China–Republic of Korea Relations:  An Analysis of the Security Forum, 2002-2009        Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University  for award of the degree of        DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY              KIM JIN WOOG                  CHINESE STUDIES DIVISION  CENTRE FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES  SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY  NEW DELHI–110067  INDIA  2013 

- 2 -              10 December, 2012         DECLARATION        I declare that the thesis entitled, “China – Republic of Korea Relations: An Analysis o f  the Security Forum, 2002-2009” submitted by me for the award of the degree o f  DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The   thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any othe r  university.      ………………….  KIM JIN WOOG        CERTIFICATE      We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.        …………………………………. …………………………………  Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli  Chairperson, CEAS   Supervisor, CEAS                

- 3 -    ABSTRACT        This is the case study about China-South Korea Security Forum which has been  held in Beijing and Seoul from the year 2002 to 2009. China-South Korea Security  Forum (CSKSF) was introduced by two civil institutions of the two countries in 2000. It  was organised and co-hosted by Chinese People’s Association for Friendly Contact  (CPAFC) and Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs (KRIMA). An innovative civil  approach between China and South Korea has been developed in Annual Security Forum  involving participation of high incumbent officials from both sides.    CSKSF has played a role to provide an important network for the cooperation and  confidence-building of security specialists and for the exchange of security information  between the two countries. As an attempt to facilitate the improved relationship between  the two countries, the Security Forum organized several rounds of formal and informal  meetings during the period with the participation of high policy makers. The Forum has  brought various security issues in the Korean peninsula and its surroundings into debate.  The result has been reported to both the governments and applied to the policy making.    The events involved various people including security experts both incumbent and  retired in the military services of both countries, and civilian experts and researchers in  this field totaling around 100. Some of the high ranking personalities who took part in the   meetings were then Ministers for Defense Cao Gangchuan, Chi Haotian and Liang   Guanglie from Chinese side, and ex-Ministers Cho Sung Tae, Lee Sang hee, Yoon Kwang   Woong, Kim Dong Sin from the Korean side. This alternative framework has initiated a   new approach in improving China-South Korea security relationship.    China-South Korea security relationship was not so vibrant even after the   normalization. There were two factors that have prevented China and South Korea   

- 4 -    coming together. For China, North Korea was sensitive issue and South Korea could no t  bypass the US easily. So, it was not comfortable for both to vitalize security relationship   overnight. Many deliberations and mediations are needed for the ice break. In this   circumstance this unofficial dialogue organised by the Security Forum has been   beneficial.    The study has tried to explain and evaluate the role played by the China-South   Korea Security Forum in improving relations between China and South Korea. The   research focuses on the period from 2002 to 2009. It has explored the difference of the   role played by the civilian institution when the government organs have been ineffective .  The study used the personal interviews with key officials and participants in differen t  meetings organized by the Forum at Beijing and Seoul.    The major thrust of the research was on qualitative study and it investigated 60 o f  the papers presented at the Forums. The papers were categorized as per their topics and   year of presentation. The study tried to apply deductive and inductive method to analyze   and understand the dynamics of China-South Korea relations in the context of the   proceedings of the Forum so that it became easier to decipher their changing viewpoints   with the passage of time.    Furthermore, the role of Korean Diaspora in China (including full-star Korean   ethnic general Cho Nanchi who served in the Chinese military) were searched to study   China-South Korea relations. The researcher especially used the information acquired   from formal and informal talks, personal interviews, seminar debates etc. So, this study   endeavored to be useful for actual policy making with the scholarly objectiveness in the   end.    The work has discovered that the CSKSF has contributed a lot to the promotion o f  security relations between China and South Korea. The former and incumbent defense   

- 5 -    ministers as well as senior policy-makers in the military of the both countries deem this   Forum a crucial one to promote security relations between China and South Korea. It can   be one of the contributions to the promotion of Korea-China security relationship. They   are much interested in how this dialogue can be continued encompassing the think-tanks   of both countries in this process.    The achievement and contribution of the Forum can be explained by how much   scholars and experts as well as policy makers and practitioners of both countries are   taking advantage of this Forum. Party members and workers of the Ministry of Foreign   Affairs and the Department of Defense policy and practitioners of National Information   Agency, members of Department of Policy and Information from the Ministry o f  National Defense were observers in the seminars and meetings of this Forum. Sometimes   they have been utilizing this mechanism to solve their problems.    In short, China and South Korea, two rising countries located in Northeast Asia,  the formal conversation between them was difficult in the past era because of North  Korean factor for China and the US factor for South Korea as well as the ideological  barriers. The limits of the conversation in the official channels find a new outlet and it is  the birth of the CSKSF. CSKSF has played a positive role for promoting the security  relationship between both countries and still going on.        

- 6 -    ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS    I am grateful to Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli for his supervision. Had I not got his   insights and friendly encouragement I would surely have given up my efforts. He guided   me so wisely with helpful and supportive advice, critical comments, and intellectua l  freedom.    CEAS/SIS in JNU has been literally my “Centre” of academic life. I pay respec t  to the former Chairperson, Prof. Lalima Verma and all other faculty members.  I  appreciate administrative support from our Centre staff and others. I developed my basic   ideas on my research topic with the help of many specialists participated at the   programme of the China-South Korea Security Forum (CSKSF). I am very much   appreciative for the thoughtful encouragement from Ex. Minister Cho Sungtae, Ex .  President of LG Ki-Jun, Ex. Vice-minister Hwang Kyusic, General Song Youngun and   other consultants of KRIMA (Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs).    At Seoul National University I learned much about public policies from my   supervisors Prof. Jung Junggil and Prof. Lee Dalgon who became later ministers o f  Korean Government. Their guidance was very helpful for me to write this thesis at thi s  time. I could be much lonesome here in India without help of Chairman Hyun Dongwha ,  President Lee Junghun and Secretary General Mr. Harry Shin of Korean Association   India. Advocate Vijay Prakash who passed away in November last year, Professor Rakesh ,  Professor Uttam and other friends in India supported me in many ways. Special grea t  thanks to Mr. Sudhakar Vaddi, Mr. John Jojin, Mr. Charan Dass and his wife.    My wife and my daughter Kim Jiye gave me indispensable support to complete   my study and this Ph.D thesis. My son Kim Taeyang who is also pursuing his Ph. D. in   Germany has often cheered up for my writing. I was supported much by my good batch ,  students and friends, special thanks to Mr. Tara Prasad Joshi, Dr. Mahendra Prakash, Mr .  Arpit, Mr. Satyendra Kumar Uttam and Mr. Thangkhal. Thank you.  

- 7 -    LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS    ACCP Association of Chinese Culture Promotion  APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation  ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations  CACDA China Arms Control and Disarmament Association  CAIFC China Association for International Friendly Contact  CAMIR Chinese Academy of Modern International Relations  CAMS Chinese Academy of Military Science  CCMR Citizens' Coalition for Media Reform  CNDU Chinese National Defense University  CPIIA Chinese People’s Institute of International Affairs  CSKSF China-South Korea Security Forum  EAS East Asian Summit  FEM Federation for Environmental Movement  GKU Green Korea United  KEDO Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization  

- 8 -    KIDA Korean Institute for Defense Analysis  KNDU Korean National Defense University  KRIMA Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs  NDU National Defense University  NGO Non-Governmental Organization  NK North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea)  NPM New Public Management  NPO Non-Profit Organization  NPS New Public Service  PLA People's Liberation Army  PRC Peoples Republic of China  OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  SK South Korea (Republic of Korea)  USFK United States Forces in Korea  

- 9 -    LIST OF TABLES, MAP & GRAPH    Table #1 Meeting Schedules of the Security Forum ……………15   Table #2 PRC five major campaigns during the Korean War... 46   Table #3 Summit Talk Diary ………………….………………….53   Table #4  North Korea Nuclear / Missile tests and Responses from   China & South Korea ……………………………….…55  Table #5 Defence Minister talk diary ……...….…………………56   Table #6 China’s Think Tanks on International Relations ….…89   Table #7  Korean Think Tanks in Relations with Chinese Think   Tanks …………………………...……………………….94  Table #8 Main Subjects of the CSKSF Meetings ………..…….109   Table #9 East Asia Summit ………….…….…………………....135   Table #10 East Asia Foreign Minister Talks ……………...……..135   Table #11 Six Party Talks and Agreements ……………………..156   Table #12  Ministerial Level–Meetings and Personnel Exchange in   Training …………………………………………...…..224  Map #1 PRC five major campaigns during the Korean War... 47   Graph #1  Sino-South Korea Trade (1992-2008) ………………...87   Graph #2  Comparing the Reciprocal Visits before and after   CSKSF …………………………………..……………..241    

- 10 -    TABLE OF CONTENTS      Declaration and Certificate .………………….......……………..………..2  Abstract ……………………………………………………………………3   Acknowledgements ……………………………………………….……….6   List of Abbreviations ……………………………………………..……….7   List of Tables, Map & Graph …………………………………….…....….9       CHAPTERS    1: INTRODUCTION ……...……………………………………………………..…….11     2: CHINA-SOUTH KOREA RELATIONS SINCE 1992 NORMALISATION……28     3: THE SECURITY SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA:   THE ROLE OF NGO AND NPM …………………….…………………………....64     4: EVOLUTION AND EFFECTS OF THE SECURITY FORUM 2002-2009….....86    5: ANALYSIS OF THE PAPERS, DEBATES AND THE RELEVANCE OF THE  CSKSF……………………………………………………………………………….109     6: CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………..243     APPENDIXES ………………….……………………………………………….….251  REFERENCES ……………………………………………………………….……315    

- 11 -    CHAPTER 1    INTRODUCTION      Throughout the Cold War there were no official relations between China and   Republic of Korea (South Korea), whereas China maintained close relations with North   Korea, South Korea maintained formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China   (Taiwan). This hindered trade and economic relations between Beijing and Seoul because   both countries were unable to protect economic and social interests without bilatera l  agreements.    However, because of cultural and geographic proximity, China and South Korea   were keen to develop trade relations since 1980s. In the late 1980s, Chinese–South   Korean individual contacts 1  have been encouraged between China and South Korea;  however, significant barriers to strong trade and bilateral relations persisted. The absence  of any protections granted by official relations had still remained. China had been  politically closer to Pyongyang, and South Korean’s relations with North Korea remained  tense and distrustful.    Since August 1992, China has been trying to end the uncomfortable relationship  with South Korea with the establishment of diplomatic ties. And, China has been  broadening the scope of its external cooperation with countries of free market economy  with its neighbour–South Korea. With the changed international scenario after 1990s,  South Korea was willing to build and promote a new amicable relationship with China as  well. It was in China’s strategic interests to cooperate with South Korea, not only to  promote economic relations (Goodman and Segal, 1994: 364), but also to establish peace  and stability in the Korean peninsula for its economic development without any territorial  disputes.    1  People from both countries have done individual trade which mainly happened on the bordering  oceans using the ships.  

- 12 -    The relationship between China and South Korea has been related to the North  East Asian security dynamics involving neighbouring states. Both countries were largely  influenced by the security framework 2  of Cold War since 1945. The Cold War blocs and  mindset have compelled policy-makers, security specialists and researchers of both  countries to follow a certain perception promoted by Eastern and Western blocs in which  they choose to take side with.    Therefore, after the collapse of the then Soviet Union, the Cold War existed  between China and South Korea till early 1990s, which remains common to the extent  that both countries tend to approach international issues from the Cold War perspectives  based on their preferred ideology; even though, there were many common interests  between China and South Korea in the improved relationship, their relations were  constrained to a limited degree of official cooperation. In the post-Cold War era, China  has been constrained by North Korean factor and South Korea has been restricted by the  US factor in their bilateral political and security relations.  This situation initiated China- South Korea Security Forum as the non-governmental channel talk.    In spite of the remaining problems between both Koreas and the China-Taiwan  problem after Cold War, there have been various developments of multilateral  cooperation, dialogues between the governments in North East Asia and the Asia-Pacific  region especially after the late 1980s. Regionalism in the Asia Pacific has been evolving  in various forms such as security to trade, finance and economy. Multilateralism in the  Asia-Pacific involves various countries and participants from government officials to  various non-governmental scholars and specialists.    The ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) has acted as mediator  through ASEAN-led multilateral regimes and institutions. In the security realm, the  ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 3  was established in 1993. It has enhanced dialogues    2  It was so called Northern triangle for China, Soviet Union and North Korea and Southern triangle fo r  U.S.A, Japan and South Korea.    3  The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is a formal, official, multilateral dialogue in Asia Pacific regio n.  

- 13 -    through various annual conferences to discuss about the security issues in the Asia - Pacific. This regionalism and multilateralism has been developed after rigorous dialogues   among the member countries and, further they are too concerned about the security of the   region especially after increased terrorist activities worldwide.    The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has been the main forum since   its formation in 1989 to facilitate trade, business, investment, technology and economic   cooperation in the region involving twenty-one Pacific Rim countries. At new regiona l  groupings, since 1997, the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and the Republic of Korea )  cooperation has included diverse areas of cooperation. Cooperation is now being pursued   in twenty areas, ranging from political and security, transnational crime, economic ,  finance and monetary, agriculture and forestry, energy, minerals, tourism, health, labor ,  culture and arts, environment, science and technology, information and communication   technology, social welfare, rural development and poverty eradication, disaste r  management, youth, women, and to the other tracks.    The East Asian Summit (EAS) has been held since 2005 involving China, South   Korea, Japan and others, nonetheless excluding the US, Russia and North Korea till 2010 .  The member states of the region are keen to solve the security challenges either due to   North Korean nuclear advancement or due to terrorist acts, climate change and othe r  issues with consensus. The relation between China and South Korea on security issue is   having an important role in the region for peace and cooperation. Both countries have   developed the strategic relations since 1992 and dialogues on the security issues have   been taking place.    On contrary to the growing economy, trade, development and cooperation in the   Asia-Pacific, however, the existing various security frameworks and forums have   achieved little or close to nothing to solve the security situations surrounding two Koreas .  Those frameworks have not been able to improve the North East Asian security affairs       As of July 2007, it is consisted of 27 participants. ARF objectives are to foster dialogue an d  consultation, and promote confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the region.  

- 14 -    due to the extreme and persistent mistrust, perception-gaps among the parties reinforced   by their rigid governmental policy-decision-making process, inflexibility, narrow and   short-term national interests (Tanaka and Cossa, 2007).    In analytical terms the East Asia Security Forum would be a mere redundancy   given the existence of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an organisation already   tasked with managing security issues in the region. Such individuals would argue that an   attempt to create another security forum is tantamount to an attempt to destroy the ARF .  However, such critics would fail to realise two key points: 1) the limits of the ARF’s   capabilities; and 2) the potential for an East Asia Security Forum to complement, rathe r  than substitute for, the ARF (Tanaka and Cossa, 2007).    Despite its designation as “Asia’s leading security forum” the ARF has not been   able to accomplish much outside of conference room since its establishment almos t  thirteen years ago. It proved itself ineffective when faced with either specific threats to   regional stability, such as the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, the crisis requiring a   specific and quick response, such as the December 2004 tsunami. The former has been   primarily handled in the context of the Six-Party Talks while the latter was more or less   handled by a “coalition of the willing” whose main members included the United States ,  Japan, Australia, and India.    Given these prevailing constraints surrounding the China-South Korea   relationship in the North East Asia, “the China-South Korea Security Forum (CSKSF)”   was introduced by two civil institutes of both the countries in 2000. Those meetings o f  the CSKSF were organised and co-hosted by the China Association for International  Friendly Contact (CAIFC) and the Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs (KRIMA).  This innovative and new alternative approach has been developing a platform such as  ‘Annual Security Forum’ involving high-level official’s participations. The CSKSF holds  annual meetings at non-governmental level since 2002. The annual meetings of the  Security Forum have been held seven times from 2002 to 2009 except 2003 (1 st , 3 rd , 5 th  and 7 th  meetings were held in Beijing, and 2 nd , 4 th  and 6 th  meetings took place in Seoul).  

- 15 -    The meeting was cancelled in 2003 due to the outbreak of SARS). The eighth meeting   was held in October 2010 in Seoul.    Table #1 Meeting Schedules of the Security Forum    Security Forum  Dates  Places  Remarks  1 st  CSKSF  2 nd  June, 2002 Beijing, China Signed MOU  for the Forum  2 nd  CSKSF    2 nd  June, 2004 Seoul, Korea Cancelled in 2003  due to SARS crisis  3 rd  CSKSF    25 th  April, 2005 Beijing, China General Tang   New  Representative  4 th  CSKSF    20 th  June, 2006 Seoul, Korea    5 th  CSKSF    21 st  April, 2007 Beijing, China 7 days tour  6 th  CSKSF    28 th  October, 2008 Seoul, Korea  5 days tour  7 th  CSKSF    3 rd  November, 2009 Beijing China Minister Kim  New Representative    Recently, this Security Forum has grown up to provide an important platform for  the cooperation and confidence-building of security specialists and for the exchange of  information between China and South Korea. This unofficial security forum at non- governmental level involves various participants including security experts from military  general-level to lower-level, both active and reserved, as well as military experts and  military researchers from both the countries. The CSKSF has debated various security  issues surrounding North-East Asia, two Koreas and China-Korea relationship: the  critical challenges against Peace of North East Asia; the China-South Korea cooperation  

- 16 -    for peace of Korean peninsula; the role of US forces in Korea for North East Asian   Security; and the Six Party Talks linked with North Korean Nuclear programmes.    Besides this, the other informal meetings along with the Security Forum have  been organised separately involving major high-level official participants from both  China and South Korea. The high profile participant’s lists includes acting and former  National Defense Minister such as Cao Gangchuan, Chi Haotian, Cho Nanchi, Tang  Tianpyao from China and Lee Sang hee, Yoon Kwang Woong, Kim Dong Sin, Cho Sung  Tae from Korea. Whereas there have been seven talks of China-South Korea defense  minister and some other non-periodic security scholars meetings. This Security Forum is  very unique and significant as most of the acting and ex-ministers participate in active  debates together with security scholars and specialists from both the countries.    This alternative security framework established as the ‘Security Forum’, has  played a constructive role in improving China-South Korea relationship and the two  Koreas with a long term objective of bringing peace and stability in East Asia. The  Forum also aims to build an “alternative multi-lateral security scheme” in East Asia.  Despite some expectations that on-going Six Party Talks could develop into a more  comprehensive and effective multi-lateral security regime in the North East Asian  security regime, nevertheless this six-party talks are not held regularly.    Although the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) held annual meetings since 1993 ,  this multilateral forum has focused on the South East Asia and the Pacific. Thus there are   no other regular regional security related meetings with focus on the North-East Asian   region except CSKSF; even though it is a non-governmental forum. In spite of the   significant role in the region, this Security Forum has not been able to pay enough   attention; given the serious security dynamics and minimal roles of the existing security   frameworks in the North East Asia, it is important to focus, analyse and examine tha t  how this Security Forum has contributed to the improvement of bilateral China-South   Korea security relationship.    

- 17 -    REVIEW OF LITERATURE    The thematic review of literature presents the historical background and overview o f  the security of China, South Korea and their bilateral relationship in the East Asian region .  It reviews the role and limitations of the existing regional security frameworks including   the ASEAN Regional Forum in the Asia Pacific and the Six-Party Talks in East Asia. I t  will further introduce about how China-South Korea Security framework has been   evolved out and consultation between the former defence ministers from both countries   has taken place through the form of interview as the primary source.    a. The Chinese Security and Foreign Policy since 1990s    China is facing complicated and diverse security threats and challenges which are   interwoven and interactive with the traditional and non-traditional security threats; the   domestic and international security challenges. Being in a stage of economic and socia l  transition, China is encountering new problems and issues in maintaining social stability .  The damages caused by non-traditional security threats like terrorism, natural disasters ,  economic insecurity and information insecurity are on the rise. Impact of uncertainties   and destabilising factors in China’s outside security environment on the national security   and development is growing. (MND PRC: 2008) 4     China, faced with the superiority of the developed countries, wants to focus its  energy on the economic development without being interrupted by accidentally igniting  an all-out war especially in the Korean peninsula. That’s why China has been trying to  establish a safety valve to prevent tensions in this region through various methods. The  six party talks is one of the alternatives. (Information Office of the State Council 2011)    4  China’s National Defense is the white paper published by Chinese Ministry of National  Defense (MND). Before Chinese MND started to publish official white paper, it  presented its perspective on defense policy through  China: Arms Control and  Disarmament in 1995. Chinese white paper is the primary source that shows China's  recognition on international security circumstances and its policy directions. However,  according to Kiselycznyk and Saunders (2010), China has never disclosed any  information about its R&D part, weapon acquisition, prospect for future budget. For the  assessment of MND white paper from Korean's point of view, see Park (2011).  

- 18 -    The China-South Korea Security Forum has also initiated to probe the peace keeping   measures. Two civilian institutes in both the countries analyzed the situations in thi s  region and started to make a Forum to find ways to prevent any possibility of war in the   region.    b. China-South Korea relationship in the North East Asian security dynamics    Since the end of the Cold-War, the US has been consolidating on its role as only   super power in the international community. In East Asia, China is emerging as a   powerful country both economically and militarily at steady pace. Against this   background, the US has been acting cautiously with China, carrying out a series o f  strategic campaigns, depending on the situations dictating China as a competitive State.    Yan Xuetong, a foreign affairs specialist at Qinghua University in Beijing, writes tha t  China’s fast growth in political and economic fields will dramatically narrow its powe r  gap with the United States. In an article “China’s global role” in “China Journal o f  International Politics”, published in December 2006, Yan argues that China has already   surpassed Japan, Russia, Britain, France, Germany and India in terms of economic ,  military and political power. The evolution and process of China-South Korea Security   Forum is deeply related to this growth of China’s role in the East Asia involved with the   two-Koreas, the US, Russia, and Japan in this environment.    Victor D. Cha, the former Director for Asian Affairs in the White House’s Nationa l  Security Council, wrote in his paper ‘Seoul-Beijing Detente and Korean security ’  published in 1999, that the dramatic transformation of the relationship between China and   South Korea in the 1990s is the most successful case of ‘engaging China’ in the East Asia .  This case provides framework on the likely effectiveness of the American and South   Korean efforts to engage North Korea. He envisions that as “the Agreed Framework”   threatens to loosen and another potential crisis appears over the Peninsula, the China - South Korea axis acts as a balance and a stabilizing factor. It could be partially not righ t  to assess that China can control North Korea easily. The research will examine why   

- 19 -    China cannot control North Korea easily and how difficult it is for China to manage   North Korean affairs; through first-hand knowledge from the CSKS Forum.    Actually, Hans J. Morgenthau has already said in his article “To Intervene or Not To   Intervene,” Foreign Affairs, April 1967 that we are faced not with one monolithic   communist bloc controlled and used by the then Soviet Union, but with a variety o f  communisms, whose relations with the Soviet Union and China change from country to   country and from time to time whose bearing upon the interests of the United States   requires empirical examination in each concrete instance. Communism has become   polycentric, that is to say, each communist government and movement, to a greater o r  lesser extent, pursues its own directions and national interests within the common   framework of communist ideology and institutions. It was quite right in the case of North   Korea.    Thomas Fingar in the presentation ‘Enhancing South Korea's Security: The U.S .  Alliance and Beyond’ on 20 March 2009 in a conference at Stanford University, said tha t  South Korea unexpectedly faces a new constellation of significant threats to its security   from both the traditional and non-traditional sources. China’s rise presents not only   opportunities but also the challenges for South Korean security. He peculiarly argues tha t  the ROK has one of the world’s lowest birth rates; resulting in the lack of young people   and the aging of the society. This will have major implications for South Korea’s long - term security considering the huge Chinese population. The research will study those   kinds of opportunities and challenges of China’s rise for Korean security.    Dr. Denny Roy writes in his paper ‘China and the Korean peninsula: Beijing’ s  Pyongyang problem and Seoul hope’ that Beijing and Seoul enjoy warm relations and   great potential for economic cooperation. Based on the current trends, the Chinese have   reason to hope that in the long term Seoul will have a closer and stronger relationship   with China. He argues that the Chinese generally fear the risks and uncertainties of the   transition to a united Korea and are not inclined to campaign for a dramatic change in the   status quo. Does China want a united Korea or not? It is a big suspicious question to al l  

- 20 -    the IR (international relations) researchers. The study will also try to answer that  question through the analysis of presentations and free debates at the China-South Korea  Security Forum 2002~2009.    A book titled ‘Power and Security in Northeast Asia; Shifting Strategies’ published in  October 2008; authored by Byung-Kook Kim and Anthony Jones, in which they wrote  that the region is witnessing an ongoing process of democratization, possibly inviting an  unpredictable future. While realistic predictions tell us that these dynamic changes will  bring about armed conflicts among nations, however they conclude that power politics in  Northeast Asia indicates ‘an uneasy but resilient equilibrium of spatially and temporally  asymmetric power relations (p.279)’. 5  The research will evaluate the proposition that the  economic development and democratization in China will be an important factor for  improving the relations between South Korea and China. It will testify whether ongoing  process of democratization in China may bring about armed conflicts among nations in  the region or not.    In another book entitled ‘Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power and  Efficiency’ published by Stanford University Press, 2004; the co-author J.J. Suh argues  the durability of the US–Korea alliance despite the fact that the balance of power seems  to have shifted to South Korea. Suh further clarified that ‘the alliance constituency, a  domestic coalition of officers, officials, and merchants whose existence stemmed from  and grew through the alliance, had an existential interest in bringing about this reversal of  the alliance’s fortunes…. The hegemonic discourse perpetuated the identities of North  Korea as the irrational dangerous other … And that hegemonic status of the dangerous  North Korea made it possible for the alliance to win the war of survival without fighting a  battle.’ The research will look into the dynamics between the Korea-US alliance and the  China-South Korea relationship in this respect.        5  The book highlights the shifting power structure of Northeast Asia. It writes that the impact of rising   China on the power balance of the region is substantial, and the dynamic growth of the economy and   the resulting growth of interdependence are the distinguishing characteristics of the region.  

