going, peaceful dialogues. Though they were nearing a feasible solution, they had not yet discovered a clue to the resolution of the problem. South Korea: We understand China’s roles and hopes when it comes to a peaceful resolution of the issue. If this nuclear issue should not be resolved peacefully and hence North Korea should conduct nuclear tests or possess nuclear weapons, what kind of North Korean policy would China pursue? It would be appreciated to hear from Professor Ban Jin Kang or others that have thoughts on this possibility. (At the debate of the 2 nd Forum) China: First, we would say that such a negative assumption might not be very desirable. Rather, we would promote a resolution of the issue in a positive direction. The North Korean nuclear issue should be resolved under the principle of concession based on equality and mutual respect. The resolution has to be made gradually and the timing has to be determined professionally. That is, there are problems to pursing a resolution modeled after Libya’s nuclear case. Efforts should be made to resolve the North Korean issue in a positive direction under the principles of joint efforts, mutual equality, and mutual respect. (At the debate of the 2 nd Forum) China: The nuclear issue is something that everyone is paying attention to at present. There are three big questions. First, will North Korea possess nuclear weapons? Second, what will be her intention and purpose if she possesses nuclear weapons? Third, will it truly declare the renunciation of the nukes if terms and conditions of mutual benefit are reached? The current estimate by South Korea and American experts is that North Korea has already produced early-stage nuclear weapons or possesses technology to produce such weapons. However, many military experts around the globe question whether it was able to produce nuclear weapons without nuclear tests or sophisticated technology. Since there is no compelling evidence that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, i.e., there is no evidence that it has accumulated nuclear
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- 187 - technology through simulation games or mock tests, or conducted nuclear tests, we are skeptical about possession of nuclear weapons. The second thing that we are wondering about is what North Korea wants from possessing nuclear weapons. It is a bargaining chip for the country to use on the negotiable table as a part of the brinkmanship tactics. In other words, its nuclear development or possession means the pursuit of her strategic interest. The third question is what conditions it is demanding with the development of nuclear weapons. North Korea desires economic gains, regime assurance and neighboring powers’ approval as a reward of giving up nukes or suspending nuclear development. We suspect that it may abandon such weapons if she thinks that strategic benefits arising from such demands in exchange of nuclear development abandonment are bigger than those from maintaining the nuclear program. (At the debate of the 2 nd Forum) Chinese scholars feel that there was inequality between US and North Korea. Frankly speaking they were saying US did not respect North Korea. They esteemed that those inequalities was the main reason for producing nuclear weapon by North Korea. As the chair-state China was uneasy for no progression on Six-party talks. So they said it has to be made gradually and the timing has to be determined professionally. There was also controversy on whether North Korea had nuclear weapons or not. Most of Chinese participants were suspicious about North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons. They said it was not able to produce nuclear weapons without nuclear tests or sophisticated technology. But both sides agreed with that North Korea nuclear was a bargaining chip for the country to use on the negotiable table as a part of the brinkmanship tactics. North Korea developed nuclear weapon because of economic support and regime assurance approved by neighboring powers. It could be solved easier by flexible civilian channel rather than by rigid governmental channel.
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- 188 - China: Why does China play proactive roles at the six-party talks? Why is China helping to resolve the nuclear issue? There are a few reasons as follows: First, the coming 21 st century is a very important time for China’s modernization in the next 50 years. And Beijing observes that the years between 2001 and 2020 provide strategic opportunities to achieve national development. For China to capture such strategic opportunities, various internal measures should be pursued, including economic development, reforms and open-door policies. Second, external conditions such as stable and peaceful international environments need to be established for it to facilitate internal development. This strategic interest is a whole aim China has been pursuing in the course of her national development processes. Establishing economy and shaping international conditions are long-term objectives, and other foreign policies are subordinate to its national development policy. China’s policy to shape peaceful and stable international environments can be summarized as follows - it takes root in the Asian Pacific region, while stabilizing her surroundings. This again is the key tenet of Beijing’s foreign policy. One of the fundamental reasons that it participates in six-party talks and is anxiously engaged in resolving the nuclear issue goes along with the same line. There is one question for the Korean side. The US claims that it wants to continue to get ahead with the missile defense plan because of North Korea’s nuclear threat, but this is nothing but an excuse. In my opinion, the US-led missile defense plan purports to place Taiwan under the influence of the US. Hence, if such a motive persists, China’s roles in six-party talks should be considered to a certain extent. Many of you shared your thoughts on the South Korea-US alliance and US-Japan alliance. China maintains the principle of a peaceful reunification as a mode of reunification and the One China policy. However, if circumstances are such that a peaceful reunification principle is not feasible, China is willing to resort to a method of reunification by force. In any case a peaceful reunification of Taiwan and China is most desirable and most beneficial to both countries. However, if the separation movement which is currently taking place in Taiwan should spread any further, this would inevitably force China to pursue a reunification by force. My second question pertains to how Japan and Korea as allies of the US would respond to a situation where the US should get involved in an unfortunate war in the Taiwan Strait. (At the debate of the 2 nd Forum)
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- 189 - South Korea: First, we would like to elaborate on South Korea’s position regarding the missile defense program. It was stated that although China would not think of North Korean nukes as a threat, that could work as an actor that provokes the US to establish the defense program, something that would include not only Korea, the US and Japan but also Taiwan. As far as we know, Japan has clearly relayed its official position to the US that it will participate in the defense program, and the two countries are putting forward joint efforts. As far as we know, Taiwan’s position is yet to be important. We want to emphasize that Beijing should not put a light on Seoul in the light of its forward-looking attitude towards the One-China policy. We are telling this to you because we heard it mentioned that South Korea’s participation in the missile defense may be connected with the enhancement of China’s constructive roles in six-party talks. The roles that Beijing is playing in the talks certainly benefit South Korea to a large extent, but they also give benefits to China. A while ago, a good point was raised that stability in the neighboring countries is one of the most important things conducive to the maintenance of China’s national power. Someone has also made a comment on South Korea’s position with respect to a potential military conflict between China and Taiwan. First of all, we need to lay out one major premise. You have mentioned that since China perceives the Taiwan issue as an internal affair, it would be set to wage a war against Taiwan by using force. But that is just China’s position. If we take a realist international perspective on this issue rather than viewing it as a legal matter, we need to pay attention to a provision stipulated in the US domestic law and the relevant Taiwanese law that Taiwan will receive support if it comes under attack in time. Japanese National Defense officers asked “in case of emergency, which side will Korea be on?” This proves that Japan perceives China- Taiwan relations as an international matter and considers them as related to its national interest. This is completely my opinion, but in case of emergency involving, Seoul’s policy decision will have to consider two aspects: on one hand, in accordance with the South Korea-China diplomatic normalization declaration ‘Taiwan is part of China’ and on the other hand, the policy decision requires coordination with the USFK within the framework of the alliance with the US. This is my personal opinion, but South Korea is unlikely to strongly devise plans against this issue. (At the debate of the 2 nd Forum)
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- 190 - In a joint statement for China-South Korea diplomatic normalisation in 1992, South Korea not only recognised the One-China policy but also included in the statement ‘Taiwan should recognise China’ a phrase that even the US did not endorse. With respect to the Tibet issue, US, Japan and even Taiwan invited the Dalai Lama for visits. However, South Korea has not extended invitations to the Dalai Lama because of China’s earnest request. South Korea and US differed from each other regarding the status of the defence programme within the South Korea-US combined defence system. Seoul’s basic position on the missile defence programme was that it was to be carefully approached in a way that enabled not only stability and peace in the peninsula but also Northeast Asian stability and peace including peace in China. South Korea’s basic position on the Taiwan issue has focused on supporting One-China policy more earnestly than any other country in the region. South Korea: I have one question. It is desirable that the armistice system be upgraded to a peace system. In the course of transition to a peace system 53 years since the Korean War, it is important to note that China is a signatory of the Korean War Armistice Agreement. Recently, North Korea has begun approaching a peace agreement with the US and Korea, but it has not included Beijing in this conversation. As we are moving from an armistice system to a peace system, what is China’s position? We would like to hear some thoughts on this. (At the debate of the 2 nd Forum) China: The Korean War broke out within the context of the then- international circumstances way before the Armistice Agreement was signed. As a signatory to the Agreement, China has an important role to play in moving from the Agreement to a peace agreement. When it comes to changing it to a peace system, Beijing’s major position is that it will surely respect the strategic interests of all the countries concerned and the transition should take place in such a manner that ensures long-term and enduring peace. In what manner should enduring peace be ensured? First of all, efforts to ensure enduring peace began at the Geneva Conference in 1954.
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- 191 - Attempts were made to ensure peace at the Geneva Conference, but in vain. Recently, similar attempts were put forth through the framework of talks. These attempts may make it possible to ensure peace. By engaging in the talks, China will continue trying to change the Agreement to a peace treaty in one way or another. Either through talks or a multilateral framework, Beijing will definitely play certain roles. It was mentioned that China does have roles to play in the transition to a peace treaty. Such attempts to upgrade the Agreement to a peace agreement have been continuously made since the Geneva Conference, but have not been successful. Discussion on transition to a peace treaty seems possible within such frameworks as six-party talks or multi-lateral arrangements. (At the debate of the 2 nd Forum) Both China and Taiwan, and South Korea and North Korea are truly unfortunate countries because of the tragic division. Chinese scholars made a consistent claim that China would play a leading role in ensuring peace in the Northeast Asian region and resolved issues in a peaceful manner. However, when it comes to Taiwan, China avoided talking about peace and goes, so far, as to say that it would achieve reunification by force, if required. This claim was anything but different from South Korea saying that it would reunify the two Koreas by force as necessary, if North Korea did not listen and behave, although the only difference was that North Korea is a larger country than Taiwan and is more equal to South Korea than Taiwan is equal to China. Nobody was sure whether there will be reunification or not. It sounded like China interpreted the situation to her own advantage. China side asked a question as to how South Korea would respond to a war between China and Taiwan. Korean side also asked a similar question as to how China would respond if it resorted to a war in order to achieve reunification in Korean peninsula. Korean participants argued China could rightly assess North Korean regime in the current status of inter-Korea relations.
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- 192 - China: We want to reemphasize that there are two aspects of China’s solution to the Taiwan problem. First, its principle is not to use force right away, but to resolve it in a peaceful manner. The second aspect is that Beijing intends to attempt at peaceful reunification, but if it doesn’t work, i.e., Taiwan seeks independence; it will not exclude an option to use force. It will be good to understand this principle to mean that China gives the highest priority to the peaceful resolution with a focus on peaceful reunification rather than to mean that China intends to mobilize force as a solution to the problem. (At the debate of the 2 nd Forum) China: As far as the provision that China will not give up the use of force in resolving the Taiwan problem is concerned, much can be inferred from Chinese leaders’ comments on Taiwan’s recent presidential election. First, China will make her best efforts to reunify with Taiwan in a peaceful manner. Second, if Taiwan intends to seek independence, Beijing will make sure that the other will pay the price for it. Two remarks are noteworthy. Currently, the US is pressurizing China not to use. This is an interference with domestic matter. The ultimate decision to resolve the issue peacefully or by force is up to the Chinese leadership. We don’t think the US has the right to intervene or comment on the domestic issue. For the same matter, using force could be an option to reunify the two Koreas. When it comes to reunification with Taiwan, China’s constitution stipulates that the People’s Liberation Army of China has the obligation to defend the country and its territory. It also stipulates that if Taiwan tries to go independent, China has the obligation to deter the move. (At the debate of the 2 nd Forum) As for the US-Japan alliance, Chinese side said that its nature was changing as Japan has established a Surrounding Areas Law – a country which has a history of invasion in Asia. But they said South Korea-US alliance has not gone through such functional changes as to establish laws like that law. Given that experiences with invasions by Japan, both China and South Korea had a common
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- 193 - understanding in many respects and were likely to have a high chance of mutual cooperation in the future. 3. The 3 rd China-South Korea Security Forum Starting the debate of the 3 rd Forum, one of Chinese scholar asked whether it is possible that the USFK (US Forces in Korea) can be deployed without the permission of the South Korean government in the event of military conflicts surrounding the Taiwan issue. It was a very provocative and meaningful question. All the Korean participants thought there were serious misunderstanding on strategic flexibility of USFK but Chinese participants were very sincere on this issue. South Korea: The US has spearheaded a new strategic initiative, and realigned the USFK in accordance with this initiative. This change has made it possible for some portion of the USFK to be deployed in Iraq. However, South Korea did not agree to the commitment of the USFK in the event of conflicts in Northeast Asia, including those between China and Taiwan. The South Korean government doesn’t approve of the strategic flexibility of the USFK. This is an issue that SK and the US should consult each other as the role of the USFK changes. Our president has said that South Korea cannot accept a new role of the USFK deploying to an area beyond the Korean peninsula if it doesn’t serve South Korea’s national interest. It is true that our congress and people have concerns about issues affecting China, including the Taiwan problem. The primary focus of the South Korea-US alliance is on deterrence against North Korea’s threat. (At the debate of the 3 rd Forum) China: It makes sense that President Roh wants South Korea to be a balancer in the Northeast Asian region. But this seems to contradict the fact that the country has no alliance relationship with other US allies or is not an ally of China, doesn’t it? (At the debate of the 3 rd Forum)
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- 194 - South Korea: The South Korea as a regional balancer perspective is being questioned in the country as well. The two central questions are whether South Korea has the actual capability to serve as a balancer in Northeast Asia and whether it can play a neutral role by running the risk of the South Korea-US alliance. The regional balancer neither implies that Seoul will weaken the SK-US alliance nor suggests its neutral role. Rather, it will pursue dynamic security relationships with neighbors in an amicable way and in the long-term perspective, thereby serving as a regional balancer not militarily but diplomatically. Also, South Korea serves as a regional balancer to proclaim the commitment to ensuring stability and maintaining peace in the peninsula (At the debate of the 3 rd Forum). The regional balancer perspective was proposed due to combined effects of South Korea’s historical background and strategic vision for the future. This perspective reflects its strategic vision that the peninsula will not be left subordinate to other neighboring countries and will play preventive roles in the future. To achieve this, South Korea will shape conditions to enable this vision not as a force-based balancer but as a role-based balancer. Contrary to the way how superpowers in Europe maintained the balance of power, South Korea, while maintaining the fundamental framework of its alliance with the US, will garner public opinion and consult neighbours. Hypothetically speaking, should tensions escalate in the peninsula due to conflicts and confrontations between China and Japan, deterrent power greater than the South Korea-US ties would be needed because the alliance itself could not be enough for a deterrent. In the 1980s, China and the US forged a cozy relationship to execute a joint strategy against Russia. South Korea did not normalise diplomatic relations with North Korea because China as an ally of North Korea was considered a potential threat, but desired to be on good terms with China because a friend of the US could be South Korea’s friend as well. In order to maintain the South Korea-US alliance while improving South Korea-China relationship, South Korea should serve as a balancer facilitating the
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- 195 - strategic common understanding between China and US. There should be some strategic leverage that South Korea can utilize in achieving the role of balancer between China and US. South Korea anyway should keep alliance with US without hampering China-South Korea relationship and develop China-South Korea relationship without undermining South Korea-US alliance (Kim 2005: 130). China: The root cause of the nuclear issue lies in misunderstanding of the North Korean system. North Korea is a reunification partner and the people are compatriots. We would like to ask Korean participants to share the Korean military’s assessment of North Korea’s internal conditions based on the SK-US combined Operations Plan to the extent that it is not confidential. (At the debate of the 3 rd Forum) South Korea: Professor Chang mentioned that as one who has tied a knot must untie it, North Korea holds the key to resolving the nuclear issue. It is imperative that Chairman Kim Chong Il take a bold measure. No countries participating in the six-party talks are sympathetic with Pyongyang, and all of the five countries agree upon the grand principle of a nuclear-free peninsula. Under no circumstances is the possession of nukes favorable to North Korea. North Korea’s declaration that she possesses nukes runs counter to what is considered to be common sense and militates against her. We would like to hear from Chinese partners who may have visibility on the inside story of North Korea through regularized contact as to why it runs counter to common sense, which South Korea does not understand. (At the debate of the 3 rd Forum) South Korea has a complete assessment of North Korea’s military threat, and has the perfect preparedness against it. Inter-Korea exchanges are flourishing, but reduction of military tension through building confidence measures is insignificant. If South Korea provides energy assistance, North Korea may divert that assistance to strengthen her military power. South Korea cannot allow that possibility to happen. While the military authorities of both Koreas, including the
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- 196 - Defense Ministers, agreed on confidence-building measures, they have not been implemented. China: North Korea as a Cho-sun style socialist country based on Juche idea has responded to international pressure not by succumbing to international game rules but by developing nuclear weapons so that she will ensure security. In the post-Cold War era North Korea’s economy collapsed, and has been confronted with natural disasters and economic system limitations. Given such circumstances, Pyongyang has been trying to convince the US, Japan, and South Korea to lift their economic sanctions and let it receive assistance from the international community. Since North Korea desires to employ talks to receive economic aid, she is likely to return to the framework when she is sure that economic aid will be certainly provided. (At the debate of the 3 rd Forum) South Korea: The South Korean government has a hard time devising a clear North Korean policy guideline with respect to the nuclear issue. Seoul expects that if it relied on a US approach, Pyongyang would be strongly opposed to that, but if it considered the North Korea’s position, it would be criticized for not understanding North Korea’s South Korean policy. China should dissuade North Korea from taking SK hostage and convince it to give up its strategy to communize SK. (At the debate of the 3 rd Forum) 4. The 4 th China-South Korea Security Forum The dynamic structure of East Asia can be best described as a two- superpower or multipolar system. It is partially because there seem to be much bigger misunderstandings with regards to each other’s perspectives between China and US. The misunderstanding manifests itself as overestimation or exaggeration of the threat from each other. Experts should meet face-to-face to share assessments and opinions through flexible dialogues. Military exchange and
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- 197 - cooperation between the countries has not yet got on the right track. There also existed some sources of misunderstanding regarding USFK strategic flexibility, which can be resolved through dialogues. The lack of reciprocity is a big problem. It is imperative that strategic dialogues between China and the US, between China and South Korea should be regularised. Stability and peace in East Asia is a national objective and strategic objective for all the countries in the region. In order to achieve this, they should create opportunities to keep the same pace with one another. At the debate of the Forth Forum the emergency happenings in North Korea and how to manage it was sincerely discussed. Basic assumptions surrounding the case of emergency were that it follows not because of North Korea’s provocations but because of the collapse of its regime, civil uprisings or political upheaval. Both sides agreed with that the surrounding countries should focus their objectives on stabilising North Korea or putting it back to order, but not on trying to exploit those situations as opportunities for their national selfishness. Should they try to exploit those opportunities for the sake of reunification or interference, they would eventually hurt their own security interests. The perspective of neighboring countries should direct towards stability and peace on the peninsula. South Korea: Chinese scholars have mentioned that the stabilization of North Korea is important and nobody is opposed to a stabilized nation. Neither the South Korean government nor its people want a war. No one wants a mass flux of North Korea defectors into South Korea. Should the defectors pass across Yap-Rok and Doo-Man Rivers, what would you do about it? South Korea is in the same shoes. When it comes to what is North Korea’s stability, we think that there are two things that need to be made clear. First, stability differs depending on whether we view it as a peacetime concept or as a contingency concept. What is a peacetime stabilization concept? Literally speaking, this means change in North Korea. Why do
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- 198 - you guess Kim Chong Il went to China early this year? Why did China show him around special economy zones, Guang Dong province, and Shinchen region? Wasn’t it because China wanted to show him that even if his country could not implement reforms and an open-door policy as China did, it should no longer continue the way things have been done in North Korea. Wasn’t it because Beijing wanted to tell him that the neighbor could not be sustained anymore? Didn’t China want to tell him that Pyongyang also had to sustain itself to enable stability? In that sense, stability refers to autonomous change by North Korea, not assistance to it. Assistance has limitations. North Korea has been helped and now what are the outcomes? Nuclear capabilities have been developed and missiles launched. Accordingly, the true meaning of what North Korea means by stability is its system security. Could regime security be the same as system security? If we regard the Kim Chong Il regime’s internal reforms and open- door policy as signals of instability, it eventually is not North Korea’s system security. For this reason, the South Korean and Chinese governments made it clear that they wanted North Korea’s system security. In that regard, the regime has to change. The regime, although not pursuing a Chinese-style or a Soviet Union Perestroika-style change, should not be the way it has been for long. Such current problems as defectors, economic devastation, foreign currency forgery, drug export, missile launches, and nuclear tests will drag North Korea into self- destruction. All these problems deserve attention for the interest of China as well. Stability is a peacetime concept as well as an emergency concept. A scenario may arise in North Korea, which neither China nor Korea has anticipated. For example, an incident may take place similar to the December 6 Incident and December 12 Incident in South Korea 25 years ago, or China’s Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989. Or it may be like the Ceausescu Incident in Romania in 1991 or the Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Such incidents can happen without warning. What are we supposed to if they happen so? Now, China and South Korea may have conflicting interests over this type of issue, and the latter may consider making an unwanted intervention. It is highly likely that chaos in the North Korean army will eventually cause accidental conflicts between the Koreas. If it happens, South Korea, the US, China, and other countries concerned need to find ways to make sure that no damage is made to the national interests of each country. We also need to cooperate so that all countries concerned may have a joint system in place. (At the debate of the 4 th Forum)
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- 199 - Every country establishes and implements its own security policy and deterrence against war and preparedness is of primary importance. More substantially, turning an international environment that can be threatening to security into a peaceful condition can be another principle. From this viewpoint, South Korea is a country which has experienced many misfortunes throughout history. With unsolved Cold War problems, it yearns to find solutions to the problems in the 21 st century. China’s national policy is to make it emerge as a Great China by 2025. Likewise, South Korea wants to achieve reunification as fast as it can, and as China emerges as a Great China, South Korea wants to be a reunified, peaceful country, if not a great country, that coexists side by side with China. The controversial issue of the debate at the forth Forum was the concept of strategic flexibility of the USFK. It emerged as part of comprehensive alignment of the US global strategic repositioning, which was also known as global force. The concept derived from the US strategic requirement exploit its military forces in a flexible manner to respond to any possible threats, because the security coverage of the US has widened, while its forces stationed abroad available for contingencies have reduced with the global war on terrorism. Issues surrounding the USFK have been raised as it was not an exception to the US global strategic requirement. In the past, the USFK principally responded only to threat from North Korea. In the post-Cold War era, things have changed. For example, some 3,500 soldiers were deployed for the War in Iraq. So the concept of strategic flexibility allowed for flexible options where the USFK might be deployed to areas of crisis other than North Korea or the US forces other than the USFK might be deployed in the peninsula should events occur surrounding it. It seemed that there was no reason that South Korea should be opposed to this initiative to implement strategic flexibility. This initiative was a necessary consequence for the US. The question was whether the USFK might be deployed to Taiwan should crisis take place? That was a critical area of interest for China.