- 21 -    Theoretical Perspectives and Assumptions    The proposed research has both empirical and normative concerns. The basic   theoretical, epistemological and methodological assumption of this research is close to   neo-liberalism and social constructivism of international relation theories. Realists   assume that states are the most important actors in anarchical international politics; tha t  national defence and security are the highest priority; that states seek relative gains and   maximum power; that conflicts are inevitable; that international regimes and institution s  are not significant in security area (Carr 1946; Morgenthau 1948; Grieco 1997 ;  Mearsheimer 2003).    Neo-liberals counter-argue that not only states but also non-state, non - governmental actors and individuals are salient actors in a globalizing world; that security   should consider people at grass-root level from traditional to non-traditional agenda; tha t  states seek absolute gain; that peace and prosperity are possible; that internationa l  regimes and institutions are significant to improve security for states and people in the   world community (Hoffmann 1987; Keohane and Nye, Jr. 1972).    Keohane and Martin (1995), explain that international regimes and institutions   can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible ,  establish focal points for coordination and, in general, facilitate the operation o f  reciprocity. Social constructivism assume that identities and interests are socially   constructed through culture and practice in our social world and that internationa l  relations can be changed by learning, understanding, norms, ideas and practice.    Track theory will be used for the analysis of China-South Korea Security Forum .  Track theory is often used for the case which has common goal and two routes to it .  Bilateral relations and decision-making process between two countries involve both   governmental level (1.0-track) and civilian level (2.0-track). The actors at both levels on   both sides are influencing and influenced by each other. The theory can be applied to   China-South Korea relations effectively. Although China is widely regarded as   

- 22 -    Communist Party-led authoritarian political regime, in other track Chinese foreign   policy-decision-making process has become more flexible and multi-dimensional since   its economic liberal reform in the 1980s.    The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) is a good   case of 2.0-track security dialogue whose mission is to prepare studies on security matters   for their governmental 1.0-track counterparts in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) .  Sheldon W. Simon 6  studied CSCAP activities and their impact on the ARF. Simon argues  in his paper “Evaluating 2.0-track approaches to security diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific”  (2002) that the CSCAP has achieved some noteworthy successes, including a definition  of ‘preventive diplomacy’ adopted by the ARF. On balance, 2.0-track epistemic  communities are playing a significant role in 1.0-track security deliberations in the Asia- Pacific.    In spite of various study and surveys on China-South Korea relationship and  existing security regimes such as ASEAN Regional Forum and Six-Party Talks, there is a  dearth of literature focusing on the promising role of non-governmental level dialogues in  the improvement of China-South Korean bilateral security relationship. Therefore it is  important to analyze the role of China-South Korea Security Forum and evaluate its  impact on the improvement of China-South Korea relationship. This research investigates  the roles of Annual China-South Korea Security Forum during 2002–2009 in China- South Korea security relations. The research will also examine over sixty papers  presented in the course of six Annual Forums and at the same time free debates and  informal meetings around the conference will be investigated.              6  Sheldon W. Simon is a Professor of Political Science and Faculty Associate for the Center for Asia n  Studies and Program in Southeast Asian Studies at Arizona State University. He consults with the Sta te  Department, Department of Defense, and the U.S. Information Agency.  

- 23 -    DEFINITION, RATIONALE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY    China-South Korea security relationship is associated with the North East Asian   region. The concept of the North East Asian security mainly indicates security of states ,  society and people in the two Koreas, China and Japan. The US and to far lesser exten t  Russia also are major factors in the dynamics of the North East Asian security.    The research will focus on the period 2002-2009, as China-South Korea Security   Forum was formed in 2002. However, the research analyses the historical background   and the general trends of China-South Korean bilateral security relationship in the North   East Asian security dynamics before the normalisation 1992.    China-South Korea Security Forum is non-governmental level dialogues initiated   between China and South Korea civil institutions. The aim of the Forum is to enhance   security interests in people and the states of both countries. China-South Korea Security   Forum has been held since 2002 with participation by various levels of security   specialists from civilian scholars to government officials. It was very limited for either o f  countries to fully satisfy its interests through official channels because China was   sensitive to North Korea factor and South Korea was sensitive to US factor. In areas   where official coordination or 1.0-track dialogue is impossible, unofficial coordination o r  2.0-track dialogue is expected inevitably. This is where the so-called ‘2.0-track ’  coordination between both countries emerged.    Track theory involves official and unofficial channels in the matters o f  diplomacy. Generally speaking, an official coordination channel is called ‘1.0-track’, and   a private-level unofficial coordination channel in support of official channels is called   ‘2.0-track’. ‘1.5-track’ referred here is a hybrid, semi-governmental or half-governmenta l  and half-private coordination channel. This study intends to suggest ‘1.5-track’, a hybrid   of ‘1.0-track’ on governmental level and ‘2.0-track’ on private level as a subject for the   research.    

- 24 -    China witnessed the necessity of an intermediary to bridge the gap between its  planned economy system and the free market economy system, and in 1984, established  China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC) under the umbrella of the  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. CAIFC is a semi- governmental organization designed to promote international exchange and to serve as a  conduit between China and the Western block. Huang Hua, Chinese former foreign  minister classified CAIFC as an NGO (Non-Governmental Organization) and writes in  his autobiography ‘since the opening-up and reform policies were adopted in late 1978,  China’s exchanges with the outside world have increased rapidly and at the same time  NGOs have been appearing in large numbers. The China Association for International  Friendly Contact (CAIFC) is one among them’ (Huang, 2008)    This association is also well-known in South Korea as an effective diplomatic  channel because of the pivotal role it has played in providing Roh, Tae Woo, the former  Korean President, access to communicate his ‘northern policy’ with China. During this  time, China chose to utilize this so called non-governmental organization considering the  strategic environment of its strong ties with North Korea. The researcher has maintained  a close, regular contact with CAIFC over ten years, through such activities as annual  security forum. Therefore, present research will be enriched with the first-hand  experience of the researcher.    The Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party has  considerable influence on China’s national and foreign strategy. In China, Vice Chairman  or member of the Central Military Commission is appointed to serve in the position o f  Chinese Minister of National Defense, meaning that the Minister is just a symbolic   position to represent the Ministry of Defense affairs externally. In other words, the   Ministry can be said to be under the supervision of the Commission. (中国网 2003) Thus,  it is important to investigate China’s military policy considering the status of the  Commission, and this effort deserves a primary attention in serving the purpose of this  research.    

- 25 -    Factors that shape the dynamics between the South Korea-US alliance and the  China-South Korea relationship are the national strategies and foreign policies of the US  and China. This necessitates the analysis of strategic changes in both countries and their  linkages, through which choices for South Korea can be determined. Against this  backdrop, it is of a great significance to pursue what position South Korea can take, not  from the Cold-War perspective but from a different, neutral and independent perspective.  The present study intends to analyze perceptions over stability and security in East Asia  and a peace structure in the region, by presenters who participated in seven rounds of  Annual China-South Korea Security Forum from a neutral perspective, and seeks to  develop a mechanism for peace in the region.    RESEARCH HYPOTHESES    The proposed research work has the following hypotheses:    1. China-South Korea Security Forum has contributed to the improvement of the  bilateral security relations between China and South Korea to the extent that both  countries exchange military personnel in their training academy and regular  minister level– meetings.    2. China-South Korea Security Forum has provided alternative 1.5-track policy  process to existing 1.0-track level relation.    RESEARCH METHODS    The analytical and elaborative research will use the personal interview with key  officials and participants of the forum, as methodology for proposed study. The key ex- defense ministers Chi Haotian and Cho Sungtae who started military relations between  China and South Korea, will also be interviewed. Other persons of high repute such as  acting defense ministers, political leaders would also be approached. Moreover, military  attaches of both the countries including all the scholars and specialists who participated at  

- 26 -    China-South Korea Security Forum 2002-2009 will be questioned. The data collection on   the basis of questionnaires would be used to examine the outcome of the present study.    The major thrust of the research would be on qualitative study and conten t  analysis of sixty papers presented at the Forums. In content analysis, first the arguments   will be categorized according to the theme and the presentation year. And it will describe   free debates according to the countries and its forums. It will seek to apply deductive and   inductive method of analysis to understand the dynamics of China-South Korea relations   in the context of Security Forum proceedings. Hence it could become easier to deciphe r  their changing points of view with the passage of time.    Furthermore, the study also investigates the role of Korean diaspora in China .  The researcher will especially use the information acquired from formal and informa l  talks and private conversations including presentations and debates at the Forum. Hence   the research will endeavor to be useful for actual policy making with the scholarly   objectiveness in the end. It also analyses the similarities and dissimilarities between the   1.5 track channel (informal meeting) and 1.0 track channel (official meeting) and find ou t  which one is more effective in pursuing the practical interest at certain stages and how to   cooperate both ways in the end theoretically and empirically.    From the comparative analysis of both countries’ papers presented at China - South Korea Security Forum study through 2002-2009, the study will try to find out wha t  potential intention each country has and how it is reflected to the outside world in   different manner. Then it will investigate how these intentions could be manifested in a   1.5 track meeting and how to convert these ideas to 1.0 track meeting of both the   countries. The research will rely upon both primary and secondary data sources. In   addition, other sources acquired from unofficial contacts will also be analyzed in thi s  research. It probes journals such as Korea Defense Review; Diplomacy etc. Materials   published in Chinese and Korean Languages will also be surveyed. The research also   considers India’s academic debates and perspectives on the issue.    

- 27 -    The outcome of the study would be, to analyze the factors which are playing a  significant role in improving the relations between China and South Korea. Secondly, it  evaluates how far CSKSF(China-South Korea Security Forum) has been playing a role in  strengthening the cooperation between China and South Korea; thirdly, it also asses and  predict the Security Dynamics of East Asian Region.    So the next chapter will analyse the historical background of the China-South  Korea security relations before and after 1992 normalization, particularly in the military  aspect. In the Chapter Three, the concepts and models for 1.5 track channel meetings will  be introduced and they will be compared with the roles of Government, NGO (Non- governmental Organization) and NPM (New Public Management). After reviewing  general theories and practices about NGO and NPM, I delve into non-governmental  activities between China and South Korea to describe that NGO activities would be more  effective in pursuing the practical interest at certain stages between the both countries and  how their activities are coordinated and co-operated with governments.    In the Chapter Four, it will be introduced the detail of the hosting institutes of  China-South Korea Security Forum; Chinese People’s Association for Friendly Contact  (CPAFC) and Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs along with the evolution of  CSKSF. CSKSF was planned by two hosting institutes mutually to keep in close contact  with government level talks. So the statement from the retired or incumbent high ranking  officers from both countries’ governments will be also quoted to find the relevance o f  government’s policy making and civilian activities. In the Chapter Five, around sixty   papers presented in six forums will be analysed and the improvement of the relations   between China and South Korea will be traced in accordance to these exchanges. Finally   it will be stated that the relevance between the improvement of China-South Korea   relation and CSKSF itself.  

- 28 -    CHAPTER 2    China-South Korea Relations before and after Normalisation    Ⅰ . Relations between China and South Korea before the Normalisation    The relation between Korean and Chinese people can be traced back to time   immemorial due to geographical proximity, even before the establishment of modern   nation-states in 1945 and 1949 respectively. The relationship between the two nations has   not changed much from the repeated pattern of formation extending for long history. In   modern era, Korea and China established relation with western countries; however, those   relations were officially initiated after the western power came to the eastern colonies .  Koreans and Chinese have much longer history of relationship in political and socia l  exchanges. Therefore, a study of the contemporary relation between South Korea and   China requires review of historical aspects for in-depth research.    It is important to perceive that the Koreans and Chinese originated   anthropologically as different groups. The relationship between two differen t  communities can be established only when the peoples recognise each other as differen t  entities. It is widely considered that Chinese founded an ancient kingdom in Korean   Peninsula. However, considering that ‘Korea has its ancestors from an ancient kingdom   which was founded by Chinese rulers’ it is impossible to reach to the conclusion tha t  people in Korea and China established relationship from ancient period as ‘differen t  political entities’. For that reason, Chapter 2 begins with the review of the history abou t  the races of Korea and China.    The framework of the contemporary international relation between Korea and   China can now be understood from the anthropological background which has been   passing on from ancient period. In ancient period, kingdoms in Korean Peninsula and   China existed in the system of coordination. However, after Silla unified the three   kingdoms of Korean Peninsula in AD 676 with the support from Tang ruler in China ,  

- 29 -    Unified Silla began to show the tendency of dependence upon Tang Empire. After unified   Silla, with a commitment to restore the territory of the Koguryeo Kingdom, Koryo made   fairly aggressive policy as a national instrument against China. After the establishment o f  the Koryo Kingdom, this region became to be known as Korea. Koryo was very much   independent but was invaded frequently from the China. Korean people severely suffered   from the invasion of China, Mongol and other Manchurian rulers.    After Koryo, the relations between the Chosen Dynasty and China centred on the   issues of tribute and king approval again. Chosen could save its expenses on self-defence   by participating actively in the status quo of Chinese world order and gained access to   products of Chinese civilisation i.e. books, military products, luxury goods etc. It also   resulted in strengthening the legitimacy of the royal court and many other incidenta l  benefits. The contemporary society of South Korea and North Korea are influenced by   policies previously adopted by past kingdoms and empires. Their attitudes toward China   are also not much different from their policies.    1. Chinese and Korean Races    The common perception that the Korean race is derived from the Chinese is   erroneous. Both the races are from different origins, though they have later mixed up and   have similar traits. Human beings have evolved from the age of food gathering, hunting   and fishing people to develop into farming communities or nomads. While the nomadic   people moved in search of pastures for their cattle, the farming people settled down fo r  cultivation. Typically, the nomads invaded the farming communities to make a dominan t  ruling class. Though nomadic people continued to roam around and did not imbibe the   settling culture and customs of farming communities, they got intermixed with them.  The Korean race, which was originally a nomadic community, has intermingled   with the Chinese race, basically a farming community. The Korean race is derived from   the Mongoloid race. The first group of Korean race from the Southern Mongolia   primarily got mixed with the Chinese and the second group from the Northern Mongolia   

- 30 -    mixed up with the Chinese 13,000 years ago again. Korean and Chinese races were no t  the same, but got mixed with each other resulting in the formation of same traits and   cultural homogeneity from the early days.  The birthplace of humanity is known to be in Africa. The traces by which the   first human beings spread from Africa through the South West Asia to other continents   are shown in the fossil trail. About 100,000 years ago, new races different from African   races evolved in Asia and Europe and they are believed to have separated only abou t  40,000 years ago. Some of human beings evolved in Africa, moved to the Southern Asia   and then to the northern regions of China. Their moving path and associations can be   traced exactly by the genetic pattern of human beings’ skeletal remains (Duerinck: 2006) .  They moved from Central Asia along the coastline of the Indian continent to the Southern   region of Asia. Since then, the posterior was discovered to move to the northern part o f  China, Siberian Baikal Lake and the America continent.    1)  The origin of the Chinese race     People of China are believed to have originated from Han zu (漢族) and people   of the Korean peninsula from Han zu (韓族). Letters are same in Korean language and   different in Chinese characters. The sound is the same in Chinese pronunciation but the   ‘ sheng diao’ (Chinese tone) is different. While Han zu signifying Chinese people i s  pronounced in the 4 th  tone in ending of the letter, Han zu signifying Korean people is  pronounced in the 2 nd  tone in ending of the letter. Presently, the Korean races are named  Chao xian zu (朝鮮族) instead of Han zu (韓族) as in the case of People's Republic of  China.  As civilization evolved, there were two races in China - one was xia zu (夏族)  and the other hua zu (華族) which was also called yi zu (夷族, the origin of hua zu is  from southern Mongolia). Xia zu took settled farming, while Yi zu used to lead a nomadic  

- 31 -    life. Yi zu got mixed up with Xia zu and moved Far East to Manchuria, the Korean   peninsula and Japan evolving into the main races in their respective areas.  When Yi zu came down to the Korean peninsula, there were original inhabitant s  of Neolothic era, who disappeared later. Currently, the dominant race of People's   Republic of China is Xia zu while that of Korea and Japan is Yi zu. In the Chinese history   books, it was mentioned that the Emperor (the ancestors of China) advancing to the Eas t  concluded the Federation with the Emperor of hua zu (華族) born to huaxia zu (華夏族 )  which is the race of old Chinese kingdom. And it also explains that there was mixing and   assimilation with another ethnic races resulting into Han zu (漢族) at Han dynasty.  The Chinese developed early farming civilization along the bank of the Yellow   river, the most advanced and developed region in Asia. Naturally it became a center o f  the civilization of Asia as compared to other nomadic nations. It changed a lot on each   era, but usually kept the territory of Empire Qin almost intact in history. The Qin Dynasty   was the first imperial dynasty of China, lasting from 221 to 207 BC. The strength of the   Qin state was greatly increased by the legalist reforms in the 4th century BC, during the   Warring States Period.    2)  The origin of Korean race    Chinese is one of the branches of Sino-Tibetan family of languages. The Sino - Tibetan languages are a family of some 250 languages of East Asia, Southeast Asia and   parts of South Asia including the Chinese, Tibetan, Burma and Bhutan languages. The  term Sino-Tibetan languages were introduced in the beginning by Jean Przyluski  (Edward 1925).  Korean, on the other hand is the branch of Altaic language. Altaic is a language   family that includes the Turkic, Mongolic, Tungusic, Manchurian, Japanese and Korean .  These languages are spoken in a wide arc stretching from northeast Asia through Centra l  

- 32 -    Asia to Anatolia and eastern Europe (Song: 2005) The group is named after the Altai  Mountains, a mountain range in Central Asia.  Chinese and Korean are same Mongoloid race but their languages are grouped  in different families. Chinese do not speak Altaic languages like other Mongoloid races  such as Korean, Japanese and Manchurian. They are using Sino-Tibetan language. Altaic  and Sino-Tibetan languages are different in word order itself and winding rules. However  old Chinese letters follow the word order and winding rules of Altaic language instead of  Sino-Tibetan language. So, Chinese letters were rather invented by Altaic races - Hua zu  (華族) or Yi zu (夷族) (from which the Korean race originated) not by Xia zu (夏族)  (from which the Chinese race originated) in the beginning.  It is said, Buryats (Bulargaty) race that lives now in the Lake Baikal shows the  nearest original traits of Mongoloid. Anthropologists, who are studying scientific analysis  of the genes, also argue that Lake Baikal seems to be the place of origin for Mongoloid  race (Novoradovsky AG et. Al: 1993). Mongoloids lived mainly in the northern and the  southern parts of the Lake. Northern Mongoloids stayed there for a significant period as it  was covered with glacier or other natural obstacles.  Historically, the territories around Lake Baikal belonged to Khalkha and the  local people, Buryats were subject to Khalkha Tusheet Khan and Setsen Khan. When the  Russians expanded into Transbaikalia (eastern Siberia) in 1609, the Cossacks found only  a small core of tribal groups speaking a Mongol dialect called Buryat and paying tribute   to the Khalkhas. However, they were powerful enough to compel the Ket and Samoyed   peoples on the Kan and the Evenks on the lower Angara to pay tribute.  The Southern Mongoloids crossed the Himalayan glaciers through narrow   passes (Burma passage) which are the stretches made from Bengal seaports to the   southern regions of China, Tibet, Thailand, Myanmar and Malaysia between 30,000 to   50,000 years ago. They formed Sino-Tibetan language family. Between 15,000 to 20,000   years ago, the North Mongolians also chose to move into Chinese mainland, Manchuria ,  Korean peninsula and Japan around 13,000 years ago with the advent of the Alluvial Age .  

- 33 -    They have formed Ural Altaic language family. Some of North Mongoloid Neolithic   people, which are called as Tongues race or Altaic race, have moved from Siberia   through north eastern part of China, Manchuria to Korean Peninsula coastal areas. These   people, who settled down farming the crops of the northern hemisphere such as foxtail ,  millet in the warm climate and fertile lands, supposedly form the origin of Korean race.  During the Neolithic Age, people lived not only on farming, but also on   hunting and food gathering like the Paleolithic Age people who came from the southern   Mongolia. Those from the southern Mongolia had already settled in the Korean Peninsula   which is evident in the Paleolithic artifacts that were discovered such as Clam stockings   and Arrowhead used for hunting.    3)  Mixing of the Chinese and the Korean race     Anthropologists in China say that dominant Chinese race came to the southern   China some 5,000 to 6,000 years ago. The multitude of Chinese people has been formed   at that time. Shryangj ( 徐亮之 ) of Taiwan University says that 4,000 years ago before the   Han ( 汉 族 ) came to the Central Plain of China ( 中原 ), the old Korean race East Yi zu ( 东 夷 ) had already managed to dominate the northern and southern part of China. He argues   that the two races have contacted each other and have been mixed since Han zu came to   China.    The ancient Chinese culture and traditions were close to the Koreans rather than   the present ones. The remaining ancient Chinese character follows the same word orde r  and winding rules of Ural Altaic, which has been used by the Korean language instead o f  the Chinese or Tibetan language. Sino-Tibetan languages follow the word order o f  subject-verb-object like English, whereas in Ural Altaic, the word order is subject-object - verb. The ancient Korean and Ancient Chinese are of the same roots and, in fact, ancien t  Chinese history is the ancient Korean history as well.    

- 34 -    The human race has developed and been brought to make the unique genetic  feature, personality, society, culture and civilization adapting to variations of the natural  environment as a matter of survival in the nature. The Korean-Chinese-Japanese races  were formed because of migrations of tribes from North Mongolia, South Mongolia and  their inter-mingling resulting in the development of a unique culture in a geographical  region although with some degree of differences among themselves.    While studying the origin of Chinese and Korean races, it was found that they  were mixed and without any significant differences and that they cannot be distinguished  through blood strains. Therefore, the distinction is not so much racial, but primarily  cultural and linguistic. It would be appropriate to term them as distinct cultural language  communities. However, even in languages and cultures, China, Korea and Japan have  used Hanjas and Kanji for a long time together and shared same cultural similarities such  as Confucianism and Buddhism.    Anthropological study between the two countries is important for both to define  the desire of the people in the bordering territory and to define the bordering line between  both countries. The population of Koreans in China include millions of descendants of  Korean immigrants attaining citizenship of the People’s Republic of China, as well as  smaller groups of South and North Korean expatriates, with a total of roughly 2.3 million  people as of 2009 (MOFAT 2009), making it the largest ethnic Korean population living  outside the Korean Peninsula. Recently, quite a number of them move to South Korea   every year. If they start to make separation movement from Chinese government, the   relations between China and Korea will be deteriorated. Understanding the facts abou t  the separate racial identity between both countries was therefore very important in the   Security Forum deliberation.            

- 35 -    2. Security Relations between China and Korea in Ancient times    1) Early ancient times    International relations in ancient times were mainly military affairs. Many   countries in and around China had invaded and influenced each other with military forces .  Through the history of ancient times such as Old Chosen, which ‘Dangun’ 7 ; the Founder  of Korea has established, several tribal states era, Three Kingdoms period, Unified Silla  Kingdom and Koryo Dynasty, Korea and China occasionally resorted to war or kept the  military alliance, while maintaining relationships.    The first record of war between China and Korea took place during the Han  Dynasty (BC 202 ~ AD 220) when its forces invaded Korea’s Old Chosen Kingdom (BC  2333 ~ BC 108) and installed a prefecture in Korea. Through this prefecture, China had  tried to influence Korean culture. This invasion remains the oldest historical record of the  security relationship between China and Korea.     2)  Three Kingdoms Period     With the advent of the Sui and Tang Dynasties in China, the period of Three   Kingdoms; Koguryeo, Baekje, Silla begin in Korea. Lately, China has argued tha t  Koguryeo (which Chinese termed as Koguro) is a Chinese kingdom. Ancient Koguryeo   Kingdom was first founded in 37 B.C. in Han Dynasty and fell to the Silla-Tang alliance   in 668 A.D. The city was sacked several times until the rise of the 19th ruler king   Gwanggae the Great, who greatly expanded Koguro’s territory and made it a formidable   power in the northeast Asia. China evaluates Koguryeo Kingdom as the following quotes .  (Ra Sungho 2011: 19):      7  ‘Dangun’ is the founder of Old Chosen; the first Korean kingdom, around present-day Liaoning ,  Northeast China, and the Korean Peninsula. He is said to be the "grandson of heaven", and to ha ve  founded the kingdom in 2333 BC.  

- 36 -    As an influential power in Northeast China Koguro Kingdom once created  glorious history. Large amount of its historic relics have been excavated from  Jilin and Liaoning Province of China, most of which are discovered in Hengren  and Ji'an, the early political, cultural and economic center of Koguro Kingdom.  And all of the relics are of high historical and cultural value. At present, 190  ancient cities of the Kingdom have been excavated, 80 in Jilin, 90 in Liaoning and  20 in North Korea, among which the capital cities and tombs of the ancient  Koguro Kingdom are quite valuable.    During Three Kingdom’s period, Korea and China had engaged in fierce  military campaigns and there are detailed records about these wars. Sui and Tang  dynasties in China attacked Koguryeo in Korea several times. Whenever Chinese troops  attacked across the border of Koguryeo, they were defeated. In the end, China supported  Silla, one of the Three Kingdoms to defeat others and in turn unified Korean peninsula  and occupied Manchuria which used to be the land of Koguryeo. The border was initially  created which is the international boundary between China and Korea now.    Sui’s invasion to Koguryeo    Sui Dynasty unified China in AD 581 and expanded its territory towards the  neighboring countries triggering conflicts with Koguryeo 8 , which held hands up with  Baekje to the south and got along with the Turks against China. Sue in China was  associated with Korea’s Shilla. Emperor Moon, who founded Sui in China, declared in  598 year that Sue would conquer Koguryeo and after five months preparations they  attacked in July. At that time, Koguryeo was mainly located in Manchuria and the army  of Sui gathered at Youngu; the northern strategic point and attacked Koguryeo through  Imyugwan, the end spot of the Great Wall of China carrying various weapons and  provisions   (Ra Sungho 2011:23).    8  Historical disputes remain in the relation between China and South Korea at present  and spectrum of discourse is various depend on countries and also respective scholars.  North Korea is the stakeholder in this affair since the geographical scope of the conflict  spreads the border of North Korea and China. See Lee (2004), Song (2007) and Seo (2008)   for Korean perspective, see Chen (2012) and Sun et al. (2012) for Chinese perspective and see  Kang (2003) for North Korean perspective. In the security forum, due to two reasons,  historical issue was not actively discussed; the forum was organised for upgrading two  countries relation regarding security matter, and the historical issue was too sensitive t o  deal with.  