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- 200 - South Korea: Seoul has interest in and concerns about the way the USFK and South Korea-US alliance become a source of conflict in its relationship with China. Against this backdrop, President Roh has officially relayed this situation to the US. The US has a clear sense of South Korea’s position. The US also knows how issues regarding the USFK are causing tension in South Korea-China relations and that South Korea is very concerned about and opposed to such possible tension. That is why personally to believe that never will the USFK be committed to Taiwan in the name of strategic flexibility. If the USFK were committed, this would be used politically, or would amount to an excuse for political attacks. From a political perspective, this would be a kind of concern, but in actuality there is a slim chance that it would be an actual concern. Generally speaking, the South Korea-US alliance is not geared towards issues surrounding China or Taiwan, but is designed to ensure stability through the balance of powers in the peninsula and Northeast Asia. (At the debate of the 4 th Forum) South Korea: China-Japan relations date back to the Meiji Reform in 1868, the Sino-Japanese War, the Greater East Asia War and the First World War. China is expected to outsmart Japan in terms of economic power by 2015 or 2020. In five to ten years, the Sino-Japanese ties may have the biggest turning point in its history. Because of this reason, it is natural that Japan keeps strict watch on China. It is such a big deal for Japan in 100 or 150 years. This is what Japanese people are talking about. Beijing may as well understand why Tokyo has concerns about China and perceives it as a potential, competitive and absolute enemy. Many of you spoke about strategic transparency. What we would desire for China and Japan is that both countries meet face to face and engage in dialogue with Korea in the middle. Japan raised such concerns about China and strengthened its alliance with the US. These actions are not related to the Taiwan issue, but purport to make the China-Japan relationship favorable to Japan’s national interest when it comes to dealing with China. We Koreans, located between China and Japan, can understand both sides, but China and Japan themselves seem to have different positions. (At the debate of the 4 th Forum)
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- 201 - 5. The 5 th China-South Korea Security Forum At the debate of the 5 th Forum North Korea nuclear test and economic relations between China and South Korea were discussed on the table. For the past 20 years China and South Korea have become new friends. However, North Korea is older friends with China. From Beijing’s perspective, South Korea has promises for development and hence China has to maintain friendship with it. China has known North Korea as a friend for a long time, but has become a real friend who will sincerely give advice. Therefore, China should not only contemplate important advice to give to North Korea so that stability in the peninsula is ensured, but also should devise ways to grow side by side with South Korea. South Korea has severed relationship with Taiwan as an old friend since the 19 th century and established diplomatic relations with China. China should also reconsider about its relations with both the Koreas. The triangular alliance among China, Russia, and North Korea was one of military aid. However, with qualitative changes since in the post-Cold War era, an economic alliance was a lot more important than a military alliance. South Korea and the US entered into an FTA. China also wants an FTA with South Korea. Both need to have a critical discussion as to whether moving back to a military alliance present in the Cold War era or moving towards an economic alliance helps to maintain stability in the Korean peninsula. South Korea: The first appearance of the writing in terms of the history of the China-Korea relation dates back over 2,000 years ago. Each time the ZhongYuan of China and the Korean peninsula were mentioned important.
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- 202 - The stability of the Korean peninsula, although its influence was not very strong, including Japan would have relatively big influence on the stability of the ZhongYuan of China. Historically speaking, since the Han dynasty many Chinese dynasties such as the Sui, Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties, have approached the Korean peninsula, either with conciliatory or confrontational attitudes. The fiercest confrontation was present when Chinese minority tribes occupied the ZhongYuan of China. The Yuan, Jin, and Kara Khitan dynasties and the Qing dynasty established by the Mongol gentile were good examples. Korea had both amicable and antagonistic relationships with the Sui, Tang, Song, Ming dynasties, all of which were established by the Han race. When speaking of the eastside of the ZhongYuan of China, the world itself is equated with the great China system. In this condition, when there are problems in the back of the ZhongYuan, or in the Korean peninsula, the ZhongYuan is likely to go through instability. One may use the phrase, “wait for the other shoe to drop” to speak of the Northern Triangular Alliance and Southern Triangular Alliance since the 18 th century. This ultimately means that stability in the eastern side of China, or the Korean peninsula, is a critical factor for the stability of China. Since the 19 th century, both China and South Korea experienced the same agony under the colonial rule of Japan. South Korea and China had an antagonistic relationship during the Korean War. Stability factors in the peninsula before the Cold War were characterized by the Southern Triangular Alliance (the US, Japan, and South Korea) and the Northern Triangular Alliance (China, Russia, and North Korea). To put it differently, for China the status quo in the peninsula means stability in Northeast Asia. We need to think differently about post-Cold War stability issues in the peninsula. China needs to realistically assess in what form stability in the peninsula should take and in what direction it has to go so that China ensures internal stability as well. China: General Hwang made good comments on the history of South Korea-China relations based on his experience as an Assistant Defense Minister. We agree with General Hwang that China and South Korea should promote strong trust with each other. For the sake of mutual interest and trust promotion, both countries should handle even the slightest problem as well as the most sensitive issues. This type of issue is something both countries can work on as a good starter. A Chinese proverb says, all those little steps do add up. In a similar manner, a small leak will sink a great ship.
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- 203 - Most of the experts and the scholars think that China can influence or control North Korea very much. That was totally wrong. China cannot influence or control North Korea. North Korea is a very strong independent country and does not want be influenced by China. Through the China-South Korea Security Forum China was clearly discovered that she never interfere in the internal affairs of North Korea. China said US and North Korea are the ones that hold the key to the resolution of the nuclear issue. They said although China and North Korea have friendly relations, China, in principle, does not interfere with another country’s internal matters. They thought South Koreans who are truly familiar with North Korea’s condition would not pose a demand on China about North Korea nuclear issue. They have explained to the South Korean participants that China showed North Korea both types of areas – areas which have well implemented reforms and open-door policies. This signals to North Korea that China cannot provide more economic aid to it because China also has poor regions that need to be taken care of. Hence, if South Koreans demand that China should do this or that with respect to North Korea, this will be contrary to China’s policies. They say this would also create hostility among North Koreans. China: I believe that there have been many changes in conditions in the Northeast Asian region. In particular, after the North Korean nuclear tests, there have been drastic changes in security conditions in the region. Some changes were not what we had anticipated. Much of this assessment came after the nuclear tests: the security conditions in the peninsula will worsen, trust between North Korea and the US will become weakened, the regional security balance will be disrupted and neighboring countries will exploit this occasion as an opportunity to expedite their militarization and nuclearization. It is assessed that things are becoming more and more difficult for six-party talks and uncertainty surrounding the nuclear issue is looming larger and larger. Yet, the tension-ridden situation in the region
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- 204 - eased due to intentional efforts by the countries in the region at least for a short period of time. First, a nuclear domino effect did not happen. There were concerns that the nuclear tests would lead to an arms race and a nuclear competition in the region as well as to a worsened security condition and the condition is now under control. However, in actuality tension was rather reduced as the countries made realistic efforts and there was no nuclear domino effect. Second, the possibility for a war on the peninsula is under control. The countries concerned have speedily tuned their positions and adopted an effective and appropriate sanctions resolution in the United Nations Security Council. Since the countries were cool-headed in handling the nuclear issue, we were able to avoid seeing armies marshalling on the peninsula and Northeast Asia as well as the escalation into an explosive situation. Bilateral talks between North Korea and the US within the fifth six-party framework talks resumed after the nuclear tests. The talks were raised to the next level with great substance in such a way that instead of word for word or promise for promise, action for action became the norm. While Pyongyang has not discarded its nuclear program and relevant facilities, an explosive tension has been reduced due to the international community’s expectations. The current condition shaped after nuclear tests was not entirely unexpected, and this has also affected the nuclear issue and uncertainty factors regarding security in Northeast Asia. In particular, it has become obvious from the fifth talks that Washington and Pyongyang hold the key to the nuclear issue. In the past many neighboring countries believed that the key to the nuclear issue is China, but this is not a realistic perspective. The US, SK, Japan and their friends think that China is trying to stand up for North Korea due to the long-lasting traditional friendship between them. Yet, China has shown a tough attitude upon and taken measures against North Korea for action. After the nuclear tests, none of the countries – SK, Japan and the US – demanded China to stop providing aid to North Korea. In other words, this type of relationship has to be well managed to achieve denuclearization, nuclear abandonment and stability in the peninsula. The question is whether the abandonment of nuclear facilities will lead to rapid stability in the peninsula. The key clue to the solution of this problem is how we achieve nuclear abandonment and denuclearization. Dr. Hong has proposed several models and there is an appropriate model among the proposals. The model should include an expectation for denuclearization and stability in the peninsula. We currently feel that the attitude of the US is very important. So are North Korea’s attitudes.
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- 205 - Cho Sungtae the Representative of Korean delegation has asked Chinese side to arrange North Korean observer at this Security Forum. After asking for several times, China has expressed affirmative attitude to invite North Korean scholars at this Security Forum. Actually, the members of CAIFC (China Association for International Friendly Contact) have maintained meetings with North Korean friends. Sometimes South Korean participants could get very fresh information happening in North Korea from Chinese friends. One of participants from China introduced at the debate what he has interviewed with officials of North Korean Embassy in China just after the first North Korea nuclear test. He said, “we were invited to be present at a meeting held in the North Korean Embassy in China right after North Korea nuclear test. In our private meeting with a North Korean diplomat we raised five questions, to which the diplomat responded with great certainty. First, we asked, ‘How did the nuclear tests go?’ The diplomat responded, ‘The nuclear tests were successful, but caused no nuclear contamination.’ Second, we asked, ‘How did the North Korean people receive North Korea’s nuclear tests?’ The diplomat responded, ‘The North Korean populace was very pleased and uplifted about North Korea’s nuclear capability.’ Third, we asked, ‘How did you think about China speaking in the United Nations and casting a vote of yes to the United Nations sanctions?’ The diplomat responded, ‘North Korea had known in advance that China would do that.’ Fourth, we asked, ‘What is the next step?’ The diplomat responded, ‘It all depends on what the US will do.’ Fifth, we asked, ‘How do you expect that the US will handle issues with North Korea?’ The diplomat responded, ‘The US and North Korea will have dialogues together.’
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- 206 - China: In 1992, China assessed the impact of the “Chinese Cultural Area” on the Asia-Pacific region for the next 10 years in the Chinese Periodicals. From ZhongYuan’s perspective, China encompassed the Chinese Character Cultural Area representing an agricultural civilization. This surely served as the cultural background of relationships in Northeast Asia. At that time the agricultural civilization characterized by the Chinese Character Cultural area of ZhongYuan of China originated from both North and South areas. We had the Huns during the Han dynasty, the Kok-Turks during the Tang dynasty and the Mongols during the Ming dynasty. At that time, the Han, Tang and Ming dynasties had close relationships with the peninsula. Historically speaking, China as an agricultural society had delicate relationships with the Northeast Asian region. The region was a strategic preparation area for the nomad people to come down to the Zhong Yuan of China. Hence, the Chinese history shows that the Kara Khitan dynasty and Qing dynasty maintained delicate relationships with the peninsula. A strategic preparation process by nomad people moving down south is well recorded in the history of the Ming dynasty. During the Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1592, Admiral Lee, Sun Shin resolved threats in the East Asia region through the maritime civilization, and the stability of the region was achieved through efforts on the waters. After that time, Northeast Asia was divided by the military force of the West. As a result, the peninsula was completely colonized and China was partially colonized. As history evolved, East Asia started to play traditional geopolitical roles after the end of the Cold War. It is very true in order to create a security composition in Northeast Asia, it is important to understand the history as well as establish a new awareness of the history that promotes a new perspective on nations and security mechanisms. Northeast Asia historically, which nomads used as a strategic station to advance onto the ZhongYuan of China, can be the hub of the Asia-Pacific region. China: While China-South Korea cooperation is much discussed with respect to security in Northeast Asia, the role played by the US is extremely critical. Washington has not taken the responsibility of the
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- 207 - nuclear issue as it has deepened until today. It is mainly because the US has not implemented a consistent North Korean policy in coping with the nuclear issue. That change has been huge. From this standpoint, we cannot blame Pyongyang for not trusting the US. While during the Clinton administration the US and North Korea agreed upon the General Framework, the Bush administration reversed it. It is because when a new administration sets in after the incumbent administration’s tenure is finished, partial changes to the strategy and policy, if not national-level changes, are bound to take place. Another observation is that there is not a consensus over the current policy of the US within the House of Representatives and the Senate as well as among different factions. Therefore, there are a lot of uncertainty factors. It is natural that under such circumstances a country which doesn’t believe its security is guaranteed is likely to not trust Washington. When it comes to security issues in Northeast Asia, China, South Korea and the US think differently. Basically, the US thinks in terms of an alliance system. It has bilateral alliances with South Korea and the Philippines. Based on the existing relations, it pursues a Northeast Asian security cooperation system with China and Russia. It cannot be neglected the inconsistent policy toward North Korea from US and South Korea. In South Korea and US when Presidency was changed, the policy was changed at the same time. They say state foreign policy never changes according to the regime change but it is perceived to free voting political system country not to North Korea. Through the debate it was discovered that North Korea has some consistency of their policy. Of course sometimes North Korea has exploited this voting system politically in South Korea and US but they were much unsatisfied with this policy inconsistency of US and South Korea. From China’s perspective, all the countries are equal within a Northeast Asian security cooperation system. China thinks that no alliance should be established within the system. This is where Beijing and Washington differ. South Korea, while forging an alliance with the US, asserts a Northeast Asian balancer. The formation of this type of policy suggests that South Korea’s view is getting closer to China’s view. In reality, a big dilemma that faces Seoul is that it cannot discard a mutual
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- 208 - relationship with the US. Alliances are major stumbling blocks to ensuring security cooperation in Northeast Asia. Hence, the issue that we are faced with is how we view the South Korea-US and US-Japan alliances. Currently, China doesn’t have the power to improve the situation. It only has the power to influence the basic context of cooperation system. Under the prevailing circumstances Beijing does not have the power to change the current phenomenon. Nor does it have the power to oppose the US-Japan and US-South Korea alliances. The reality is that while China doesn’t approve of such military alliances, it doesn’t have the power to change the situation. China’s realistic policy today is to tolerate these alliances, while maintaining the context of multilateral cooperation and upholding the principle that every country is equal. In other words, the policy is gradually establishing a true security cooperation system through accepting one area and changing another area. The fact of the matter is that there are alliance systems in Northeast Asia, and while these alliances are not favorable to a Northeast Asian security cooperation system, China has no choice but to accept this. China: I would like to hear from Korean experts. What does strategic flexibility between South Korea and the US mean? How do strategic flexibility and Northeast Asian security issues affect both countries? More specifically, to what extent will the strategic flexibility of the USFK influence the North Korean nuclear issue and the Taiwan issue? South Korea: These questions seem to be difficult, but in fact they are easy once you know their nature. What is the strategic flexibility of the US? Some are concerned that this strategic flexibility which the US advances is a way to divert the USFK to an armed conflict with China. However, it is not true. There is no chance of an armed conflict. It is not common sense to believe that the grand strategic changes of the US will influence what is not even likely to happen. If so, where does this strategic flexibility come from? With the September 11 terrorist attacks the US was engulfed in huge shock and waged a global anti-terrorism war against Afghanistan and Iraq. While the US won the wars, terrorist threats have persisted. This situation forced it to change its strategy from a Win-Win one that prepares
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- 209 - it against two simultaneous wars in two regions to a global war on terrorism. Washington was confronted with a possible scenario where a 767 airplane loaded with nuclear and chemical weapons might attack the WTO building or the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. The top strategic priority of the US is the global war on terrorism. While it won the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US had to implement a huge change because it failed to prevent terrorism. This is the strategic flexibility of the US. The major idea behind the strategic flexibility of USFK was that US will not operate a built-in military force, but maintain flexibility and in the worst case respond immediately to an identified terrorist threat through marshaling a force in an area where terror is likely to happen. Some people who have an intention to drive a wedge between China and South Korea could be trying to speculate that should an armed conflict take place between China and Taiwan, the strategic flexibility of the US will involve the commitment of the USFK in the affected area. In the worst case scenario, this might happen. There is almost no chance in Taiwan. It is the worst choice to make if we allow for this type of issue to worsen South Korea-China and South Korea-US relations. Therefore, a broad interpretation about the strategic flexibility issue is extremely inappropriate. 6. The 6 th China-South Korea Security Forum At the free debate of the 6 th Forum, participants from both countries have discussed the South Korea-US strategic alliance as well as stability in Northeast Asia. China said the alliance was very important for the South Korea-China strategic cooperation partnership. And it needs to be changed dynamically as circumstances change and should develop in a way that it is consistent with the common interests of all the countries concerned. They argued China and South
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- 210 - Korea should prepare for the future and play appropriate roles for peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula. China: Objectively speaking, the international condition sometimes changes beyond our recognition as any circumstances constantly change. In my opinion, the South Korea-US alliance is very complex and profound, and has its own history. Under this condition, the alliance is bound to set in a positive direction. Whenever it meets with the US, China has consistently emphasized that it does not have any military alliance with any neighboring country. It means that China doesn’t have such military alliances as foreign scholars conceive of. We hope that Koreans will understand this fact as well. When it comes to the security policy of the US with China, it is different from what is understood by South Koreans. South Korea: Strategic partnership between South Korea and China was adopted by the heads of the two countries who had a shared vision, but not as a result of the meeting. Sometimes some communication as 1.5-Track Dialogue is needed to implement issues addressed in the statement. We have been wondering about the nature of the strategic cooperation partnership between Beijing and Seoul. For example, China has a big interest in the Missile Defense. We must think about how South Korea’s MD policy would affect our bilateral strategic cooperation partnership. In that sense it is imperative that feasible proposals be discussed for policy recommendation and 1.5-Track coordination is made between them over suggested ideas and opinions. Any country has changes in perceptions about circumstances. When researching the modernization of China back at the RAND Institute in the late 1980s, relations between China and the US were very good to the point that they were viewed as strategic cooperation. Their cooperation back then was targeted against Russia. As such, these types of meetings are opportunities to resolve differences in opinions as new issues come into existence with the change of circumstances. China and South Korea have made significant progress through sharing candid opinions with each other at the Security Forum. Security implies survival or how a nation can survive and prosper or how a nation can live better. Both
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- 211 - participants have gathered together to upgrade their mutual existence and mutual prosperity between South Korea and China. China seemed to have less trust about the South Korea-US alliance. There were issues including the Missile Defense that made China uncomfortable. The USFK has roles in the peninsula, in Northeast Asia, and in the globe. In particular, deterrence against war in the peninsula is the primary purpose of the USFK. On a global scale, the USFK can contribute to efforts at the denuclearisation of the peninsula. During the Minster-level talks between South Korea and China, both sides agreed on three big items. Those same items explained why the USFK has to be stationed in the Korean peninsula. Then, this issue has to be approached from a broader point of view, where China and South Korea share the same values. They share universal values such as freedom, equality, peace, and prosperity which they should aspire to advance, and if so, the countries could solve many issues from a broader point of view. Strategic dialogue and cooperation would enable the US and China to resolve the Missile Defense issue and issues associated with the strategic flexibility of US. China could benefit from a peninsula policy based on the assessment that should reunification follow a sudden change taking place in North Korea, this would benefit China both politically and economically. Partners cannot exist if either side becomes superior or exclusivity is at play. The future direction should be pursuing universal values. All the countries in Northeast Asia should make joint efforts to realise universal values for the sake of stability in the region and world peace. South Korea: Relations between countries by nature have elements of ambiguity. As relations between China and South Korea improve, diverse opinions are being expressed. In Korea, there are voices that evaluate the relationship between South Korea and the US rather positively in the midst of the relations between China and Seoul. There are other voices that view China as negative, threatening and dangerous. Geographically speaking, South Korea is in between China as a continent and Japan as an
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- 212 - ocean, and has become a battlefield throughout history. Considering this, China’s growth since the reforms is partially attributable to stability in the peninsula. Could Beijing have focused on growth had the peninsula not been stable? One Chinese government official says that the Korean War delayed China’s economic development by over 10 years. This highlights the fact that instability in the peninsula is a stumbling block to China’s growth. If we could assume that stability in the peninsula for the last 60 years is the cause of China’s prosperity, what would be the source of stability? The South Korea-US alliance could be one source of stability, and China should admit that. North Korea has maintained a hereditary communist system, trying to achieve the reunification of the two Koreas by force. Under this circumstance, China’s growth would have been impossible without the existence of the South Korea-US alliance. In this regard, China’s further growth may be determined by how stability is ensured until the reunification comes or even after the reunification is achieved. History is teaching this to us. Namely, if the Korean peninsula is stable, Northeast Asia is stable. Each time we meet with US officials, we try to convince them that the South Korea-US alliance is a key factor in achieving stability in the peninsula, thereby ensuring stability in Northeast Asia. However, China thinks that the alliance is hegemonic and dangerous. A more realistic assessment is that the alliance is an important source of stability on the Korean peninsula, thus ensuring continued economic development. Reflecting on presentations by the Chinese side, we realize that Beijing thinks with negativity and hostility that the alliance is to deter against China or pose threat to China. China has to recognize the South Korea-US alliance because it is needed for the prosperity of China. The future goal of the alliance is to contribute to stability in Northeast Asia. This is an absolute goal that both South Korea and the US are trying to achieve. The alliance is laying the foundation for the achievement of this goal. Under this condition, what is the relationship between South Korea and China? The heads of the countries have agreed upon a strategic cooperation partnership for various areas including overall security areas. South Korea and China need to further develop this strategic cooperation partnership and run this relationship in parallel with the relationship between South Korea and the US. How long do we have to attempt to gain supremacy and challenge each other, not being able to get over our history where we pointed a gun at one another during the Korean War? Over time the meaningfulness of an alliance is becoming weak. Now partnership, a partnership relationship or a combined relationship is becoming more important.
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- 213 - China: Beijing and Seoul cannot make a complete consensus in a few perspectives. First, from South Korea’s strategic point of view its national strategy cannot replace the Northeast Asia strategy of the US, and one of the key components of the strategy is targeting at China. The US doesn’t explicitly express its alliance relationships in the Northeast Asian region. Although South Korea’s is not targeting at China, the forward positioning of the USFK suggests that the US is still targeting at China. The South Korea-US alliance has gone through a lot of changes, but those changes came from the change in the Northeast Asia strategy of the US. No one questions the fact that the alliance is to ensure peace and stability in the peninsula, but one cannot readily say that the alliance is to deter Japan’s remilitarization or to secure stability in the region. From a broader perspective, the alliance can be seen as deterrence against Japan. However, the alliance is moving away from its traditional focus on deterrence against North Korea’s threat. Rather, it is experiencing changes on global and practical dimensions and is included in various areas. As such, China cannot help but pay attention to the alliance. South Korea is adjusting to the strategy of the US on a different dimension, but South Korean government officials’ comments inform us that the alliance has to be the basis of a mechanism to build peace in Northeast Asia. Last May, a high-level government official from South Korea gave a lecture to Chinese graduate students, in which the US military is suggested as a source of stability. China and South Korea differ over such issues as addressed above. Why the strategic South Korea-US alliance? The alliance has become less strong in terms of common threat factors since the end of the Cold War. In 2006, the alliance was redefined as a post-Cold War, comprehensive, dynamic, and reciprocal non-military alliance, remote from the military alliance earlier. The alliance is reestablished as a strategic one that promotes new values, trust and peace. It also means an expanded scope of mutual cooperation. Therefore, it is not logically sound to say that the military alliance has become stronger. At the debate it was mentioned that it moved from a cooperation limited to the peninsula to one expanded to be a regional alliance. A retired Korean high official said, ‘As relations between China and South Korea improved in the 1990s, problems were raised regarding the regional alliance concept. This stopped further discussion on
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- 214 - the alliance. Rather, global cooperation was emphasised to respond to terrorist states such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, the strategic flexibility of the USFK doesn’t represent the characteristic of the South Korea-US alliance, but that of the USFK. The alliance should not get engaged in military involvement in regional issues.’ 7. The 7 th China-South Korea Security Forum The discussion of the 7 th Security Forum was very candid and convinced the participants from both countries that although the circumstances in the East Asia were complex, there should surely be a cue to the solution of those problems. They were strongly motivated to make the solutions and two hosting institutes CAIFC from China and KRIMA from South Korea were very much satisfied with the results. At the debate, North Korea nuclear weapon and some structural problems of East Asia such as China’s permission of North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons, the possibility of North Korea’s nuclear abandonment, conflicts between South Korea and North Korea and South Korea-US military alliance etc. were discussed. South Korea: Dr. Wang mentioned that the nuclear umbrella of the US has a negative effect on the denuclearization of the peninsula, but this is contrary to the nuclear strategy theory. If the US didn’t provide a nuclear umbrella for South Korea, its people would definitely call for South Korea’s nuclear armament. This is not congruent with the purpose of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The NPT is designed to achieve the objective that countries don’t need to possess nukes because they will be covered by the US. Therefore, it doesn’t make sense, both in theory and practice, to assert that the deterrence of nuclear proliferation provided by the US for South Korea has a negative influence on the denuclearization of the peninsula.
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- 215 - There seems to be a misunderstanding about the Missile Defense discussed at the 41 st annual South Korea-US Security Consultative Meeting (SEM). The Missile Defense includes the nuclear umbrella provided by the US, missile defense capabilities and deterrence against proliferation through the application of conventional offensive forces. This Missile Defense is not one South Korea is participating in, it only refers to the system that the US possesses. In other words, if North Korea uses nuclear weapons to attack South Korea, the US will take retaliatory measures. Through this, a message has been sent to North Korea that Pyongyang should not attack South Korea. This is how we can assure safety and security for the South Korean people and prevent the occurrence of bad nuclear situations in the peninsula. South Korea, which values good relations with China, wants to participate in the Missile Defense, but at the same time doesn’t want to. China: North Korea differs from South Korea and the US in terms of preconditions for nuclear disarmament as well as North Korea’s opening the door. According to the Chinese media, a Korean media outlet had reported that an operation plan had been written in preparation against a sudden change in North Korea. The report mentioned that the plan began during the Kim, Dae Joong administration and became visualized since the Lee, Myung Bak administration. This plan is reported to contain five possible scenarios. We wonder how operational control will be at play between South Korea and the US. Given this, we are questioning whether South Korea and the US have the desire to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue in a peaceful manner. In particular, we would like to know how the United States administration is assessing a sudden change in North Korea, what response plans the United States has, and what other plans the United States has. Currently South Korea has twenty nuclear reactors. She has 700 to 800 tons of spent nuclear fuels per year from the twenty reactors. By now, the inventory of spent fuels amounts to 10,000 tons. Spent fuels are extremely dangerous and need to be permanently treated. If they are not reprocessed, they cannot be permanently treated. Therefore, South Korean experts are asking for the reprocessing of the spent fuels. International community thinks that the proliferation of reprocessing means an expansion of capability to build nuclear
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- 216 - weapons. Many countries such as Korea, which produce nuclear energy in a peaceful manner, are not able to reprocess spent fuels because of environmental concerns. To solve this problem, some people claim that a consortium should be organised at an international level. It is important to cope with the spent nuclear fuels issue as soon as possible in such a way that plutonium is not separated and reprocessing does not involve the production of nuclear weapons. By the end of 2016, South Korea’s spent nuclear fuels are projected to be fully saturated. Actually this is a very urgent issue for the country. South Korea: I would like to share the policy direction of the US with respect to the Korean peninsula as well as some of my personal thoughts. The South Korea-US alliance began with the three-year-long Korean War that started in 1950. Sixteen countries under the flag of the United Nations including the US restored the pre-war borderline and the war stopped with the establishment of the Military Demarcation Line. In order to prepare against North Korea’s reinvasion, the US and South Korea signed the Mutual Defense Treaty. This system has successfully deterred war for the past 60 years as well as ensured peace and safety in the peninsula. Consequently, we were able to overcome the calamity of the war. During the 1960s, Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world. However, after updating the national organization into a modern system through war deterrence, South Korea became the 13 th largest economy in the world. For the past 60 years, safety in the peninsula has played a positive role in promoting security in Northeast Asia and has helped China to emerge. The region with China and Japan at its center has become a key player in the 21 st century Asia-Pacific era. Nobody doubts that in the future South Korea, China, and Japan will play a central role in the world. The economy of the US is closely related to that of South Korea, China, and Japan. Since any deviation from the framework by any country among the four will affect the whole, the four countries have no other choice but to consider mutually complementary interests for further development. As such, China-South Korea relations have tremendously contributed to regional stability and the improvement of the regional economy. In other words, the most important purpose of the US policy with the Korean peninsula is to ensure war deterrence and peace and stability there and the growth of the regional economy, whether the approach is to take a firm or soft stance.
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- 217 - China: I have a comment on the nuclear umbrella. The question is whether the Joint Statement specifies the application of the nuclear umbrella in the event of a crisis in the peninsula and under what conditions it will be used, or whether it will be provided in the event of a nuclear weapon threat, or in the case of the loss of control over nuclear weapons. According to media reports and other information regarding the missile defense system, we understand that South Korea is building its own C41 system. We wonder if this system is a missile system that South Korea is building independently. We think that is why South Korea is actively participating in the US missile defense system. We wonder how its participation in the defense system will influence safety in Northeast Asia. What would happen if there were a sudden change in the midst of the possession of nukes? These problems need to be resolved in any way possible because they are urgent issues not only for the peninsula but also for Northeast Asia. The biggest current issue of the US peace policy on the peninsula would focus on how to stably manage a potential sudden change in North Korea in a non-military, super-national, and comprehensive manner. Accordingly, a fundamental step needs to be taken to establish peace and safety. What will those steps be? Korean participants argued that China should play a decisive role not only as a geopolitical neighbour but also as a leading power in the world economy. They said the problems cannot be solved without China. Feasible options such as the six-party talks and multilateral coordination were proposed, and these options should develop into more realistic and practicable options. Quite many on the Chinese side proposed that Koreans themselves should resolve the problem. The basis of Eastern philosophy which both China and South Korea espouse highly values the ways of the world; ‘Wars beget fire, and long-lasting conflicts beget attrition.’ Peace and stability ensure production. Only when peace and stability continue, economics can be improved and culture can be promoted, thereby improving the quality of people. It is desirable to end confrontation and distrust and to envision a big picture for the
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- 218 - sake of future-oriented development through dialogue and cooperation based on mutual trust. China: Korea and China have different perspectives. How are we going to solve the North Korean nuclear issue? Are we going to wait passively? Or are we going to proactively respond to it? What thoughts do South Korea and the US have about this issue? How is it going to correspond with the nuclear disarmament objective? How are certain countries going to respond after the two Koreas are reunified? Most Chinese scholars think that North Korea is an autonomous sovereign state. If problems occur in a sovereign state, that is dealt with according to international law. As Professor Chung mentioned, one race is living in the Korean peninsula, but according to international law two countries composed of one race exist. Each country has an opinion as to how other countries should behave when a country has its own internal problems. We can think of different situations that face different countries. Let’s take an example of Afghanistan, which is a sovereign state. This country has many problems. So do Pakistan and Somalia. The interim government in Somalia is totally dysfunctional at present. Yet, Somalia is a sovereign state. Under this condition, it has to solve its problems. We all need to seriously ponder whether the DPRK’s problem is limited to North Korea’s problem alone. When we see a problem in North Korea, we need to think whether the problem is a problem North Korea should be left to solve or a problem that foreign countries intervene in. A unified nation- state is a choice that the people need to make for themselves. The reunification of Germany was a choice that both East Germans and West Germans made. Hence, more deep research is needed about the Korean reunification issue. All the countries, including China, have a sudden change in North Korea in mind, but China’s research interest lies in how China can maintain the safety of Chinese people along the China-North Korea borders. The major factor is under what conditions the least threat will be posed to Chinese people. I think that the same is true of South Korea. Those issues need to be taken into account as most important factors. From the international law perspective, it is necessary to come up with ways to deal with problems in other countries. There must be lots of problems. The Afghan government, the Pakistani government and the Somali interim government are not doing anything, but they should try to solve their problems on their own like the West and East Germans did. North Korea should solve its
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- 219 - national problems, but we need to think whether they have the capability to do so. When it comes to reunification, the US also respects South Korea’s principle of self-determination. This principle has been emphasised by the South Korean government over and over again. Nobody questions the grand premise that the two Koreas should be reunified in a gradual and peaceful manner. The future of the South Korea-US alliance in the post-reunification days depends on a reunified Korean government’s intention. Should the USFK be withdrawn from the peninsula, there could be a power vacuum. This situation will invite interventions by neighboring countries which desire to exert influence. This will result in armed conflicts to gain regional supremacy. Therefore, the alliance might be needed to achieve stability and peace. The only problem is when the USFK physically advances onto the northern part of the peninsula. Since such a move could pose a threat to the security of China, as long as the USFK remains south of the Military Demarcation Line, no threat will be posed to China. South Korea: Joint Statement was not clear on the conditions under which the nuclear umbrella or deterrence will be provided and what kind of event may justify such actions. But this can be answered if we look at the process in which the NPT was made. Nuclear states provided the NSA and the PSA. NSA means that nuclear states will never attack non-nuclear states. This sends a message to non-nuclear states that they should not possess nukes. This was declared in the process of maintaining the NPT. Although this promise was made to unspecified countries, there was a question whether that promise will be implemented. Hence, in order to complement the NSA, the PSA was in place. This is the nuclear umbrella. It is an official declaration that a nuclear state retaliates against a third country that attacks the nuclear state or its allies using nuclear weapons and that the nuclear state will never attack a non-nuclear state. However, due to suspicion on group promise, the PSA was provided. Yet, since this applies to nuclear attacks, no concerns should be raised as to the nuclear umbrella. It’s fair to say that international law has to be respected in the event of a sudden change in North Korea. Korea is not the exception.
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- 220 - Some scholars speculate that there are five or six scenarios, but it is likely that there are over 100 scenarios. Scenarios differ depending on the gravity of an event. As for an event of low importance, there are a little cautious scenario and an extremely serious scenario. An event of low importance refers to an event where North Korea has a sudden change, but can resolve it without foreign intervention. In this case, neighboring countries can assist it in recovering stability as fast as possible. A more serious change includes mass casualties, large-scale human rights issues, disaster or security danger among neighboring countries, in which case foreign countries may intervene according to international law. This is when we can start our discussion on intervention. This doesn’t mean that a sovereign state can cross another country’s border without permission. Intervention is possible to the extent that the US specifies the scope in accordance with the international agreement. In this case Seoul will have to do a lot of costly things. As for refugees in North Korea, South Korea will have to voluntarily provide emergency aid or other assistance. The problem takes place when the refugee situation is most serious. The most serious situation involves no organized army, no control of nuclear weapons and absolute collapse. In this case, if a majority of North Koreans want reunification, we need to support it based on the principle of self- determination. This only applies to the most serious situation. China: The North Korean regime has survived both the Clinton administration and the Bush administration. A while ago, former president Clinton had met Chairman Kim Chong Il in North Korea and briefed President Obama about the visit. The US is making a realistic assessment regarding the collapse of North Korea. When it comes to the North Korea policy of the US, there seems to be some difference in positions between South Korea and the US. In my personal opinion, we should not focus on the change or the collapse of the North Korean regime, but on how the nuclear possession will affect other countries’ ambition for nuclear possession. For example, if NK possesses nuclear weapons, will South Korea follow suit and then Japan also want to possess nuclear weapons? If North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, Japan will. So will Korea. If North Korea does not possess nuclear weapons, Japan won’t. Neither will South Korea. Should a sudden change take place due to structural inconsistency followed by a civil war, a mass exodus of refugees, and the occurrence of people dying of hunger, this will affect South Korea, China, and Japan, thereby causing instability in Northeast Asia. The focus is on how to resolve this situation using
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- 221 - non-military measures, but not on military action. This has to be understood within the context of preparation against contingencies. In the event of emergency in North Korea while it possesses nuclear weapons, what is likely to happen? There seems to be a concern about the US entering North Korea, but this has to be understood in the context of leading nations with nukes taking safe and swift measures to prevent the transfer of a country’s nuclear weapons to another country. There are many different approaches toward resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. The nuclear issue is not an issue that will be resolved if the six- party talks have successful outcomes, South Korea successfully persuades North Korea, or if the US pushes North Korea in a high-handed manner. It is because the nuclear issue originates from the regime problem. From the perspective of the North Korean leadership, they have maintained dictatorship for the past 60 years. They think that protecting the regime is their survival. The last bastion of the protection of the regime is nukes. Hence, it is difficult to resolve the issue unless neighbouring countries cannot resolve or improve various problems implicated in the regime instability of North Korea. Simply resorting to the six-party talks and South Korea’s North Korean policy using both carrots and sticks is not the ultimate solution. The focus should be put on how neighboring countries can gradually help North Korea to improve its system to resolve the North Korean issue definitely and permanently, because the issue cannot be resolved at a time. China: I have a few comments pertaining to the South Korea-US alliance. The US makes environments in Northeast Asia complex by pursuing strategic intents either bilaterally or individually through forging alliances with countries such as Thailand, New Zealand, and Singapore. This way of alliance-building by the US needs to be understood in the context of its global strategy. South Korea and the United States are military alliance partners and security issues are an important aspect of the relationship between Seoul and Washington. Currently, the US is attempting to globally transform its military positioning, including expansion toward the Asia-Pacific region. From a strategic perspective, the South Korea-US alliance was forged in consideration of the military relationship between
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- 222 - Koreas. Also, the US has a military alliance with Japan. This makes the US positions very complex. As such, the US has two military alliances, which is part of its seamless global strategy. For the US, the alliance is on a global dimension, while for South Korea it is on a security dimension. Therefore, the relationship should not be considered to be a general alliance. As military positioning by the US is swiftly moving in the Asia- Pacific region, the US is not only maintaining strategic relations with Singapore and Australia but also is maintaining and consolidating its strategic initiatives in the Pacific, thereby containing China. South Korea is strengthening its positions in the Asia-Pacific region for the sake of the alliance. However, South Korea should consider a broader and deeper alliance as long as that effort is not to cause conflict with North Korea. The US has a position whose dimension is broader, more global and more strategic. It is necessary that the alliance should be strengthened in such a way that it strikes a strategic balance so that South Korea’s strategic interest is not hurt. Of course this means that South Korea’s strategic intent should be respected within the context of the strategic intent of the US in Asia. An excessive alliance, if established by the US in the front doors of China, cannot help but make China feel that the US is containing China. Unless South Korea mediates between the US and China regarding this issue, this can have significant effects on strategic relations between SK and China. Yet, China wants to have a continued relationship with the South Korean government. Seoul cannot help but bear costs for the sake of the alliance. The US has made impractical promises that it will provide a nuclear umbrella or missile defense system for South Korea, which is induced to bear tremendous cost and human-power commitment. It appears that the Washington has inevitably chosen the alliance to achieve its strategic intent, rather than simply paying attention to the resolution of the nuclear issue, which South Korea has demanded. South Korea: I have one question for the Chinese side regarding its non-nuclear objective. The two objectives of no nuclear weapons and stabilization in North Korea play both positive and negative roles in China implementing its policy on North Korea, which makes things difficult. What is China’s position on this down the road? Every time we have discussions with the US, people point out that China has to be more honest about this issue. In other words, China takes the stabilization of North Korea over its denuclearization. How is China intending to make both stabilization and denuclearization objectives coexist? Many good points were raised regarding the future of the alliance, but this is a relatively structural issue. Also, some of you mentioned various roles of the US, and we want to add that Washington has led efforts to maintain both world order and
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- 223 - denuclearization order. China has agreed on those efforts. Therefore, China has to take responsibility along with the US. It was mentioned that the entry into Afghanistan and Iraq by the US is an internal interference. But who would take responsibility of the global chaos should it hands-off on this issue? This is the reality of today’s international politics. China, as it becomes stronger and stronger, has to produce public goods with respect to this issue and contribute to regional stability and global safety. It was mentioned that the USFK and South Korea-US alliance is targeting at China, but let’s look at the history. The Nixon-Zhou Enli joint statement in 1972 and the memoir of Kissinger reveal an appropriate story where the US withdrew its forces from the Taiwan Strait and severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan. At that time, Kissinger said, “The USFK is never targeting at China” and the Chinese side said that “Chairman Mao will never harass South Korea as an ally of the US.” This illustrates the importance of intentions when it comes to relations between China and the US. International politics scholars describe this as an example of constructivism. Judging from South Korea who does not perceive China’s numerous nuclear weapons as a threat, but takes issues with North Korea’s nukes, and Japan who perceives China and Russia as threats, yet doesn’t perceive the nuclear weapons of the US as a threat, such must have taken into account territorial issues rather than nukes themselves or possible future threats. Therefore, it is important to communicate intentions to generate transparent policies. In order to do this, these kinds of meetings have to be convened more often and their outcomes need to be reflected in policymaking. At the debate of the 7 th Forum participants from both countries have had lively discussions about nukes. Some claimed that South Korea has to possess nukes and some discussed the issue of nuclear sovereignty, if not nuclear possession. The general sentiment and policy direction involves the calculation of benefits of nuclear development and possession and burden of no nuclear possession. The current understanding seems to be that if North Korea ends up developing nuclear capabilities, inevitably the nuclear umbrella of the US or proliferation deterrence will follow. Even if North Korea ends up further developing nuclear capabilities, South Korea will be better off making sure that North Korea disarms nuclear capabilities under the nuclear umbrella instead of possessing deterrence by way of nuclear military power.