- 37 -      In the battle fought on the borders of Liao, Koguryeo kingdom defeated the Su i  kingdom as the latter had not prepared for the monsoons of July. Interestingly, the   soldiers of Koguryeo took the advantage of flood in Liao during that season, which   would make the region marshy. Sui’s navy also set off their journey to Dosangdong   peninsula and crossed the Daedong River. It plotted an attack on the fort of Pyongyang   and ignored a strongly approaching typhoon, which sank their ship even before they   could reach the shore. Sui navy could not make the battle and suffered a great loss. I t  could not get into the Yodong Palace either and on account of increasing damage ,  suffered a defeat.    King Mun of Sui passed away and later in April, 611, his successor, Yang ,  made a plan to attack Koguryeo again. Sui’s army outnumbered 1,130,000 soldiers which   were divided into 30 units. Out of this, 12 units were commanded by General Umunsul ,  another 12 units by Umunjung his brother and remaining 6 units by the King. Only one   unit moved in one day as distance between the fleet marching was about 40 miles and   hence order was released for all the teams to start only after 40 days.    First of all, Koguryeo waged the attrition combat at the first front line of Liao   and Yodong castle and planned the ambushing tactic in the second front of Ohgol and   Ahnsi castle which were located at the east side of Yodong castle. At the last front, at the   Yalu River and Pyongyang area Koguryeo waged ‘divide and conquer war’ and Sui army   dispersed.    For Sui’s naval fleet, Koguryo deployed the ambush at extrinsic castle and   dispatched troops pretending to lose for Sui navy having them to move to private housing   area. Entering there, Sui navy have filled the blind greed of individual’s desire and the   esprit the corps of the military fell to annualize to nothing. Koguryeo military did no t  miss this opportunity and raided the Sui navy putting the ambushed troops. Sui navy   barely escaped annihilation in the river and fled, as their boat was moored. Because o f  navy's defeat when Sui military power was depleted in Koguryeo, General Euljimundeok   

- 38 -    sent the envoy to the King Yang of Sui Dynasty with the famous poem "a mysterious plan   to pierce the sky, curious strategies and the mastery of geography, now that you have   already made enough to have a major turn off and happily want to go back home .  (東文選 1478)    Tang’s Invasion to Koguryeo    When Sui failed in the war against Koguryeo, the second cousin of the King   Yang of Sui, Li Yuan killed the King and established Tang dynasty in the year 618. Eigh t  years after establishing the dynasty, his son Lǐ Shìmín was crowned the new emperor a t  the age of 29 years. Lǐ Shìmín attained the name Taizong 9  on coronation and fought  against Koguryeo again in the year 645 with 150,000 soldiers. While crossing the Liao  River after Taizong defeated the castle Gaemo of Koguryeo, military of the opponents  counter-attacked to regain the territory with 40,000 troops of the castle Kugnae and Shin,  which were enforced urgently. Initially, the battle seemed to succeed in getting out Tang  troops, however, the horsemen of Tang military appeared and attacked the lateral of  Koguryeo troops, who suffered serious casualties. (Ra Sungho 2011:35)    Tang Taizong then attacked the castle Yodong. The army approached near the  wall of the castle with gun carriage and fired stones into the castle and the city, besides  mobilizing the impacting carriage to destroy its wall. Koguryeo army renovated the  breached wall with wood fence which was prepared in advance and instantly built the  wall to prevent the enemies’ entry into the castle. Over ten days into the onslaught by  Tang military, the castle Yodong which had once defeated the millions of troops of Sui  military, was not breached. However, over time, overwhelming Tang's forces advanced  further resulting in around 10,000 soldiers and 40,000 civilians being captivated and a  vast stockpile of provisions of Koguryeo seized.      9  Emperor Taizong of Tang (唐太宗January 23, 599 – July 10, 649), personal name Lǐ Shìmín (李世 民), was the second emperor of the Tang Dynasty of China, ruling from 626 to 649. As he encourage d  his father, Li Yuan to rise against Sui Dynasty in 617 and subsequently defeated several of his mo st  important rivals.  

- 39 -    After the castle Yodong too fell, only the castle Anshi remained at the forefront  of forming a defensive fortress. The Koguryeo army kept the lead to defend the castle  along with 150,000 troops of Manchurian Malgal tribe. The only way to win over Tang's  army was not to confront the grand troops, but demonstrate the time lag to cut off the  supply line in the Tang’s rear area and capture the boom. Since Tang’s military started the  attack, the Koguryeo governor of the castle Yangmanchun protracted a kind of  psychological warfare mobilizing people beating drums and shouting insults against King  Taizong and his army.    King Taizong threatened to bury alive all the soldiers and civilians of Koguryeo  in the castle once it was conquered. The castle governor Yangmanchun provoked the  soldiers and people recollecting the precedent that King Taizong had once buried 3,300  Malgal solders alive and cheered up the morale of the soldiers and the people with the  attitude of lifelong defense. As the fierce attacks of Tang’s military mounted, the defense  of the Koguryeo army also became stronger.    As fortress of Anshi was not shaken and casualties of his troops were increasing,  King Taizong created a high earth artificial mountain near the castle to attack the  Koguryeo troops looking down on them. Koguryeo military also built up a similar one in  the castle. Over two months later, when the mountain of Tang was getting higher than  that of Koguryeo, they started attacking the enemies. Then the mountain of Tang  collapsed abruptly and misfortunes piled up for Tangs after Koguryeo army occupied the   land in a sudden attack. With the Koguryeo’s occupation of the land, the troops morale   touched the sky, and Tang troops routed back to China.    In the year 647, two years after being forced to withdraw from Anshi castle ,  Tang invaded Koguryeo again and fluctuations in the winds of war once again swept . In   defence against re-invasion, Koguryeo built a multi-line of castles in the way and   successfully blocked Tang’s troops. Sui and Tang’s forces, though experienced through   large campaigns, could not defeat Koguryo and hence they waited until the three Korea   kingdoms; Koguryeo, Baekje and Silla conflicted among themselves. Later Tang aligned   

- 40 -    with Silla, which had a strong support from the people to unify the Korean peninsula, and   helped her attack Koguryeo in the decline of its power and occupied its territory. So ,  Korea lost most of the territory of Manchuria of that time and later fixed the presen t  border between the North Korea and China.    3) China affiliates in Koryo Kingdom era    The name Korea was derived from the Koryo Dynasty. Korea-China relations in   Koryo Dynasty is the security relations between Koryo and China's five great and 10   small countries including Song, Yo, Kum, Won, Yang, Jin, Han, Chu, O, South Dang ,  Whal, Min, Cho, Chok, North Han. Koryo named itself as the successor to Koguryeo o f  three kingdom periods and tried to restore the old Emperor and the old territory practicing   the policy of northward military enlargement. In the spirit of commitment to restore the   territory of Koguryeo to Chinese states and Manchuria kingdoms, they made fairly   aggressive policy as a national instrument against bordering countries (Ra 2011:81)    Through aggressive campaign, Koryo made its name well-known to the world  and had a historical chance to announce the name of the state ‘Korea’ to the international  community. Koryo recognized the importance to get the recognition from China for the  newly acquired area as 'consideration of the Koryo territory' and from the beginning it  had tried hard for it. Koryo argued that its territory is based on the history of the treaty  between Korea and China on the basis of Chinese internal law.    Koryo diplomat ‘Seo Hui’ 10 , who was involved in the border talk with Khitan 11 ,  one of Manchurian countries, in the year 993, is known to historians as a successfu l  trouble shooter in border conflicts. He is even now referred by Koreans as a saying     10  Seo Hui (942–998) was a Korean politician and diplomat during the early days of the Goryeo   Dynasty of Korea (918–1392). Seo is best remembered for his diplomatic skills that led 60,000 Khit an  troops to withdraw from Goryeo without a battle.  11  The Khitan(契丹) were a nomadic Mongolic people, originally located at Mongolia and Manchuria   (the northeastern region of modern day China) from the 4th century. They dominated a vast area  in  northern China by the 10th century under the Liao Dynasty, but have left few relics that have surviv ed  until today.    

- 41 -    ‘Tongue is greater than Armed forces’. At that time, Khitan had occupied some part o f  Korean peninsula and there were frequent collisions between both the countries. Koryo   and Khitan agreed to a territory agreement which instead of rupturing China’s Song ,  fixed that Khitan will pay tribute to Koryo on the condition that Koryo occupy the south   of the Yalu River and Khitan occupy the northern part of Manchuria. The people o f  Koryo have recognized clearly the concept of border with Yalu and Tumen River since   then. Even now it is the general territorial line of Korea.    Not until the end of Koryo Dynasty, there was sharp conflict within on the   question of Manchuria. There were strong claims that while Koryo is the successor to the   ancient Koguryeo kingdom, they should wage war against Manchuria while others   thought that it was well managed by Seo Hui’s diplomatic talk with Manchurian   countries and hence there will be no more wars. These two conflicts led to fierce powe r  provocations in the Koryo cabinet resulting in the destruction of the Koryo kingdom and   rise of a new kingdom ‘Chosen’. Yi Seongae, founder of the new kingdom, was from the   section which argued to end the war. He finally persuaded his staffs not to wage wa r  against Manchuria and went back to Koryo attacking the last King of Koryo ‘Woo’. This   is the famous historic event of Korean history which follows the establishing of new   kingdom ‘Chosen’    3.  Security Relationship in the modern era     Chosen’s era of 500 years in Korean history is in agreement with China's Ming   and Qing Dynasties. The security relation between Chosen and China centered at the   issues of tribute, King Approval and kind of toadyism. The first two have been formed in   the beginning of establishment of Chosen Dynasty for its interests in the diplomatic   relationship that would be judged as a good international diplomacy for managing   Manchurian countries. China also established the relationship of a tribute system with   Chosen to be administered to foreign interests.    Considering the geo-political situation of Chosen, which was indulged in   

- 42 -    frequent crisis from the Manchurian countries, its main objective was preventing the   intrusion from the north, which was secured by the way of tribute with Ming and Qing .  Chosen could save the expenses for self-defense by participating actively in the status   quo of Ming’s order as well as to gain access to products of Chinese civilization i.e. book ,  military product, luxury goods etc. It also resulted in strengthening the legitimacy of the   royal court and many other incidental benefits.    Chosen did not actively cope with the changes in East Asia, so that by the time   the Ming was replaced by Qing dynasty, its position got worsened and resulted in a   humiliating surrender to Qing. Chosen proclaimed the Confucianism and the tribute to   Ming as two major founding ideology of the dynasty and has formed the relation with   Ming on the basis of Confucian value of filial piety to Ming. While this Confucian piety   dominated in Chosen, the East Asian international stage around Chosen turned into new   order as Qing’s force and diplomatic intervention substantially expanded its reach more   than the previous Ming’s order. It then became more powerful than Ming toward the   bordering countries resulting in the strongest power in East Asia.    In world history, the period from 17th to 19th century is the era of turbulence .  The world’s first globalization has happened at this time. However, during this period ,  Chosen locked their doors and blocked communications with the outside world and   continued loyalty to Ming Dynasty which had already vanished. Chosen kept dwelling in   the imagination of old order and like a hermit and got isolated seriously from the   tumultuous outside world. It tried to fill up the gap between new order of Qing and old   tribute piety to Ming in this way living in isolation for almost 200 years from the   international turbulent reality. As a result, while the internal order of the dynasty   sustained and ruled the people for more than 200 years, on the external front Korea's   national competitiveness weakened rapidly resulting in Japan's military domination in the   end.    Three Korean kingdoms - Koguryeo, Baekje, Silla - have competed with Chinese   Kingdoms Sui and Tang for attaining equal power. But Silla unified three kingdoms with   

- 43 -    the help of Chinese kingdom Tang. Since then Korea was dependent on China. In   reaction to that, Koryo kingdom succeeded by Silla made its diplomacy to China very   stubborn and united with Manchurian kingdoms to compete with China. Koryo’s too   much stubbornness toward China made General Lee revolt against Koryo government .  Lee’s dynasty Chosen governed Korea for 500 years peacefully with the support of China .  (Han 2000)    It is argued in this thesis that the situation in present Korean peninsula, divided   into North and South Korea, is continuum of long historical tendency in Korea. North is   very stubborn toward foreign countries in the reaction to Lee dynasty and South is very   dependent on foreign countries in reaction to Koryo kingdom. This is whimsical remnan t  of the Korean history.    4. Security Relations after the World War II    On August 15, 1945 as World War II came to a close, Korea was liberated from   the domination of the Japanese military. People of Korea were glad for regaining thei r  sovereignty and being independent from Japan. However, because Korea did no t  participate as a sovereign nation in the War, it once again was divided into two at the   38th parallel being occupied by the US on the south and the then Soviet Union on the   north. China was relatively weak in comparison with the US and USSR in both military   and political power especially because of the civil war between Kuomin Party and the   Communist Party so that it could not object to residing of foreign military troops in   Korean peninsula.    Korea has tried to build an independent state quickly in the Korean peninsula   burying the colonial past. On the other hand China, because of the historical and cultura l  ties with Korea, was keen to establish a pro-China government in terms of nationa l  security to prevent the influence of great powers, primarily the US or the Soviet Union   and used it as a buffer around her. China, in the name of the recovery of Korea's   independence and freedom, tried to establish the pro-Chinese government giving   

- 44 -    international legitimacy to Korean exile government which had maintained a close   relationship with the Chinese government during Japan’s dominating era. China’s plan   was derived from consciousness to preserve the traditional friendly relations with Korean   peninsula from a historical view of ‘lips and teeth’ relation (Park 2002: 33-34, Zhou   1984) and regain the past sense of superiority to control the peninsula.    However, civil war began in China between the Kuomintang and the Communis t  Party and it could not help compromising with the US and USSR. to win the internal war .  Beijing expressed consistent support and assistance to Korea to stand independent and   argued at the Cairo Conference for the need to solve Korea's post-war problems, in the   process of criticizing a split ruling by the US and the USSR. China feared that the spli t  ruling eventually would lead to division of the peninsula and when the conflict began to   intensify in the Northeast region, it led to destabilizing peace in Asia and resulted in the   crisis of the world. But China's military forces could not compete with those of the US   and the Soviet Union, and especially due to the civil war, it could not respond actively   towards the split ruling.    While the Soviet communists ruled North Korea through Russian military majo r  Kim Il-Sung in divided peninsula and an armed North Koreans linked to the Communis t  Party which was fighting against Kuomintang government engaged in activities of civi l  war in China, the Chinese Kuomintang government was clueless on ways to strengthen   ties with the US. The intention of China was that even though it could not build pro - Chinese government in Korean peninsula, at least, it could help build pro-American anti - communist government in South Korea which could fight against the Soviet communism   in East Asia in collaboration with Kuomintang and the US. Eventually their choice was   Dr. Rhee Sung-Man who was in the US. Dr. Rhee was also associated with the   Provisional Government of Korea in China and was the best person at that time among   the seniors of pro-China and the U.S.A.    5. Chinese participation in Korean War    

- 45 -    On June 25, 1950, North Korea declared war and occupied South Korea's capital  Seoul in three days and most of the country in less than 2 months. But the invading troops  met strong resistance of Pusan defense line in early August formed by Korea-US  combined forces. (Roh 2000: 358)   It was so worrisome for China which was very  optimistic in the beginning about quick and sweeping victory by North Korea, because it  had got involved with the US, changing the situation in Korean peninsula. On October 1,  Park Heonyoung, the deputy Prime Minister of North Korea, visited Beijing requesting  its support and Stalin requested Mao to send the troops through the Soviet ambassador in  China. On October 3, China openly proclaimed the possibility of military intervention in  Korean peninsula saying "It will never wait and see that the US military cross the 38  lines" (抗美援朝戰爭的戰術經驗總結 1956: 151)   through Indian ambassador 12  in China.  As the US military ignored China’s warnings and crossed over 38 th  parallel line,  which was the first border between South and North Korea since 15 October, 1945,  China's leadership began a debate at the end to decide sending the troops to finally. Mao  renamed the troops of northeastern fringe which was placed on the northern border of the  Yalu River as Chinese People's Volunteers and appointed Peng Dehuai as the commander  of the unit which was ordered to cross the Yalu River and it entered North Korea on  October 15, 1950. On October 19 night, the Chinese People’s Volunteers; China's 12  divisions, shouting the slogan of ‘combatting the US and assisting Korea, defending our  home and motherland’ crossed the Yalu River and participated in the Korean War (Huang  Hua Memoirs 2008: 130).   The first confrontation between the Chinese and the United Nations’ troops took  place on October 26, 1950. Chinese army supported North Korean army especially on the  mountainous region. They accomplished their mission mostly during night time and bad  weather conditions. However, they were very weak in cold winter season because they  did not carry any winter clothes and anti-frostbite medicines with them. The have attained  their morale and combat capabilities through the long communist political training. They  moved quickly and defend their command despite of all the casualties and poor logistics.    12  At that time there were no relations between Eastern and Western bloc. They could communicate  only through the channel of India.  

- 46 -    American phobia of Chinese soldiers shown in the beginning has been disappeared little   by little with successive victories against American Army (Rajubaeb 2002: 223).  Table #2: PRC five major campaigns during the Korean War    Campaign  Period  Forces deployed Combat area  The 1 st  campaign 1950.10.26~11.5 The 13 th  Corps  100,000  Unsan, Biho Mount.  The 2 nd  campaign 1950.11.25~12.8 The 9 th  Corps  120,000  Janjinho, Kunuri  The 3 rd  campaign 1950.12.31~1951.1.8 30 divisions  300,000  Wonju combat  The 4 th  campaign 1951.2.11~2.15 12 divisions  120,000  Hoiseong, Jipyungri  The 5 th  campaign(1) 1951.4.22~4.29  4 Corps  300,000  Sachangri  The 5 th  campaign(2) 1951.5.16~5.21 The 3 rd , 9 th  and 19 th   Corps  Hyunri, Bunker    Chinese troops came into Korean peninsula in twilight and kept them concealed  with daybreak, the UN forces 13  did not notice them at all. It was the only way for poorly  armed Chinese military to surprise the UN forces with an overwhelming force at night.  The raid by the Chinese troops was a serious blow to the U.S. forces, which were  approaching the north of Ulsan - Onjeong-ri - Huicheon line. The UN troops suffered a  blow to the situation and withdrew from Cheongcheon river lines and watched what  would happen next. However, because of poor logistics and supplies, Chinese advance  was limited (ROK Army 2009: 108).    13  The United Nations command was consisted of 16 countries including the United States, within two   months was pushed back to the Pusan perimeter, a small area in the south of the country, before t he  North Koreans were stopped. A rapid UN counter-offensive then drove the North Koreans past t he  38th Parallel and almost to the Yalu River.  

- 47 -    Map #1: Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) Five Major Campaigns during the  Korean War    Source: 中國軍事科學院軍事歷史部 (1991),  See Table #2 for the scale of forces deployed and respective periods  

- 48 -    After the Chinese army stayed in ambush quietly at Deokcheon - Gaecheon -  Gunwoori line for the time being, it again surprised the UN and U.S. forces causing a lot  of damage. This is called the second campaign by Chinese military history. Eventually,  the UN military pulled out all the troops from the front and all the way back to  Pyongyang without any decent fight against the Chinese withdrawing to the 38 parallel- line. UN forces had to retreat again and again and camped in the northern part of Seoul.  On December 31, 1950, Chinese army attacked the last defense line of Seoul capital of  South Korea with overwhelming force. This is called the third campaign by Chinese  military history. Chinese and North Korean military were brought back to Seoul again  with this third campaign after being expelled by Incheon landing operation by UN  Commander General MacArthur on 15 September, 1950.  As MacArthur failed in the first campaign against North Korean army and  continued to fail against the Chinese in the northern part of the Korean peninsula; he  designed some grand operation for annihilation of Chinese massive army in retaliating at  the right place in exchange for their failures until then. He thought about the Tannenberg  campaign 14  in the First World War with which the German army annihilated the Soviet  Union troops or Operation Barbarossa 15  in World War II. Then he thought China would  never disparage Korean peninsula again. So MacArthur asked to send the 30 million  reinforced American troops as well as Taiwan's 50,000 troops to the Korean peninsula.  MacArthur also planned scattering radiation ashes from the reactor on the borders of  China and the Korean Peninsula and the mountains which are easy to penetrate for  Chinese personnel.  In addition, he made a plan to destroy the major facilities in Manchuria by  bombing the railways and roads of China and Russia and to have Taiwan troops landing    14  The Battle of Tannenberg was an engagement between the Russian Empire and the German Empire   in the first days of World War I. It was fought by the Russian First and Second Armies against t he  German Eighth Army between 23 August and 30 August 1914. The battle resulted in the almo st  complete destruction of the Russian Second Army.    15  Operation Barbarossa was Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union during World War II that began   on 22 June 1941. Over 4.5 million troops invaded the USSR along a 2,900 km (1,800 mi) front wi th  600,000 motor vehicles and 750,000 horses. The operation resulted in 95 percent of all Germ an  casualties from 1941 to 1944.  

- 49 -    amphibious operation into some coastal areas of mainland China. It was actually like tota l  war with China at that time. However, until the requested reinforced troops arrived ,  certain period of waiting time was needed. He needed wide plains to draw and annihilate   the massive Chinese forces. The place which he considered to battle with Chinese army   was the plain fields between ‘Han’ and ‘Kum’ River. The region was a major population   centre which China could have agreed worthwhile and the area of possible vulnerabilities ,  where China supporting unit had to cross the river to supply logistics to Chinese troops in   the Korean peninsula.  But in Washington, they did not agree with General MacArthur. The Pentagon ,  Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and even the Army came out in denial about US   troop’s reinforcement in Korea and the escalation of war against China. They argued tha t  the US has no reason to continue to fight killing their young people unworthily in othe r  country and wasting high taxes in the war where it has been internationally humiliated .  President Truman decided to end this war as soon as possible ahead of the elections   which would be affected by the flow of a bad situation.  MacArthur requested permission to use nuclear weapons and to attack the   Chinese mainland. Truman refused, and the Chinese advance continued. The president's   popularity nose-dived, especially after he fired MacArthur. Americans had grown tired o f  war. But soon, the tide began to turn. By March 1951, the Americans had pushed the   Chinese and the North Koreans back to areas above the 38th parallel. Peace talks began   in July. When a weary Harry Truman left office in January 1953, peace had still not been   achieved (Harry S. Truman Library 2012).  The atmosphere of American leadership was to finish the war in Asia at the   appropriate level and having a truce with China before concentrating its forces in Europe   for the national interest. Truman instructed the US State Department to appeal to the   Chinese side to initiate armistice negotiations and to remove General MacArthur from his   post as commander-in-chief of the US army in Korea (Huang 2008: 132). People’s   Republic of China also had no reason to oppose the truce in circumstances in which it had   to start the inevitable war and already got more than 200,000 killed.  

- 50 -    Ⅱ . China – South Korea Security Relations since Normalization  1. New Relations since 1992 normalization  On August 24, 1992, Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China   signed a joint statement on the establishment of diplomatic relations 16  and opening of a  new era to stop the conflict of more than 40 years of Cold War. Establishment of  diplomatic relations has brought benefits for Korea and China and effected a very  significant change in East Asia also. 17  Korea expected that political changes in China  would have important implications for regional security in relationship with North Korea,  and it would adjust the position of the positive effects to North Korea’s policy. China has  secured a position to exert influence virtually, both north and south of the peninsula, and  was accepted as the most significant in the formation of the new order in the Northeast  Asia.  Since the beginning of diplomatic initiatives, the relations between both  countries developed in good pace. Both settled hostile relations in political and military  interaction posing North Korea between both countries, promoted the economic  exchanges actively and have been working together for peace in Northeast Asia. South  Korea improved the environment for economic investment dramatically and helped  stabilize the situation in the peninsula.  After normalization of relations with South Korea, China's foreign policy was to  strengthen political cooperation with North Korea and enhance economic cooperation  with South Korea. This was because of the rapid collapse of North Korea as a socialist  country and its fallout on the safety of Communist country China politically. The chaos  inside North Korea automatically could have led to the chaos inside China and if North  Korea collapsed, South Korea would take initiatives for the unification of 1 million ethnic    16  See MOFAT (2009: 338) for “the Joint Statement for the Establishment of Diplomatic Relation between  Republic of Korea and People's Republic of China” signed in 1992.  17  Kwon Byung Hyun participated in the negotiation with China as the chief delegate at the time. After  retirement, he revealed the behind story of negotiation. Some of China's conservative high officials strongly  opposed the relation with South Korea by arguing that North Korea was ‘blood alliance’ for China.  (Hankook Ilbo 2007) China also had to comfort North Korea, however, Kim Il Sung was not able to adapt  the reality so that the relation between China and North Korea was jeopardised. (Huh 2012)   

- 51 -    Koreans in Manchuria. The strengthened solidarity among Koreans could have led to   divisive campaign against the Chinese government. China's two largest national interests   are economic development and prevention of the separatist movement, and both of them   will be affected in case of collapse of North Korea.  In 1992, when diplomatic relations between South Korea and China began ,  there were only 4.3 million visitors who crossed the border of each other but it increased   to five million in 2007, eight million in 2008 and accounted for ten million in 2010; thu s  registering a whopping 200 times growth in less than a decade. The number of foreign   students in China is 57,000 in 2012; the number one multitude foreign country and   citizens in China ranked 700,000 right after the Beijing Olympics 2008. As can be seen   from Korean Drama 'Dae Jang Geum', there is a boom of Korean culture so-called   ‘Hanliu (韩流)’ 18  in China. There were 729 direct-flights as of 2010 (26 percent of total  flights in Inchon airport) between Korea’s six cities and China’s 30 cities every week  (Ministry of Land and Maritime, 2010).    2. China – South Korea Security Relations since 1992 Normalization  China-South Korea diplomatic relations had formed the favourable conditions  to develop good relations between the east and west block. The new political and  diplomatic development was a crucial instrument to regain the traditional relationship  between Korea and China and played a great role to convert the past system of an alliance  and league to normalize relationship among the related countries.  However, China has limits in actively promoting the relationships with South  Korea due to the long political and military relations with North Korea in the security  area 19  and South Korea also could not go entirely with China because of the existing    18  ‘Dae Jang Geum’ is the Korean soap opera ‘Jewel in the Palace’ which most of Chinese have   watched. Chinese president Hu Jintao was also a great fan of Korean drama ‘Dae Jang Geum’. To p  actress Lee Young-ae has created a “Daejangggum Syndrome” in China by starring as a Changgum,  a  palace maid who becomes a royal physician in the Chosen Kingdom. Hu Jintao had a dinner wi th  actress Lee once when he visited Korea (Park 2005).  19  China-North Korea alliance is present progressive. Even after Cold War, China-North Korea  alliance has been considered an axis confronting against Korea-US alliance. Their relationship has  

- 52 -    confrontations with Pyongyang. Since diplomatic relations, there were roadblocks in   promoting security relationships between China because of North Korean affairs, and   South Korea because of USA’s affairs (Kim 2005, 117). China Association fo r  International Friendly Contact (CAIFC) and Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs   (KRIMA), which are semi-governmental and semi-private institutes, had approached fo r  founding some think-tank of security talk to solve these problems.  On August 25, 2008, just a day after Beijing Olympic Games, Chinese   president Hu Jintao visited his South Korean counterpart Lee and held a two-day summit .  The two leaders stressed on implementation of a 'strategic cooperative partnership’ 20   agreed before. In a joint statement, they focused on several military and security   provisions which were mainly discussed at the China-South Korea Security Forum. The   followings are the arrangements of summit talks and defense ministers’ talks since   1992. 21     1) Summit talk diary    Summit talk between China and South Korea meant many things at that time.  Because of China’s close relationship with North Korea, summit talk between China and  South Korea has been delayed even after the end of Cold War. However, both countries  were strongly motivated by economic factor. The talk was started out to bridge the gap  between the two countries, so that both can benefit politically and economically.  Sometimes they could not help meeting outside their capitals due to China’s concern over  its relationship with North Korea.            been a main factor consisting the dynamics of the Korean Peninsula situation (Choi 2009).  20  The announcement of a “strategic partnership” by Lee followed in a line of South Korean   presidents who have claimed a closer relationship with China. From a “friendship and cooperati ve  relationship” when relations were normalized in 1992 to a “full-scale cooperative partnership” und er  Kim Dae Jung, to a “comprehensive cooperative partnership” during the administration of Roh Mo o- hyun.  21  See Appendix # 4 for China ROK Joint Statement (2008. 05. 28)  

- 53 -    Table #3 Summit talk diary  Period  Place  Summits  September 28,  1992  Beijing  President Roh Taewoo met  President Yang Sangkun  November 19,  1993  Seattle of U.S.  President Kim Youngsam met  President Jiang Zemin  March 28, 1994 Beijing  President Kim Youngsam met  President Jiang Zemin  November 14,  1994  Jakarta Indonesia President Kim Youngsam met  President Jiang Zemin  November 13,  1995  Seoul  President Kim Youngsam met  President Jiang Zemin  November 24,  1996  Manila  Philippines  President Kim Youngsam met  President Jiang Zemin  November 24,  1997  Vancouver  Canada  President Kim Youngsam met  President Jiang Zemin  November 12,  1998  Beijing  President Kim Daejung met  President Jiang Zemin  September 6,  2000  New York U.S.  President Kim Daejung met  President Jiang Zemin  October 18, 2001 Beijing  President Kim Daejung met  President Jiang Zemin  October 27, 2002 Los Cabos  Mexico  President Kim Daejung met  President Jiang Zemin  July 7, 2003  Beijing  President Roh Muhyun met  President Hu Jintao  October 19, 2003 Thailand  President Roh Muhyun met  President Hu Jintao  November 19,  2004  Chile  President Roh Muhyun met  President Hu Jintao  

- 54 -    May 8, 2005 Moscow, Russia  President Roh Muhyun met  President Hu Jintao  November 16,  2005  Seoul  President Roh Muhyun met  President Hu Jintao  November 17,  2006  Hanoi Vietnam  President Roh Muhyun met  President Hu Jintao  September 7,  2007  Sydney Australia  President Roh Muhyun met  President Hu Jintao from China  November 20,  2007  Singapore  President Roh Muhyun met  President Hu Jintao  May 17, 2008 Beijing  President Lee Myungbak met  President Hu Jintao  August 9, 2008 Beijing  President Lee Myungbak met  President Hu Jintao  August 25, 2008 Seoul  President Lee Myungbak met  President Hu Jintao  April 30, 2010 Shanghai, China  President Lee Myungbak met  President Hu Jintao from China  November 11,  2010  Seoul  President Lee Myungbak met  President Hu Jintao    In 1999, the first East Asia Summit Talk was held in Manila with the participation  of China, Japan, South Korea and other countries. They thought the affairs between  China and South Korea could be managed at East Asia Summit Talk at that moment.    When North Korea conducted its second nuclear test on June 1, 2009, President  Lee was angry and asked China strongly to take the clear stance on it. But, unlike the  North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, China did not condemn North Korea. Between  both countries, there was the feeling that the summit talk was of no use and was not  productive. Neither China nor South Korea was enthusiastic to propose the summit talk at  that time. So, summit talk was not held in 2009.  

- 55 -    Table #4 North Korea Nuclear / Missile tests and Responses from China & South Korea    Dates Nuclear / Missile Tests  Remarks  29, May,  1993  Rodong-1 Missile test  fire / 1,300Km / East  Sea  •China: Sino-US relation improved and Sino-NK  aggravated  •South Korea: Asking for Patriot Missile, Apache  helicopter and aircraft carrier to US  31, Aug,  1998  Taepodong-1 Missile  test fire / 2,000Km /  passed through main  land Japan  •China: Japan cooperated with China, NK despised  •South Korea: Missile test disguising satellite test  2, Oct,  2005  Declaration for  possession of nuclear  weapon and Boycott  for six-party talks    •China: Opposed to UN regulation and Pressure,  Wang Jiarui, head of CPC International Liaison  Department, visited to North Korea  •South Korea: NK Nuclear will be serious for  Korean Peninsula, Foreign minister Ban Gimoon  cooperated with Dick Cheney.  5, July,  2006  Taepodong-2 Missile  test fire / Failed Mid- air explosion in 7  minutes / 6,000Km  •China: Wu Dawei, the Vice Minister of Foreign  Affairs visited to North Korea  •South Korea: President Roh talked to Hu Jintao on  the line, cut the relation and tough stance to North  Korea  9, Oct,  2006  1 st  Nuclear test / 1 Kt •China: Consent with UN resolution 1718, Tang  Jiaxuan, State Councilor from the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, visited North Korea  •South Korea: President Roh visited China and  cooperated with Hu Jintao  5, Apr,  2009  Taepodong-2 Missile  test fire / Localization  of launching site  including KSLV-1  (Korea Space Launch  Vehicle)  •China: NK satellite launching is not against to UN  resolution  •South Korea: Taepodong-2 launching is Missile test  disguising satellite launching  25, May,  2009  2 nd  Nuclear test / 2~4  Kt  •China: Recovering the traditional relation with  NK, sharp increase in trade between both countries  •South Korea: Declaration of total participation for  Proliferation Security Initiative    13, Apr,  2012  Taepodong-3 Missile  test fire / 10,000 Km /  Failed an abrupt mid- air explosion with  technical problems  •China: Persuaded the relavant countries to keep  the cool position  •South Korea: It is against UN resolution 1874,  broke the peace of East Asia  Sources: Cho, Min and Jinha Kim (2009) and other sources from the Bibliography      

- 56 -    2) Diary of Defence Ministers’ talks between China and South Korea    Since diplomatic relations started between the two countries in 1992, the summi t  talk has occurred frequently between the two countries’ leaders, but Defence Ministers ’  talk has happened yearly or once in two years in Beijing, except the years between 2001   and 2005 22 . It can be compared with that of defence ministers’ meeting between South  Korea and the US or the Joint Chiefs of staffs’ meeting, held more frequently than  summit talks.    Table #5 Defence Minister Talks Diary    Period Place  Ministers / Remarks  1999 Aug Beijing  Cho Seongtae 23  met Chi Haotian  - Invite Chi Haotian to South Korea  - Mutual exchanges of military high officials, naval  ships, military student officers for Defence, Army,  Navy, Air force college  2000 Jan Seoul  Cho Seongtae met Chi Haotian  - Understanding strategic common interest  - Promoting the relation between both Koreas with  Chinese support  - Presentation of Chinese defense policy  2001 Dec Beijing  Kim Dongshin met Chi Haotian  - Invite Jiang Zemin former General Secretary to 2002  World Cup  - Anti-terrorism cooperation for 2002 World Cup    22  There was no Defence Ministers’ talk between 2001 and 2005 as China’s Defence Minister cannot make  decision of his own to visit South Korea without getting the permission of the party leaders. China also  feels that South Korea being a small and weaker power country should visit China rather than the other way  round.  23  Cho Sungtae, the 35th Defence Minister of South Korea (1999-2001), did a role of  midwife for China-South Korea Security Forum.  

- 57 -    - Mutual exchanges of Air Force cargos  - Invite Chinese naval commanders to South Korea  2005 Mar Beijing  Yoon Gwangwoong met Cao Gangchuan  - Promote desk officers talks between two countries  - Construct Air Force and Navy cooperation in the  Yellow Sea  - Cooperation in civilian fishing between two countries  - North Korean defecting POW returning to South  Korea  2006 Apr Seoul  Yoon Gwangwoong met Cao Gangchuan  - Observation for Taiwan military operation  - Cooperation in North Korea nuclear issue  - Evaluate military cooperation between two countries  - Hot line between both Navies and Air Forces  - Presentation about South Korean Defence Reform  2020  2007 Apr Beijing  Kim Jangsoo met Cao Gangchuan  - Mutual presentation about each countries’ defence  policy  - Cooperation in North Korean defectors' problem  - Discussion on Chinese illegal civilian fishing in  Yellow Sea  - Cooperation in rescue operation exercise  2009 May Beijing  Lee Sanghee met Liang Guanglie  - Preparedness for North Korea’s 2nd Nuclear test  - Understanding on PSI and MD  - Signing MOU for Defence interchanging cooperation  - Establishing defense strategic conference  - Facilitation the retired military officers  - Cooperation for Somalia naval operation  2011 Jul Beijing  Kim Gwanjin met Liang Guanglie  

- 58 -    - Cooperation in International Peace Keeping  operation  - Understanding the Taiwan affairs  - Discussion on Cheon'an corvette attack  - Explain Korea-US combined Military exercise in the  Yellow Sea  - Cooperation in North Korean defectors.  Source: Lee (2012) and several sources as in the Bibliography section    3) Upgrade to a level of security diplomacy    The security relationship between China and South Korea is still relatively on  slow pace when compared with growth in other areas like those of South Korea - U.S and  South Korea - Japan. Since 2000, military leaders’ mutual visits and the regular meetings  have been increased and various security exchanges, including China-South Korea  Security Forum implemented. However, substantial security cooperation between the two  countries has not yet been getting on the track. It is because of the China-North Korea  traditional security relations and US-South Korea alliance. In addition, there are potential  security conflicts between both the countries about the North Korean factor and existing  exchanges between South Korea and Taiwan. More aggressive exchanges such as  military exercise and personnel exchanges in high-level could make the practical security  cooperation possible.    The day before President Hu Jintao’s visit to Korea after the 2008 Beijing   Olympics, China’s official news agency Xinhua reported ‘Hu's visit will finalize the   direction of the future relationship between China and Korea’ (Xinhua News 2008). As   the summit visit happened shortly after the most important event in China, Hu's visit was   highly anticipated in South Korea. President Hu mentioned about the unification o f  Korean peninsula, the international human rights, refugees, etc. which have been a taboo   so far to talk in a summit and it improved bilateral relations between both countries   significantly in security area.  

- 59 -      In the summit talk, the direct hot line between Navy and Air Force of both   countries has been discussed. Further, Hu offered the strengthening of military exchanges   between Korea and China; ranging from opening hot line, mutual observance at military   training; joint rescue training and broadly both agreed to promote military cooperation .  Military Hotline 24  was discussed for the first time; when Cao Gangchuan Chinese  Defense Minister met Yoon Kwang-ung, Korean Defense Minister for the 4 th  Defense  minister talk in 2006. Minister Yoon has suggested hotline between both Sea Fleet  Headquarters in the Yellow Sea and both air defense units in Air Force for joint search  and rescue training at the humanitarian base in the Yellow Sea.    Although there were technical problems, they discussed installing hotline  between Naval Operations Control Room of Korea Navy Command Headquarters and the  Operation Center of the North Sea Fleet Headquarters Qingdao as well as Central  Pyeongtaek Air Defense Center in Korea and Air Defense Command Center of the Air  Force Beijing or the Air Defense Center of Jinan corps in the Shandong Province.    Professor Ou Yang Wei from Strategic Research Department of Chinese National  Defense University, at the 5th China-South Korea Security forum held on April 21, 2007  said, "I was informed that Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan is very eager to open hotline  between South Korea and China’s high placed department, but it has technical difficulties  so that it should be studied to solve the current roadblock.” The hotline connection has  been discussed for about last six years between both the militaries. Negotiators between  Korea and China have to access specific psychological issues directly which seems to be  getting better now. The solution is reached when a positive attitude to scrutinize the  problem between the two countries exists; especially for technical part of the project.    24  Hotline means a point-to-point communication linked to the preselected party directed   without any additional action to avoid misunderstanding during any moments of crisis  and emergency. It is normally installed as a confidence measure in the beginning of  improvement between hostile countries. South Korea and China have hotline system in   both Navies, Air Forces and Defence Ministries. China and US set up a military hotline   between Beijing and Washington in 2007 (Miles 2007). China has proposed setting up a   maritime emergency hotline with Japan, 2010 (Hannon 2010).  

- 60 -      4)  Exploring ways to expand security exchanges    President Hu Jintao suggested increasing the military personnel exchanges   between the two countries for the effectiveness of the strategic partnership at the 2008   summit talk. The reason why military exchanges were poor was that there were strong   straps of the military alliance between the US and South Korea as well as a strong   military relation between China and North Korea. Both the summits concluded that the   senior and working-level personnel exchanges, military educational exchanges and   mutual observation of military exercises as well as mutual observation of military   facilities could develop security cooperation in a great way.    Including the agenda of strengthening military contacts between South Korea   and China; summit meetings explains the urgency of need for the promotion of the   security relationship between both the states. Peace in the Korean peninsula and in the   Northeast Asia will be the main benefits from the progress of South Korea-China   relations and it could help to solve the nuclear issue of North Korea as well as improve   the relations between South and North Korea.    In the long-term, both the countries could try strategic cooperation, including the   expansion of military exchanges, for maintenance of peace in East Asia. Both the   countries should study and research about the alliances between the US and South Korea ,  the relations between China and North Korea as well as North Korea’s nuclear issue fo r  peace in the Northeast Asia and the resilience according to the dynamics of security   situation in a wide range.    There were specific projects at the 2008 summit on maritime delimitation   between South Korea and China. The summits acknowledged that the maritime   delimitation could be an important factor in the future. Both the countries expressed the   

- 61 -    will to solve border disputes from the Northeast Project 25  in Manchuria, and tried to  provide alternatives for solving the maritime boundary problem.    5) Security Dialogue at civil level    Expanding of military exchange between China and South Korea inevitably  needs to be understood by China's ally North Korea and South Korea’s ally the United  States. Under these circumstances, the military exchanges between China and South  Korea do not irritate North Korea and the United States. There can be a higher level of  understanding among these countries which would help promote security talks between  South Korea and China. If these assumptions may not materialize, expanding military  exchanges between China and South Korea will probably end up in habitual slogans.    To enable expansion of military exchanges between South Korea and China to  establish a strategic relationship, it needs to be understood that U.S.A. must work in  parallel with South Korea, North Korea and China and each of the military alliance  system in South Korea.    China's military system and personnel exchange policies are not like the South  Korean. Military personnel exchange in South Korean is too frequent and it is less  binding on incumbent decision makers if military personnel are retired. So it is difficult  for new military personnel to keep policy consistent; while the Chinese troopers even i f  they are retired, can affect military decision making and thus maintain continuity in the   policy. It was difficult to maintain the same pace in conversations on the issues o f  security cooperation because they have differences on personnel system.    25  The Northeast Project (东北工程), which is short for the Northeast Borderland History and the   Chain of Events Research Project (东北边疆历史与现状系列研究工程), was a 20-million-yuan (2 .4  million US dollars)   project launched by the Chinese government in 2002 and finished in 2006,  conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Science. This project applies the ideology of Zhonghua  Minzu(中和民族) to ancient ethnic groups, states and history of the region of Manchuria and northern  Korea. Under the Zhonghua Minzu ideology, it is assumed that there was a greater Chinese state in the  ancient past. Accordingly, any pre-modern people or states that occupied any part of what is now the  People's Republic of China are defined as having been part of that greater Chinese state.  

- 62 -      3. The prospect of military relations between China and South Korea  While China's role in the international community is continuously growing, in   reality, it is useful for South Korea to develop the 'strategic cooperative partnership’ with   China and maintain the alliance with the U.S.A. China will also gain friendly forces   through the development of strategic partnership and economic cooperation with South   Korea to face the political social and diplomatic challenges.  On developing the military relationship between South Korea and China, the   former cannot help but be influenced by the US. Policies of China and the United States   on the East Asia, appear to be revolving in the viscosity of contradictory interests on   major issues. Though there are different strategic interests, both the countries could share   the common strategic interests in the course of solving the problems of the region.  Since Barack Obama became the president of America, China has strengthened   its role as a responsible state in the international community. During the Obama   administration, both the countries shall be deemed to take joint steps without a majo r  conflict for world peace and development. Either contradictory in the interests or both   share the common interests; South Korea objectifies those matters related to its interes t  and expresses its opinions actively to both the countries searching for an intermediary   role. So the development of military relations between South Korea and China with the   South Korea-U.S.A. military alliance will be able to exert a multiplier effect.  On the one hand both countries could extend bilateral military cooperation in   the area of non-traditional security threats or comprehensive security area, and on the   other hand they could try to work together for the emergence of the security apparatus in   East Asia just like OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). These   are the approaches for maintaining the alliance with U.S.A. as well as develop security   relationships with China. While both countries expand mutual strategic consensus   through solving North Korea Nuclear issue, the division of the Korean peninsula issue   

- 63 -    and the issues of the East Asia Peace, they could explore their roles and functions fo r  building the peace and the new order in the East Asia.  South Korea does not want to distance its relations with the United States while   developing relations with China. China might not also want strengthening relations   between the two countries if it resulted in aggravating the relations with North Korea .  The development of security relations between China and South Korea would be helpfu l  to the security interests of the United States, at the same time China could understand tha t  South Korea–U.S.A. alliance is helpful for keeping peace in the peninsula and help   stabilize Northeast Asia.  In this chapter, the historical background was described and the background o f  military relations between both countries has been analysed specifically. It was   discovered that Korean and Chinese races originated from different anthropologica l  groups. The relations between two countries could have been started when the two   peoples recognised each other as different entities. In ancient period, kingdoms in Korean   Peninsula and Chinese Empire existed in the system of coordination. But because Silla   was helped by Tang in China for unification of Korean peninsula, Korea began to show   the tendency of dependence upon China. Since then the modern-nation state of South   Korea and China established the similar pattern of foreign relations. China-South Korea   Security Forum has sought to re-establish this almost 5,000 years of relationship between   both countries and believes that, through the common culture of the long history they can   overcome the 50 years severance easily.  

- 64 -      CHAPTER 3    The Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula:  The Role of NGOs and NPM      Ⅰ . Government Failures and Alternatives    After becoming independent from Japan, the Korean Peninsula separated into   two Koreas and two governments in South and North Korea, supported by US and Sovie t  Union respectively. There were two different leaders for South and North Korea: Lee   Sung Man for South and Kim Il Sung for North. There would have been less possibility   of conflicts between two Koreas ended up Korean War, if there were no leaders like them   who were held up by super powers. Korean people’s desire to construct one nation   collapsed owing to their leaders backed up by external powers. More than one million   people were killed during Korean War, which is the clear example of ‘governmen t  failure’. Antagonism between two Koreas has continued since it was devastated by   offensive and aggressive leaders.  Still, China utilises North Korea issue, and US uses South Korea for hegemony   competition. Even though South Korea and China have necessitated establishing the new   stage of relationship, historical background and conservative atmosphere in two countries   distressed the new relationship between South Korea and China. China had to have taken   care of the relationship between North Korea, and South Korea was required to do the   same toward US’s opinion (Kim 2006).  The China-South Korea Security Forum can be considered to be an emerging   alternative to compensate the limitations of government activities for protecting the   security interests of the people. In economic aspects, the limits of government actions are   relatively defined as 'government failure'. But the government’s perceived failure in the   security interests of the people, which is actually more important than the economic ones ,  

- 65 -    are not defined. People’s security interest means their right to get a peaceful and secure   life, to protect life and property which are collectively called sovereignty and territoria l  integrity. Government’s security failures are shown in various patterns in each country.    Barry Buzan argued in an interview that international relations theory is a theory   by and for the West, and ‘rests on an assumption that Western history is world history ’  He criticises western perspective of IR theory:    “The supposedly ‘timeless and universal’ perspective of IR is based on a Euro - centric understanding of the past, the present and future, and it does not take into  account nearly enough the cultural syncretic processes by which the west itself  was and still is made. While the idea of international society is not for someone in  particular, it tends to be made by the great powers of the day. In a sense,  ‘international society’ can be understood mainly as the international projection or  extrapolation of what the great powers agree to construct as the international order  in which they want to operate—like most else in IR, it is a great power centered  theory, but it has wider potentialities. As Hedley Bull constructs it, the concept  evolves around international order, and everybody has an interest in a certain kind  of order as opposed to chaos or anarchy. You might or might not like any  particular order, and at any given point you can find people who are opposed to or  supportive of the reigning order. Right now, we live in a liberal order, so it suits  people and societies of that disposition while it is hostile to people and countries  who are not of that disposition—which is also one reason why we see this  regionalising tendency. Yet within this normatively ‘agnostic’ analysis, one can  argue that it seems to be the first order that has constructed values such as ‘all  humans are equal’, an assumption we have only operated with for the last 60  years. It’s a very big principle that delegitimises racism, slavery, genocide, and  empire. So there have been some transformations under this order which seem not  only to reflect the interests of the great powers, but also of people.” (Schouten  2009)    Ken Booth also defines the differential concept of the security between the state  and the society:    “During the Cold War Western security specialists were particularly deferential to   the definitions and agendas of governments. Politicians, diplomats and military   establishments have their own identities and interests which are not always shared by   those for whom they supposedly speak. This is particularly the case where `state' and   ` society' do not coincide. This is why the growth of civil society is so important fo r  security, cooperation and development, whether regionally or globally (YCISS  Occasional Paper No. 26 October 1994).”      

- 66 -    In the Korean peninsula, influenced by superpower neighbours, the government’s  security failure has taken on structural aspects. How to escape from the big powers'  interests and guarantee people's security interests? How the country can have committed  political or military leaders representing interests of the people and security of the nation  rather than their own selfish interests or their party’s? These questions are basic to  government’s activities in security area and if not the foundation of the premise in  question. Even if the government makes a good strategy and shows fantastic policy  activities, there might be a distortion as experienced in the killing of a million people in  the Korean War.    In order to understand this dynamics of the above questions it is imperative to  look/ study some of the major theories in the field of Public Administration. Thomas  Woodrow Wilson 26 , the master of government affairs, pointed out the management of  government organizations saying "The most important principle of government officials  is serving not for their own leaders and organizations, but for the community and the  states” (Wilson, 1887). According to him the most desirable way for disciplining of the  government organizations and management is centered on the efficiency through the  introduction of private sector management practices. In other words, Wilson's claim is  that the government based on hierarchic system, efficiency and scientific approach will  provide a good public service. His study with a focus on efficiency and rationality is the  important trend throughout the 20th century in government affairs (Shafritz & Hyde,  2011). 27     The efficiency-centric adventure of government affairs during the last century  has been very helpful to improve the organization of the government, however, it has    26  Thomas Woodrow Wilson (1856~1924) was the 28th President of the United States, from 1913 to   1921. As a leader of the Progressive Movement, he served as President of Princeton University fro m  1902 to 1910. Because he has reformed so many government affairs such as Federal Reserve Ac t,  Federal Trade Commission Act, Clayton Antitrust Act, the Federal Farm Loan Act, income ta x,  Keating–Owen Act and the Adamson Act, he is called the master of government affairs.  27  They have analyzed Woodrow Wilson and today's government activities in their book ‘Classics of   Public Administration (Jay M. Shafritz, Albert C. Hyde, Wadsworth Pub Co: 2011) which w as  originally aiming to introduce students to the principles of Public Administration.    