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- 224 - Ⅴ. The effect of CSKSF (China-South Korea Security Forum) The first hypothesis of this thesis is ‘China-South Korea Security Forum has contributed to the improvement of the bilateral security relations between China and South Korea to the extent that both countries exchange military personnel in their training academy and regular minister level– meetings.’ Since 1992 normalisation between China and South Korea, Korean military attaché was installed at Beijing in 1993 and Chinese military attaché at Seoul in 1994. As CSKSF started in June 2002 military exchanges between the two countries became more activated. Military exchanges between the two countries before and after CSKSF can be tabled up as follows. Table #12 Minister Level– Meetings and Personnel Exchange in Training Meetings 1992~2002 (before CSKSF) 2002~2009 (since CSKSF) Remarks Defence Minister Meetings 3 5 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 5 5 times Army, Navy, Air force Chief of Staff 4 8 Twice Military Personnel in 2 8 4 times
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- 225 - Training The Representative of Korean delegation for the first CSKSF 2002, Ex- Minister Cho Sung-tae has opened the first Defence Minister talk with the then Chinese Defence Minister Chi Haotian in July 1999. Chinese Minister Ch'ih Hao- t'ien visited Korea in January 2000 for the reciprocal visit. While before CSKSF the then minister Kim Dong-shin visited China in December 2001 once more which totaled up to 3 times of reciprocal visits but since CSKSF 2002 Defence Minister Yoon visited China in March 2005, Minister Cao Gangchuan visited Korea in April 2006, Xu Caihou; Vice-Chairman of Central Military Commission visited South Korea in September 2006, Minister Kim Jang-soo to China in April 2007 and Minister Lee Sang-hee to China in May 2009 which totaled up to 5 times of reciprocal visits. Mutual visits of Defence Ministers have contributed greatly to improve military relations between both countries. Before CSKSF, visits of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was only once which was the Chairman Cho Yeong-gil’s visit to China in August 2000 but since CSKSF, the visits of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was 5 times which were the Chinese Chairman Fu Quanyou to South Korea in August 2002, then the Chairman Liang Guanglie (incumbent Defence Minister) to South Korea in November 2003, the South Korean Chairman Kim Jonghwan to China in May 2007, incumbent Defence Minister then the Chairman Kim Kwanjin to China in November 2007 and the Chinese Chairman Chen Bingde to South Korea in March 2009. Referring to meetings of Army, Navy, Air Force Chief of Staff between China and South Korea, before CSKSF there were 4 times which were Lee Su- yong, the Naval Chief of Staff to China in April 2000, Liu Shunyao the Chinese Air force Chief of Staff to Korea in March 2001, Kil Hyung-bo, the Korean Army
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- 226 - Chief of Staff to China in March 2001 and Lee Uk-soo the Air Force Chief of Staff to China in February 2002 but from CSKSF to year 2009 there increased double times of visits which were Moon Jung-il, the Naval Chief of Staff to China in October 2004, Lee Han-ho, the Air Force Chief of Staff to China in July 2005, Nam Hae-il, the Naval Chief of Staff to China in August 2006, Song Yong-mu the Naval Chief of Staff to China in August 2007, Kim Hung-ryul, the Army Chief of Staff to China in February 2008, Kim Un-ki, the Air Force Chief of Staff to China in April 2008, Wu Sheng Li, the Chinese Naval Chief of Staff to South Korea in November 2008 and Jung Ok-gun, the Naval Chief of Staff to China in April 2009. Chinese and South Korean military structure differ each other. Army, Air Force and Naval Chiefs of Staff in South Korea are more powerful and independent compared to Chinese Chiefs of Staff which are just a member of Joint Chiefs of Staff, so you can notice Korean side is more active to visit than Chinese side. Now exchange of military personnel in training before CSKSF were twice which were Korea’s first visit of naval vessels to Shanghai in October 2001 and Chinese first visit of naval vessels to Inchon Seaport in May 2002 but since CSKSF to 2009 Korean naval vessels visited Chinese harbor in 2003, 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2009 such as to Qingdao and Zhanjiang. In September 2002 Korea Air Force aircraft visited to China, China Air Force aircraft visited to Korea in 2003 and especially Air Force aircraft carrying the Air force Academy cadets visited to China in June 2005 which improved far better mutual military relations. The second hypothesis of the study is ‘China-South Korea Security Forum has provided alternative 1.5-track policy process to existing 1.0-track level relation.’ The paper was actually written to clarify how much CSKSF forum as the 1.5 Track dialogue contributed to the promotion of 1.0-track level relations between China and South Korea. There could be a lot of ways to analyze the
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- 227 - correlation between CSKSF forum and 1.0-track level relationships of both countries. It is probably a good way how government agencies or policy makers as the indirect customers for this Forum evaluate this dialogue. And the analysis and calculation of the performance of each forum itself will be helpful; how they made contribution to the development of security relations could also be a good idea. First of all, the former and the incumbent defense ministers of both the countries as well as senior policy-makers at military area deem this forum a critical dialogue process to promote bilateral security relations. They are much interested in how this dialogue can be maintained and developed for the think- tank of both the countries. The fact that former defense ministers recognize the achievement of this forum is the best evidence for contribution of this forum to the promotion of security relationship. Secondly, the achievement and contribution of the Forum can be explained by how much scholars and experts as well as policy makers and practitioners of both the countries are taking advantage of it. Party members and workers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Defense Policy from China and practitioners of National Information Agency, members of Department of Policy and Information from the Ministry of National Defense are listening to the discussions. Sometimes they are utilizing this mechanism to solve the problem which is not facilitated at the official level. A joint statement of agreement between Korea-China summits in August 2008 has included a lot of contents discussed and refined on the forum. Third, it is the evidence to determine the contribution of a forum to convince the government of both countries each year to sponsor the forum budget. This forum is not a government activity and all the projects are completely led by civilian agencies. The cost basically is being procured from private sector and accepted sponsorship of government agencies. As the years go by, the forum has
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- 228 - grown and the increased costs are funded by government agencies to a great extent. Due to the sufficient budget structure the forum, in addition to the regular forum, there projected occasional additional personnel exchanges, academic scholars’ exchanges and non-periodic discussions on certain topics in expansion. 1. The effect of the first Forum 1) China is offensive to accept itself as a friendly country to the world for achieving the national policy on economic revival placing CAIFC (China Association for International Friendly Contact) under the Chinese Foreign Ministry covering up the political, business, arts and military. The Party and Government support its activities positively. In order to increase the dimensions of the interview, the government's senior officers actively participate in the activities of CAIFC meeting and entertaining guests to visit China. 2) KRIMA (Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs) visited China on June 1, 2002 for the first China-South Korea Security Forum. With the status of Representative for Korean delegation Cho Sungtae; ex-Defense Minister, Defense Minister Ch'ih Hao-t'ien has invited Korean delegation to 8.1 Building and hosted a dinner. This is the symbolic gesture for Chinese government's strong commitment to increase friendship with South Korea. The receiving side doesn’t have the reason to refuse such a welcoming courtesy and therefore friendly relationship naturally can be formed as China has intended. 3) At the first Forum, there was no direct criticism against South Korea or the United States from the Chinese side. Perhaps, they were not refusing to recognize that Korea delegation came to China for friendship with Beijing. China was quite aware that political propaganda is a violation of this meeting focusing only on human exchange and tried to develop the private diplomatic exchanges in terms of MOU.
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- 229 - 4) The Chinese side has shown Korean delegation a deep affection and has tried to show the consensus with Korean participants citing people who have a deeper understanding about Chinese situation. It is their mission and also a major role for the Forum. When we see the procedure of Chinese welcoming the Korean delegation, it was not just the one of normal seminars and meetings, it was a very high level of courtesy which even the former Minister Cho Suntae; the chief of Korean delegation, has not yet expected. 5) South Korea has expressed that it supports Chinese government’s 'One China' policy. China looked like arguing that because it was one originally, it has to become one. About returning Hong Kong back to China, it was not because China is greedy with ownership to Taiwan as you would think from outside the United States or Korea to promulgate 'one China' policy. Perhaps that outsider remarks to support 'One China policy' as if they were granted main China’s ownership to Taiwan, so those expression seemed to feel for them what so called external interference in Chinese internal affairs. 6) Since the 2008 Beijing Olympics, per capita income of China is equivalent to 800 US Dollars and it is predicted to rise up to 5000 through 7000 $ in the mid- 21 st century by many scholars. Chinese side itself has never seen such a good reaction to that estimate. There could be two explanations for that Chinese attitude. One is that while China has tried to keep economic stability as the conservative National Phase formulation for the future, it wants to eliminate the perception recognized by the relative countries that China has the intent to raise the Northeast another supremacy. Another reason is the consciousness that increasing income of the people up to 5000-7000 Dollars as a Communist society may create crisis and may be difficult to maintain vigilance to collapse by the people. 7) While we may accept China's reform and opening-up policies easily and that they are focusing on economic growth; they take quite an open gesture to the international stage. But we still know that they are showed to be organized and
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- 230 - move in accordance with the instructions of the Party. When we visit the Buddhist temple, party executive members, instead of monks, have received us and they mobilized outside chef to provide us food. 2. The effect of the second Forum 1) The relations between South Korea and China are growing rapidly tending to form a partnership, which looks good. But the fact is that to understand and access each other strategically is not easy. Views on China’s forecasts for the current and future changes are a huge variety among Chinese scholars. They can be seen as a different inside of China and outside of China; but at certain points they are common and say together. 2) There has to be a different conceptual change about the relationship between South Korea and China to understand each other correctly and access strategic approach rather than emotional approach. 3) The majority of 44 people elected for the military leadership of the 16th Central Committee and 24 candidates for the members of the Central Committee are the military commanders and young professionals, who are trained in the military. It is also true that there is a concern that Jiang Zemin did not step away retaining post of Chairman of the Central Military Commission while the newly elected Hu Jintao is still Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission. A lot of people predicted Chairman quitting at the Third Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee of the Central Military Commission, but it did not come up on the agenda and Jiang Zemin continued to seize the military for some more time. 4) Because people did not understand the guidance system of China's national leaders following their national strategy, they thought that Jiang Zemin would pass on the Chairman of the Central Military Commission to Hu Jintao
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- 231 - immediately. It is a good example that after two years, Deng Xiaoping has taken the Chairman of the Central Military Commission and continued for several years after passing on the leadership to Jiang Zemin. People think that Hu Jintao being Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission would create confusion for a national emergency command system because they do not understand the unique linkages between the Chinese Party and the military. 5) China is the country which is ruled mainly by human relationship. Informal human network influences policy-making system of the country's foreign affairs directly rather than formal and external organization. China's decision-making system in foreign affairs by human network shows us the possible approaches to develop relations directly or indirectly. KRIMA has tried to take full advantage of these characteristics of Chinese foreign policy making through indirect relationship. While maintaining steady relationships between many, including military officials such as former Minister Cho Sungtae from Korea and Ch'ih Hao-t'ien from China who has inaugurated the military relations between both countries, it tries to build up extraordinary route when disagreements and conflicts occurred. 6) China's foreign policy shown at the 10 th National People's Congress and the 10 th National People's Political Consultative Conference is to improve Chinese international position representing a practical approach towards the world over the next five years. China's diplomatic principles are to upgrade the international status in the complex international situation keeping the route of self-reliance, independence and peace through multilateral diplomatic activities extensively engaged in participating in international exchanges. 7) Chinese Army has established a strategic plan for the military modernization even under the leadership of Jiang Zemin following the global trends of international strategies of the complex. National defense and army modernization construction is included to the entire plan of the country to promote national
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- 232 - development strategies. Survival and development of the country are depending on the defense and military construction and with the conclusion that military modernization is based on economic development. Military buildup goes along with the economic development strategy. Therefore, Chinese Army's modernization becomes an important part of construction of China's socialist modernization construction. 8) We can predict Chinese Army's military diplomacy from the direction of their military strategy. China's military strategy is active defensive military strategy. China's leadership require the construction of military struggle for communism and army buildup. Taking into account China's security situation, national interests, social system and internal and external policies the military strategy of active defense must be carried through. They are convinced that it would be consistent with China's national situation and the military situation so that active defense attitude should be the fundamental military strategy for national security. 9) Economic and social relations between South Korea and China have improved much but military and security ties are quite low at institutional level. In the event South Korea faces threat from North Korea and Pyongyang maintains security relationship with Beijing, Seoul’s diplomatic system is poorly determined for changing the security environment and engaging with China to recognize its importance in getting out of the reality in the long term. High-level talks and exchanges between South Korea and China as well as the Defense Ministers’ regular talk are required to activate security cooperation. 10) South Korea’s high-level personnel visit to China can be done without great difficulty. Chinese Army's current and retired high-ranking personnel’s visit to Korea would require the permission of the party's central committee. To promote bilateral personnel exchanges in which the systematic scheme are different from each other, it is necessary to exert political or national diplomatic coordination
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- 233 - with the other ministry considering the differences of the characteristics on decision making. 3. The effect of the third Forum 1) China-South Korea Security Forum promotes the density of military exchanges of official channels establishing a close relationship among former and current highest ranking military personnels. The continuous flow of high-level personnel, which was responsible for the military diplomacy, raises the efficiency of military exchange activating the so-called1.5 Track network. 2) Both the institutions try to maintain the relationship between high-ranking retired personnel, who have played a key-role especially in the area of military diplomacy in Korea and China by inviting them to the Forum frequently. Both the hosts try to prevent the disconnect between personnel of the two countries so that they keep their promise. 3) Through the 3rd CSKSF Forum in Seoul, both the countries recognize that they have to have the patience to solve the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully. Besides discussions on security cooperation between South Korea and China, Forum discussed Northeast Asia security cooperation to contribute to peace and stability in the area. Participants from both countries agreed with each other to develop this Forum to the enlarged security dialogue among Northeast Asian countries. 4) In addition, through the meeting and highly refined discussions with former Chinese Defense Minister such as Cao Gangchuan and Ch'ih Hao-t'ien, both participants could have a chance for improving the current issue of North Korea’s nuclear issue and military confidence-building between both Koreas.
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- 234 - 5) Considering that there is North Korean military leadership at the center of peace settlement in Korean peninsula, KRIMA proposed the constructive role of China to its military leadership, which is very influential to Pyongyang’s military leadership. Chinese side accepted the proposal and offered to persuade the neighbor to work for peace and stability in the peninsula and contribute to creating favorable conditions towards confidence building. 6) CSKSF Froum will provide a foundation on buildup the region's intellectual’s league in Northeast Asian the future expanding the participants to include foreign dignitaries and high ranking security professionals. Both parties shared the recognition on the role for CSKSF Froum to contribute the transitions from the order of conflict, confrontation and hostilities to the order of cooperation, peace and common prosperity in the Northeast Asia. 4. The effect of the forth Forum 1) On June 5, 2006 when Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan visited South Korea, KRIMA with Cho Sungtae; former defense minister invited him and his party for a breakfast meeting. Cho Sungtae; counselor of KRIMA, requested Cao Gangchuan, representative Director of the Chinese side of CSKSF Forum who was possibly in a position to intimate to North Korean military high ranking officers. As soon as Minister Cao Gangchuan came back to China, he quickly recommended General Tang Tian Pyao (唐天标), who has good friendship with North Korea's senior military personnel as the representative Director of Chinese side. 2) Participants from both sides analyzed challenges that impact Northeast Asian security at the 4th Forum and sought what cooperation could be possible between Korea and China. As regards the security situation in Northeast Asia, there has been cited various challenges and concerns that threaten peace in the area such as the nuclear issue, bilateral issues between China and Taiwan, Japan affairs and
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- 235 - US-Korea alliance. 3) Participants from both the sides evolved a consensus on the importance of balanced security awareness in East Asia and agreed with each other that security cooperation should start by removing the element which might have undermined peace in the region. To thwart military conflict between both Koreas and enhance confidence between China and South Korea on North Korea's reform and changing situations, the joint research effort is essentially required. 4) There were discussions on persuading North Korea to embrace reform and openness through North Korean military by the Chinese military and also on possibilities that USFK's strategic flexibility and its ground forces’ intervention to Taiwan cause war between China and Japan. And additionally, there were explanations from the Chinese side on its emphasis on international norms for Security and Cooperation by China's military and legislation for anti-nation law to oppose Taiwan’s independence. 5. The effect of the fifth Forum 1) The 5 th CSKSF Forum has been recognized as the root of human networks for military contact between South Korea and China to maintain the retired and incumbent's leadership. It has founded 1.5 Track channel for informal conversation to promote mutual understanding and trust between the two countries and promote peace and security in Northeast Asia. General Tang Tian Pyao was nominated as the representative director of Chinese side who was the vice director of the political bureau of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and now acting as a member of Chinese representative parliament. 2) The presentation and the discussions were not in the government level, but participants from both the sides have discussed the subject fully as if they were representing both governments. Political, military and economic positions of both the sides and contradictions had been discussed and they had tried looking for a
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- 236 - realistic alternative. The real debate was induced to evolve consensus on situations and productive conclusions between the two countries. 3) The consensus on the strategic interests of both the countries formed at 1 st defense Ministers’ meeting in 1999 is reaffirmed. From 2002, 1 st CSKSF Forum to the 5 th Forum in 2006, both institutes had been constantly seeking ways to develop the relationship of cooperation between China and South Korea through defense ministers while reaffirming mutual strategic interests. The 5 th Forum has discussed additional agendas such as regional cross-border arms race in Northeast Asia and denuclearization of Korean peninsula. 6. The effect of the sixth Forum 1) The 6 th CSKSF Forum was the platform to practice the Joint Statement signed during the South Korea-China summit in August, 2007. Security Forum activated the opportunities of military cooperation above existing social network between Beijing and Seoul and had upgraded military personnel exchanges between them. The Forum was able to build military personnel network route continuously through senior leaders of both the countries. The Forum could be adapted well to the environment of improved bilateral military changes. 2) Though the Forum was free from both the governments as the form of a private presentation, in terms of the output the discussions were activated to be realistic and practical. The discussions had been focused on the topics of realistic and practical affairs in terms of various perspectives for peace and stability of Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. Despite that there was an unspoken rule between Korea and China not to talk about political and military affairs each other, the Forum was trying to access viable alternatives for resolving the discrepancies among other systems. Consensus on complex nuclear issue in the peninsula, cooperation between Korea and China following improved relations between US
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- 237 - and North Korea and the peace regime in Northeast Asia were formed through various discussions of the Forum. 3) Because it was the first forum since declaration of the strategic cooperative partnership between both the countries, all the issues between Korea and China immobilized during the Cold War were fully reviewed and there was a future-oriented discussion over the practical ways to overcome the challenges. Participants from both the sides realized that there was a need for broadening the positive correlation between South Korea-US and South Korea-China for new understanding of the joint role. They have expanded perception that efforts for strategic partnership between Korea and China directly affect peace and stability in Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. Understanding North Korea from the basis of the immediate interests of both the countries, sought the practical approaches to find the joint role for solving the North Korean problems. 7. The effect of the seventh Forum 1) There is the feature in China that their participation of Chinese scholars and officials are selected and controlled according to the theme of the forum. Due to the nature of a free system, scholars and officials from South Korea are easily accessing various forums sometimes indiscreetly. South Korean military veterans enjoy free activities compared to the non-free activities of Chinese military retired personnel so that the reckless inadvertent actions from South Korean personnel are likely to have an adverse effect in the future development of ties between Korea and China relations. All outreach activities of Chinese personnel are under the control of the party and partners with them and their speech contents are being managed by the Party unlike free-system countries. China's characteristics should be considered when exchanging with China. It should be borne in mind that the result of all the
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- 238 - outreach activities of the Chinese personnel are reported to Chinese Government and reflected on their policies. Systematic step-by-step cooperation and coordination should be taken to promote future-oriented development of relations between the countries’ different systems. According to the systematic roadmap, all the exchanges and cooperation between both the countries at the government level and the private sector should be managed so that it could create a multiplier effect for the development of bilateral relations. 2) Liang Guanglie; Chinese Defense Minister said Chinese military wants to promote military exchanges and cooperation actively for the future development of relations between China and South Korea. It is required to execute the strategic research for military exchanges to find direction and scope of the expansion of the field and there is a need for research about efficient operation of 1.0 Track and 2.0 Track. Chinese Military has focused on building the information structure on the level of modernization. They will have significant improvements on mechanization and informatization of Chinese Military so that since 2020, Chinese Army will make a great progress especially on local campaigns. It is also necessary for Korean experts to have interests in the process of modernization of Chinese Military. The experience of informatization from Korean military can be expected to give technical support for Chinese Military. The institutional research for bilateral Software development is needed for the possibility of a strategic cooperation. 3) Since the establishment of Obama government, security alliance between South Korea and the US became more strengthened, China became alert and concerns much about the change of security situation in East Asia. South Korea should develop countermeasures to eliminate concerns of China.. Expanding the scope of the alliance between South Korea and the US brings in obstacles for the
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- 239 - strategic cooperative partnership between China and South Korea so that they have to clarify the relevance between the development of the alliance of the United States and South Korea and the practical relationship between China and South Korea and evolve consensus between both the countries. 4) Presently strategic dialogue between China and the US as well as triple dialogue among China, the US and Japan are being operated. If relationships among the three nations are not going well, it may adversely affect the security situation in Korea. So strategic dialogue among directly interested parties in Korean peninsula; South Korea, China and U.S.A. is required to promote understanding. Through strategic dialogue, South Korea, China and the US can play the roles and the responsibilities on the scenario-specific consultation for contingency situation in North Korea. It will yield a positive impact for the relations between China and South Korea. 5) China supports peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula, but due to the change of geopolitical strategy towards China after the unification, it is being threatened in the security concern. They are describing that after the unification if USFK moves northward to the Yalu River is as the same context as Chinese Army moves down to the 38th parallel border region of Korean peninsula. China is very much interested in the role of the USFK forces after the unification of Korea and they are saying that strategic consensus between both the countries is needed. China considers that the initiative of the reunification may be in South Korea; however it also considers that the accessibility of USFK to China border increases in case South Korea initiatesunification so that they need to talk about some rearrangement of concept and the nature of the USFK. 6) Liang Guanglie (梁光烈), defense minister, said that military has forwarded for the national disaster and stressed that there is a need for military cooperation and coordination between South Korea and China for the case when one faces national disaster. The Chinese side is concerned about illegal refugees
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- 240 - crossing the border between China and North Korean in contingency which will cause mass confusion and it argues to seek the solutions and initial response measures to be resolved. Besides the case of refugees, it suggests a number of non-traditional security issues as well as various aspects of the possibility of disasters and asks coordination of research between South Korea and China. China also argues that they should be prepared to take adequate measures in the event of massive food shortages in North Korea in contingency. 7) Once Kim Jeongun regime is set up in North Korea, it will announce to the world a strong start of hereditary systems of North Korean so that it is concerned about the possibility of expressing a collective action for showing their military power. China predicts that North Korea most likely provokes a military campaign in local level in its most confident areas to inform the world that regime's succession has been completed depending on support of the military. While the actual transfer is not completed yet, it is predicted that it will arise NLL-related issues driving the world's attention unilaterally in the direction which they want to go. South Korea must be equipped with the ability to respond to North Korea's military regime power transfer. 8) China and North Korea have been determined that the discussions of denuclearization between the US and South Korea only emphasize denuclearization of North Korea. As regards fuel retreatment for South Korean nuclear reactor and some controversy on nuclear sovereignty in South Korea, the misunderstanding on South Korea's nuclear weapon ambitions has occurred among China and North Korea. The concept of denuclearization claimed by South Korea and the US is the entire denuclearization of the peninsula. Between Korea and China, the concept of denuclearization has to be clarified. 9) Both the sides have been rewarding that they have developed CSKSF forum and had debates seven times. The two countries hope to maintain the tradition of this security forum between South Korea and China and they judge
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- 241 - that this forum contributed to support the exchange of official channels as the effective communication of 1.5 Track. Graph #1 Comparing the Reciprocal Visits before and after CSKSF 0 2 4 6 8 10 Defence Minister Meetings Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army, Navy, Air Force Chief of Staff Military Personnel in Training 1992~2002 (before CSKSF) 2002~2009 (since CSKSF) In this extensive chapter five, all the presentations and debates presented at the Forums were analysed. And the researcher tried to prove the first hypothesis of the thesis ‘China-South Korea Security Forum has contributed to the improvement of the bilateral security relations between China and South Korea. The researcher firstly introduced the main stream of the Forum 2002-2009. And key arguments depending on the countries by the subjects were classified. Both countries have shown clear differences on each subject. Without knowing the differences of the interests you cannot go even one step more to improve the relations. CSKSF has played a role in finding the differences and understanding them each other. As analysed in this chapter, after CSKSF military exchanges between the two countries became more activated. You see the graph as follows that the reciprocal visits for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has increased five times, Army, Navy, Air Force Chief of Staff double times and Military Personnel in Training four times.
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- 242 - On July 15, 2011 South Korean Defence Minister Kim Kwan-jin and Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie met together in Beijing to agree with military educational exchanges between the two countries. Minister Kim Kwan- jin has participated at the 6 th , 7 th and 8 th CSKSF as the member of Korean delegation and met Minister Liang Guanglie again at the 7th CSKSF in Beijing since their meeting when they were Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under the recognition that exchange of young officers between both countries could contribute to promoting mutual trust, two Ministers decided to start military educational exchanging programme from the short-term training courses and gradually strengthen exchanges to the long-term academic courses in the other country. The formation of warmer ties between military officers of both countries will be a big turning point and an intangible asset for the development of bilateral security relations.
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- 243 - CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION China-South Korea Security Forum (CSKSF) was evaluated as the effective mechanism through the process of overcoming government malfunction in the realm of security relations between China and South Korea at certain period. The researcher has tried to find out whether CSKSF contributed to the improvement of the bilateral security relations between China and South Korea and provided alternative 1.5 track (Half government and half Civilian track) policy process to existing 1.0 track (Governmental track) level relation. It is argued here that governments in China and South Korea are obsessed with the past and the order of the Cold War to make rigid policy decisions, the violations of people’s security interests could be getting serious. Not only political instability in both countries but also a new type of instability which violates the security interests of the people will be increasing. Further this thesis emphasizes that if the governments had the structural and fundamental limits to ensure the security interests of the people, then other mechanisms will have to do something to complement the limits. There are many researches on NGOs activities but the researches of NGO on people’s security interest are few. The thesis basically concerned about government failure in people’s security area and analysed CSKSF for one of the mechanism to overcome that failure. Since Adam Smith’s invisible hand the research of market failure has been main topic in public administration school. The role of government could have been justified through the study of various market failures. This thesis studied government failure differently from that of market failure which justifies the role of NGO. So the thesis might bring up a new scope of the failure on people’s security and the way to solve it.
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- 244 - In Chapter two of this thesis, we analysed the historical background of the China-South Korea security relations before and after 1992 normalization particularly in the military respect. And in the chapter three, the concepts and models for the analysis of 1.5 track channel meetings were introduced and it compared the difference between roles of Government and NGO (Non- governmental Organization), NPM (New Public Management). After viewing general theories and practices about NGO and NPM, it delved into non- governmental activities between China and South Korea and described that NGO activities could be more effective in pursuing the practical interest at certain stages between the both countries and how to be coordinated and co-operated them. In chapter four, the researcher introduced the detail of the hosting institutes of China-South Korea Security Forum; Chinese People’s Association for Friendly Contact (CPAFC) and Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs and the evolution of CSKSF. CSKSF was planned cooperatively to keep in close contact with government level talks. So the interviews with retired or incumbent high ranking officers of governments from both countries were also styled to find the relevance of Governmental activities and Civilian activities. In chapter five around 60 papers and six debates were analysed and it traced the improvement of the relations between China and South Korea and tried to find out the relevance and causal relationship between the improvement of China-South Korea relations and CSKSF itself. CSKSF organized dozens of meetings and seminars so far where more than 100 experts from both countries have participated. Participants debated on various topics regarding to security dynamics in East Asia. It has actually contributed a lot to the promotion of security relations between China and South Korea. Policy-makers in the security area from the both countries estimated that the Forum is a valuable one to stimulate security relations between China and
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- 245 - South Korea. They have been frequently utilized this mechanism to solve their various issues. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, China and South Korea endeavored a lot for removing the inconveniences between the both. China opened the door not only for South Korea but also for all free market countries which had detached themselves from China during the Cold War and it also tried to facilitate the trade towards free market economy 42 . Since 1990, Korea has also been adapted itself to the changes of the new world order and actively extended the diplomatic relations with many other communist countries including China. China and South Korea has enthusiastically propelled exchanges not only for economic interests but also at security front. China has had the most important strategy to stabilize the Korean peninsula by eliminating the excessive war expenses on unexpected security affairs and focus on her own economic development. On the other hand, South Korea has had a strategic intention to fix the problems caused by the division of Peninsula and North Korea’s affairs by engaging with China. In fact the normalization of the relationship between China and South Korea would positively affect to enhance the relationship among other neighboring countries such as Japan, North Korea and Taiwan in Northeast Asia and even with the US. Since the middle of 1940s, the two countries have been influenced and used in the security structure of the Cold War era than the other countries. The relationship between the two countries epitomized the confrontation of the Eastern and Western blocks in the East Asia. The policy- makers, security experts and scholars of the two countries were dominated by the antagonistic mentality of the Cold War blocks. 42 China has shifted her state-directed or planned economy to the free market economy slowly. In a free market economy, the prices of goods and services are determined in a free price system instead of the centralized planning system of the state.
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- 246 - Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the vestige of the Cold War was still left in the case of China and South Korea. Two countries took different sides in every international affair. The traces of the same mentality have been seen in the relations with the US and North Korea. Both countries have incurred losses and sabotaged their interests for the sake of belligerent attitudes of the USA and North Korea. While there was wider common ground for meet the interests of China and South Korea, the relations with North Korea and the US have been more sensitive issues for both countries respectively which they cannot simply store up. In retrospect, after the World War II, the decision making in the security front in the Korean Peninsula has been directed by the interests of the great Powers rather than the interests of the Korean people. As a result, the security policy and implementation in the peninsula were severely distorted. The failure of government’s policy in security sector in Korea was a reflection of internal and external factors which has been the common character in the Third world countries. Such distortion in the security policy, guided by the external Powers, resulted not only in oppressing the Korean people but also spoiled the concept of security in Korean peninsula, which the people actually aspired to be part of the decision making process of sovereign country. In fact, there was no so much diversity in the language, culture and religion, Korea remained unified country for last more than 1000 years. In contrary to the will of the people, the country was divided into two by the external forces, viz. the United States and the Soviet Union. The leadership of Korea was used by the outside powers. If there had not been external influence on Korean Peninsula after liberation, the Korean people could have built a unified country by themselves. In the theory of International Relations, the realists say there were
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- 247 - different hidden interests of major external powers in dividing the Korean peninsula at that particular time. The interest of the external power has apparently caused to break out the Korean War where millions of innocent people were lost their lives. There were ‘Kim Il Sung’ in North Korea; a hero made by the Soviet Union, ‘Rhee Syngman’ in South Korea embraced by the United States. And at the same time there were ‘Kim Koo’ a social activist like Gandhi in India who had been supported popularly by the people opposing the division of Korean peninsula. Initially, Kim Koo had strongly opposed to such provisions as trusteeship and division. Despite desperate efforts, the South and North Korea were divided officially then Kim Koo accepted the trusteeship from the Powers. With regards to protect people’s security interest Kim Koo changed his mind on deteriorating conflicts among political factions in the North and the South Korea. Political leaders criticized for changing Kim Koo’s attitude but it was necessary now to look at closely what factors which led him to conclude such decision. He had met North Korean leader Kim IL Sung and South Korean leader Rhee Sung Man to try founding one state in the Korean peninsula but failed. He has recognized the security failure in the Korean peninsula by the factional conflicts; the failure of the peninsula's peace and the security benefit of the people. Therefore he judged if division in the Korean peninsula would be inevitable, the concept of trusteeship could be better-represented for security interests of the people of Korea. Kim Koo was not a government-oriented leader but society-oriented leader, who considered the matter of trusteeship or division as one of the means. What is the most important thing to him at that time was how people of Korea can live in peaceful environment which is so called security interests of the people. Kim Koo took a flexible attitude depending on the circumstances by recognizing the peoples’ security interest. What he cherished the most was neither the political
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- 248 - system nor the unification of the peninsula but the concern of protecting people that there should not be any more bloodshed in the Korean peninsula. What he has pursued was the pure patriotism, the value of the emphasis on security interests of the people not based on partisan governmental interests. He differentiated the goal itself from the means for the goal finely. What is the goal and what is the means for the goal? The goal is definitely people’s interest. Ideology such as communism or capitalism and political systems are just means for people’s interest. Means can be changed for the goal. Because of partisans such as Kim IL Sung in the North Korea and Rhee Sung Man in the South Korea, the goal was lost by means at Korean War. The goal; peoples’ real security interest was lost with a million killed to protect their ideologies and political systems which were just one of the means for the goal. It was a serious security failure and distortion. China-South Korea Security Forum was born through the process of overcoming these partisan government failures in the realm of people’s security interest. If the partisan governments are obsessed with the past and the order of the Cold War to make a rigid policy decisions, the violations of people’s security interests would be getting more serious. This also results serious security breach of the countries in the region. If the governments had the structural and fundamental limits to ensure the security interests of the people, non- governmental organizations will have to take/play an initiative role to complement these limitations of the Sate for protecting the security interest of the people. The CSKSF has been a channel which has been trying to improve the security relations between China and South Korea for the people’s interest. The Forum has discussed various security issues which are beyond the Cold War security regime and rigid structure of governmental decision-making. The Forum initiated by the civilians of both countries has organized annual seminars since
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- 249 - 2002 where the members of incumbent and former government agencies have been taking part. The recent events of torpedo of Cheonan ship 43 and the bombardment in Yeonpyeong Island are likely to make the countries around Korean peninsula return to Cold War situation. In these circumstances the security relations between South Korea as a member of the axis of Southern triangle 44 and China that of Northern triangle are very important for peace and development in East Asia. The CSKSF has created the important people’s network between China and South Korea for exchanging the information among security professionals and building confidence among policy-makers. It has grown up to a valuable ‘Think Tank’ discussing the important security issues between the two countries. The CSKSF has become a very unique and useful mechanism. With the advent of the 21st century one of the most remarkable changes in East Asia is the unexpected economic upsurge of South Korea with the rise of China. South Korea has become a new economic power employing western free economic systems in a short period of time and made an active democracy in every aspect of society since the liberation from Japanese domination in 1945. With the emergence of economic expert; President Lee Myung-bak 45 who has assumed office at the 25 th of February 2008 South Korea takes part in world economic problems devotedly. Its role as an economic leader was acknowledged 43 On 26 March 2010, an explosion occurred near the rear of the Cheonan of South Korea, causing the ship to break in two. The cause of the explosion was not immediately ascertained. The 1,200 ton ship started sinking about 1.9 km away from the south-west coast of South Korea. The ship had a crew of 104 men at the time of sinking, 58 crews were rescued, and 46 crews were killed. On 17 April 2010, North Korea denied any involvement in the sinking of Cheonan ship. 44 The Cold War security regime in East Asia, Southern triangle was consisted of U.S.A., South Korea and Japan, Northern triangle comprised China, North Korea and then Soviet Union. 45 Prior to his presidency, he was the CEO of Hyundai Engineering and Construction.When he started at Hyundai in 1965, it had 90 employees; and when he left as chairman after 27 years, it had more than 160,000. After leaving Hyundai at the end of a 27-year career, he decided to enter politics. Under Lee, South Korea has been increasing its visibility and influence in the global scene, resulting in the hosting of the 2010 G-20 Seoul summit.
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- 250 - by holding the G20 summit talks in 2010. South Korea has emerged from aid receiving country to highly developed state and became an OECD member in 1996 with in a stipulated time. It has also experienced the military conflict as the divided nation. If the world's economic problems and security issues can be solved with participation and cooperation of all the countries of under-developing and developing countries together rather than by only some developed countries, South Korea will be able to perform some special role as the unique country of having both of the experiences in the short period. China and South Korea, two major countries located in Northeast Asia, the formal conversation between them was difficult in the past era because of North Korean factor for China and US factor for South Korea as well as the ideological barriers. The limitations of the communications in the official channels found a new outlet and it was the birth of the China-South Korea Security Forum (CSKSF). They are still having many potential conflicts such as Ieo Island, Claiming over Arirang, Distortions of Great Wall etc. Some conflicts can be solved through the other mechanisms rather than the governments’. So the more studies on this area can be expected to ease rigid decision making of the governments. CSKSF has played a significant role for improving the relationship between both countries.
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- 251 - Appendix #1 Casualties and losses during the Korean War Country Killed Wounded MIA POW Remarks South Korea 137,899 450,742 24,495 8,343 North Korea 215,000 (est.) 303,000 (est.) 79,900 (est.) 40,100 (est.) Not clear USA 36,940 92,134 3,737 4,439 China 152,000 383,500 450,000 14,190 England 1,078 2,674 179 977 Turkey 741 2,068 163 244 Australia 339 1,216 43 26 Canada 312 1,212 1 32 France 262 1,008 7 12 Greece 192 543 3 Colombia 163 448 28 Thailand 129 1,139 5 Ethiopia 121 536 Netherland 120 645 Philippines 120 645 Belgium 99 336 4 1 South Africa 34 9 New Zealand 23 79 1 Norway 3 Luxemburg 2 13 Soviet Union 282 Civilian (S.K.) 373,599 229,625 387,744 Civilian (N.K.) Not clear Total 919,458 1,471,572 946,273 68,401 * MIA : Missing in Action * POW : Prisoners of War
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- 252 - Appendix #2 High level Exchanges between China and South Korea From China to the ROK 2000 October Premier of State Council Zhu Rongji 2001 May Chairman of NPC Standing Committee Li Peng 2003 September Chairman of NPC Standing Committee Wu Bangguo 2004 August Chairman of National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Jia Qinglin 2005 November President Hu Jintao 2007 April Premier of State Council Wen Jiabao 2008 August Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi 2008 August President Hu Jintao 2009 December Vice President Xi Jinping 2010 May Premiers Wen Jiabao 2010 November President Hu Jintao 2011 October Vice Premiers Li Keqiang From the ROK to China 2001 June Prime Minister Lee Handong 2002 January Speaker of National Assembly Lee Mansub 2003 July President Roh Moohyun 2005 June Prime Minister Lee Haechan 2006 January Speaker of National Assembly Kim Wonki 2006 October President Roh Moohyun 2008 May President Lee Myungbak 2008 September Prime Minister Han Seungsoo 2009 October President Lee Myungbak 2010 April President Lee Myungbak 2011 April Prime Minister Kim Hwangsik 2012 January President Lee Myungbak
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- 253 - Appendix #3 Outcome of the ROK-China Foreign Ministers' Meeting (2012.03.02) 1. Foreign Minister Kim Sung-Hwan had a meeting with his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi, who is visiting the Republic of Korea, on the morning of March 2. They exchanged views on major issues of mutual interest, including ways to make the "ROK- China Strategic Cooperative Partnership" more substantive, the situation on the Korean Peninsula, and regional and global issues. 2. Marking the 20th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the ROK and China, the two sides agreed to work to make the "Strategic Cooperative Partnership" more substantive. They also decided to increase exchanges of high-level officials, strengthen substantial cooperation and closely consult on the situation on the Korean Peninsula. ㅇ Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said Chinese President Hu Jintao's participation in the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit in March is being reviewed, and invited Minister Kim to the ROK-China-Japan Foreign Ministers’ Meeting to be held in April in China. ㅇ Both sides agreed on a slogan, a logo and an annual plan for major events to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. They also decided to work together for a successful opening ceremony to be held in Seoul on April 3. ㅇ Minister Kim introduced "Good Friendship Chinese Class," operated recently to enhance mutual understanding and friendship between Korean and Chinese youth. Following Korean junior diplomats' visit to China last year as part of the ROK-China
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- 254 - junior-diplomat exchange program, Minister Kim expressed his anticipation of Chinese junior diplomats’ visit to Korea this year. ※ "Good Friendship Chinese Class" is a free Chinese language class held for 3 months from November 2011 to January 2012 for about 60 elementary and middle school students from under-privileged families, run by Korean university students and Chinese students studying in the ROK. 3. The two Ministers had a candid and in-depth discussion on the North Korean defector issue, and agreed to closely cooperate for a smooth resolution of the issue. 4. Both sides also exchanged opinions on the current situation on the Korean Peninsula including the outcome of the US-North Korea consultation, announced on February 29. 5. The official visit to the ROK by Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, the third after visits in August 2008 and February 2011, is expected to contribute to deepening the "ROK-China Strategic Cooperative Partnership."
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- 255 - Appendix # 4 China ROK Joint Statement (2008. 05. 28) At the invitation of President Hu Jintao of the People's Republic of China, President Lee Myung-bak of the Republic of Korea paid a state visit to China from 27 to 30 May 2008 and was accorded a grand and warm reception by the Chinese Government and people. During the visit, President Hu Jintao had talks with President Lee Myung-bak. Presiden t Lee Myung-bak also met with Premier Wen Jiabao of the State Council and Chairman Jia Qinglin of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference . President Lee Myung-bak expressed deep condolences and sympathy to the great loss o f life and property caused by the earthquake in Wenchuan, Sichuan Province and offered to provide necessary help to China's disaster relief effort. President Hu Jintao and othe r Chinese leaders expressed sincere thanks to the ROK Government and people for thei r care and timely help such as sending a rescue team. Both sides agreed to strengthen exchanges and cooperation on handling natural disasters such as earthquake, tsunami and typhoon. During the talks and meetings, the two sides had an in-depth exchange of views and reached extensive agreement on further developing China-ROK friendly relations and cooperation on regional and international issues of mutual interest. I. Further Developing Bilateral Relations The two sides applauded the rapid growth of their relations since the establishment o f diplomatic ties in 1992. They both agreed to raise their comprehensive and cooperative partnership to the level of strategic cooperative partnership and step up exchanges and cooperation in the diplomatic, security, economic, social, cultural, people-to-people and other areas. Both sides believed that dialogue and cooperation in the diplomatic and security areas
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- 256 - should be further strengthened and agreed to establish a high-level strategic dialogue mechanism between the two foreign ministries and develop the existing diplomatic security dialogue into a mechanism. The two sides decided to increase the exchanges between their leaders, governmen t agencies, parliaments and political parties. The Chinese side reiterated that there is only one China in the world and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. The ROK side expressed its full understanding of and respec t for China's position and reaffirmed its position that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China and tha t it upholds the one China principle. II. Expanding Economic Cooperation and Trade The two sides agreed to adjust and enrich the Joint Research Report on China-ROK Mid - to-Long Term Development Plan on Economic Cooperation and Trade issued by the leaders of the two countries in 2005 to reflect the new progress on bilateral economic cooperation and trade which will serve as the basis for further practical cooperation in this field. The two sides commended the smooth progress of the joint study on China-ROK FTA by government agencies, industries and academia and agreed to build on past achievements and continue the research to push forward the bilateral FTA for win-win result. The two sides welcomed the amendment and issuance of the Treaty on Investmen t Protection Between China and the ROK and agreed that the Treaty is conducive to protecting and expanding two-way investment and is in line with the development of the mutually beneficial business relations. The two sides agreed to work together to gradually achieve balance in the bilateral trade as it develops. The ROK side expressed its readiness to take an active part in China's various trade and investment fairs such as the China Import and Export Fair, China
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- 257 - International Small and Medium Enterprises Fair and continue to send to China purchasing and investment groups. China expressed appreciation of this. The two sides agreed to the need of strengthening concrete cooperation on mobile communication, actively supporting further capital and technological cooperation between the two countries' communication enterprises and expanding the cooperation on electronics and information communication to areas such as software and radio frequency identification. The two sides agreed to strengthen extensive and mutually beneficial energy cooperation such as cooperation on nuclear power, oil reserve, joint development of resources and renewable energy in an effort to achieve concrete results in cooperation on energy conservation. The two sides agreed to strengthen cooperation on IPR protection, food safety and quality inspection, logistics and labour service. The two sides believed that closer financial cooperation is conducive to the developmen t of the financial industry of both countries. They believed that they should learn from each other, share experience, improve their financial systems, promote the reform and opening up of their financial markets and step up coordination and cooperation in internationa l and regional financial institutions. The two sides agreed to enhance joint study and survey in areas such as polar science and technology. Both sides recognized the importance to strengthen environmental cooperation and agreed to enhance exchanges and cooperation on environmental industry, sand storm monitoring and the Yellow Sea environmental protection, etc. The two sides agreed to actively cooperate in the preparation of the 2010 Shanghai World Expo and the 2012 Yeosu World Expo.
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- 258 - III. Enhancing People-to-people and Cultural Exchanges The two sides decided to enlarge the programs of mutual youth visit and step up exchange activities such as home stay and home visit and expand the program o f governmental scholarship swapping. The two sides agreed to explore ways to streamline visa procedures so as to increase mutual personnel visit. China welcomed the setting up of a consulate-general in Wuhan, China by the ROK. The two sides believed that the long history of bilateral exchange is an important asset o f China-ROK friendly relations. To enhance mutual understanding, both sides should actively support the exchanges on history and culture between their academic institutions . IV. Advancing Cooperation on Regional and International Affairs The Chinese side reiterated its firm support to the improvement of relations and ultimate peaceful reunification between the north and south of the Korean Peninsular through dialogue. The ROK side appreciated China's efforts in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsular and looked forward to China's continued constructive role. The ROK side stated its positions on facilitating the settlement of the Korean nuclea r issue and expanding exchanges and cooperation in the economic, social and other areas between the north and the south of the Korean Peninsular. China expressed it s understanding of the ROK's positions and hoped to see progress in the reconciliation and cooperation between the north and the south of the Korean Peninsular. Both sides believed that the second phase Action Plan of the September 19 Join t Statement by the Six Party Talks should be fully implemented at an early date under the principle of "action to action". The two sides agreed to work with other parties concerned to look into and formulate the action plan for the next phase in a constructive effort to fully implement the September 19 Joint Statement.
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- 259 - The two sides recognized the importance of China-ROK cooperation to the Six Party Talks and the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsular and agreed to continue thei r close cooperation for achieving peace and stability on the Korean Peninsular and in Northeast Asia. The two sides reaffirmed the important role of the United Nations in solving issues o f global significance and agreed to continue their close cooperation in UN affairs. The two sides believed that the UN reform should enhance the authority, effectiveness and efficiency of the organization so that its system, based on the consensus of the membe r states, will be more transparent, democratic and representative. Both sides support the UN Secretary General's efforts to enhance the efficiency and role of the UN. The two sides believed that cooperation among China, the ROK and Japan is very important to peace, stability and prosperity of Asia. The two sides agreed to work together to maintain the regular meetings among the three countries, such as the talks o f their leaders and foreign ministers that take place alternately in the three countries. The two sides agreed to work together for the success of the 7th ASEM Summit to be held in Beijing this year. The two sides agreed to step up cooperation on issues of mutual interest such as climate change, non-proliferation of WMD, combating international terrorism, financial and economic crime, piracy and high-tech crime. V. The two sides welcomed the signing of the Treaty Between the People's Republic o f China and the Republic of Korea on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Polar Science and Technology Between the Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China and the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology of the Republic of Korea and the Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Recognition of Higher Education Degrees and Background between the Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China and the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology of the Republic of Korea.