- 67 -    created a hierarchical organizational structure to degenerate the government becoming an   administrative authority and utilitarian power (a power tool) to the people; the rea l  targeting customer for the adventure of efficiency (Morgan 1997). Government based on   the power of authority and axiomatic might provide efficient administrative services bu t  cannot take care of the substantial interests of people. Greenleaf (1991) criticises large   service organisations such as the inhumanity of the government about the characteristics   of asylum-hub and explained government failure in its quotes:    Caring for persons, the more able and the less able serving each other, is  the rock upon which a good society is built. Whereas, until recently caring was  largely person to person, now most of it is mediated through institutions - often  large, complex, powerful, impersonal, is not always competent and sometimes  corrupt. If a better society is to be built, one that is more just and more loving, one  that provides greater creative opportunity for its people, then the most open  course is to raise both the capacity to serve and the very performance as servant of  existing major institutions by new regenerative forces operating within them. 28     The only way to solve the problems to increase capacity and performance is to  help each other as servants. Greenleaf is finding the clues of an alternative possibility for  the government failure and he noted that it is something in common with the democratic  values of society and government. He argues, in his study, that organizations, which are  responsible to the community, should be organized to contribute to the citizens and the  members of the organization continue to develop into servant leaders. According to him,  the organization's leadership basically should possess the ability to be named the qualities  of servant leadership. 29     Another important research in the area of alternative for the government’s  failure is the theory ‘The New Public Service’ presented by Denhardt & Denhardt (2000).  They have focused on the participation of citizens arguing that the administration of  government agencies and government officials should ensure the people to ensure the    28  For more details see http://www.greenleaf.org/whatissl/  29  Servant leadership is a philosophy and practice of leadership, coined and defined by Robert K.   Greenleaf (1904–1990) and supported by many other leadership and management writers. Servan t- leaders achieve results for their organizations by giving priority attention to the needs of the ir  colleagues and those they serve. Servant-leaders are often seen as humble stewards of the ir  organization's resources: human, financial and physical.  

- 68 -    participation on implementing the policies in the process. They argue that people should   grab the oars and paddle the key of the vessel called government rather than governmen t  officials. Government employees are just playing an auxiliary role for the people   paddling the vessel of government. The theory argues that not government officials, bu t  people should be central to create and manage their own government as well as   participate in implementing the policy in the process.    Concurrently, the alternatives for government failure have turned into two   approaches. One is the way to transform the government itself and the other is citizens ’  direct participation in the policy decision making directly. The former approach, which is   the attempt of transforming government itself, was so-called NPM (New Public   Management), NPS (New Public Service) and the latter approach, in which people   participate directly for the national interest and the benefit of the people, has emerged in   the form of NGO (Non-Governmental Organization) and NPO (Non-Profit Organization) .    1).  New Public Management and New Public Service     Since the late 1970s, one of the alternatives for the government failures is the   theory of new public management (New Public Management). (Ferlie 1996) 30  Ferlie has  categorized the form of the new public management into four types. The first one is  efficiency model, the second is reduction model for the size of organization (downsizing)  and decentralization, the third one; the pursuit of excellence (in search of excellence)  model and finally the service-oriented (public service orientation) model.    Efficiency model is the first type appeared in the new public management  through which private scheme was introduced to public sector. Second model seeks  reducing the size and number of unnecessary hierarchical organization to prevent waste  of government budget and to increase flexibility and diversity. The third type is the    30  Ferlie identifies six features of the new public management. Those are privatization; introduction of   market mechanisms into the public sector; a separation between core, or policy, activities an d  peripheral, or service delivery, activities; the outsourcing of service delivery activities; enhanc ed  management, including the use of performance management; and labor market flexibility.    

- 69 -    pursuit of excellence affected by Peters & Waterman who attached the theory of human   relations to the government organization. Excellence-seeking model emphasized   organizational culture, institutional change and renewal of the government. (Peters &   Waterman 1982) Finally, service-oriented model mainly focuses on the quality o f  government services, citizenship and social learning. In particular, citizens’ participation   and responsibility are being emphasized.    In New Public Management the public sector does not provide the goal of the   community, rather than granting a consensus among interested parties to set the vision .  (Lee Myengsuk 2001) The roles and responsibilities are set accordingly and strategic   challenges are proven for the achievement of shared objectives. What is important is tha t  after setting the vision, enforcement is achieved by all the stakeholders and not just the   officials. For effective participation of people, citizens' civic consciousness and a sense o f  responsibility must be accompanied. (Kim Taeroyng 2000) Therefore, the role of politica l  leaders and bureaucrats is required to educate and retrain citizens for enhancing the civic   consciousness and responsibility of community. The role of government is only   supportive to strengthen civic participation and community spirit. (Kim Hungryul 1998)    The theory of the New Public Service is the evolution of New Public   Management, which is a more developed concept with involvement of citizen   participation. (Bae Youngsu 2000) New Public Service criticized that New Public   Management reduced citizens passive and negative in the process of highlighting   customer satisfaction. New public service theory claims that citizen is not a governmen t  customer, but the host of government and government officials are in a position to serve   the citizen; the principle of government. Government officials should build a relationship   of mutual trust and cooperation with the citizens rather than respond to the needs o f  citizens as customers.    New Public Service theory argues that government officials serve citizen as the   manager of public funds, the upholder of public organization, the creator of citizenship   and democratic discourse, the catalyzer of building community and the leader of fron t  

- 70 -    official works (Terry 1995; Denhardt & Gray 1998; Vinzant & Crothers 1998). Denhard t  & Denhardt (2000) claims that the principles of the New Public Service are better suited   to the basis of public administration than the principles of New Public Management .  Denhardt (1993) is referring the reader as follows: “The concept of leadership is no   longer related to controlling concept, but the associated result of effective collaboration .  Leadership is not a privilege of top people, but the influence to participate at differen t  times to different people, each other, in the organization.” 31     New Public Service is based on the theory of so-called servant leadership. Laub  has defined the theory of the servant leadership as follows: On understanding and doing  the leadership, Servant Leadership leads the members in the right direction beyond self- interest. (Laub 1999) It develops members, enhances values, builds community,  establishes confidence, provides authority, divides power, erects the public good of each  individual and serves to the entire members throughout the organization. The principles  of servant leadership provide a highly effective leadership model to the government  which pursues the New Public Service.    In South Korea, unlike China and North Korea, NPM and NPS have been  typically practiced in government sector and the society for a long time. The professors  from Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University have played a  major role for that accomplishment. They participate as the chairman of consulting  committee for the President in the beginning and later they participate as the Secretary  General for the President and the ministers. Their theories of NPM and NPS have great  influence on the real Korean politics.    During the Presidency of Roh Moo-hyun 32  who has named his administration    31  Denhardt is best known for his work in public administration theory and  organizational behavior, especially leadership and organizational change.   In ‘The New  Public Service: Serving, not Steering’ he developed a new model of governance that  stresses the need to engage citizens in governance of their communities.    32  Roh Moo-hyun was the 16th President of South Korea (2003–2008). The rate of  increase in defence budget remained in a single digit, however, there was 11.4% increase  

- 71 -    the ‘Participatory Government’, NPM and NPS was consummated in its achievements .  As his policy for eradicating corruption inside the government had included many   administrative reforms, he had to face high oppositions from the prosecutors. To resolve   the opposition he chose to draw the people’s participation and suggested a TV forum .  The prosecutors insisted that President Roh appoint the major positions of the   prosecutor’s office without consulting the personnel committee. Roh’s reply was that ,  “The current members of the personnel committee themselves represents the old   prosecution which has to be changed, if we do not change now, it would sustain the old   prosecution.”    Roh set the tone of his administration with a number of adventurous policy  related to NPM and NPS.    2) Non-Governmental Organization and Non-Profit Organization    The activities appeared to solve the government failure as the substantial  alternatives are Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) or Non-Profit Organization  (NPO). The NGO is the civilian activities organized by citizens without getting  interference from the government. Sometimes NGOs receive funds from the government  or international organizations such as the UN, but they attempt to preserve the property of  the characteristics as private organizations by excluding government officials from the  membership. The number of international non-governmental organizations reaches an  estimated four million. If you counted national NGOs to work internally, the number will  far surpass ten times.  There are many civic organizations in South Korea such as Solidarity for  Participatory Democracy, Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice, Environment and  Human Rights Movement, Sarang Bang, Anti-Corruption National Solidarity and South  Korea Women's Associations United. Further if we include non-profit corporations,  foundations and institutes like Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs, hosting  China-South Korea Security Forum, the number of NGOs or NPOs would be almost  20,000. In India, an estimated 1 million to 2 million NGOs activities have been reported .      in the tenure of Roh, 2010 (MND 2010). Nevertheless, in the tenure of the President Ro h,  the relation between South Korea and China went smoothly.  

- 72 -    China has the Association of International NGO Promotion, which encourages NGO   activities in the country and there are many other NGOs under the umbrella of ministries   such as China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC) hosting China - South Korea Security Forum with Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs.  Various groups began to be organized in the mid-19th century such as Anti - Slave Movement, Women's Rights Movement, Disarmament, etc. However, the term   NGO began to be used in 1945 with the founding of the United Nations Organisation   (UNO) for differentiating non-state organizations from the states’. There arose many   problems from all over the world which one country alone cannot solve due to   globalization of the 20th century. Activities of treaties such as free trade agreements and   international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been   limited to the economic sector, but there is a need to emerge new types of organizations   which can resolve various social problems and safety issues caused by globalization. In   order to meet the needs of the times, activities of NGOs have been focused on human   rights, development issues, security issues and emergency relief on the details.  In Korea, numerous NGOs were established since 1980 as a result of the   democratization movement. They were categorized into various areas of activities such a s  environment, political social, economic justice, education, women, religion, science ,  security, media, arts and culture, human rights, youth, health and residents' autonomy .  Nationwide big organizations are YMCA, YWCA, Heungsadan, CCEJ, Federation fo r  Environmental Movement, Women's Associations United, Green Korea United, Citizens '  Coalition for Media Reform etc. The central-centered middle size organizations include   Parent Education Trust, Human Solidarity, Citizens’ Education Trust and Citizens '  Alliance for Making City to Walk. Locally, an estimated 10,000 grassroots NGO are   being developed.  NGOs in South Korea have attained their goals taking advantage of a variety o f  ways and means in several areas where the government cannot do much. Civic groups   have been developed and applied in institutional and non-institutional and professiona l  and popular means based on the experience of over 10 years. Sometimes they use the   

- 73 -    mass media to inform citizens of their claims for review, including a statement to the   nation so that their activities are developed and known to the people. The most typica l  type of activities of them used to be a direct action such as collective meetings and   demonstrations, but in recent years they developed an entirely new format such as cybe r  protest using the internet and mono demonstrations. It is a remarkable point to use the   internet for the activities of NGOs more actively. The internet became increasingly the   essential domain for the activities of the civil movement. NGOs have tried to propose the   alternatives based on their specialized knowledge gained through debates and hearings   about the issues raised and they have been increasing their power through legal means   such as litigation or prosecution by the utilization of NGO specialists.    Ⅱ . Distortion and failure of security services    Trials to protect life from wild animals and extreme climatic conditions made   unique residential conditions for human beings from which the concept of family   community evolved. The family community was created to meet the instinctive desire on   the basis of kinship and the extending family community formed the clan society .  Although the clan society organizations were formed around kinship, the society was   sharing the profit between members and thereby organizations were bound through the   medium of benefit. There were parameters of interest beyond the blood and the clan   society created political power, which must manage the kind of profit.    The clan elder or elected head of the clan was a highly respected figure among   the members and they voluntarily submitted themselves to the authority. But it did no t  have the power to control unlike the state, and members were able to escape from the   power. Even though they resisted the authority, the benefits were not misappropriated .  Lack of resources or preparing accumulation for lack of resources created inevitable   competitions and clashes among the clans and when they should fight among themselves ,  the members engaged in armed combat. This is a point of departure for the military   organization. Of course, the military of the clan society was a voluntarily organization ,  

- 74 -    which could be distinguished from the nature of a professional military organization such   as the national armed forces these days.    Competitions and conflicts among the clans formed a tribal society to have   greater power through the process of dissolution and union. Tribal society was formed on   the basis of the region rather than the kinship. Such societies competed among   themselves and, at times, went to war with troops and dominated members of othe r  societies, leading to emergence of the era of tribal state. While tribal state strengthened   the military, enslaved the members of conquered tribes and enhanced the dominance o f  country, our human societies created the system of nation. In fact, birth of a nation was   generated as the ability to manage military organization.    Does the state use the military power properly? Doesn’t the government use the   army for the benefit of any individual or some groups? Isn’t the military corrupted   politically in the name of security interest of the people? Does the state manage the   military organization properly for the security interests of the people? Reflection on these   questions explains the government’s failure in the security area. Likewise, in the area o f  economy, in the security area also there emerged NGO, NPO or the new public   management and new public service concept to complement government failure. NGO is   very important in controversial areas of civil society such as security. Participation o f  private sector in security area is growing because of civil development of technology and   the effectiveness of policy making in the security.    1. The characteristics of security service    The normal market where the price for the goods are determined by supply and   demand can be established when those who do not pay for the goods must not consume .  Otherwise individuals will select the 'free-ride' and refuse to pay. However, one canno t  rule out a man who doesn’t pay for his spending authority security commodities. This is a   phenomenon which exists in certain economic areas such as roads commodity ,  environment commodity and security commodity etc. It is called the principle of non - 

- 75 -    excludability and the men who do not pay for the expense of the security cannot be   excluded from the consumption of the benefit.    Security commodity is also non-rivalry goods. Here non-rivalry means tha t  another person's consumption of goods does not interfere with other's consumption. The   marginal cost (MC) of non-rivalry goods when added to another person to use them wil l  be counted 0. In economics, the most efficient price should be equal to the marginal cost ,  so (P=MC), if the marginal cost of the goods is 0, then the price is 0 which means you   can get them free. Because the security commodity as non-rivalry goods can also be   shared by many people at the same time, it is always available for every person so called   ‘joint-use for goods’.    The security commodity or service has some different features from othe r  goods or services in the market as mentioned; which is also functioning as a factor to   cause the government failure. Security service is difficult to measure in amount and   inadequate to define the lot of it, so that there is no way to evaluate it in quantity and   quality. For this reason, it is to be measured in a way of the value of inputs used in   production, for example, the number of troops, the number of weapons, systems of forces   and the degree of high quality; instead of results and effectiveness of security services.    Security services like monopoly commodity cannot go to the market o f  competition because its exclusive jurisdiction is fed by a single authority by law .  Continued exclusiveness and the absence of competitive environment make it difficult to   assess the quality of security service. In each country, as the security realm is secret, its   quality and quantity are usually not well known to the people, and even if known, it wil l  be uncertain and ambiguous. This environmental situation makes the powerful politica l  officials to adopt inefficient methods of production and incentive to pursue their own   interest, instead of the interest of the people and in the end the government failure   necessarily occurs.    

- 76 -    The features summarized to cause the failures of government security services  are as follows. First, the definition of services, i.e., measuring the quantity and quality of  output is difficult to judge. Therefore, the input is often substituted by the commitment of  the output. Second, security services are generally produced by a public authority and  therefore have legal monopoly in many cases. Because of no competition, inefficiency is  likely to occur in the supply. Third, the quality of security services is not well known. In  other words, the causal relationship between policy objectives to achieve government’s  goods and services and the means is not clear.Fourth, there is the lack of mechanisms to  evaluate its achievements in security services; therefore, there is no reliable mechanism  to terminate the conclusion.    2.  The reason for the failure of security service     Let us look at factors which cause failure of security services more specifically.  The government also has limited information to judge the security affairs. It is often  inadequate for officials to identify various security threats and all the signs and make  judgments appropriately. Decision-making processes of security services need political  agreement through the Congress, which can also cause failures. As Congress has a group  of diverse backgrounds and interests, it is often difficult to decide the rational decision  purely on the basis of interest of people. Further as representatives, who are elected by  vote of their constituents, would be willing to listen to their feedback and because   representatives, who are involved with interest groups, would be willing to listen thei r  political interests and on the process of compromise national security, policies can diver t  in the wrong direction.  Imperfect control of military organization, such as its excessive enlargemen t  and inefficiencies or wrong attitude of officials’ passion for promotions and assignments ,  would lead to failure of security services. When the government is not predicting the   response of the people, while it is practicing the policy, failure occurs often .  Confidentiality is necessary for national security so when the government tries to increase   or decrease security service while maintaining a secret, people do not have enough   

- 77 -    information to criticize constructively. People’s inappropriate appreciation on the security   policy of the government's determination becomes bigger and the distrust between   government and people get severe leading to distortions of security interest for the people .  When politicians participate in the decision-making process of security policy,  they consider their political position more importantly rather than the interests of society   as a whole. They say they are working for the society but actual impact on their behavio r  is always their collective interests or their political beliefs. In some cases, apparen t  unreasonable security policies are created by conspiracy among political leaders. Security   policy is produced in relation with its allies, neighboring countries and super powers. I f  political leaders are colluding with Super Powers in this process, then a serious security   inefficiency and distortion would follow.  Government’s failure in security area such as inefficiency and distortion can be   mitigated to some extent through the establishment of democratic political systems, but i t  is very difficult to get complete resolution. Because of the expertise and confidentiality o f  its own security issues, it is difficult to form a correct opinion among ordinary citizens   and control politicians' behavior. Because the men who execute security policy are high   military professionals and government officials, including political leaders, their attitude   determine the success or failure of services. Even though the policy itself is very   reasonably produced when senior commanders or officials take uncooperative attitude o r  try to exploit them, inefficiency or adverse effects may occur. Sometimes, when their role   as professional soldiers which they need to perform will be different from their persona l  interests and they pursue their own interests rather than practice their role, the failure o f  security services aggravates.    Ⅲ .  Security Failure of the Government in Korea    After the World War II, since the security decision in the Korean Peninsula was   determined by the interests of great Powers around, rather than the security interests of it s  

- 78 -    own people, security policy and services were inevitably distorted. The security failure in   Korea is characteristic of a combination of internal and external factors. The researche r  came to India and had read several papers related to the peninsula written by loca l  scholars. The efforts confirmed that there took place some distortion in security concep t  and systems, in other words security administration has been executed regardless of the   interests of the people in the region.    Since the World War II, India has opposed the power blocs and chose a non - aligned line so that it was the only country capable of academic activities free from the   influence of eastern and western blocs. The Korean War was the most attention - concentrated war after the World War and hence there were a lot of papers in India abou t  what led to the War, its course and the post-War peninsula. As we have a saying in Korea   'Help from outsider reads better than the player of Changgi' 33 , it is true that an outsider  without interests in the Peninsula can find out the facts better and read the historical  context better. To the researcher, the objectivity of the external party was much more  useful than expected.    1.  The essence of security failure in Korean peninsula     Since the unification of Germany and USSR President Michael Gorbachev’s  declaration of the dissolution of the Communist Party in 1991, the Cold War which  divided the East of communism and West of capitalism into blocs and confronted each  other, ended. All the countries around the world competitively entered into a new order  quickly. Ironically, the Korean peninsula which had suffered the maximum damage from  the old world order only rejected the new order and decided to adhere to the old order  structurally. Why there is no change in the political landscape of the peninsula since  Panmunjom truce talk in 1953 and even after Gorbachev’s declaration in 1991? What are  the reasons for the persisting unrest and antagonism between North and South Korea and  the hostilities that would harm the security interests of the people? This is a classic case    33  Changgi (or Jangki or Tjyang Keui) is the Korean Chess, a variant of chess played in Korea. The   Korean Chess can be played with a Chinese Chess Set, pieces and board are similar, but with rules a re  different.  

- 79 -    of government failure for people’s security interests.    If the reasons of security instability in the peninsula were the Cold Wa r  ideological conflict - countries like Germany and Eastern Europe – then the antagonism   between the two Koreas should have ended definitely since then. But it was not the case   in Korean peninsula. This is due to the government’s failure in security services and the   distortion of security in the region. The biggest factor is remaining partisan struggles   derived by the Super Powers and political factions. Once formed, the members of each   party would do violent struggles for survival of their lines or organizations. Presently, the   subjects of this struggle are forming similar political dominance comparatively both in   the South and North Korea. Their goal is not maintenance of peace in the peninsula o r  people's security interests, but maintaining power of their political factions.    Factional political power struggle, which is in reality unrelated to security   interests of the people, will continue in the future as it did in Korea just after its liberation   from the Japanese domination unless people wake up. When people’s security - consciousness enlightens up, this issue will be resolved. The divided system of the   peninsula is still being affected by external structural environment since Cold War .  Another important factor, which is also affecting current security landscape and its   sustainability, is fighting the hegemony of the internal political power and struggles o f  political leaders. Korean people should analyze the government failure and distortion in   security area caused by Super Powers and factional struggles. They should clarify the rea l  security interests to resolve the division and peace affairs in the peninsula.    2. The reality of People’s security interest (Kim Gu’s case)    On August 15, 1945, when Korea was liberated from Japan, it was divided into   two independent countries. It had been one country for 1000 years and has had one   language, one culture and one religion. While Korean people did not want their country   divided, it was bifurcated by the United States and the Soviet Union as well as politica l  leaders puppetted by them. If there was no outside influence after the liberation, it was   

- 80 -    clear for the people to make one Republic. As the realist says, Korea was divided   according to the interests of major Powers only to break into a war just five years later ,  killing a million of innocent people.    Every country has the right to choose their own social system according to thei r  own will and the right to maintain their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity .  No country has the right to carry out aggression, subversion, control or interference   against another country. Korea was against the imperialist and colonialist theory of big   powers being superior to small nation (small countries being dependent on big powers) .  Korea was against the hegemonic power politics of the big bullying the small and the   strong bullying the weak. The affairs of any country should be governed by its own   people (Huang 2008: 255).    The political struggles affected by international power politics in the peninsula   were very severe to make the tragic situation inside Korea. There was Kim Il Sung in   North Korea puppetted by the Soviet Union, there was Rhee Syngman in South Korea   embraced by the United States and there was also a political leader Kim Gu (Do 2007 ;  Lee et al. 2009) 34 , who opposed the division till the end. Kim Gu was strongly opposed  to such provisions as trusteeship and division. But despite his desperate effort, Korea was  divided and then he accepted the trusteeship. Why Kim Gu was strongly objected to the  terms of the trusteeship in the beginning and why thereafter he accepted it? What is his  rationale? The reason for his change in attitude, according to the situation explains what  were the real security interests and the nature of security situation in the peninsula.    Kim Gu considered the trusteeship or division matter as one of the means. It  was of utmost importance for him that people can live in peaceful environment. He could    34  Kim Gu (1876~1949), the leader of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, was a  Korean politician, educator, leader of Korean independence movement against the Japanese  occupation of Korea. He had struggled for the independent reunification of Korea since its national  division. Kim Gu was assassinated in June 26, 1949. The assassination of Kim Gu has been a  continuing controversy for long time. After the assassinator’s confession (Hankyoreh 1991;  Hankyoreh 1992; Donga Ilbo 1992), it was revealed through declassified US documents that the  assassinator was a member of US intelligence agency in 2001, causing a big controversy in Korean  society surrounding the wirepuller of the assassination. (Yonhap 2001)  

- 81 -    take a flexible attitude depending on the circumstances under such firm values withou t  losing the concept of objectives for peoples’ interest. What he cherished the most is   neither the political system nor the unification of the North and South Korea but the ideas   of loving people and that there should not be any more bloodshed. We can notice wha t  true patriotism is, who is truly representative of the interests of national security and who   realized the real meaning of peoples’ interests through his change of attitude on the   different stages. What he pursued was the pure patriotism, the real loving or the people o f  Korea and the value of the emphasis on security interests of the people not based on   partisan political interests.    Kim Gu opposed the trusteeship of the Powers in the beginning and   afterwards changed his mind on deteriorating conflicts among political factions in North   and South Korea. People criticized him for changing his attitude, but it is needed to look   at closely what his intention for change in position was. He has recognized security   failure in the peninsula; the failure in peace and the security benefit of the people. He   pondered over which are better for the security interests of the people. He met Kim I l  Sung in North Korea and Rhee Sung Man in South to try founding one state in the   Korean peninsula. And he judged if division is inevitable, trusteeship could be well - represented better for security interests of the people.    He differentiated the goal from the means finely. What is the goal and what is   the means for the goal? The goal is definitely people’s interest. Ideology such as   communism or capitalism and political systems are just means, which can be changed fo r  the goal. Because of partisans such as Kim Il Sung and Rhee Sung Man, the goal was los t  by means at the Korean War and peoples’ real security interest was lost with a million   killed to protect their ideologies and political systems. It was a serious security failure   and distortion created by bad governments. The liberation what Kim Gu has shown us in   the process is now very thought-provoking. His flexibility was his consistency for the   people’s security interests and the benefit of the people in the peninsula.      

- 82 -    3 . Overcome for Government Failure in Korean Security     There had been fierce competition between both the Koreas over decen t  authority and political representativeness (Kim 1990; Han 2011; Jeon 2011). During   king’s rule, the Crown had all the decent authority and representativeness. Decen t  authority and political representativeness should have been created by people as in othe r  counties while being shifted to a republic after the Japanese colonial era. But politica l  power was transferred by external forces in the peninsula and decent authority and   political representativeness were very weak. As a result, there had been continuous   competition between both Koreas and confusion among the people.    There was no justification from people for the formation of political powe r  when installing government in both Koreas. Therefore, both Koreas have argued and   collided frequently with each other because of the competition for decent authority and   representativeness for the people throughout the Cold War era, including the Korean Wa r  and the post-Cold War era. When founding each government, North Korea did not get the   permit from the United Nations and in South Korea, first president Rhee Sung Man   directed officials of the Japanese colonial period again for the new bureaucracy o f  independent government (Kim 1991; Park 2006, Kim 2009). That President Rhee   recruited people, who have served under the Japanese dictatorship, means no decen t  authority for him inherited from the patriots of the Provisional Government who have   fought against Japanese military during the colonial era.    How can we accredit the decent authority and national representativeness? Can   we do that by general elections in both Koreas? It had emerged as an alternative just afte r  the liberation, but it was not real. Can we judge it by the support and recognition of the   UN and countries around the world? Is it the superiority of the economic or military   sector? Is it the welfare and freedom of the people? The reality of the decent authority   and national representativeness in the present and future of the peninsula ought to be the   security interests of the people and peace in the region. People who want a more peacefu l  state of separation rather than the unification of the conflict have been increasing. People   

- 83 -    don’t care the political systems or unification, but peace in the peninsula. This thought is   a good starting point for the people to recognize what the real security interests should be .    China officially argues that it supports the peaceful unification in Korean   Peninsula, however, it does not say the unification should be initiated by one side, here   which realistically means South Korea. There are two reasons here; first, mainly China’s   traditional foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula is ‘ 脣亡齒寒 ’ which literally   means ‘without lips, teeth getting chilly’ and implies that Korean Peninsula, especially   North Korea’s security is critical to China’s eastern border security. Secondly, Korean   minority people in three eastern provinces – Jilin, Heilongjiang and Liaoning provinces –   will be shaken and they would require more independence from China (Kim 2005; Jeong   2011).  35     The idea that Korea can be unified if whichever side takes the initiative on the  process or even by way of forces are being seen as a strange thing by many foreign  scholars. Is it right that the side which would take leadership towards unification would  try to destroy the other entity? In the beginning, many never accepted the fact that Korea  can be divided into two separate countries. Recently, the concept of ‘One Nation and Two  States’ began to be embraced by Koreans naturally. Important thing is not the political  system nor the division or unification, but people’s security interest and the peace in the  peninsula.    North Korea has insisted on unification by its ideology and political system and  South Korea by its value and political system. The result of such claims would be conflict  which would eventually harm the security interests of the people. The stronger the  argument, the stronger proof of harming the security interests of the people is. Even if it  is one nation, there could be two countries which also could exploit a win-win effect.    35  However, Chinese Australian scholar You Ji (2011) argued that realistic and strategic  option is feasible in Korean Peninsula regards to the unification issue. Given the  enormous imbalance of power between the two Koreas and the DPRK’s fragility,  unification can only be imagined on Seoul’s terms. If this process is peaceful, it will  mostly likely happen through a South Korean absorption of the North according to the  German model.  

- 84 -    Because it should not have been admitted, there broke out the Korean War. It was a   serious government failure in the security realm. If the U.S.A. and the then Soviet Union   did not create the governments in both Koreas, there would have never been those   miserable casualties in the Korean peninsula. Which is the real security interest of the   people? You will be able to sift through the real security interests of the people when   devoid of political systems or ideology and partisan interests. Away from black or white   and zero-sum game, you could create the objective security strategy for the real security   interests in the Korean peninsula.    CSKSF (China-South Korea Security Forum) was born through the process o f  overcoming this government failure in the realm of security interest. If the curren t  governments are obsessed with the past and the order of the Cold War to make rigid   policy decisions, the violations of people’s security interests would be getting more   serious. Not only political instability in both Koreas but also a new type of instability   which violates the security interests of the people will be increasing. If the governments   had the structural and fundamental limits to ensure the security interests of the people ,  then NGOs will have to do something to complement the limits.    In this chapter, government’s failures in security area were analysed and the   alternatives for that failures were suggested. New Public Management and New Public   Service in public administration were introduced and the role of Non-Governmenta l  Organization and Non-Profit Organization in security area were examined for those   alternatives. The researcher clarified the reasons for the failure of government in security   service and specified the security failure in the case of South Korea. The essence of the   causes for the security failure in Korean peninsula was power struggles between the   Super Powers’ (US and USSR) and internal factional political competitions which are in   reality unrelated to security interests of the people.    The outcome of government’s failure in security area was shown in the   genocides of innocent human beings in Korean War. Around a million were killed o f  little worth in Korean peninsula. At the same time, old traditional values and morals have   

- 85 -    been collapsed. Many people are of the view that Korean War was inevitable. They fail to   connect the casualties of the War to the misdeed of the governments. But it was apparen t  that the failure of the government has caused the Korean War and made massacre in   Korean peninsula. There is still the possibility of war in Korean peninsula. The   governments must not be led to repeat the same stupidity .  On this circumstance,   China - South Korea Security Forum has started and has promoted to ease the tensions between   China and South Korea.    

- 86 -    CHAPTER 4    Evolution of China-South Korea Security Forum (CSKSF)    Ⅰ. Emergence of China-South Korea Security Forum  China-South Korea security forum began to play some crucial roles in   overcoming intractable security issues in an informal channel rather than the officia l  channel. There were still unpleasant feelings persisting amongst both countries since the   Korean War and they were not in a mood to talk thoroughly about security issues o r  military issues (Oh 1992; Bang 2004). Ideological difference soon ensued in the wake o f  lack of exchange between both countries almost for 50 years. There was always a caution   sign among each other during the forum. Chinese side talked frequently about the   principle of Qiutongcunyi (求同存异, seek common ground while reserving differences )  and South Korean side understood Chinese diplomatic remarks considering the relations   with North Korea.  Qiutongcunyi explains that China’s stand for maintaining the diversity of the   world and is in favour of promoting democracy in international relations and diversifying   development models. Countries having different civilizations and social systems and   taking different roads to development should respect one another and draw upon one   another's strong points through competition and comparison and should develop side by   side by seeking common ground while reserving differences. This is the only way to   overcome the differences between the countries (Liu 2006; Yu 2011).  In the past, official relations between China and South Korea had worsened and   both countries had developed deep antagonism due to the Korean War. While China   maintained a very close relationship with North Korea, South Korea had diplomatic   relations with Taiwan. With Cold War coming to an end, the informal trade between   Korea and China began, but the trade relations between the two shrank because thei r  

- 87 -    business interests could not to be protected. While South Korea wanted to build a new   relationship with China for solving the current North Korean problem and of unified   Korea, China needed a new relationship with South Korea especially for her economic   growth.  Graph #1 Sino-South Korea Trade (1992-2008)    Source: Zhou (2010)  After establishing diplomatic relations between South Korea and China in 1992,  both countries have been trying to liquidate the odds with each other. South Korea and   China sided with the East and the West bloc respectively. During the Cold War, policy   makers, security experts and scholars had taken to a biased thinking. The development o f  the relationship between both countries went through a very difficult process due to   security alliance respectively with the U.S.A. and North Korea. Despite development o f  bilateral relations, there were still many difficulties in formal cooperation between the   both.  

- 88 -    Even though there are organizations such as Six-party talks (Huntley 2005), EAS  (The East Asian Summit) 36  and ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) where East Asian  countries participate together but they could not make a matured security organization  like OSCE (The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). It is because that  the memory of the Cold War is still not obliterated fully and the long history of distrust  and territorial disputes still persists between the countries in the region. Rigid decision- making process for foreign policy according to each country's domestic political  environment, and the narrow, short-sighted pursuit of national interests as well as  divisional structure in the Northeast Asia are creating new competition and are going  against the hope of residents in the East Asia who have suffered immensely in the past  century from the conflicts.  To challenge this situation the security cooperation channel named China-South  Korea Security Forum was conceived in February 2000 by South Korea and China's non- governmental organizations (CAIFC, China Association for International Friendly  Contact from China and KRIMA, Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs from  Korea), both institutes held the periodic and non-periodic forums pursuing innovative and  alternative oriented approach. Some high-level former and acting security officers have  participated at theses forums. From 2002 to 2010 regular meetings have been held eight  times among which 1 st , 3 rd , 5 th  and 7 th  happened in Beijing and 2 nd , 4 th , 6 th  and 8 th  happened in Seoul. Non-periodic irregular meetings have happened occasionally in both   countries.  China-South Korea Security Forum has become an important dialogue channel fo r  the security cooperation, trust building and information exchange between security   professionals of both the countries. The Forum which takes place in non-governmenta l  area is the flexible security dialogue channel between acting and retired officers, security   scholars and specialists, military experts and senior officials of the ministerial-level and   general-levels. The so-called 1.5 track which can be defined as semi-governmental and   semi-private dialogue has discussed all the pending problems between China and South   Korea, peace and security affairs in the East Asia and critical issues in the Korean     36  See Appendix #10~#16 for East Asian Summits Agreements.  

- 89 -    peninsula which has been reflected in the vision of decision makers of the track 1.0   (official diplomatic channels)    Ⅱ. Introduction of Organising Institutions    1. CAIFC (China Association for International Friendly Contact)    China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC) 37  was founded as a  private organization in December 1984 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China as  there was the need for organizations in the private sector according to China's Open  Reform policy. The mission of CAIFC is the cooperation with international private sector  to promote friendly exchanges for international brotherhood and contribute to world  peace and development. CAIFC has entertained an average of more than 100 visiting  foreign delegations from foreign countries annually for the friendly exchange relationship  and the personnel of which have visited overseas more than 30 times annually.    Table #6 China’s Think Tanks on International Relations    Name  (Chinese)  Institutional  Authority  Characteristics  Year of  Establishment  China Institute of  Contemporary International  Relations, CICIR  (中国现代国际关系研究院)  Central Committee of  Foreign Affairs Office  State Council of  Ministry of State  Security  The oldest  organisational origins  Focus on current  intelligence and  manufacturing instant  analyses  1965 (incepted  as an institute)  China Institute of International Ministry of Foreign Focus on medium / 1956    37  The China Association for International Friendly Contact was set up on December 22,   1984, with General Wang Shoudao as the president, General Wang Zhen as honorar y  president. Huang Hua was elected to be the president in 1992 (Huang Hua 2008).  

- 90 -    Studies, CIIS  (中国国际问题研究所)  Affairs long-term issues of  strategic importance  Designated as the key  'Track II' by Ministry  of Foreign Affairs  Chinese People's Institute of  Foreign Affairs, CPIFA  (中国人民外交学会)  an arm of Ministry of  Foreign Affairs  Informal exchanges  (past)  Principal institutional  channel (current)  1949  China Association for  International Friendly  Contact, CAIFC  (中国国际友好联络会)  Military counterpart  to the CPIFA  PLA General Political  Department  Ministry of State  Security  Characteristic of  duality (General  Wang Zhen as its  first honorary  president / former  Foreign Minister  Huang Hua as its  first president)  Involved retired  civilian / military  personages  1984  Xinhua Centre for World Affairs,  XCWA  (新华社世界问题研究中心)  International  Department of Xinhua  News Agency  Large number of  affiliated fellows  retired from Xinhua  Focus on 'big powers  and India'  199 1  Institute of Taiwan Studies, ITS  (台湾研究所)  CASS  State Council Taiwan  Affairs Office  Central Committee  Leading Group on  Taiwan Affairs  Principal organisation  for current  intelligence on  Taiwan affairs  Formulate Taiwan  policy  198 4  

- 91 -    Ministry of State  Security  China Society for Strategy and  Management, CSSM  (中国战略与管理研究会)  State Council  Foreign Affairs Office  Government  departments provide  it fiscal,  administrative and  autonomy  1989  Foundation for International  Strategic Studies, FISS  (国际战略研究基金会)  PLA General Staff  Department  Ministry of Foreign  Affairs  Claims to be an  independent and non- profit institution  Many members of  active duty PLA  colonels  1989  Shanghai Centre for International  Studies, SCIS  (上海国际问题研究中心)  Shanghai Municipal  Government's Office of  Foreign Affairs  Shanghai Academy of  Social Sciences  Formulate policy  papers for leaders in  Beijing  Provide information  to Shanghai  companies  1985  China Academy of Social  Sciences, CASS  (中国社会科学院)  State Council  Massive organization  of ministerial status  ( 4,000+ total staff)  Attached graduate  school  1977  Source: Shambaugh (2002)    The CAIFC has also connections with the civilian foreign affairs establishment as  well as the People's Liberation Army General Political Department. This duality was  evidenced in the fact that General Wang Zhen was its first honorary president while  former Foreign Minister Huang Hua was its first president. On the military side, it  appears that CAIFC is linked to the Intelligence Bureau of the Liaison Department of the  

- 92 -    PLA’s General Political Department. On the civilian side, it appears to have ties with   both the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its offices today   are located in a compound in north Beijing shared by other PLA units. CAIFC was   founded in 1984, and is involved in bringing both retired civilian and military personages   to China (Shambaugh 2002).    CAIFC has been playing a positive role to keep the relationship with many   national government agencies, community organizations and politicians for promoting   mutual understandings and trusts and creating bilateral interests. CAIFC has promoted   foreign companies to invest in China through the exchange of personnel, informing   China's economic policies to foreign companies, introducing the market situation in   China and finding joint venture partners by cooperating with companies. At the same   time CAIFC has also cooperated with Chinese entrepreneurs to facilitate this   international exchange actively.    CAIFC has been holding various events of cultural exchanges externally in a big   way. It has invited personnel and organizations from various fields and various types to   visit China such as foreign culture, art, religion and physical education etc. and helped to   facilitate cultural and artistic activities such as exhibitions, artistic performances and   sports games etc. CAIFC has also led Chinese cultural and artistic organizations to held   exhibition in foreign countries and overseas trips.     CAIFC is actively engaged in international academic exchanging activitie s  emphasized on international issues on education. Under the umbrella of 'Peace and   Development Research Center’, CAIFC has substantial number of well-known domestic   and foreign researchers. The Centre has published quarterly magazine ‘Peace and   Development’ in which scientific papers related to international affairs and issues are   addressed and symposiums are also organized.    CAIFC was culminated by former foreign minister Huang Hua (黄华). Currently  its President is former Foreign Minister Li Zhao Xing and now it is an officially  

- 93 -    registered private institute. It has branches and group members throughout China in   nearly 30 provinces and cities including Central Metropolitan City and autonomy   prefectures. CAIFC headquarter is made up of the Permanent Council, Board of Directors   and each functional department. Board of Directors is composed of retired or incumben t  government in the administration, diplomats, educators, entrepreneurs, artists and   scholars. It links civil activities and government closely to various fields. Huang Hua said   in his Memoirs,    People-to-people exchanges have become important supplements to   governmental exchanges. The CAIFC receives nearly 100 groups or people  annually. In 1991 Wang Zhen held a reunion meeting with the delegates of Dixie  Mission. The CAIFC makes a fair number of overseas visits. Over a course of  several years, I myself led delegations to Thailand, India, Japan, South Korea and  the U.S. I was very happy to see my old friend John Service, and paid a visit to  President George H. W. Bush. (Huang Hua 2008: 600)    CAIFC has been supported by national and regional leaders from various circles   in China since its foundation. Chinese leaders continue to give attention to the busines s  promoted by CAIFC and grant an audience to the guests whom they often invite. The   business of CAIFC has got significant support from the Party and the related departmen t  of government. CAIFC has played the role of external representative for the Chinese   people, built a bridge between China and foreign countries and an intermediate agency   for international cooperation and has especially contributed to private exchanges between   China and foreign countries.    The Peace and Development Research Institute under the umbrella of CAIFC was   founded in 1984 which is an academic institution mainly to study international affairs and   national security issues. Since its foundation, the Institute is primarily involved with   security issues between China and other major countries. The Institute is composed of 5   Divisions including Asia Pacific Division and editorial Division for publishing security   magazine ‘peace and development’(和平与发展). The Institute has been receiving funds   from CAIFC or overseas institutions and has exchanged security and military information   

- 94 -    with the scholars from many countries at the conferences in China or abroad (CAIFC   2012).    2. Introduction of KRIMA (Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs)    There are six think tanks in relations with Chinese think tanks in Korea which are   periodically or non-periodically holding conferences and exchanging scholars. Korea   Research Institute of Military Affairs (KRIMA, www.military.co.kr) is one of the mos t  active NGO think tanks among them. It has been publishing security specialised   magazine, Korea Defence Review on a monthly basis and has been renowned for its   objectiveness in the last 18 years. KRIMA is a nonprofit corporation which was   established in 1995 to get the people’s support for national security and to develop the   most effective security strategy for people’s security interests in Korea. KRIMA has been   trying to provide the most efficient security policy beyond the interests of specific   political parties and leaders or the superpowers around the Korean peninsula (KRIMA   2012; Future Korea 2004).    Table #7 Korean Think Tanks in Relations with Chinese Think Tanks    Name  (Korean)  Institutional  Authority  Characteristics  Year  of  foundation Related Chinese Institute   (Chinese)  Activity  Duration  of  Relation  Korea Institute for  Defense Analyses  (한국국방연구원)  Ministry of  National Defense  Government- funded research  institute  1979  China International Institute  for Strategic Society  (中国国际战略学会)  Regular visiting  Annual forum  1992~  Institute of Foreign  Affairs and National  Security  (외교안보연구원)  Ministry of  Foreign Affairs  and Trade  Affiliated to Korea  National  Diplomatic  Academy  Think tank for  long/medium term  foreign policy  1976  China Institute of International  Studies  (中国国际问题研究所)  Annual forum 1992~  China Reform Forum  (中国改革开放论坛) Strategic talks  Two times  since 2008  

- 95 -    Korea Institute for  National Unification  (통일연구원)  Ministry of  Unification  (before 1999)  Prime Minister's  Office (after  1999)  Unification policy  research institute  1990  China Institute of  Contemporary International  Relations  (中国现代国际关系研究院)  Workshops  Roundtable    China Institute of International  Studies   (中国国际问题研究所)  China Association for  International Friendly Contact  (中国国际友好联络会)  Sejong Institute  (세종연구소)  Independent body  Research institute  in foundation  1986  China Institute of  Contemporary International  Relations  (中国现代国际关系研究院)  Annual Forum 1994~  China Institute of International  Studies   (中国国际问题研究所)  Roundtable    Korea Retired  Generals and  Admirals Association  (성우회)  Independent body  Consultative body  consisted of retired  General  1989  China International Institute  for Strategic Society  (中国国际战略学会)  High-level talks  Meetings  2009~  Korea Research  Institute for  Military Affairs  (21세기군사연구소) Independent  body  a non-profit  corporation  approved by the  ROK Ministry of  National Defense   1994  China Association for  International Friendly  Contact  (中国国际友好联络会)  Annual forum 2002~  Source from respective official websites mentioned in Bibliography section    KRIMA has been contributing to the enhancement of the national security and   developing the national defense science and technology through the various security   meetings and exchange of technology information through forums, seminars, debates and   events among the general public and the security communities. It has also promoted   relations between the people and the military to make consensus about security affairs   and draw the creative ideas from the people based on professional research studies related   to defense polices and technologies.  

- 96 -      KRIMA comprises six legal directors’ board, the advisory panel of a few forme r  defense Ministers, consulting team comprising around 40 retired generals and more than   70 researchers who are doctorate and specialists in pool system. The Institute has been   publishing a monthly magazine Korea Defense Review (KDR). KDR launched in Apri l  1995 and has been published total volume 211 basically about military affairs, defense  policies and security issues. KDR is a general public magazine which is registered by  Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Besides, it has also published many policy  reports and other military books. (KRIMA 2012)    KRIMA has received the official accreditation as a non-profit foundation from  Ministry of National Defense in Republic of Korea at February 1, 2000 and the Missions  of KRIMA were as follows:-    ① In order to achieve public support and cooperation which is absolutely  critical to national security, the will of the people should be reflected on the  national security policy or strategy. KRIMA will play a pivotal role in the  improvement of relations between the military and the people in order to  fulfill the needs and expectations of the people toward the military.    ② In case of emergency, all the national resources and technology should be  mobilized. Even, during peacetime, the potential resources should be secured  and fostered in private sector. Whenever needed, it should be mobilized  instantly. On the basis of requirement, KRIMA will facilitate civil  technologies, information and practical military knowledge immediately.    ③ KRIMA will contribute to the military development for the improvement of  professionalism in the defense policy, science and technology. It anticipates  defense technology and forecasts military power demanded by the research  groups to provide information to the military and consults defense  companies accordingly.    ④ KRIMA constitutes an informational exchanging channels among the  security communities to form a strategic consensus and also suggests the  idea and wisdoms to the foreign and security sectors of the related agencies  through the joint research, study and academic seminars with the help of  national or the international defense-related agencies and organizations.    

- 97 -      Ⅲ . Architecture for mutual academic forums and exchanging information    On June 2, 2002 KRIMA from South Korea and CAIFC from China have   signed ‘the Letter of Joint academic exchanges’ contents of which is mainly about the   seminars on regular basis, exchange of personnel visits and the exchange of academic   information. Lee Changsoon, the senior vice chairman 38  of CAIFC, suggested at the  signing ceremony “We cannot see each other just for one meeting so we will have these  meetings continuously to understand each other better and accomplish the development  of mutual relations". He said "South Korea and China should not be the enemy. We have  more important value than the mutual strategic interests. It is same culture, same  traditions and same letters which indicate that we have long shared history together.”    Cho Sungtae, former Defense minister South Korean delegation headed,  praised "Korea and China share the same strategic interest so it is useful for mutual side  to talk about the details. It is much appreciated to CAIFC providing a forum for the  discussion at this time. Both organizations had a really great job.” Cho; the chief adviser  of KRIMA said "On the occasion of this signing today, these events do not end with a  one-off but if the two countries continue military exchanges together then it will be the  deciding factor for the future of both military”    After the greetings of Lee Changsoon, Vice President from CAIFC and Cho  Sungtae, the chief advisor from KRIMA and President Kim Jinwoog from KRIMA and  Chae Munjung, the director of ‘Peace and Development Research Center’ from CAIFC  have signed at 'Joint letter of academic exchanges'.    Chae Munjung: Director of ‘Peace and Development Research Center’ from  CAIFC told "KRIMA and CAIFC looked as if both have got married. There were the   allowance from the defense minister Chi Haotien and a witness at wedding ceremony ;    38  Huang Hua, the then Chairman of CAIFC, was not present, they explained his health was not good.   Therefore the senior vice Chairman; Lee Changsoon presided the meeting instead of him.  

- 98 -    Cho Sungtae whom people of Korea like very much as well as thankfully Lee   Changsoon; Vice chairman of CAIFC host the banquet at luxury hotel. May KRIMA and   CAIFC long live together and give the birth of many descendants.”    Both parties have signed Memorandum of Understanding accredited by Ch i  Haotien; Chinese defence minister and Cho Sungtae; the former Korean defence minister .  Lee Changsoon; vice chairman of CAIFC hosted the celebration dinner at the signing   ceremony. As Chae Munjung; director of ‘Peace and Development Research Center’ said ,  “Both parties have got married and so both vowed trying to live longer and love each   other forever”. Both institutes have held the Security Forum 12 times, 4 times in Beijing ,  4times in Seoul and 4 times in other places.      Ⅳ. Contents of Cooperation between KRIMA & CAIFC    1. Status    KRIMA and CAIFC will try to promote friendly relationship between Korea and   China. In military science both drive a wide range of mutually beneficial co-operation   and dispel mutual distrust with promoting mutual understanding so that they wil l  contribute enhancing mutual interest between people and military relations. In military   science, both sides, respect, trust and agree the equality based on long-term business   recognizing the importance of partnership and mutual benefit.    2. Purpose    The purpose of the memorandum of understanding on the relationship between the   two institutions is to grant every details of the official status. Cooperation parties wil l  comply with the principles of mutuality, related to international law, Korean law and   Chinese law based on the contents of a memorandum of understanding. Both institution s  will run the best efforts to increases bilateral cooperation abiding by the agreemen t  

- 99 -    between South Korea and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense and the pre - agreement with the spirit of the guidelines in the field of Military Science.    3. The form and contents on mutual cooperation    To achieve the above objectives, the two sides will visit, have conferences, ask   consultations, and exchange information related to the joint collaboration in the field o f  Military Science. In order to realize the contents of the MOU both institutions organize   and execute the following details:-    A. China-South Korea Security Forum will be held once a year.  B. Both institutes will prepare the presenters and debaters with scholars and specialists in   military science and policy area for annual Forum.  C. Both will exchange all the published papers, reports, assessments and other military - related data.    In addition, in case of one side asks other side the formal request, the other side wil l  respond readily for the purposes of the MOU and its contents and if the provision s  detailed in a Memorandum of Understanding is not enough to cooperate in good faith ,  both will cooperate each other sincerely.    4. The practice on mutual cooperation    Funding on the basis of realistic considerations of the validity, both sides should   apply the following common principles according to memorandum of understanding with   regard to the policy enforcement budget.    A. Visiting party will pay the cost to the point of entry for the country such as   transportation and personal costs associated with Forum participants. (Same applies when   they return).    

- 100 -    B. Hosting party will pay all the costs for visiting party since they arrived at the territory   of the hosting country such as accommodations, transportations, tourism-related costs and   medical expenses etc.    C. In case, one side suggests non-planned cost, the decision will be taken in accordance   with the spirit of Memorandum of Understanding and will appropriately be determined   by the two sides.    5. The procedure of information exchange    Both sides, if requested, provide information on the public nature each other to   realize memorandum of understanding. Both sides guarantee protection of information   provided by either side in accordance with memorandum of understanding and practice   the bilateral cooperation in the process of providing information.    The information obtained in the course of mutual cooperation should not be misused   for the third party countries' interests in any of measures. 39  Formal exchange of  information for the purpose of achieving mutual cooperation, in the process of policy,  trade and military, based on Memorandum of Understanding will be run directly through  the diplomatic channel.    6. Intellectual Property    'Intellectual property' within the framework of this Memorandum of Understanding  means intellectual property rights in Article 2 concluded at the International Convention  on the July 14, 1967 in Stockholm. Royalty of provided materials, the independent  intellectual property rights by participants at Forum will be preserved by the bilateral  cooperation memorandum of understanding. Both sides preserve adequate and effective  guarantees for intellectual property rights without discrimination about the information    39  The researcher could not fully open all the information and materials due to this clause but only for   scholarly purpose.  