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- 260 - VI. The two sides expressed satisfaction with the achievements of President Lee Myung - bak's visit to China and believed that this visit is important to the further growth o f bilateral relations. President Hu Jintao said he looked forward to welcoming President Lee Myung-bak a t the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games. President Lee Myung-bak wished the Beijing Olympic Games a complete success and a grand gathering of human harmony and solidarity. He said he would attend the opening ceremony. President Lee Myung-bak expressed thanks to China for the warm hospitality and invited President Hu Jintao to visit the Republic of Korea at an early date. President Hu Jintao thanked him for the invitation and accepted the invitation with pleasure.
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- 261 - Appendix #5 China ROK Joint Communiqué (25 to 26 August 2008) I. At the invitation of President Lee Myung-bak of the Republic of Korea, Preisdent Hu Jintao of the People's Republic of China paid a state visit to the Republic of Korea from 25 to 26 August 2008. During the visit, President Hu Jintao held talks with President Lee Myung-bak and they reached broad common understanding. II. The two Presidents expressed satisfication with the great progress bilateral relations have made in the political, economic, social, cultural and other areas since the two countries established diplomatic ties in 1992, which, they believed, not only promoted the development of their respective countries, but also contributed to the peace and development of Asia and the world at large. III. President Lee Myung-bak offered congratulations on China's success in hosting the Beijing Olympic Games. President Hu Jintao thanked President Lee Myung-bak fo r making a special trip to Beijing to attend the opening ceremony of the Games and fo r ROK's support to the Games. IV. They agreed that China-ROK ties are important bilateral ties for each other. The two sides decided to promote China-ROK strategic cooperative partnership in an all-round way on the basis of the China-ROK Joint Statement issued in May 2008 during Presiden t Lee Myung-bak's visit to China. Committed to the fundamental goal of long-term common development, the two sides will expand and deepen mutual cooperation comprehensively, strengthen coordination on major regional and international issues and work for lasting peace and common prosperity of the world and development and progress of mankind. To this end, the two sides agreed to promote their bilateral ties in the following aspects: 1. Enhancing political mutual-trust and supporting each other's peaceful development . The two sides will maintain and strengthen bilateral high-level exchanges, expand and
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- 262 - deepen exchanges and dialogues between their governments, parliaments and politica l parties, and strengthen defense dialogue and exchanges. 2. Deepening mutually beneficial cooperation. The two sides will continously explore new areas of cooperation and expand the scope and depth of cooperation based on complementarity and mutual benefits, and promote sustainable development of the two countries through practical cooperation. 3. Promoting people-to-people and cultural exchanges. The long history of mutua l exchanges and profound cultural links between the two countries should be used to promote exchanges and deepen mutual understanding and friendship between the two peoples. 4. Strengthening coordination and cooperation on regional and global issues. The two sides are committed to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and Northeas t Asia. They will actively participate in regional cooperation of Asia, strengthen dialogue and cooperation in international multilateral arena and earnestly engage in cooperation in major issues vital for mankind's survival and development. V. The ROK side stated that it will develop South-North relations of mutual benefit and common prosperity through reconciliation and cooperation. The Chinese side reiterated its continued support to the efforts of the South and the North to promote the reconciliation and cooperation process, improve relations and ultimately achieve peacefu l reunification. On the Taiwan question, the ROK side reaffirmed its position in the China - ROK Joint Statement issued in May 2008 and continued adherence to the one-China policy. VI. In order to develop bilateral relations, the two sides agreed to give priority to the following cooperation areas: 1. Political Area
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- 263 - (1) Top leaders of the two countries will maintain regular exchange of visits and contact. (2) The foreign ministries of the two countries will hold the first high-level strategic dialogue within 2008 to launch the strategic dialogue mechanism for exchanging views on major issues concerning the two countries' shared interests. The two foreign ministries ' working-level consultation will be institutionalized to strengthen communication on foreign policies and the international situation. (3) Experts and scholars of the two countries will conduct a joint study and submit a report to the two governments on how to comprehensively promote China-ROK exchanges and cooperation. (4) Defense ministries of the two countries will have high-level exchange of visits , strengthen contact and liason mechanism and conduct multi-tier exchanges and cooperation in various areas. (5) Consultation will be expedited on the maritime delimitation issue between China and the ROK, an early solution of which will be important to the long-term, stable development of their bilateral relations. 2. Economic and Trade Area (6) The two sides will make joint efforts to increase bilateral trade volume to US$200 billion by 2010. To this end, they will strengthen cooperation in trade and investmen t facilitation, quality inspection and quarantine, trade remedy and intellectual property rights. (7) The two sides will continue working on the adjustment and supplement to the Join t Research Report on China-ROK Mid-to-Long Term Development Plan on Economic Cooperation and Trade, in accordance with the agreement reached by the two Presidents in May 2008. (8) The two sides will further strengthen the mechanism of trade and economic
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- 264 - consultation and practical trade cooperation to expand bilateral economic and trade cooperation. (9) The two sides will further strengthen cooperation in key areas such as environmenta l protection, information technology, telecommunication, finance, logistics and energy. (10) Since an increase in mutual investment can promote mutually beneficia l development of the two economies, the two governments will strengthen cooperation and support for a better investment environment. (11) The two sides will find ways to actively advance the China-ROK FTA process in a mutually beneficial way on the basis of the joint study on China-ROK FTA involving government agencies, industries and academia. (12) The two sides will sign the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation and Exchanges between the 2010 Shanghai World Expo in the People’ s Republic of China and the 2012 Yeosu Expo in the Republic of Korea so as to ensure the success of both expos by strengthening cooperation and sharing experience and information. (13) The Employment Permit System will be launched in labor service cooperation according to agreement between the two governments to protect the legitimate rights and interests of labor from both sides. (14) The two sides welcome the outcome of their mutually beneficial cooperation in the financial sector and will strengthen cooperation in mutual market access for financia l institutions from each other’s countries. (15) Competent government departments and companies from the two countries will sign the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in IT Technology Innovation so as to strengthen and develop IT technology cooperation. (16) The two sides will cooperate actively in building an environment-friendly and resource-conserving society.
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- 265 - (17) The two sides will strengthen exchanges and cooperation to cope with natura l disasters such as earthquake, tsunami and typhoon. (18) The two sides will sign the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Energy Conservation, so as to enhance cooperation in energy conservation consulting , personnel exchange and technological development. (19) The two sides are aware of the importance of protecting global ecosystems and agree to sign the Memorandum of Understanding on Scientific and Technological Cooperation for Desertification Prevention, which will promote and strengthen such cooperation through joint studies, expert exchanges and information sharing. (20) The two sides will sign the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Operation and Maintenance of the China-ROK Economic and Trade Cooperation Website. The website to be launched will offer the latest information on trade and investment. (21) The two sides will sign the Memorandum of Understanding on Hi-Tech Cooperation and will cooperate in IT, telecommunications technology and new energy, and actively explore new hi-tech cooperation programs in the next five years. (22) The two sides will sign the Agreement on the Sanitary Management of Export and Import of Aquacultural Products, so as to strengthen cooperation in inspection and quarantine, legal information sharing and mutual visits by aquacultural produc t quarantine personnel. 3. Cultural Exchanges (23) The two sides will expand the present scale of people-to-people exchanges of six million visits per year and provide all necessary facilitation, including the study of visa facilitation measures. (24) The two sides have designated 2010 the Visit China Year and 2012 the Visit Korea
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- 266 - Year and will host tourist events and other bilateral exchanges to enhance people-to - people exchanges between the two countries. (25) The Chinese side has announced the upgrading of the Consular Office in Gwangju o f the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China to a Consulate-General, which the ROK welcomes. (26) The two sides will sign the Agreement on Educational Exchanges and Cooperation Between 2008 and 2010 and increase the number of annual government scholarship exchange students from 40 to 60. Young people will be invited to make mutual visits under the youth exchange program. (27) The two sides will promote exchanges and mutual understanding between the cultural sectors, media, sister cities, academia and private organizations and suppor t exchanges between private organizations in culture and media and exchanges between academic institutions in history and culture. (28) The two sides will sign the Memorandum of Understanding on the Gift of Crested Ibises from China to the ROK and Cooperation in Crested Ibis' Breeding and Population Rebuilding. China will make a gift of a couple of Crested Ibises to the ROK, which the ROK appreciates. The two countries agree to strengthen cooperation in the rescue o f Crested Ibis, an endangered species. 4. Regional and International Affairs (29) The two sides will continue to strengthen communication and cooperation under the framework of the Six-Party Talks, promote the implementation of the second phase actions in a comprehensive and balanced manner at an early date and make constructive efforts for the comprehensive implementation of the September 19 Joint Statement. (30) The two sides will maintain coordination and cooperation in ASEAN plus three (China, Japan, the Republic of Korea), China-ROK-Japan, the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, APEC, the Asia Cooperation Dialogue, ASEM, the East Asia -
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- 267 - Latin America Forum, the Asia-Middle East Dialogue and the Asia-Africa Summit. (31) The two sides will establish a consultative mechanism on UN affairs between thei r foreign affairs departments to strengthen mutual understanding and cooperation in UN affairs. (32) The two sides will advance dialogue and cooperation in international human rights. (33) The two sides will strengthen cooperation in the prevention of the proliferation o f weapons of mass destruction and the cracking down on international terrorism, drugs , financial and economic crimes, hi-tech crimes and piracy. (34) The two sides will work unremittingly with the international community to address climate change, a common concern of the world. VII. The two sides agree to make full use of bilateral mechanisms such as the strategic dialogue between foreign affairs departments, the joint economic and trade committee and the tourism ministers’ meeting to make specific arrangements for and effectively promote the implementation of the above mentioned agreements in various areas. VIII. China appreciates the warm and friendly reception given to President Hu Jintao during the visit by the ROK.
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- 268 - Appendix #6 Goguryeo Issue : Official Point of View of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK The Course of Events Which Led to the Verbal Agreement between the ROK and the PRC In April 2004, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China put up distorted interpretation of Goguryeo(Koguryo)'s history on its web site. In July 2004, the Chinese government registered Goguryeo's relics in China (a part of the Korean history) as 'World Cultural Heritage', and published articles on Goguryeo's history with distorted interpretation ("Goguryeo was an ethnic local government of ancient China") in the government and political party's magazines. Since then, the history of Goguryeo has become a diplomatic issue between the ROK and the PRC. * Prior to this, China began a project called 'A Series of Researches on the History and Current Status of Northeast Borderland', which is also known as the 'Northeast Project'. This five-year project, which began in February 2002, included researches on, but not limited to, the region's history from ancient to modern time, China-Russia relations, as well as the history of Goguryeo. · In June 2003, China's Guangming Daily and China Daily introduced the overall outline of the Northeast project, claiming that "Goguryeo was an ethnic local government of ancient China". Our Government considers the Goguryeo history issue as "an overriding task that is directly related to the roots and identity of our nation", and has been taking firm and decisive diplomatic measures against China consistently, urging China to correct its distorted interpretation of the history of Goguryeo.
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- 269 - As a result of such efforts made by our Government, the vice foreign ministers of the two countries reached the verbal agreement on the Goguryeo's history issue in August 2004, which can be summarized as follows : · There will be no additional distortion of interpretation of Goguryeo's history made by the PRC government. The PRC government will make efforts to correct existing distortions: and · The academic circles of history of the two countries will make efforts to hold a joint academic conference at an early date, etc.. Diplomatic Measures for the Implementation of the Verbal Agreement Our Government urged the Chinese side to take corrective measures according to the verbal agreement on various occasions of high-level consultations between the presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers of the two countries. Furthermore, our Government has been urging China consistently to make corrections through various diplomatic channels such as the ROK-China Vice Foreign Ministers' Talks, various working-level consultations, our Embassy in China and the Chinese Embassy in Seoul. The PRC Government's Corrective Measures Ever since the verbal agreement was made in August 2004, there have been no additional distortions made by the central government, political party, and government-managed media (People's Daily, Xinhua News Agency, etc.) of China, and China's corrective measures thus far were as follows: · Central Government 1. Alteration of the Foreign Ministry web site's distorted contents (August 2004)
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- 270 - 2. Deletion of the People's Education Press web site's distorted contents (September 2004) 3. Correction of Xinhua News Agency web site's "Cultural Heritage of China" introductory section's distorted contents (January 2005) 4. Deletion of Xinhua News Agency internet edition's distorted article (July 2005) 5. Holding back of official adoption of the "test version" middle school history textbooks (September 2005) 6 & 7. Addition of a map with Goguryeo as a part of the Korean Peninsula to middle school history textbooks (Chinese History)/ addition of Korean history(with Goguryeo's history included) to middle school history textbooks (World History) (July 2006) 8. Deletion of the distorted introduction of Ji'an City on the State Administration of Cultural Heritage web site (January 2007) 9. Deletion of distorted contents in Xinhua News Agency Web site (October 2010) 10. Deletion of distorted contents in China Radio International(China Broadcast) (November 2010) · Local Government 1. Deletion of Chinese media (Dalian Daily, Jiangxi TV, etc.) web sites' distorted articles about 'O-nyo(Wunu) Mountain Fortress' in Huanren City (August 2005) 2. Removal of 4 sign boards(out of 6) with distorted facts about Goguryeo's history at 'Yongdam(Longtan) Mountain Fortress' (August 2005)
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- 271 - 3. O-nyo(Wunu) Mountain Fortress in Huanren Perfecture Historic Museum Closed(June 2006) 4. Deletion of Huanren County web site's distorted contents (July 2006) 5. Removal of a sign board with distorted interpretation of Goguryeo's history at 'Bonghwang(Fenghuang) Mountain Fortress' in Liaoning Province (October 2006) 6. Removal of 2 white stone plaques at 'Yongdam(Longtan) Mountain Fortress' (presumably around December 2006) 7. Deletion of distorted contents of Goguryeo's history in World Cultural and Natural Heritage Expo Shenyang China (June 2007) 8. Deletion of distorted contents of Goguryeo's history in Benxi City, Liaoning Province Government web site (May 2010) 9. Deletion of distorted contents of Goguryeo's history in O-nyo(Wunu) Mountain Fortress' Museum (May 2010) 10. Deletion of Distorted Contents of Goguryeo's history in Introduction of Jian City, Jilin Province Museum (May 2010) 11. Deletion of Distorted Contents of Goguryeo's history in Dalian City, Liaoning Province Foreign Affair Office Web site(November 2010) * 4 out of 6 in total were already taken down in August 2005 Meanwhile, we are urging China continuously to make prompt corrections to the matters that the Chinese side is still reviewing, such as the distorted contents of the explanatory stone plaque at the Ji'an City Museum. Based on our stern position that we will take decisive measures against any attempt to distort our history, our Government will continue efforts to prevent such distortions and make corrections with regard to Goguryeo's history. At the same time, we will actively pursue or provide support for various other efforts such as strengthening academic capacity for countermeasures, promoting Korea-China and international academic exchanges, reinforcing overseas publicity activities, discovering core historical
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- 272 - materials(sources), and excavating and preserving Goguryeo's relics in both South and North parts of the Korean Peninsula.
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- 273 - Appendix #7 Agreement on the Establishment of the trilateral Cooperation Secretariat among the Governments of the People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (2011 01 25) The Governments of the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (hereinafter jointly referred to as the "Parties"), Desiring to establish a secretariat for the efficient promotion and management of trilatera l cooperation among the Parties and to enhance existing dialogue mechanisms and contribute to the further promotion of their cooperative relations as decided at the Third Trilateral Summit held on May 30, 2010, in Jeju island, the Republic of Korea, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 1. The Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as the "Secretariat") is hereby established. 2. The Secretariat shall be located in the Republic of Korea (hereinafter referred to as the "host country"). Article 2 The objective of the Secretariat is to contribute to the further promotion of cooperative relations among the three countries by providing support for the operation and management of the trilateral consultative mechanisms among the Parties and by facilitating the exploration and implementation of cooperative projects. Article 3
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- 274 - 1. In order to achieve the objective referred to in Article 2, the Secretariat shall carry ou t the following functions and activities: (a) provide administrative and technical support for the operation and management o f such trilateral consultative mechanisms among the Parties (hereinafter referred to as the "consultative mechanisms") as the Trilateral Summit Meeting, the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting, the Three-Party Committee and other ministerial meetings, and the Trilateral Senior Foreign Affairs Officials' Consultation and send, if necessary, its representatives to attend major consultative mechanisms; (b) communicate and coordinate with the Parties, and if necessary, with othe r international organizations, particularly with other East Asian cooperation mechanisms; (c) explore and identify potential cooperative projects among the Parties, and report those projects to the relevant consultative mechanisms for adoption; (d) evaluate the cooperative projects and draft reports on them, compile necessary documents into database, and submit annual progress reports to the Three-Party Committee or the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting for approval; and (e) conduct research on important issues related to the trilateral cooperation, manage the Secretariat's website, and promote understanding of the trilateral cooperation. 2. The Secretariat shall carry out its functions and activities within its mandate authorized by and under the supervision of the Parties through the Trilateral Foreign Ministers ' Meeting or in a manner decided by the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting. Article 4 In the host country, the Secretariat shall have the legal capacity: (a) to contract; (b) to acquire and dispose of movable and immovable property; and
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- 275 - (c) to institute legal proceedings. Article 5 1. The Secretariat shall be comprised of a Secretary-General, two Deputy Secretary - Generals and Professional Staffs (hereinafter jointly referred to as the "officials") and General Services Staffs to be nominated and appointed, or employed, in the following ways: (a) The Secretary-General shall be appointed at the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting upon nomination of a Party on a rotational basis in the order of the Republic of Korea , Japan and the People's Republic of China. The tenure of office shall be two years. (b) Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, each Party other than the Government of the country of the Secretary-General shall nominate a Deputy Secretary-General respectively who shall be appointed at the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting. The tenure of office shall, in general, be two years. The appointment of the Deputy Secretary-General may be renewed once for an additional period of up to two years with the approval of the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting. (c) The Secretary-General shall appoint the personnel seconded by the Parties as the Professional Staff. (d) The Secretary-General may employ the General Services Staff as needed to carry ou t the functions and activities of the Secretariat. 2. The Secretariat shall have the Consultative Board comprised of the Secretary-Genera l and the Deputy Secretary-Generals. The Consultative Board shall consult and make decisions by consensus on matters submitted for its consideration. The Consultative Board shall consult with the Parties on matters of importance in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 3. 3. Subject to the approval of the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting, the Secretary - General may establish the departments of the Secretariat to efficiently carry out the
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- 276 - functions and activities of the Secretariat with a view to facilitating trilateral cooperation in various areas. Article 6 The Secretary-General shall represent the Secretariat and be responsible for the function s and activities carried out by the Secretariat. The Secretary-General shall also be responsible for the administration of the Secretariat, in particular as follows: (a) prepare annual and, where necessary, ad-hoc reports on the functions and activities o f the Secretariat, as well as an annual budget of the Secretariat, and submit them, with the approval of the Trilateral Senior Foreign Affairs Officials' Consultation, to the Trilatera l Foreign Ministers' Meeting for approval; (b) establish and amend internal rules and regulations of the Secretariat subject to the approval of the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting; (c) establish the basic terms and conditions of the officials' secondment, including thei r salary matters, subject to the approval of the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting, and suggest the termination of the appointment of the Professional Staffs to the Party which seconds them after the consultation with the Deputy Secretary-Generals; (d) establish General Services Staff positions, and terms and conditions of employment , including salaries, subject to the approval of the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting , and employ qualified personnel for the General Services Staff positions and dismiss the General Services Staff, as necessary, in accordance with the rules and regulations referred to in sub-paragraph (b) of this Article; and (e) enter into contracts required for the operation of the Secretariat. Article 7
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- 277 - 1. The Deputy Secretary-General shall assist the Secretary-General in carrying out his/he r functions and activities. In this connection, the Deputy Secretary-General shall conduct , in particular, the following duties: (a) provide advice to the Secretary-General on the future direction of the progressive development of trilateral cooperation; (b) represent the Secretariat at conferences, ceremonies, and other occasions as authorized by the Secretary-General; (c) provide support for research activities of the Secretariat; and (d) perform other functions and activities that may be mandated by the Secretary-Genera l. 2. The Deputy Secretary-General shall act for the Secretary-General in case of his/he r absence or inability to perform his/her duties in accordance with the rules and regulations referred to in sub-paragraph (b) of Article 6. Article 8 1. The Government of the host country shall be responsible for providing and arranging the premises for the operation of the Secretariat. 2. The operational costs of the Secretariat shall be met from equal contributions of the Parties to be made subject to their respective national laws and regulations. Article 9 1. In the host country, the Secretariat and the officials shall enjoy privileges and immunities in accordance with the provisions of Articles 10 and 11, as appropriate for the achievement of the Secretariat's objective and the carrying out of its functions and activities. 2. The Parties other than the Government of the host country may grant, in thei r respective countries and to the extent permitted by their respective national laws and
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- 278 - regulations, such facilities as may be deemed necessary for the proper operation of the Secretariat. 3. The privileges and immunities from jurisdiction of the host country in respect of civi l or administrative proceedings shall not be granted in relation to a contract, or a civi l action for damages arising from an accident caused by a motor vehicle, vessel or aircraft , used or owned by the Secretariat and the officials where those damages are no t recoverable from insurance. 4. The Secretariat shall cooperate at all times with the appropriate authorities of the hos t country to prevent the occurrence of any abuse in connection with the privileges , immunities and facilities granted under this Agreement. 5. If the Government of the host country considers that there has been an abuse of a privilege or immunity granted under this Agreement, consultations shall be held between the Government of the host country and the Secretariat to determine whether any such abuse has occurred and, if so, to ensure that no repetition of such abuse occurs. Article 10 1. The Secretariat, its property and assets shall enjoy immunity from legal process excep t where it has expressly waived its immunity. Any waiver of immunity from jurisdiction in respect to civil or administrative proceedings shall not be held to imply waiver o f immunity in respect to the execution of the judgment, for which a separate waiver shal l be necessary. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, in case the Secretariat initiates a legal process, waiver of immunities in respect not only of that legal process but also o f the execution of a judgment thereof is presumed. 2. The premises of the Secretariat shall be inviolable. The archives of the Secretariat and , in general, all official papers and documents belonging to the Secretariat shall be inviolable.