- 101 -    obtained from the results of the activities of Forum in accordance with Memorandum o f  Understanding.    Based on the two sides of the Memorandum of Understanding and country's   laws/regulations, when it is violated in accordance with the entire data except the   recognition or pre-arrangement, return can claim and the offender shall take all necessary   measures for prohibiting the material distributed and publicized. When a natural person is   designated and stipulated as the author of the materials by the two sides of the country, he   shall have the right to receive bonuses, grants or other awards by both sides in accordance   with the procedures.    7. Duration and Expiration    Memorandum of Understanding will come into effect from the moment of the   representatives of the both sides signed into two years if one party of the two side s  formally promulgates stopping the effect in six months.    The effect of a memorandum of understanding is automatically extended unless one   of the parties formally notifies the other to be expired the effect of that six months ago .  According to an international treaty, Memorandum of understanding does not infringe on   the rights and obligations of other party.    Ⅴ. Interviews during the Forum Meetings     Even though China-South Korea Security Forum was held at the level of civilian   institutes, the purpose of the Forum itself was to influence the decision makers of the   formal channel. So, the participation of the former or incumbent high military officials a t  the Forum was very essential. Actually they are promoting to strengthen the Forums by   themselves. The statement from them will show how this forum has been evolved and   contributed to the improvement of the bilateral security relations between China and   

- 102 -    South Korea. What they indicated indirectly was the plan of CSKSF and what they   evaluated was the effect of CSKSF.    The most important figures in this forum were ex-Defense Minister Chi Haotien   and Cho Sungtae. Both figures had held the first Defence Minster talk in 1999 and   promoted this CSKSF forum in 2002. Especially Minister Cho has played a great role as   the representative of Korean delegations at every Forum for last 10 years. During three   times of interview with Chi Haotien – including the period of his tenure –, it was possible   to ask his opinions about the Forum and the security relations between the two countries.    These materials were gathered directly from them in personal meetings which   were exclusive for CSKSF.    1. Ex-Defence Minister Chi Haotien    Ex-Defence Minister Chi Haotien has led the 1st defense minister talk between   South Korea and China along with Cho Sungtae, the Minister of National Defense from   South Korea, and made a major contribution to the development of today's military   relationship. Since the 1st Defence Minister talk, he has observed the development of the   military relationship between both countries. He has visited South Korea for the 2 nd   Defence Minister talk. He stated at the first Security Forum 2 June, 2002:    The agreement signed at the 1st defense ministers’ talk is still practicing now in   China. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, the two countries actively  cooperate in political, economic, trade, culture and military fields and had a great  development. Cooperative partnership now has entered a new phase of  cooperation, the so called ‘overall cooperation’. With issues related to Korea,  China consistently focused on maintaining peace and stability in Korean  peninsula and hopes sincerely to work improving the inter-Korea relations to be  continued.    It has passed five years to visit South Korea, however, I still have the vivid   memories about that. Wherever I went Seoul or Jeju Island, whoever I met  soldiers or people, they all welcome us wholeheartedly so I felt a deep friendship  from them. I was impressed much to find that South Korea has had a long history  

- 103 -    and brilliant culture and people are very industrious. China and South Korea have  a similar history and culture and had suffered the pain from being dominated by  Japanese militarism. They have overcome a difficult impasse of the financial  crisis in 1997 along with people all together.    Minister Chi Haotien has also mentioned about TMD in East Asia promoted by  the US, the alliance between South Korea and the US and the military exercises being  conducted at that time at the third Security Forum 26 April, 2005. In his words:    Military exercises between South Korea and the United States will have an  adverse effect on the relations between both Koreas. According to the secret  report of the US about North Korea and China, it narrated that America  undermined Chinese sentiments due to excessive action and it pointed out  mistakes of Bush and his administration. TMD is targeted by the US to China.  The US President George Bush does not like South Korean President Kim Dae- jung's engagement policy towards North Korea. ‘Axis of Evil’ speech by  President Bush is a manifestation of the stupidity of the US.    2. Ex-Defence Minister Cho Sungtae    Ex-Defence Minister Cho Sungtae has held the first South Korea-China Defense  Minister talk with Chi Haotian. He visited China for attending the 1 st  CSKSF Forum in 2  June, 2002. This is his reminiscence. And he also mentioned the way how to develop  CSKSF Forum, thus:    Defence Ministers from both the countries shared common agenda that first of all  peace and safety should be established in Korean peninsula, second, the stress was  on the necessity for regime transition from truce system to a new peace system  through the dialogue between the two Koreas, third, inhibiting the proliferation of  weapons of mass destruction on the Korean peninsula. In January 2000 I visited  China officially and Chi Haotien (迟浩田) visited South Korea in the following  year. The chapter of Defense Minister’s mutual visit has formed and it made the  opportunity for higher dimensions in the development of bilateral military  exchanges.    It is very wonderful to discuss military affairs between South Korea and China by  military veterans from both the countries at the level of private organizations.  Because there are some common strategic interests between both the militaries  and it is available for them to discuss some topics. We can observe the activities  

- 104 -    between KRIMA (Korea Research Institute for Military Affairs) from South  Korea and CAIFC (China Association for International Friendly Contact) from  China in that respect. If the Forum between both institutes persists continuously, it  would be a crucial factor for military cooperation between both countries.    At the 3 rd  Security Forum, 28 April, 2005 Minister Cho said that one of the  objectives of CSKSF Forum was preparing ground to persuade North Korean military  leadership to be open. North Korean military was in the midst of reforming. And he  thought the Chinese military leadership could play some roles towards North Korean  military reforming. He stated:    Six-party talks are stalled due to North Korea’s nuclear programme and there is  no progress on the military confidence-building measures between the Koreas.  North Korean military is the major cause of the stalemate. Whenever China's  high-ranking military personnel meet their North Korean counterparts, they could  ask and persuade whether it is right or not to develop nuclear weapons when  people are starving, why is it important to build military confidence between the  two Koreas and promote it early, how it is helpful to people of North Korea and  its military and government to promote reform and introduce an open market  policy learning from the Chinese experiences.    3. Ex-Defence Minister Cao Gangchuan    Ex-Defence Minister Cao Gangchuan has mentioned about China’s role  towards a peaceful solution for North Korean nuclear affairs and the maintenance of  peace and stability in the peninsula at the 3 rd  Security Forum 29 April, 2005. And he also  mentioned about the future role of CSKSF Forum, thus:    I have talked to North Korea military strictly about Principles of Denuclearization  in Korean peninsula, a peaceful solution for North Korean nuclear affairs and the  maintenance of peace and stability in the peninsula. There is a thick wall between  U.S. and North Korea with mutual suspicion and it is required to have the  patience for resolving the conflicts between both peacefully. Whenever I have the  opportunity, I will deliver Minister Cho’s suggestion to North Korean friends.  However, it is very hard to persuade them.    I never forget the event of meeting South Korean friends. We have to maintain  friendly relations between both the militaries in the area of politics and military. It  is a very effective way that both the countries hold periodic and non-periodic  

- 105 -    security conferences at which specialists share the information about the situation,  promote understanding among each other and feel the commonness in strategy.  While the situation is changing rapidly, it is necessary to share the opinions.    At the 5 th  Security Forum, Minister Cao Gangchuan stated about the movements  of Japanese rightists which were a matter of concern to the people of Korea and China at  that time, as follows:    While Korea and China suffered under the Japanese invasion, we now see that  Japanese militarists are coming back and rising again. They are revising the  history books distorting the history of their invasion of Asian countries. We know  the bad effects of such initiatives on the Japanese youth. Justifying the invasion,  the students are misguided to believe that Japan invaded Asian countries to expel  western countries. We will make some joint efforts to rectify the Japanese  mistakes.    4. Ex-Defence Minister Yoon Kwangwoog    At the 4 th  Security Forum 23 June, 2006 ex-Defence Minister Yoon Kwangwoog  stated some Chinese role for the changes in North Korea. He said:    In the 21 st  century, China is estimated to be more extended so that the constructive  role of the country is essentially required to maintain peace in the world. I think it  is not a good idea that North Korea invests a lot of money for preparing for war  and developing ballistic missiles unlike China and Vietnam which are engaged in  reforms and opening up of the market. I think South Korea and China together  will help the development of a stable society in North Korea. I heard China is  inviting North Korean military personnel to Beijing annually. I hope China use  these opportunities to deliver our peaceful intention.    5. Ex-Defence Minister Liang Guanglie    At the 5 th  Forum there was the notable presentation which was related to  cooperation for disaster management and collaborative exercise for the disaster in North  Korea to keep the capacity for the safety in this area. The humanitarian approach to keep  security cooperation between China and South Korea for helping North Korea would be  effective. Minister Liang Guanglie mentioned about that.  

- 106 -      Non-traditional security cooperation is very useful and important for friendly  cooperation between both the countries. Recently, the issue of natural disaster is  being raised around the world constantly. General disasters such as SARS in 2003  and swine flu need multilateral cooperation so that military from collaborating  countries have to co-operate and play some crucial role for multi-national  cooperation. Natural disasters are relatively frequent in China. So the Chinese  army has played a major role for the relief in disaster. On May 12, 2008 when  earthquake rocked Sichuan province, around 100,000 people were affected.  Chinese People's Liberation Army engaged all resources for the relief works. I  hope that ROK military and Chinese military could work together for the relief of  the people in disaster.    At the 7 th  Security Forum in Beijing 5 November, 2009 both participants have  debated the security alliance between South Korea and the US. It was astonishing that  participants from both the countries have discussed the topics so frankly to feel  breathtaking enough. CSKSF Forum has contributed to talk each other this much freely  and it is estimated that strategic cooperative partnership between South Korea and China  has been developed with these kinds of endeavors. The Korea-US alliance would be the  key issue in future in the security area between China and South Korea. Ex Defense  Minister Liang Guanglie stated about the alliance between South Korea and the US.    In terms of the alliance, the two countries are assumed to have a special bilateral  relationship. I hope that relations could contribute to regional peace and  development. And I also hope that you need to have attention on other countries  when you do some activities in the region which will affect the national interest  significantly.      The 60 th  anniversary parade of PLA founding at the 1 st  of October 2009 was  enough to show that PLA has developed much since 1999. Minister Liang Guanglie  mentioned the plans for Chinese military reform at that time as follows.    China's party has put the emphasis on construction of the army. Growth in  military has been evident at the latest parade of the 60 th  Anniversary of October 1,  2009. Military construction should be done under the premise of the national  economy and the development in military should be maintained in harmony with  economic growth. There are always issues that Chinese military buildup is raised  

- 107 -    10 percent annually, but I'm assuming that it is unsuitable to overestimate the  development. China has a large army; but the per capita military expenditure is  too incomplete when compared to the US military. Chinese defense budget is  allocated to the training cost of soldiers, the lives of professional officers and  veterans’ replacement costs. Some budget is assigned to equipment purchases as  well as for military modernization. The goals of the military required by the Party  and the State rose since Deng Xiaoping are the Chinese military modernization  and normalization.    Chinese military modernization construction is being built according to the  informational operations. Modernization is considered to be effective on the local  campaign. The military informatization construction will be developed in three  stages. While in the year 2010, the focus is on implementation of a strong  foundation for informatization construction, by 2020, achievement in the field of  mechanization and informatization will be promoted and by 2050 Chinese  military is expected to have realized informational military. The military is being  built towards a defensive dimension. In particular, the informatization  construction is the big challenge because it should be constructed according to the  needs of the modern information. Development of China is influenced by the  growth of its army.    6. Ex-Defence Minister Lee Sanghee    At the 8 th  Security Forum 29 th  of October 2008 Ex Defense Minister Lee Sanghee  has assessed the Security Forum as follows:    I was told that the Security Conference has been held between Korea and China  since 2002 and former military leaders and researchers from both countries have  reached mutual understanding on security issues. I think it has contributed greatly  to the development of personal networks between both the countries. The vision  of future security relations between two countries is well reflected in a joint  statement of two leaders’ summit talk. I hope the areas of bilateral defense  exchanges would be larger than the largest and the Security Conference would  give a greater role for that.    7. General Tang Tian Pyao    Since the third Forum 23 June, 2006 General Tang Tian Pyao has participated in  the conference headed by the Chinese side. He stated the future direction of the Forum  and its implication in security relations between both the countries.  

- 108 -      CSKSF Forum has already been successfully held four times. Qualitatively, it is   very advantageous to promote cooperation enhancing mutual understanding and  trust between the two countries as the root of the only private high-ranking  dialogue for peace in Northeast Asia. The theme of this third forum is to secure  the peace measure of Northeast Asia and the role of China-South Korea  cooperation which further promote friendship through presentations and  discussions commemorating the 15 th  anniversary of diplomatic relations.      

- 109 -    CHAPTER 5    Analysis of the Papers and Debates at the Security Forum    Ⅰ. Main stream of the Forum 2002-2009    This thesis is a case study about China-South Korea Security Forum held  from 2002 to 2009. Although it may describe the story of relations between China  and South Korea, it basically concerns how the Forum started, proceeded and  effected. The main contents of this case study are to just show what they talk and  what they discuss at the Forum. And it has tried to find out how this Forum  functioned for the improvement of relations between China and South Korea  rather than the relations itself.    Table #8 Main Subjects of the CSKSF Meetings      CSKSF  Meetings    Main Subjects      1 st   CSKSF    9.11 Terror and the Security Situation in East Asia      2 nd   CSKSF      Security Cooperation Regime in East Asia  and China-South Korea Cooperation    3 rd   CSKSF      Cooperation for Peaceful Resolution of North Korea’s Nuclear  Problem    

- 110 -      4 th   CSKSF      The US Strategy with Asia and Strategic Repositioning of the  USFK      5 th   CSKSF      North Korea Problems and its Impact on Security Situation in  East Asia      6 th   CSKSF      South Korea-China Strategic Cooperation Partnership  (Direction and Challenges)    7 th   CSKSF      Inter-Korea Relations and Outlook for Korean Peninsula        On June 3rd, 2002 at Beijing hotel the 1st China-South Korea Security  Forum was held. Secretary General Li Ning (李宁) from CAIFC (China  Association for International Friendly Contact) declared that the security seminar  will be held for the first time between Korea and China in terms of 1.5 track  diplomacy which includes incumbent and retired high officials. There had never  been any civil society contacts or NGO meetings held between the two countries  in this format. There were opening remarks by Lee Chang Shun (李长顺), Vice  Chairman of CAIFC from China side and Cho Sungtae, the senior advisor,  Chairman of China study association in KRIMA from Korea side. The 1 st  China- South Korea Security Forum was the starting point in civil-military relations  between China and Korea.    

- 111 -    The 2nd CSKSF Forum was held on the 2   June 2004 Seoul Korea.  Working Group meetings in both countries agreed to seek a role with the security  situation in Northeast Asia and form a consensus on discussion topics ‘Peace of  Northeast Asia and Cooperation between China and South Korea’ . Through the  preparation for the advancement of the Forum, they also agree to analyze the U.S.  national strategy in Northeast Asia and learn about pending issues between both  countries in order to co-ordinate for solving disagreements in the northeast Asian  security situation as well as changes that occur in many aspects in near future.    During the free debates, participants from South Korea were much  interested in the role and its influence of China-North Korea relations;  participants from Chinese side were interested in the alliance between U.S. and  South Korea and USFK's role in northeast Asia. Both sides have talked about the  various aspects raised in the region and decided to focus on security issues about  Korean peninsula and how South Korea and China would have to co-operate each  other.    The 3rd Forum was held four nights and five days from 25th to 29 th  of  April in 2005 at Beijing with the topic "the task of six-party talks after North  Korea’s declaration of Nuclear experiment". On April 26, there were  presentations and discussions being divided session 1, 2, 3 and a general  comprehensive discussion for another one and half hour. On April 27, there was a  congratulatory dinner at Diaoyutai (钓鱼台) 40  invited by Chi Haotian; ex Defense  Minister and on the 28 th  in the evening at 8.1 Building Korean delegation was  invited welcoming party with acting defense minister Cao Gangchuan.    The retired generals and security experts from Korea and China had  discussed in depth at the 3 rd  CSKSF about current situation in Northeast Asia and  cooperation between China and South Korea. Through the forum both countries    40  The Diaoyutai (钓鱼台) is the State Guesthouse which welcomes visiting heads of state or  governments and international celebrities.  

- 112 -    had agreed to have the patience in the peaceful resolution to North Korea nuclear  issue. In addition to that, specialists from both countries discussed the security  cooperation among related countries in Northeast Asia as well as cooperation  between both countries.    The 4 th  Forum was held in Seoul Korea from June 20 to June 27 in 2006.  In the 4 th  Forum participants had analyzed challenges impacting Northeast Asian  security one by one and had sought the way for cooperation between Korea and  China for the peace of Northeast Asia. Issues raised included nuclear factors in  the Korean peninsula, bilateral disputes between China and Taiwan, Japan-US  alliance concerns and the impact of the changes of Korea-US military alliance  system. Although there were some differences between China and South Korea,  both sides exchanged mutual opinions frankly and sincerely. Participants from  both sides had formed a consensus on the importance of balanced security  awareness and security cooperation which starts with the recognition of removing  the elements that could hurt the security environment.    In addition to this, there were two discussion topics; one on encouraging  North Korean military groups which help North Korean government to move  ahead on the road of reform and the other one on the issue of the USFK(United  States Forces in Korea)'s strategic flexibility and possible war in cross-strait in  case of intervention by US ground forces. There were also collected opinions  about building the Northeast Asia regional security mechanism to maintain peace  and cope with urgent situation in the area. The 4th Forum was much progressed  with development presentation and more serious discussion comparing to the  former meetings and the attitude of participants from both sides were open so that  personal opinions ware freely discussed.    The 5th Forum was held from the 20 April to the 27th 2007 in China.  During the forum, Korean delegation were invited to Zhengzhou City, Henan  Province; home of Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan, and at Hunan Changsha;  

- 113 -    home of Tang Tian Pyao Representative of Chinese side. It was a good  opportunity to meet the state leaders through a long journey and form a network  of senior personnel’s of each state.    The 6th Forum was held from October the 27th to November the 1st, 2008.  Forum discussed “strategic cooperative partnership between South Korea and  China " agreed by bilateral summit talk of two countries to realize military  personnel’s mutual exchanges and cooperation as well as academic research  activities. Forum was consensus-intensive about the military diplomacy between  both countries and the role of China's active and retired military generals for the  peace of Peninsula and Northeast Asia.    It was the honest discussion among the experts to clarify the threats and  challenging elements in the area of East Asia. Also, there were dinner on board at  Han River hosted by Lee Sanghee; the Minister of National Defense from Korea  after the Forum ends. Around 70 delegations from the both side attended at the  boarding party on the River and had the opportunity to socialize with each other.    The 7th Forum was held in Beijing China from the 3 rd  of November to the  6 th  throughout the six days. Non-traditional security cooperation between China  and Korea and consensus of sustainable development for CSKSF for that purpose  was highlighted during the Forum. The participants co-formed a consensus on the  need for countering the challenges of terrorism and unconventional threats as well  as they stressed the role of the army in Korea and China to accomplish that  mission.      Ⅱ. Key Arguments depending on the countries by the subjects    In order to improve the bilateral relations between China and South Korea,  firstly the conflicts between both countries have to be lessened. Without clarifying  

- 114 -    the interests of both countries they cannot understand each other and improve the  relations. Through the forums, the participants from both countries have cleared  the differences of the interests between both countries and understood each other.  How China-South Korea Security Forum has contributed to the improvement of  the bilateral security relations between China and South Korea is how participants  from both countries find out the differences between both at the forums and to  mitigate the arguments. In that way China-South Korea Security Forum has  provided alternative 1.5-track policy process to existing 1.0-track to improve the  relations.    So many presentations and debates are executed through the Forums  during the period 2002-2009. While in the beginning, there was some hesitation to  show frank opinions with each other but by meeting year by year, participants  became comfortable and bold to say their frank opinions. There were some typical  subjects which were frequently presented and discussed such as ‘North Korean  Nuclear Issue’, ‘USA-South Korea Military Alliance’, Strategic Repositioning of  the USFK (United States Forces in Korea) and China-South Korea Security  Relations and so on. Those were key issues or arguments between both countries  to solve for improving the relations.    The difference between both countries can be highlighted subject-wise in  the following. And the change of them will be recognised depending on polices of  both countries at that moment. For example, the status of North Korean Nuclear  issue was quite different between 1 st  Security Forum at 2002 and 7 th  Security  Forum at 2009, one of which U.S. was very aggressive to make a plan of pinpoint  bombing against North Korea and the other of which U.S. has changed its policy  to peaceful negotiation influenced by changing policy of South Korea and Japan  at that moment. Chinese participants at the Forum have shown its pro-South  Korea attitude at the 1 st  CSKSF but pro-North Korea at the 7 th  CSKSF frankly.  They have released their genuine thought through the Forums toward both Koreas.  

- 115 -      1) North Korea Nuclear Issue    Through the ‘Agreed Framework’ of 1994 adopted by US and North  Korea, the North Korea's nuclear facilities (plutonium facilities) have been frozen  for years. But there were different intentions on agreement between US and North  Korea. US regarded the Agreed Framework primarily as a non-proliferation  agreement, whereas North Korea placed greater values on measures for  normalising relations with US (Hecker, Lee, Braun: 2010). As new allegations on  North Korea's uranium nuclear programme which was raised in 2002 could not  find a solution in consultation between the US and North Korea, North Korea  eventually lift the freeze of existing plutonium nuclear facilities and the Agreed  Framework was actually disposed of.    Then the Six-party talks began in 2003. Two years later, the Joint  Statement of September 19, 2005 and a subsequent agreement of 2007 among  members of Six-party talks were adopted, some plutonium facilities in North  Korea were disabled. But the matters of declaration and verification for execution  are not narrowed among the participating states; finally, Six-party talks were  suspended in December 2008. North Korea did the first nuclear test in 2006 and  the second nuclear test was carried out in 2009 and the International Atomic  Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors were expelled. In addition, it opened uranium  enrichment facilities in 2010. Countries involved in the Six-party talks persuaded  North Korea at the end of the 2011. There were denuclearisation talks between  US and North Korea twice and talks between South Korea and North Korea twice.    After the death of Kim Jong-il on December 17, 2011, there was still no  dialogue. So countries concerned are trying to resume the denuclearisation  dialogue process as soon as possible from various angles.  