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- 279 - 3. The Secretariat shall enjoy for its official communications, treatment not less favorable than that accorded by the Government of the host country to foreign diplomatic mission s or any international organizations in the host country. The Secretariat shall have the righ t to dispatch and receive correspondence and other official communications by courier o r in sealed bags, which shall have the same privileges and immunities as diplomatic couriers and diplomatic bags. 4. Without being restricted by financial controls, regulations or moratoria of any kind, the Secretariat may: (a) hold funds or currency of any kind and operate accounts in any currency; and (b) freely transfer its funds or currency to and from the host country or within the hos t country and convert any currency held by it into any other currency. 5. In exercising the rights referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article, the Secretariat shal l comply with the national laws of the host country, and shall pay due regard to any representation by the Government of the host country in so far as it is considered tha t effect can be given to such representation without detriment to the interests of the Secretariat. 6. The Secretariat, its property and assets shall be: (a) exempt from all direct taxes except those which are, in fact, no more than charges fo r public utility services; (b) exempt from customs duties and from prohibitions and restrictions on imports and exports in respect of articles imported or exported by the Secretariat for its official use. I t shall be understood, however, that articles imported under such exemption shall not be sold in the host country except under conditions determined by the Government of the host country; and (c) exempt from customs duties and prohibitions and restrictions on imports and export s in respect of its publications.
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- 280 - 7. While the Secretariat will not, as a general rule, claim exemption from excise duties and from taxes on the sale of movable and immovable property which form the part o f the price to be paid, nevertheless, when the Secretariat is making important purchases fo r official use of property on which such duties and taxes have been charged, the Government of the host country may, whenever possible, make proper administrative arrangements for the remission or return of the amount of duty or tax. Article 11 1. The officials shall: (a) be exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid to them by the Secretariat; (b) be immune, together with their spouses and relatives dependent on them living in the host country, from immigration restrictions, alien registration and national service obligations; (c) have the right to import free of duty furniture and household goods for their persona l use or for use by their spouses and relatives dependent on them at the time of their initia l posting at the Secretariat; and (d) be accorded, in respect of exchange facilities, treatment not less favorable than tha t accorded to officials of comparable rank of any other international organizations posted in the host country. 2. The Government of the host country shall not be obliged to grant the privileges and immunities referred to in this Article to the officials who are nationals or permanen t residents of the host country. 3. Privileges and immunities are granted to the officials in the interests of the Secretaria t only, and not for their personal benefit. The Secretary-General has the right and duty to waive the immunity granted to the officials under this Agreement through consultation with the Deputy Secretary-Generals in any case where the Secretary-General considers
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- 281 - that the immunity would impede realization of justice and can be waived withou t prejudice to the interests of the Secretariat. The immunity granted to the Secretary - General and Deputy Secretary-Generals may be waived, as and when necessary, at the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting. Article 12 The working language of the Secretariat shall be English. Article 13 The financial affairs of the Secretariat shall be audited annually and shall be reported to the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting. The Secretary-General shall establish the auditing procedures subject to the approval of the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting. Article 14 Any Party may propose amendments to this Agreement. This Agreement may be amended by written agreement of the Parties. Article 15 Each Party shall notify all other Parties in writing through diplomatic channels that thei r respective internal procedures necessary for the entry into force of this Agreement have been completed. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when the las t notification thereof is issued. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.
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- 282 - Appendix #8 Trilateral Cooperation VISION 2020 (2010. 05. 30) We, the Leaders of the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea , convened in Jeju, Korea on May 29, 2010, on the occasion of the 3rd Trilateral Summi t Meeting. We express our satisfaction with the visualization of substantial outcomes derived from the past decade of our cooperation, in the field of political affairs, economy, culture, and people-to-people exchanges. We will continue to uphold and fully implement the common views enunciated in the Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation, Joint Statement for Tripartite Partnership and the Joint Statement on the Tenth Anniversary of Trilateral Cooperation among the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. We confirm that there still remains great room for the development of trilatera l cooperation in promoting the exchange of people, goods, services and capital, and in the field of regional and global issues led by the world's trend in globalization. In the spirit o f facing history squarely and advancing towards the future, we will unswervingly continue to push the trilateral relations forward in the direction of good-neighborliness, mutua l trust, comprehensive cooperation, mutual benefit and common development. We share the common recognition that by presenting specific goals and visions to be achieved through cooperation by 2020, when the next decade ends, we need to combine our capacities and enhance trilateral cooperation to a higher level so that our future - oriented comprehensive cooperative partnership will be more solid, cooperation to ou r mutual benefit in all areas will be more fruitful, the sentiments of friendship among ou r peoples will be more profound, and the trilateral cooperation will serve common interests of the three countries and contribute to peace, stability and prosperity of the East Asian region and the world at large.
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- 283 - With this in mind, we have decided as follows: I. Institutionalization and Enhancement of Trilateral Partnership 1-1. We envision the advancement of building solid strategic mutual trust among the three countries by stepping up high-level contacts and the development of friendship and amity among the peoples of the three countries, while deepening and expanding trilatera l exchange and through inter-governmental cooperative mechanisms such as the Summi t Meeting, Foreign Ministers' Meeting, other Ministerial Meetings, Senior Foreign Affairs Officials' Consultation, etc. 1-2. We will establish the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in the Republic of Korea in 2011 in order to promote and strengthen trilateral cooperation. The Secretariat wil l provide support for the operation and management of the trilateral consultative mechanisms such as the Trilateral Summit Meeting, the Foreign Ministers' Meeting, othe r Ministerial Meetings, and the Senior Foreign Affairs Officials' Consultation, and facilitate the exploration and implementation of cooperative projects. 1-3. To jointly respond to natural disasters effectively and contribute to disaster risk reduction in Northeast Asia, we will endeavor to fully utilize existing institutions and organizations in sharing disaster-related information, policies, and technologies including Japan-China-Korea Trilateral Head of Government Agency level Meeting on Disaste r Management. 1-4. We will explore the possibility to establish the 'Trilateral Defense Dialogue' in orde r to strengthen security dialogue and facilitate exchange and cooperation among the defense or military personnel of the three countries. 1-5. We will establish a close cooperative mechanism among the police authorities of the three countries in order to jointly respond to international crimes and enhance the trilateral policing cooperation. 1-6. We envision the advancement of exchanges among the local governments of the
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- 284 - three countries as we strengthen cooperation in administrative, economic, and cultura l areas by expanding the sisterhood relationship among the three countries II. Sustainable economic cooperation for common prosperity 2-1. By the year 2012, we will endeavor to complete the Joint Study for an FTA among China, Japan and Korea, which was launched in May 2010. Through the Joint Study, we will pursue a common understanding among the three countries on issues involved, for a practical reference for the future negotiations of a possible FTA among China, Japan and Korea. Furthermore, we will continue to work towards further economic integration o f the three countries in the long-term, including the establishment of a common market in the region. 2-2. Aiming to increase the volume of trilateral trade by 2020, which is vital for furthe r regional economic growth and integration, we will continuously improve the trilatera l trade environment through greater trade facilitation efforts. 2-3. We recognize that establishing a coordinated and efficient transport and logistics system among the three countries will benefit the reduction of product costs and the improvement of international competitiveness. Therefore, we advocate continuing to take full advantage of China-Japan-Korea Transport and Logistics Ministerial Conference and bilateral policy dialogues to push forward the development of transport logistics network in Northeast Asia, for the purpose of a seamless logistics system. 2-4. We reaffirm the importance of customs cooperation, which will contribute to trade facilitation and supply chain security not only among three countries but also in the region. In this regard, we will further enhance customs cooperation through the implementation of 'the Action Plan of the Tripartite Customs Cooperation' under the framework of Tripartite Customs Heads' Meeting (TCHM). 2-5. We will make efforts towards concluding the Trilateral Investment Agreement, with a view to actively promoting regional investment of enterprises within our respective countries and also provide a favorable legal, institutional and procedural environment fo r
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- 285 - investment in order for regional investors to manage successful businesses. Moreover, we will endeavor to provide the necessary infrastructures to facilitate the free movement o f investment capital of the region. 2-6. To respond to the changes in international financial markets, we will further enhance coordination among financial authorities, and endeavor to strengthen financia l cooperation by encouraging financial institutions in China, Japan and Korea to advance into each other's markets. We welcome the successful launch of the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization and the substantial progress under the Asian Bond Markets Initiatives , and will make further efforts to enhance financial cooperation in East Asia, including enhancement of the effectiveness of CMIM. We will actively contribute to the discussions led by the G20 on strengthening international financial system including the work to improve global financial safety nets. 2-7. We share the view that an open, fair and liberalized multilateral trading system is essential to the economic prosperity not only in China, Japan and Korea, but also the world as a whole. It is imperative for us to fight against protectionism in any form in order to preserve and reinforce such system. In this regard, we are determined to seek a prompt, ambitious and balanced conclusion to the Doha development round, consisten t with its mandate, based on the progress already made, including with regard to modalitie s and strengthen the trilateral cooperation for the continuous advancement of the multilateral trading system in the era beyond the Doha Round. 2-8. We share the view to enhance the cooperation in science and innovation to improve our research capacity, strengthen the competitiveness of the industrial technology of the three countries, and address the common regional and global issue, explore ways o f contributing to the long-term goal of developing an East Asia community. For this purpose, we will continue to provide financial support to the Joint Research Collaboration Program and the Asia 3 Foresight Program and explore possibility o f further expansion of the investment in light of actual circumstances. In addition, we wil l explore the possibility of establishing a new joint fund program to support joint research with common interest in the fields, and by the means which are decided through
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- 286 - discussion among the three countries. 2-9. We will further continue to consult on policy cooperation and consultation in such areas as industry, energy, energy efficiency, resources, ICT, hi-tech, cultural industry , transportation, health, agriculture, fishery, tourism and intellectual property rights. 2-10. We affirm that cooperation on standards is a key tool by which to facilitate trade through the elimination of unnecessary technical barriers to trade. In this regards, we wil l further enhance cooperation on standards through researching harmonization o f standards, proposal of harmonized international standards and the Northeast Asia Standards Cooperation Forum. 2-11. We recognize that more coordinated trilateral economic cooperation is a key to promoting economic activities in the region, and we are committed to furthe r strengthening our cooperation through such measures as the ones stipulated above . Furthermore, recognizing the important role played by the three countries in regional and the global economy, we should act together to generate strong, sustainable and balanced global growth, in multilateral fora especially including G20 and APEC. To this end, we will actively participate in the initiating a cooperative and consultative process of mutua l assessment of our policy frameworks. III. Cooperation in environmental protection 3-1. We welcome the outcome of the COP15/CMP5 and support the Copenhagen Accord thereof. Based on the positive outcome of the COP15/CMP5, we will strengthen ou r cooperation to contribute to the successful outcome of COP16/CMP6, including the establishment of an effective post-2012 international cooperation framework on climate change, consistent with the principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in particular common but differentiated responsibilities. 3-2.We believe it is necessary to strengthen cooperation in environmental protection. In this regard, we endorse the environmental ministers to implement the tripartite join t action plan of 10 priority cooperation areas consisting of 1) Environmental Education ,
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- 287 - Environmental Awareness and Public Participation, 2) Climate Change, 3) Biodiversity Conservation, 4) Dust and Sandstorms, 5) Pollution Control, 6) Environment-Friendly Society/3R/Sound Resource Recycle Society, 7) Transboundary Movement of E-Waste , 8) Sound Management of Chemicals, 9) Environmental Governance in Northeast Asia , and 10) Environmental Industries and Technology, which was adopted at the 12th Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting (TEMM) in May 2010, taking concrete actions in cooperation with appropriate regional or international framework as necessary. 3-3.We will cooperate closely for the success of the 10th meeting of the Conference o f the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP10) scheduled to be held in Nagoya City, Aichi, Japan in October 2010, and support the International Union fo r Conservation of Nature (IUCN) World Conservation Congress, which will be held on Jeju Island, Korea, in 2012. 3-4. We will strengthen cooperation in protecting marine environment in the region, and make efforts to enhance the public awareness on reducing marine litter generation , reiterating the importance of implementation of 'the Regional Action Plan on Marine Litter' (RAP MALI) under the framework of the Northwest Pacific Action Plan (NOWPAP) to prevent marine litter. 3-5. We take note the frequency and intensity of dust and sandstorms. We will strengthen the cooperation on dust and sandstorms monitoring methodology, prevention technology , and capacity building. 3-6. We will enhance cooperation on hazardous wastes, especially E-Waste. We share the view that the three countries should enhance cooperation on E-Waste management on exchanging information and making joint efforts to combat the illegal transboundary movement, as well as the capacity building on legislation and enforcement. 3-7. We reaffirm our commitment to the exploration of the establishment of a China - Japan-ROK circular economy model base. Ⅳ. Promotion of friendly relations through the expansion of human and cultura l
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- 288 - exchange and cooperation 4-1. We will enhance China-Japan-Korea friendship and amity through expanding and developing active people-to-people exchanges among the three countries. 4-2. We are convinced that culture, as a bridge connecting minds, plays a significant role in enhancing the understanding and trust among the peoples of our three countries. In thi s sense, we will further strengthen cooperation within the trilateral Ministerial Meeting on Culture to further promote cultural exchange among our three countries, to make the annual China-Japan-Korea Cultural Industry Forum a success, and to further enhance the cooperation in various areas including intangible cultural heritage in the framework of the UNESCO. 4-3. We will endeavor to significantly expand the current scale of people-to-people exchanges among the three countries to promote friendly relations and mutua l understanding as well as to further enhance regional economic and social development. 4-4. We will contribute to strengthening the competitiveness of universities and nurturing qualified human resources through exchange programs such as credit recognition and joint degree. To this end, we confirm that the Japan-China-Korea Committee on Promoting Exchange and Cooperation among Universities will be convened continuously. We will also promote cooperation among quality assurance agencies in Japan, China and Korea, and jointly prepare a guideline in order to enhance exchange among universities. Also, we will consider a concrete policy package to facilitate the exchange of prospective students. Meanwhile, to further promote trilateral educationa l cooperation, we will make full use of meetings to facilitate the establishment of a ministerial meeting mechanism. Moreover, we will promote the exchange of teachers among the three countries. 4-5. We will expand the current scale of youth exchange conducted by the governments of the three countries to actively foster exchange among the future leaders of China , Japan and Korea.
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- 289 - 4-6. We will contribute to the realization of Vision 2020 by enhancing cooperation in sports among China, Japan and Korea. To this end, we will encourage exchange between sports organizations and agencies as well as among athletes, and active participation in various types of sports events to be held in each country. 4-7. We commit ourselves to focus our attention on vulnerable groups, including women , children, persons with disabilities and the elderly in promoting various cooperation programs within the social and cultural arenas among the three countries, while strengthening trilateral exchange and cooperation with a view to realizing the ful l advancement and empowerment of such groups. Ⅴ. Joint Efforts for Regional and International Peace and Stability 5-1. We share the view that a denuclearized Korean Peninsula would greatly contribute to not only enduring peace, security and economic prosperity in Northeast Asia. In this regard, we will continue to make concerted efforts to realize the goals outlined in the September 19 2005 Joint Statement through the progress of the Six-Party Talks. 5-2. We, recognizing that terrorism poses a grave threat to international security, wil l continue close cooperation in eliminating terrorism. In this regard, we will convene a trilateral meeting of experts in this field. 5-3. We, recognizing the need to effectively counter drug problems including drug - related crimes on a regional level, will strengthen trilateral cooperation in this field. 5-4. We will make efforts to improve food safety by exchanging information such as the standards on food safety of each respective country, timely notifying authorities with detected problems and measures to prevent their recurrence. 5-5. We will further strengthen the regional cooperation against infectious diseases among the three countries by expanding the scope of trilateral cooperation to include possible new areas.
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- 290 - 5-6. We will continue to share relevant information, such as disease occurrence situation and preventive measures that each country takes, to effectively respond to and eventually eradicate vicious animal diseases, such as Avian Flu and Foot and Mouth Disease. 5-7.We are deeply concerned about increased global poverty and hunger, and wil l continue the trilateral cooperation in the international arena such as the United Nations , for sustainable global food security. 5-8. We will further strengthen cooperation in various regional frameworks, including the ASEAN Plus Three, East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Asia - Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), so as to promote peace, stability and prosperity of the Asian region. We support ASEAN as the driving force for cooperation in Eas t Asia. We remain committed to the development of an East Asian community as a long term goal. 5-9. We shared the view that in order to respond effectively to global threats and challenges, the role of the United Nations should be further strengthened and that efforts for the reform of the United Nations should be strengthened to enhance its authority , efficiency, and effectiveness as mentioned in the outcome document of the 2005 World Summit among others. 5-10. We will continue to host, on a rotational basis, the Trilateral Policy Dialogue on Africa with a view to sharing relevant experience and pursuing effective measures to support peace and development in Africa.
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- 291 - Appendix #9 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu Remarks on China-ROK, China-Japan Foreign Ministers' Meetings (2010. 05. 17) On May 15, 2010, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu answered questions related to Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi’s meetings with hi s counterparts of the ROK and Japan on the sideline of the 4th China-Japan-ROK Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Gyeongju. Q: It is reported that when Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with ROK Foreign Minister Yu Myung Hwan on May 15, the ROK side brought up the Cheonan incident. Please brief us on that. A: ROK Foreign Minister Yu Myung Hwan expressed his concern on Cheonan in the meeting. Yang Jiechi said that the sinking of Cheonan was a tragic incident. Considering the current situation on the Korean Peninsula extremely complicated and sensitive, China hopes parties concerned could put peninsular and regional peace and stability first , proceed from long-term perspective, remain calm and exercise restraint and handle the related issues properly. Q: It is reported that when meeting with Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada complained that the Chinese marine surveillance ship was trying to change the status quo by approaching Japanese scientific survey vessel on the east side of the "median line". It undermined Japan's sovereign rights and interests. He requested the Chinese side to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents. Yang Jiechi reiterated China’s position. Please brief us on that. A: Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi stressed that China’s position on the East China Sea is clear-cut and consistent. China has never recognized the so-called "median line" claimed by Japan unilaterally. The Japanese side has no right to undertake unilateral actions in the
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- 292 - disputed sea area. Both sides agreed to deal with the relevant issues calmly to avoid escalation of the situation and undermining the overall bilateral relations. Q: It is reported that when meeting with Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada complained about Chinese navy’s training in the East China Sea. He said that the surveillance by the Japanese ships and planes over the Chinese ships follows international law, while the Chinese side took “dangerous” action. Please brief us on Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi’s remarks. A: Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi reiterated China’s stance. He stressed that Chinese navy was conducting normal training which posed no threat to any country. He hoped the defense authorities of the two countries could strengthen exchanges and communication to promote mutual trust and avoid misunderstanding and misjudgment.
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- 293 - Appendix #10 Joint Statement on Strengthening Science and Innovation Cooperation among the People’s Republic of China Japan and the Republic of Korea (2010. 05. 30) We, the leaders of the People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), on the occasion of the Third Trilateral Summit Meeting held on 29 May 2010 in Jeju Island, ROK: Recognizing that the three countries are important components of regional and globa l economy and have the responsibility to work actively to address regional and globa l issues; Agreeing that economic development calls for the supportive role of science and technology advancement and innovation and that the further development and deepening of trilateral cooperation in science and innovation are essential to improving our research capacity and addressing common regional and global issues, and are in the interest of the three countries; Reaffirming our commitments in the Joint Statement on Sustainable Development among the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea issued on 10 Octobe r 2009; Decide to coordinate and underpin trilateral cooperation in a spirit of mutual respect , mutual benefit and win-win progress in science and innovation under curren t mechanisms, and support such collaboration in areas of common interest by means jointly approved by the three countries: -Continue to provide financial support to the Joint Research Collaboration Program and the A3 Foresight Program and explore possibility of further expansion of the investmen t in light of actual circumstances. In addition, we will explore the possibility o f establishing a new joint fund program to support joint research with common interest in the fields, and by the means which are decided through discussion among the three
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- 294 - countries. -Enhance exchanges and cooperation in epidemic control and clinical studies, and give full play to the important role of science and technology advances in improving public health. -Enhance exchanges and cooperation in pollution prevention and control, hazardous waste treatment technology and management, electronic waste treatment technology and management, and crop research; vigorously promote trilateral cooperation on the management of water resources, and drive the sustainable development through science and technology. -Deepen science and technology cooperation in information communications, especially in sensor networks, 4G mobile communications standards and Internet security to promote industrial formation and development through science and technology progress. -Conduct joint research in monsoon, drought and water disasters, meteorological disaste r and earthquake to improve the capacity of Northeast Asia to respond to natural disasters through science and technology progress. -Jointly organize regular workshops from 2010 among young researchers, encourage them to be key players in science and technology development and trilateral cooperation , support the non-governmental organizations to engage in science and technology exchanges and cooperation, and science communication and public understanding o f science promote science popularization in the three countries. In order to conduct the cooperation mentioned above, we will give full play to the curren t trilateral mechanism on science and technology cooperation to coordinate collaboration in various areas of science and innovation and explore new mechanism and ways o f cooperation if considered necessary by the three countries. Through closer cooperation, we will work hard to raise the level of science and technology, and innovation capacity in support of socio-economic development in the
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- 295 - three countries, jointly address regional and global issues, and explore ways o f contributing to the long-term goal of developing an East Asian community.
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- 296 - Appendix #11 Joint Statement on Sustainable Development among the People’s Republic of China Japan and the Republic of Korea (2009. 10. 10) We, the heads of the Government / State of the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, held, on 10 October 2009 in Beijing, China, the Second China-Japan - ROK Summit Meeting, where we, Reviewed with satisfaction the progress made by the three countries in the implementation of the Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation among the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea on 7 Octobe r 2003, the Joint Statement for Tripartite Partnership and the Action Plan for Promoting Trilateral Cooperation among the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic o f Korea adopted on 13 December 2008, including our fruitful cooperation for sustainable development; Reaffirmed our shared vision and responsibility for creating a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable future for the region and international community; Stressed that sustainable development bears on the survival and development of al l countries and peace and stability of the world, and while taking vigorous measures to address the international financial crisis and promote economic recovery, the three countries should work hard to develop green economy, make joint efforts to facilitate a virtuous cycle between the social and economic system and the natural and ecologica l system, promote balance between economic growth and social development, and contribute to the realization of sustainable development; Resolved to strengthen cooperation in the following areas in the spirit of seeking mutua l benefit and win-win results, in particular of developing green economy: ― Endorse the 10 priority cooperation areas identified at the 11th Tripartite Environmen t Ministers Meeting (TEMM), such as biodiversity conservation, environmen t
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- 297 - awareness,encourage the development of a tripartite joint action plan which is to be adopted at the 12th TEMM in 2010, and take joint practical measures to facilitate cooperation; further promote sustainable environment management; ― Explore the establishment of a China-Japan-ROK circular economy model base in the spirit of Reduce, Reuse and Recycle, and make joint efforts to promote resource - conserving and environment-friendly industrial structure, growth pattern, and consumption mode; ― Promote the China-Japan-ROK Joint Research Collaboration Program, carry ou t diverse forms of exchanges and cooperation, and bring into play the role of scientific and technological progress and innovation as the engine of resolution of common regiona l issues and economic development; ― Establish a mechanism for meeting of ministers responsible for water resources in due course, focusing on integrated river management and water resources managemen t adapting to climate change; ― Promote cooperation in sustainable forest management and wildlife protection, and work together to facilitate harmonious development between man and nature; ― Work closely together and spearhead cooperative efforts in international frameworks for energy cooperation, aiming to promote sustainable development through deploymen t of clean energy and improvement of energy efficiency; ― Explore tripartite cooperation mechanisms in agriculture; ― Work closely together through strengthened dialogue among the three countries to contribute to the successful achievement of the Copenhagen Conference, including the establishment of an effective post-2012 international cooperation framework on climate change, consistent with the principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in particular common but differentiated responsibilities.
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- 298 - We will make unremitting efforts toward sustainable development of the three countries and the region.
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- 299 - Appendix #12 Joint Statement on the Tenth Anniversary of Trilateral Cooperation among the People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (2009. 10. 10) On the occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of China-Japan-ROK Trilateral Cooperation , we, the heads of Government/State of the People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea met in Beijing, China on 10 October 2009. We reviewed the course o f trilateral cooperation in the past and drew up plans for its future development. We reached the common understanding that since the launch of the trilateral cooperation in 1999, the common interests of the three countries have continuously grown, the mechanisms for dialogue have been further broadened and the cooperation in a whole range of fields has been promoted, yielding highly fruitful results. The three countrie s have enhanced political mutual trust through the forging of a future-oriented comprehensive cooperative partnership. With the rapid increase in trilateral economic cooperation as well as trade and investment, the three countries have emerged as important trading partners to one another. Cultural and people-to-people exchanges were dynamic and close, which greatly enhanced the mutual understanding and friendship among the peoples. The three countries remained committed to the development of an East Asia community based on the principles of openness, transparency, inclusiveness as a long term goal, and to regional cooperation, while maintaining increased trilatera l communication and coordination on regional and international affairs. We expressed the common recognition that the achievements over the past decade proved that to reinforce cooperation among China, Japan and the ROK serves the fundamenta l interests of the three countries and peoples, and moreover, contributes to regional peace , stability and prosperity. In this context, the three countries also recognized the significance of the “Joint Statement for Tripartite Partnership” issued at the first trilatera l Summit in Fukuoka, Japan. We believe that as the world undergoes major changes and adjustments, China-Japan -
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- 300 - ROK cooperation will have many opportunities for development in the coming decade . We will view and approach the trilateral cooperative relationship from a strategic point o f view, and will constantly aim to bring our cooperation to higher levels. We believe that mutual respect, equality, common interests, openness, transparency and respect for our diverse cultures constitute the foundation and guarantee for trilatera l cooperation, and these principles should be followed in future trilateral cooperation. In the spirit of facing history squarely and advancing towards the future, the three countries will explore the potential and expand the areas of cooperation. We will push the trilatera l relations forward in the direction of good-neighborliness, mutual trust, comprehensive cooperation, mutual benefit and common development. We are convinced that this wil l contribute to world peace, stability and prosperity. With this in mind, we have agreed to: 1. Build up mutual trust in the political field. We will step up high-level contacts and strategic dialogues, strengthen mutual understanding, expand common ground and build solid strategic mutual trust. We will regard one another as partners of win-win cooperation. We will support one another's peaceful development and regard it as an opportunity. We will respect one another's major concerns and core interests. We wil l properly address sensitive issues and seek settlement of disputes through dialogue and consultation. We will strengthen security dialogue and facilitate exchange and cooperation among the defense or military personnel of the three countries. 2. Deepen mutually beneficial cooperation. We will make full use of the high complementarities and great potential of the three economies and bring to higher levels our cooperation in key areas such as business, trade, finance, investment, logistics , intellectual property, customs, information, science and technology, energy conservation , environmental protection and circular economy. We will step up our efforts to develop green economy, improve the quality of economic development, oppose trade protectionism in all forms, uphold a fair, free and open global trading and investmen t system. We are determined to seek an ambitious and balanced conclusion to the Doha
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- 301 - Development Round in 2010, consistent with its mandate, based on the progress already made, including with regard to modalities. By making full use of existing fora, including ASEAN+3, EAS, APEC and G20, we will continuously inject fresh vitality into the recovery and stable development of the economy of Asia and the world. 3. Expand people-to-people exchanges. We will continue to conduct exchanges among al l sectors of the three countries, particularly friendly youth exchanges and exchanges among universities. We will consider establishing a long-term mechanism for youth and media exchanges, encourage academic institutions and local authorities, and promote closer trilateral cooperation in areas such as disaster management, healthcare, tourism , human resources, education and sports. We will carry forward the spirit of peace and friendship and promote affinity among our three peoples while respecting each culture so as to enhance popular support for the stable, healthy and friendly development of the trilateral relations. 4. Promote peace, stability and prosperity of Asia. We will further strengthen cooperation so as to promote development of regional and sub-regional cooperation of various mechanisms such as ASEAN integration and community-building, ASEAN+3, East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum and APEC. We will remain committed to dialogue and consultation and continue to work through peaceful means to pursue the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We will make joint efforts with other parties for an early resumption of the Six-Party Talks, so as to safeguard peace and stability in Northeas t Asia, and thereby to build an Asia of peace, harmony, openness and prosperity. 5. Actively respond to global issues. We will strengthen communication and consultation on regional and international affairs such as climate change, financial risks, energy security, public health, natural disasters, terrorism, arms control, disarmament and non - proliferation, and UN reform. We will actively participate in reforms in the internationa l political, economic and financial fields and join the rest of the international community to work unremittingly for global peace, development and prosperity. Looking ahead to the next decade, we are full of confidence and hope for the
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- 302 - consolidation of the tripartite partnership and comprehensive cooperation. We firmly believe that in keeping with the calling of the times and with the development of ou r three countries, cooperation among China, Japan and the Republic of Korea will embrace an even brighter future, benefiting not only the three countries but also indeed the world .
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- 303 - Appendix #13 Joint Press Release of the Third Trilateral Foreign Ministers Meeting among the People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (2009. 09. 28) 1. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the trilateral cooperation, foreign ministers of the People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) met in Shanghai on 28 September 2009. 2. We reviewed the fresh headway made in the trilateral cooperation and exchanged views on the celebration activities for the tenth anniversary of the trilateral cooperation and on future cooperation among the three countries. We also exchanged views on majo r regional and international issues of mutual interest. 3. We expressed satisfaction about the progress of the trilateral cooperation. With ten years of development, cooperation among China, Japan and the ROK shows good momentum of growth. With good-neighborly friendship among the three countries high on the agenda of our respective foreign policies, we have maintained high-leve l exchanges and contacts, increased mutual political trust, earnestly implemented the Action Plan for Promoting Trilateral Cooperation among the People’s Republic o f China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, and conducted cooperation on over 30 projects in the political, economic and social fields, science and technology, environmenta l protection, culture and international affairs. 4. We agreed on the need for combined trilateral efforts to build on past achievements and to deepen the partnership of comprehensive cooperation in a future-oriented manner . To this end, we will enhance cooperation in the following aspects: continue to build stable strategic mutual trust; deepen and raise the level of our cooperation; persist in trilateral social, cultural and people-to-people exchanges, and work together to promote East Asian cooperation and regional peace and prosperity. We put forward concrete ideas and initiatives in the above-mentioned fields.
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- 304 - 5. We exchanged views on matters related to the Second Trilateral Summit Meeting among the People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. At the crucia l moment of the joint endeavor to tackle the international financial crisis, promote recovery and re-launch growth, the Meeting is of great significance to enhance mutual politica l trust, advance mutually-beneficial cooperation and promote stability and development in Asia. We agreed to hold the Second Trilateral Summit Meeting in Beijing, China on 10 October and will keep in touch on the relevant preparations through diplomatic channels. 6. We also exchanged views on the international economic and financial situation , situation in Northeast Asia, East Asian cooperation, climate change, UN reform, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. 7. We agreed to hold the Fourth Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in the Republic o f Korea next year.
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- 305 - Appendix #14 Joint Press Statement of the East Asia Summit on the Global Economic and Financial Crisis (Bangkok, 2009. 06. 03) 1. H.E. Mr. Abhisit Vejjajiva, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand, as the ASEAN Chair and the East Asia Summit (EAS) coordinator, has been mandated by the EAS Leaders to issue Joint Press Statement of the East Asia Summit on the Global Economic and Financial Crisis. Pursuant to the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit in 2005, the Leaders agreed that the world is facing a global recession of unprecedented dimensions and called for policy responses that focus on restoring financial stability and economic growth and development. 2. Mindful of Asia's important role as a centre of growth that is open to the world, they understand the need to take appropriate and coordinated measures against the impact of the financial crisis and the downturn of the world's economy as well as to strengthen the region's growth potential and expand demand. They commended the fiscal and monetary stimulus measures and other policy actions undertaken by the EAS participating countries and resolved to take further actions as appropriate to sustain growth and jobs, reduce poverty, restore confidence, and support medium-to-long term macroeconomic and financial stability. They also agreed that stimulus packages alone will not have the desired effect without a stable financial system playing its role in economic growth. 3. They underscored the critical importance of standing firm against protectionist and distortionary measures and refraining from raising new barriers. They agreed that a prompt, ambitious and balanced conclusion to the WTO Doha Development Agenda negotiations based on progress achieved to date is necessary and would inject confidence and assist in the global economic recovery. They also agreed that further regional economic cooperation, trade facilitation and liberalisation would contribute to making the EAS region a more attractive market and investment destination, and to this end, they noted that Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) Initiative could further enhance intra-regional trade. They looked forward to the 2nd Phase study
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- 306 - recommendation on CEPEA at the 4th EAS. As a further sign of their commitment they pledged to minimise the trade-distorting impact of their fiscal stimulus measures and industry support polices, and agreed to work together with other countries to this end. 4. Recognising the unprecedented international linkages demonstrated by the global financial turmoil and economic slowdown and the strains on the EAS participating countries, they agreed on the need to further enhance the regional financial cooperation and integration frameworks. They commended the work of the Chiang Mai Initiative under the ASEAN+3 cooperation framework, including efforts to expedite the multilateralisation process, and the Asian Bond Markets Initiative, in developing and deepening financial markets in the region. 5. They agreed that ASEAN-led consultations with other organizations and fora in Asia and the Asia-Pacific would contribute to safeguarding the region from future regional and global economic and financial crises. 6. They supported the agreement at the London Summit on 2 April 2009 to restore confidence, growth and jobs, reject protectionism and promote global trade and investment, strengthen financial regulation to rebuild trust, reform international financial institutions to reflect greater voice and representation of emerging and developing countries, and inject an additional US$ 1.1 trillion to enhance global financial liquidity in particular to support growth in emerging and developing countries. In this connection, they expressed their commitment to support the global efforts led by G20 to raise global output by 4 percent by the end of 2010 and accelerate the transition to a green economy. 7. They emphasized the importance of international cooperation to develop concrete measures to alleviate the impact of the crisis, including social safety-net programmes and assistance to small and medium enterprises. 8. They expressed determination to strengthen the region's growth potential and expand demand, including through accelerating basic infrastructure improvement, policies and measures for expanding domestic demand, assistance to the private sector in particular
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- 307 - SMEs, and human resources development as well as advancing regional cooperation efforts, such as ASEAN integration, facilitation of trade and investment, promotion of subregion-wide development and promotion of people-to-people exchanges. 9. They agreed to support efforts by export credit agencies (ECAs), international financia l institutions and private banks to ensure that adequate finance is available to business, including small and medium-sized enterprises, and to keep trade and investment flowing in the region. They also welcomed ECAs to strengthen their cooperation in the areas of re-insurance, capacity building and information exchange. 10. They reaffirmed the importance of regional financial cooperation, in particular on strengthening the financial sector of the EAS participating countries, including financial regulations. They commended the efforts of EAS finance officials to advance this agenda , and noted that the report on An Assessment of Financial Sector Capacity Building Needs of East Asia Summit Countries could serve as the basis for ongoing work on capacity building, which would be reviewed at the 4th EAS in October 2009. 11. In order to promote sub-regional development, they encouraged the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), ADB and ASEAN Secretariat to work together to prepare as soon as possible a coherent master plan, which would contribute to coordinating, expediting, upgrading and expanding sub-regional initiatives and promoting private sector participation. In addition, they called upon ERIA to provide policy recommendation to stimulate economic growth in the region, deepen regional integration and strengthen partnership in East Asia.
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- 308 - Appendix #15 Meeting of Leaders of China, Japan and South Korea Issues an Action Plan on Cooperation (2008. 12. 15) On December 13, 2008, the meeting of leaders of China, Japan and South Korea issued an action plan on trilateral cooperation in Fukuoka, Japan. The document worked ou t specific plans of trilateral cooperation in various fields. The abstract of the plan is a s follows: I. Political affairs The trilateral dialogue mechanism will be consolidated. The second and third meetings o f leaders will be held in China and South Korea in 2009 and 2010 respectively. The three countries will continue to make consultations on holding the meeting of leaders during the ASEAN series of meetings. The third meeting of foreign ministers will be held in China next year and the trilateral meeting of senior diplomats will be held annually. The trilateral cooperation network secretariat will be set up in 2009 in order to make the tripartite cooperation more effective. II. Economic affairs The joint researches on the trilateral free trade zone will be completed by the end of 2008 and further in-depth studies will kick off in 2009. The three countries will push for the early conclusion of negotiations on promoting trade facilitation and investmen t protection. The governments of the three countries will continue with their mutually beneficial cooperation in the energy sector and make joint efforts to strengthen regiona l and global energy security. They will try to enhance trade facilitation and economic growth by building an efficient and seamless international logistics system in East Asia . The third meeting of transportation and logistics ministers will be held in China in 2009 . Customs cooperation will be reinforced to create an enabling environment for investmen t
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- 309 - and facilitate trade. China will host the third meeting of customs ministers of the three countries in 2009. China, Japan and South Korea will discuss the possibility o f establishing the liaison system in 2009 in order to push forward their cooperation in the industrial sector. They will continue to strengthen the financial dialogue and cooperation among such agencies as financial ministries, central banks and financial regulatory authorities. III. Environmental protection, science and technology They will launch the East Asia climate partnership plan, jointly study the surveillance , early warning, prevention and control of sand storms and try to solve air pollution in the region. The trilateral cooperation on managing marine waste will be strengthened and joint efforts of protecting and monitoring migrants be made. Scientific and technologica l cooperation should be improved. The second ministerial-level meeting of China, Japan and South Korea on scientific and technological cooperation will be held in Tokyo in 2009 and the existing projects will be pushed forward on strengthening information and communication technology cooperation. IV. Social and cultural affairs The three nations will discuss the possibility of enhancing the trilateral marine rescue cooperation on the basis of building bilateral rescue cooperation mechanisms. The second meeting of health ministers of the three countries was held in Beijing in November 2008 . The three nations are committed to preventing and controlling flu epidemic by close cooperation. They will continue to expand health cooperation to other issues related with health. As the consulting mechanism of diplomatic and security academic institution s among the three countries, the annual tripartite cooperation forum will be re-launched . The friendly meetings of youth of South Korea, China and Japan will be held in South Korea and China in 2009 and 2010 respectively. The forum of youth leaders of South Korea, China and Japan will be held in Beijing in 2009. The three countries will discuss the feasibility of launching the trilateral youth ministers' meeting. They will continue to host cultural activities such as exhibitions, art performances and movies and expand
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- 310 - cooperation in such fields as competitive sports, mass sports, sport science, medicine and anti-doping. Their cooperation in tourism will be increased and operation of joint cruise routes linking their major tourist destinations be broadened. V. International cooperation The three countries will exchange opinions on how to reach a fair and effective international climate change arrangement oriented the year after 2012 at the UN climate change conference to be held in Copenhagen, 2009. They will reinforce dialogue and consultations on the African affairs. They are committed to pushing forward cooperation with ASEAN, speeding up East Asia cooperation and supporting the leading role o f ASEAN in East Asia cooperation. They will make joint efforts with all parties concerned to move forward the six-party talks. The trilateral talks will be strengthened and cooperation sought to reform the UN as soon as possible covered in the outcome of the 2005 UN Summit. Joint efforts will be made to push forward the multilatera l disarmament process, reinforce the international non-proliferation system and maintain peace and stability in the region and the entire world at large.
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- 311 - Appendix #16 Joint Press Statement of the Seventh Summit Meeting among the People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (Cebu, the Philippines. 2007. 01. 14) 1. The Seventh Summit Meeting among the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) was held in Cebu, the Philippines on 14 January 2007 with the attendance of H.E. Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of China, H.E. Shinzo Abe , Prime Minister of Japan and H.E. Roh Moo-hyun, President of ROK. The meeting was chaired by H.E. Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of China. 2. The three leaders expressed satisfaction with the recent development of relations among the three countries and shared the view that, as important countries in Asia, China , Japan and ROK shoulder great responsibilities in maintaining peace, stability and prosperity in Asia. They also believed that the strengthening of future-oriented trilatera l cooperation among the three countries both serves the fundamental and long-term interests of the peoples of the three countries, and is of great significance for peace , stability and prosperity in Asia. The leaders agreed, acting in the interests of overal l stability and development of the region, to enhance political trust on the basis of mutua l respect and understanding. As the important measures for further building confidence among the three countries, the leaders agreed to have more frequent exchanges and decided to set up a trilateral consultation mechanism at the level of senior foreign affairs officials to conduct close communication and coordination on major political and diplomatic issues involving the three countries as well as international and regional issues . The first round of trilateral senior foreign affairs officials' consultation will be held by China this year. 3. The leaders endorsed the 2005-2006 Progress Report of the Trilateral Cooperation among the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea and expressed satisfaction with the significant progress made in various areas, especially in the five priority areas of economy and trade, ICT industry, environmental protection, human resources development and culture. They agreed that the three countries should build on
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- 312 - the current new momentum of growth in their relations to further promote and enrich trilateral cooperation based on the Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation among the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea and the Action Strategy on Trilateral Cooperation among the People's Republic of China , Japan and the Republic of Korea. To this end, the leaders decided to add six new priority areas, namely finance, science and technology, logistics, public health, tourism and youth exchange to their cooperation. 4. To further promote the trilateral cooperation in economy and trade, the leaders took note of the progress and looked forward to more positive results of the joint research on trilateral FTA by the three representative research institutes of the three countries with the possible participation of government officials as observers. They agreed to star t negotiations on trilateral investment agreement as soon as possible in 2007. The three parties will continue their effort to improve the business environment in their respective countries. The leaders agreed to promote the creation of a secure, efficient, cost-effective and seamless logistics system among the three countries. The leaders expressed thei r readiness to jointly work towards early and successful conclusion of the WTO DDA negotiations. 5.The leaders agreed to enhance further cooperation in the environmental field by tackling issues such as Dust and Sandstorm (DSS), marine litter and illegal trans - boundary movement of toxic and hazardous waste, and to intensify their cooperation within the existing bilateral, regional and multilateral frameworks. They noted that dus t and sandstorm along with the other issues in Northeast Asia was posing common concern for countries in this region and agreed to work together to reduce the damage caused by these regional environmental issues. To this end, they agreed to further explore concrete measures through the existing frameworks, especially in the Tripartite Environmen t Ministers Meeting (TEMM). 6. With a view to enhancing socio-cultural cooperation, the leaders welcomed China's proposal to designate the year 2007 as the Year of Cultural Exchange among China , Japan and ROK. The leaders shared the view that such an idea will enhance mutua l
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- 313 - understanding and friendship among the peoples of the three countries. China proposed to host the 9th Asian Arts Festival in 2007 which will focus on the cultures of the three countries. Japan and ROK welcomed and supported China's proposal. 7. The leaders shared the common understanding on the importance of energy security in Northeast Asia and agreed to further promote energy dialogue among the three countries. 8.The leaders agreed to enhance close cooperation on countermeasures in crime areas where trilateral cooperation is necessary, by strengthening cooperation for investigations and coordination. 9. The leaders agreed that trilateral cooperation among China, Japan and ROK is an important part of East Asia cooperation. Such trilateral cooperation enriches East Asia cooperation, enhances institutional building in this regard, and plays an active role in promoting the ASEAN Plus One (10+1), the ASEAN Plus Three (10+3), the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the building of an East Asian community. The leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the enhancement of cooperation with ASEAN, the promotion o f East Asia cooperation and their respect to the leading role of ASEAN in East Asia cooperation. They shared the view to realize an East Asian community as a long-term goal with ASEAN Plus Three (10+3) process as the main vehicle. They reaffirmed tha t the East Asia Summit (EAS) could play a significant role in community building in thi s region. They also pledged to continue their work towards a dynamic and harmonious Asia-Pacific community in the APEC. 10. The leaders expressed their concern about the situation caused by the DPRK's recen t missile launches and the nuclear test. They also reaffirmed the need for ful l implementation of the UNSC Resolutions 1695 and 1718 by all UN Member States as well as their commitment to the peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and negotiation. The leaders called for concrete and effective steps toward the full implementation of the 9.19 Joint Statement and the denuclearization of the Peninsula. They also emphasized the importance of addressing the issue o f humanitarian concerns of the international community.
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- 314 - 11. The three parties supported the reform of the United Nations, including the Security Council, to enhance its authority, efficiency, competence and accountability in meeting various global threats and challenges, and would keep in contact on this issue. They expressed their readiness to support Mr. Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary-General of the U.N. , in his work.
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