- 116 -      About North Korean nuclear issue, there are mainly six points mentioned  by Chinese participants. First, a researcher from the Chinese Academy of Military  Science) said, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, first and foremost, the  United States defined North Korea as included in the “Axis of Evil” and  designated it as a target for nuclear attack, thereby further strengthening the  hawkish policy on Pyongyang. Nevertheless, the South Korean government  incessantly maintains a conciliatory policy on North Korea and takes new  measures to improve inter-Korean reconciliation. (KRIMA 2002)    Another researcher from the Chinese People’s Institute of International  Affairs mentioned that diplomatic efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear  issue through six-party talks had continued to be relatively optimistic. Therefore,  in so far as the countries concerned continue to discuss real issues with a more  earnest and flexible attitude, they will have an absolute possibility to achieve the  ultimate objectives of a non-nuclear peninsula and peace and stability in the  region in the near future. (KRIMA 2004)    In the same forum, it was said by a researcher from the Chinese Academy  of Modern International Relations that, when it comes to Pyongyang’s intentions  behind the development of nuclear weapons, there exist a variety of speculations.  However, the first and most important intention is to defend against external  threats including those posed by the US by leveraging asymmetric deterrents. The  war in Iraq caused North Korea to learn that the US was able to attack Iraq  because she had confirmed beforehand that Baghdad didn’t have nuclear weapons.  (KRIMA 2004)    During the 2006 forum, the Chief Manager from Inter-Korean Issues  Research Team of Fudan University revealed his opinion on this issue. When it  

- 117 -    comes to her nuclear issue, historically North Korea has been using both hands.  One involves establishing nuclear development as a strategic objective and  utilizing “nuclear possession” as the most important guarantee to obtain national  security. The other involves acquiring security and material gains through dealing  with the US by leveraging “nuclear abandonment” as a nuclear bargaining chip. If  the US and North Korea were to normalize their relations while admitting to  North Korea’s limited possession of nuclear weapons, China would face the  serious issue of worsening circumstances. As for security conditions, Korea  would be challenged by security-related asymmetry between North and South  Koreas and would have to live under North Korea’s nuclear clouds. (KRIMA  2006)    In the 7 th  forum, there was an opinion of the former Attaché to the Chinese  Embassy in South Korea. The US has made a policy of carrying forward NK-US  bilateral dialogue within the framework of six-party talks and fulfilling “complete,  (verifiable) and irreversible denuclearization” through six-party talks. North  Korea has clearly acknowledged the Maginot line of the US policy that “NK-US  dialogue is possible only within the six-party talks framework.” Yet, North Korea  still emphasizes and insists that the purpose of its nuclear development is to deter  threats from external forces and fulfill nuclear balance. Hence, it is expected that  many difficulties lie ahead for the process of denuclearization on the Korean  peninsula. (KRIMA 2008)    In the same forum, a retired Major General of the Chinese Academy of  Military Science said China’s basic position on the North Korean nuclear issue is  to promote the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and maintain peace and  stability there. However, the true meaning of a non-nuclear Korean peninsula is  diluted because it is claimed even in South Korea that Seoul should set out  processing nuclear fuels and assert nuclear sovereignty. The bottom line is that  

- 118 -    denuclearization is not only an inter-Korean issue but also a concern for the  international community that advocates and respects the denuclearization of the  peninsula. (KRIMA 2008)    About North Korean nuclear issue, there are also mainly five points  underscored by South Korean participants.    According to a professor from the Korean National Defense University,  South Korea and China should utilize diplomatic wisdom to translate such  bilateral alignment to positive force towards a peaceful resolution of the North  Korean nuclear issue. Besides, both Seoul and Beijing should continue to respect  each other’s interests and diplomatic autonomy. A non-nuclear Korean peninsula  serves the common interest between SK and China only when it is peacefully  resolved under the conditions of stability in the peninsula. (KRIMA 2003)    A retired general, Advisory Member of KRIMA, said the North Korean  nuclear issue should be resolved in a peaceful manner through dialogue and  concession. A pivotal point is that either North Korea or the US should make  partial modifications to difficult-to-accept preconditions for talks and come  forward to the dialogue table. The international community should serve as a  mediator between the parties to ensure that trust between Pyongyang and  Washington will help North Korea to be free of anxiety about threats to security  assurances and that the US will be convinced of nuclear non-proliferation and a  non-nuclear Korean peninsula, thereby setting conditions for resuming six-party  talks. (KRIMA 2004)    It was said by a professor from the Korean National Defense University  that the most pressing task that faces Korea and China in promoting growth and  peace in Northeast Asia is that both the countries should earnestly cooperate and  

- 119 -    honestly exchange ideas regarding NORTH KOREA’s nuclear abandonment and  the establishment of peace in the Korean peninsula in times of emergency. While  the establishment of peace should be discussed in conjunction with the resolution  of the North Korea nuclear issue, differences in opinions regarding its conditions  and directions can be reconciled and discussed among Korea, China, and the US  either at the civilian level or through the 1.5 track. (KRIMA 2008)    In the same forum, a senior researcher from the Korean Institute for  Defense Analysis said, it is necessary that Korea understand China’s role at the  international level and sympathize with China’s Asia policy focused on “stability  in the adjacent region” and “a non-nuclear Korean peninsula.” China needs to  understand the security situation that Korea is faced with due to the continuing  military confrontation with North Korea and Pyongyang’s adherence to nuclear  ambition as well as the necessity that Korea maintains the alliance with US.  Through such mutual understanding, both Korea and China should deepen the  depth and width of their dialogue on the North Korea nuclear issue. (KRIMA  2008)    A research of KRIMA also mentioned about same issue in the 7 th  forum  that China as a host country endeavors to mediate and find middle ground  between North Korea and other countries participating in six-party talks, because  the North Korean nuclear issue has several dual characteristics such as nuclear  possession vs. denuclearization and dialogue and nuclear deterrence. But North  Korea is stupefying China by making fruitless such efforts made by China since  North Korea behaves unexpectedly so that it is not perceived to be manipulated  by China’s position. (KRIMA 2008)  In the beginning, Chinese participants are evaluating affirmatively South  Korean conciliatory policy on North Korean nuclear issue but they changed their  attitude even to enumerate South Korean peaceful nuclear fuels and its asserting  

- 120 -    nuclear sovereignty. On the other hand, Korean participants in the beginning  asked China to go together to serve as a mediator between the parties of  Pyongyang and Washington but later they showed the attitude of criticising  toward Chinese’ passive approach toward North Korean Nuclear issue. It is  mainly because of the failure and disappointment of Sunshine Policy. North  Korea has used South Korean money and aid for developing its nuclear bomb and  military buildup.  China has explained to South Korean participants about the situations of  North Korea. There was a difference between China and South Korea on the  concept of non-nuclear peninsula. China in the beginning argued tactic nuclear  shell in South Korea which has been shifted to America and later even argued  South Korean peaceful nuclear fuels and its asserting nuclear sovereignty. South  Korean scholars are trying to clarify different interest between both countries  related to North Korean nuclear issue. Using North Korea issue, South Korea  argues much about the military confrontation with North Korea and China cares  much about American threat toward China.  Both agree to the peaceful approach to solve North Korean nuclear issue  and the establishment of peace in the Korean peninsula. China continuously  expressed North Korean nuclear issue should be solved through the six-party talks  and South Korea asked China not to be stupefied and manipulated by North Korea  with this issue.    2) USA-South Korea Military Alliance    China has strengthened its national power as prompted by its open door  policy and various reform initiatives. It has become more actively involved in  restructuring the international structure in the East Asian region. China and South  Korea have been promoting the spirit of ‘Qiucuntongi (求存同异 , Accepting  Commonalities Respecting Differences) and with this spirit in mind, they have  

- 121 -    been able to pursue epoch-making amicable bilateral relationship as well as  carrying out various exchange programmes and cooperative efforts. However  military cooperation between China and South Korea has some limits because of  Korea’s special relationship with US and that of China with North Korea (Kim  2005: 131)    In order to overcome and complement such limits, China-South Korea  Security Forum has been initiated. Should any change in the US-South Korea  military alliance negatively affect the security and development of China, the  China-South Korea military relationship would deteriorate. To improve China- South Korea security relationship while maintaining the US-South Korea alliance,  Korea’s role as a balancer should be enhanced. China was much worried about the  future of US-South Korea Military Alliance and through the Forums participants  from both countries understood the situations at present and in the future. CSKSF  was actually helpful to step forward promoting military relationship between both  countries.    In regards to the issue of USA-South Korea military alliance, the director  of the Chinese Academy of Military Science said that the South Korea-US  alliance is a legacy of the Korean War, which resulted from oppositions between  the West and the East during the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War and the  demise of bipolarization, the SK-US alliance has been walking a difficult path of  constant changes and attempts to establish an efficient role with regards to  security and national defense in new international conditions with the emergence  of threats and actors that did not exist during the Cold War. (KRIMA 2004)    A researcher from the Chinese Academy of Military Science said that the  SK-US alliance with Cold War coloring may be an impediment to maintaining  peace and stability in the region. It is because the alliance runs counter to a  general trend oriented towards “peaceful cooperation and development and  coexistence in the region, which is, at present, prevalent in the Korean peninsula  

- 122 -    and in Northeast Asia. Both the Korean and the US governments are applying a  strong ideological coloring and a Cold War way of thinking in selecting their  security policies. (KRIMA 2006)    Another research from same institution mentioned that, while the Lee  Myung Bak government emphasizes the strengthening of the South Korea-US  alliance, the expansion of ties will have minuscule influence on security in  Northeast Asia given the reality that overall advance in Korea-China relations,  progress in the complicated NORTH KOREA nuclear issue, general stabilization  of security conditions in Northeast Asia, and pursuit of peaceful co-development  are becoming the mainstream of the regional situation. (KRIMA 2007)    The deputy director from the Chinese Academy of Modern International  Relations said, as the US has professed its commitment to providing “extended  deterrence” by using all possible military means, the Korea-U.S. alliance is  moving towards an exclusive, bilateral military alliance that targets as a possible  enemy a specific member country of a future multilateral security mechanism for  Northeast Asia. This movement may worsen military confrontations between  North and South Koreas and the tension existing in Northeast Asia. (KRIMA  2008)    South Korean participants also delivered many opinions about the issue of  USA-South Korea military alliance. A professor from Inha University said,  expanding economic growth since Deng Xiao Ping implemented economic  reforms and open-door policies; China has enhanced its diplomatic and economic  status in the Northeast Asian region, thereby adding a new element of change to  the alliance between SK and the US. South Korea should consider two strategic  aims in order to serve both of its national interests – emphasizing the traditional  Seoul -Washington alliance and furthering South Korea-China trade – in a  harmonious manner. (KRIMA 2003)    

- 123 -    A retired general, an advisory member of KRIMA, said that the ongoing  realignment of the United States Forces in Korea (USFK) has become a driving  force to make the South Korea-US alliance a more comprehensive and dynamic  relationship. A strong alliance and the USFK are tremendous contributors to  defusing tension and maintaining peace in the peninsula. In the future, Seoul  should further solidify a tripartite relationship among South Korea, China, and the  US by leveraging the alliance as a basic axis. (KRIMA 2004)    A senior researcher from the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis  delivered that, China needs to understand the security situation that South Korea  is faced with due to the continuing military confrontation with North Korea and  Pyongyang’s adherence to nuclear ambition as well as the necessity that Seoul  maintains the alliance with the US. Through such mutual understanding, both  Korea and China should deepen the depth and width of their dialogue on the  nuclear issue. (KRIMA 2008)    It was said by a professor from Catholic University that, if both Korea and  the US together with all the countries in the region serve as driving force in  accomplishing the missions of the times, that is, to build a peace system in the  Korean peninsula, establish a Northeast Asian security community, and  institutionalize an organization that facilitates joint responses to supra-national  threats, the Korea-US strategic alliance will contribute not only to stability and  peace in the region but also to China’s national interests. (KRIMA 2008)  Chinese participants in the beginning of the Forum were relatively  affirmative to understand the South Korea-US alliance but they have changed  their attitude at the Forums for the alliance little by little to be obstacle in  promoting the relations between Korea and China. One of Chinese scholar  presented South Korea-US alliance to be an impediment to maintaining peace and  stability in the region at the first forum. Later, he seems to be criticised within  them and changed his attitude. Generally, they prefer President Kim or Rho but  

- 124 -    they are very negative about President Lee Myung Bak because of his  strengthening of the South Korea-US alliance and the expansion of its ties.  On the other hand, Korea tried to explain the traditional South Korea-US  alliance and furthering South Korea-China relations in a harmonious manner.  They argued that a strong alliance is tremendous contributors to defusing tension  and maintaining peace in East Asia. Korean participants explained how Korea-US  strategic alliance will contribute not only to stability and peace in the region but  also to China’s national interests. Notwithstanding Chinese participants  collectively said the strengthening of Korea-U.S. alliance will worsen military  confrontations between South and North Koreas and the tension existing in  Northeast Asia.  3) Strategic Repositioning of the USFK (United States Forces in Korea)  US and South Korea persuade to a mutual agreement on the readjustment  of the US-ROK alliance to the world’s changing security environment, discussed  and finalised USFK (US forces in Korea) realignment and relocation, US-ROK  mutual military capability development, military task transition plan through the  Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA) and the US-ROK Security Policy  Initiative (SPI). Great change in the US worldwide strategy have raised the new  concept of strategic flexibility in the employment in the East Asian region beyond  the Korean peninsula as well as all throughout the world if necessary, which  signals a great shift from its historic roles as a deterrence force against North  Korea.  China tends to think that the alliance is a product of the Cold War and  anything that strengthens the alliance is the outdated Cold War thinking. “The  Chinese assumption is coming into conflict with the US assumption. Somehow,  South Korean behaviors with the United States have come to be perceived in  China as Seoul choosing Washington in ways that comes at Beijing’s expense.  That does not necessarily forge South Korea’s foreign policy objectives,” said  

- 125 -    Scott Snyder, the director of the Center for US-Korea Policy of the Asia  Foundation who advised that Seoul should maintain a strong alliance with the  United States, but also form a productive and positive rapport with China (Lee  2011).  South Korea agreed to show understanding for US change in global  military strategy and respect the need for strategic flexibility with the USFK. US  for its part, agreed to respect Seoul’s desire not to get involved in any regional  conflicts in Northeast Asia irrespective of the South Korean people’s will. Based  on ‘strategic flexibility’ US can plan to operate its forces for rapid maneuvering  rather than leaving them as a fixture in any one region. In the wake of the 9/11  terrorist attack, US has pushed for these policy changes in the interest of making  effective use of its forces overseas. Its intent is to broaden the scope of the  USFK’s placement rather than tying them to the role of deterrent against North  Korea according to the Mutual Defense Treaty between US and South Korea.  Then the Chinese Ambassador in Korea Ning Fukui said the strategic  flexibility of US troops in Korea should remain a bilateral agreement without  affecting other countries. He said, “If USFK is exercised on a third country, we  cannot help but pay our attention to it. The US troops in Korea have a bilateral  purpose to maintain security of Korea, and could also be understood in the same  manner (Lee 2006).” Snyder also said “Washington and Seoul have not explained  very well to Beijing why that approach has been taken.” His words serve as a  good reminder of the importance of communication in an increasingly intertwined  world where one’s behavior can trigger unwarranted concerns from a bystander  (Lee 2011).  South Korea contended that discussions on the strategic flexibility in the  employment of the USFK, if they were pursued in times of the reduction and  relocation of the USFK, could rupture the military balance set against North  Korea and cause security unrest on the Korean peninsula. US contended that the  strategic flexibility of the USFK is not a matter of concession and South Korea is  

- 126 -    able to ensure sufficient deterrence against North Korea with investment in  military forces as proportionate with its economic power (Kim 2005: 130)  About the issue of strategic repositioning of the USFK, Chinese  participants in the forum revealed their various opinions.  A retired Lieutenant General from the Chinese Academy of Military  Science said, North Korea is very cautious about strategic flexibility of the USFK.  This is a welcome move. President Roh opined that the USFK should not be  involved in conflicts that may take place in Northeast Asia without South Korea’s  consent. This is a firm principle that is not concessional in any case. It is also to  take responsibility for security in Northeast Asia and the well-being of South  Koreans. (KRIMA 2006)  At the 6 th  forum, a researcher from the Chinese Academy of Military  Science argued that, although both Korea and China elevate their relationship  status to a strategic cooperation partnership and open up space for more broad  long-term development, the Korea-US military alliance may interfere with  China’s internal affairs if the USFK’s strategic flexibility is strengthened so that  the USFK, which has focused only on defending Korea within the region, is  readjusted to the status of rapid task forces capable of intervening in regional  conflicts.  About the issue of strategic repositioning of the USFK, Korean panels also  mentioned about their opinion.  At the 4 th  forum, a retired general, advisory member of KRIMA, said that  issues surrounding the USFK have been raised as it is not an exception to the US  global strategic requirement. In the past, the USFK principally responded to only  one threat. In other words, the USFK prepared against North Korea’s threat. With  the coming of the post-Cold War era, however, things have changed. For example,  some 3,500 soldiers were deployed for the War in Iraq. Such deployment beyond  the Korean peninsula is possible in the future. So, the concept of strategic  

- 127 -    flexibility allows for flexible options where the USFK may be deployed to areas  of crisis other than North Korea or the US forces other than the USFK may be  deployed in the Korean peninsula should events occur surrounding the Korean  peninsula. It seems that there is no reason that South Korea should be opposed to  this initiative to implement strategic flexibility. (KRIMA 2005)  An ex-Minister, senior advisor of KRIMA, said in the 5 th  forum that the  major idea behind this strategic flexibility is that the US will not operate a built-in  military force, but maintain flexibility; and in the worst case respond immediately  to an identified terrorist threat through marshaling a force in an area, where terror  is likely to happen. Some who have an intention to drive a wedge between China  and South Korea are trying to speculate that should an armed conflict take place  between China and Taiwan, the strategic flexibility of the US will involve the  commitment of the USFK in the affected area. In the worst case scenario, this  might happen. However, there is almost no chance. (KRIMA 2006)  Chinese participants referred USFK’s strategic flexibility at the forums  frequently. China argues that the Korea-US military alliance may interfere with  China’s internal affairs if the USFK’s strategic flexibility is strengthened so that  the USFK is readjusted to the status of rapid task forces capable of intervening in  regional conflicts. So, when President Roh expressed openly that the USFK  should not be involved in conflicts that may take place in Northeast Asia without  South Korea’s consent, China was very pleased.    Korean participants enthusiastically explained that it is not an exception to  the US global strategic requirement in Korean peninsula and there is no reason  that South Korea should be opposed to their initiative to implement strategic  flexibility. Actually the major idea behind this strategic flexibility is that the US  will not operate a built-in military force, but maintain flexibility; and in the worst  case respond immediately to an identified terrorist threat through marshaling a  force in an area, where terror is likely to happen. CSKSF was a good channel to  understand the perceptions of both countries on USFK’s strategic flexibility.  

- 128 -      4) China-South Korea Security Relations  On May 21, 2012 it was reported that China and South Korea will be  working on a plan to forge a military cooperation pact together. China and South  Korea have shared the need for a mutual logistical support treaty for years as the  two countries have conducted joint maritime exercises for humanitarian search  and rescue operations. The pact, known as the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing  Agreement or Mutual Logistic Support Agreement, calls for exchanging most  common types of support, such as food, fuel, transportation, ammunition and  equipment, during peacekeeping and other operations (Ministry of Korea National  Defense 2012).  China-South Korea Security Forum used to study about Non-traditional  security cooperation between both countries asked by the then Defence Minister  Liang Guanglie. Minister Liang said “Non-traditional security cooperation is very  useful and important for friendly cooperation between both the countries. General  disasters such as SARS in 2003 and swine flu need multilateral cooperation so  that military from collaborating countries have to co-operate and play some  crucial role for multi-national cooperation. Natural disasters are relatively  frequent in China. So the Chinese army has played a major role for the relief of  disaster. Chinese People’s Liberation Army engaged all resources for the relief  works. ROK military and Chinese military could work together for the relief of  the people in disaster.”  In Chinese perspective, Chinese participants said their opinion.  A former professor from the Strategy Research Institute of the Chinese  National Defense University said, It seems that both China and South Korea are  faced with a new real challenge that requires mutual coordination and cooperation  on security issues. This challenge concerns how both Beijing and Seoul can exert  joint efforts to make sure that Japan’s policy stays away from division and  antagonism and steers toward security assurance for each country in the region  

- 129 -    and regional stability, and that the security situation in the region works favorably  towards cooperation and trust between countries in the region. (KRIMA 2004)  A professor from the Military Strategy Research Division of the Chinese  National Defense University said, in order to establish a strategic security  relationship between Korea and China for the 21st century, the countries should  strengthen their bilateral cooperation on security issues in the peninsula on the  foundation of their mutual security interest. They should discuss a solution to  current issues resulting from their bilateral relations in a mature manner without  hostile actions to each other. They should also build mature military relations.  (KRIMA 2006)  In 2008 forum, a professor from same university said, effective  cooperation between Korea and China on non-conventional security issues will  help reduce tension on the Korean peninsula, prevent crises and humanitarian  disasters, and secure peace and stability at the border and the inland areas, thereby  promoting stability in the region and improving inter-Korean relations. (KRIMA  2008)  Korean panels delivered their opinion in the issue of China-South Korea  security relations. At the 1 st  forum, a professor from the Korean National Defense  University said, there is no denying that South Korea and China have issue-based  conflicts in terms of national interest due to differences in national system,  ideology, history and geo-political factors. However the basis of “common  interest” is much broader between South Korea and China. Both Seoul and  Beijing should make a habit of engaging in dialogue regarding various issues  including an outlook on the situation in the Northeast Asian region and security- related current affairs affecting both nations. (KRIMA 2002)  In the 2 nd  forum, a retired general, an advisory member of KRIMA, said  that, so far, the South Korea-China military exchange has witnessed radical  exchanges in various areas, including three diplomatic talks between defense  ministers of both the countries. Essentially, such military exchanges have touched  

- 130 -    off South Korea-China military cooperation conducive to regional security,  thereby strengthening friendship and fellowship between them. From now onward,  Seoul and Beijing could make an attempt to gradually pursue exchanges of  military technology based on mutual agreement within an international multi- lateral framework, starting from less sensitive, more comfortable and non- sensitive areas. (KRIMA 2003)  A researcher from the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis said that  China should play a leading role for regional and world order in the mid-term and  long-term, and collaborate with South Korea to maintain security order in the  region and promote peace. The bilateral summits proclaimed that they would  work towards development in inter-Korean relations and have an understanding of  peaceful reunification. The two summits agreed to make a joint effort to achieve  stability and peace in the Korean peninsula, focus on plans to enhance trust  between the two countries, and consider the NORTH KOREA nuclear issue, the  important security issue for South Korea, as an important area of cooperation that  requires mutual understanding. (KRIMA 2006)  Both countries agreed with new challenge that requires mutual  coordination and cooperation on security issues. It is just natural that bilateral  cooperation on security issues should be done on the foundation of mutual  security interest. So participants from both countries discussed the topics resulting  from their national interest. There were many misunderstandings between both  countries due to differences in national system, ideology, history and geo-political  factors. The Forum has searched understanding and common interest including an  outlook on the situation in the Northeast Asian region.    5) Taiwan Issue    With the start of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea in  1992, the diplomatic relations between South Korea and Taiwan has been  deteriorating. There were no diplomatic relations between South Korea and  

- 131 -    Taiwan for last 20 years, but still 650,000 people visited each other in 2011 and  trade volume was nearly amounting to $ 33 billion. Mǎ Yīngjiǔ, President of  Taiwan pledged recanalisation of the direct flights between South Korea's Kimpo  Airport and Taipei Ssungsan (松山) airport in the last presidential election in  2008. Ma won the presidency by 58.45 percent of the popular vote in the  presidential election of 2008, and was re-elected in 2012 with 51.6 percent of the  vote (New York Times, January 14, 2012). In 2012, he has reopened the direct  flights between both airports in 33 years which was abolished in 1979.    South Korea has intentionally avoided Taiwan due to its respect to the  relations with China. Whereas China keeps very close exchanges with North  Korea, South Korea has followed faithfully ‘one China-policy’ of the principles of  Chinese foreign affairs. In these circumstances, the relationship between South  Korea and Taiwan was continued eventually through private channels such as  businesses, universities and cultural organisations. China often complained those  private relationships between South Korea and Taiwan at the Forums. South  Korea argued and explained to them that China has maintained a relationship with  North Korea and the Korean government cannot control the flow of private sector  because Korea is a democratic country. CSKSF has helped China a lot to  understand the situations in South Korea with Taiwan.    In regards to Taiwan issue, Chinese participants delivered their opinion.    An executive secretary of the Association of Chinese Culture Promotion  said that, China and Taiwan have been in stand-off since the 1950s and have both  professed a “One China Policy.” However, circumstances changed dramatically  towards the end of Li Deng Hui’s reign and after the takeover of the government  by Taiwanese independence supporters led by Chen Sui Bien. In particular, after  Chen was reelected as the President, independence separatists attempted to derail  Taiwan from “Becoming China” and sever historical, cultural and blood relations  by pushing ahead with the “Name Rectification Campaign” the “Correct  

- 132 -    Taiwanese Name Initiative” and “Taiwanese Cultural Independence Policy.”  (KRIMA 2005)    A former professor from the Strategy Research Institute of the Chinese  National Defense University said, There are two aspects of China’s solution to the  Taiwan problem. First, conclusively speaking, Beijing’s principle is not to use  force right away, but has a strong tendency to lean toward resolving the issue in a  peaceful manner. The second aspect is that China intends to attempt at peaceful  reunification, but if that does not work, i.e., Taiwan seeks independence, China  will not exclude an option to use force. It will be good to understand this principle  to mean that China gives the highest priority to peaceful resolution with a focus  on peaceful reunification rather than to mean that China intends to mobilize force.  (KRIMA 2003)    A researcher from China Association for International Friendly Contact  said that, as far as the provision that Beijing will not give up the use of force in  resolving the Taiwan problem is concerned, much can be inferred from Chinese  leaders’ comments on Taiwan’s recent presidential election. First, China will  make her best efforts to reunify with Taiwan in a peaceful manner. Second, if  Taiwan intends to seek independence, China will make sure that Taiwan will pay  the price for it. Two remarks are noteworthy. Currently, the US is pressuring  China not to use force against Taiwan. This is an interference with Beijing’s  domestic matter. The ultimate decision as to whether China will resolve the  Taiwan issue peacefully or by force is up to the Chinese leadership as it is China’s  internal affair. (KRIMA 2003)    Participants of South Korea also delivered their idea about Taiwan issue.    A researcher from the Se Jong Institute said, one of the top priorities for  China with respect to security interest is to deter Taiwanese independence and to  resolve the issues in its own way. Beijing does not want the status quo but nor  

- 133 -    does it want to dramatically disrupt the status quo. In that regard, China can  cooperate, to some extent, with the US which prefers the status quo. Thus,  cooperation between Washington and Beijing is to be viewed as a temporary  relationship aimed at strategic cooperation under the framework of a new  international order, and yet allows contradictory positions to exist between them  regarding Taiwan issues. (KRIMA 2003)    A professor from Han Lim University argued that, the Chinese economy is  in a position to influence the global economy. While China-Taiwan issues are  important to Beijing, economic issues should be a higher priority over the issues  at a time when the Chinese economy goes through overexpansion. It is extremely  urgent to resolve issues resulting from China’s expanded economy dubbed as a  “bubble”, and those issues may have more substantial impact on neighboring  countries than China’s military threat. Hence, China and Taiwan should improve  economic exchange and cooperate to resolve issues resulting from China’s bubble  economy. As a matter of course, both should refrain from excessively introducing  costly state-of-the-art weapon systems, but channel their energy into economic  issues. (KRIMA 2005)    A professor from the Korean National Defense University mentioned that,  in case of emergency involving Taiwan and China, South Korea’s policy decision  will have to consider two aspects: on one hand, in accordance with the South  Korea-China diplomatic normalization declaration ‘Taiwan is part of China’ and  on the other hand, the policy decision requires coordination with the USFK within  the framework of the South Korea-US alliance. This is my personal opinion, but  South Korea is unlikely to strongly devise plans against this issue. (KRIMA 2003)    China especially criticised that South Korea is receiving the Taiwanese  students. One scholar had exact data for that. In South Korea, receiving the  students just depends on the decision of the colleges themselves. So both sides  find difficult to understand each other on that matter. China cares much about  

- 134 -    Taiwanese intention to seek independence; it is not only because of Taiwanese  separatism but also other Chinese ethnic separatism movement. It never wants the  interference of external powers in its internal affairs. Some Korean scholars argue  that as China has relations with North Korea, South Korea can also have relations  with Taiwan. Actually there are some differences between both relations. North  Korea is a member of UN but Taiwan is not a member of UN.    Korea sees that the cooperation between China and US is to be viewed as  a temporary relationship aimed at strategic cooperation under the framework of a  new international order, and yet allows contradictory positions to exist between  them regarding Taiwan issues. Korea suggests that China and Taiwan should  improve economic exchange and cooperation to resolve issues resulting from  China’s bubble economy. South Korea inevitably choose two ways one of which  it follows ‘Taiwan is part of China’ in accordance with the South Korea-China  diplomatic normalisation declaration and the other of which it is required  coordination with the USFK within the framework of the South Korea-US  alliance.    6) Japan Issue    The talks among China, Japan and South Korea have been hindered  specifically by various territorial and historical disputes. In 2004 South Korea  proposed the three major economies of East Asia to have a separate talk outside of  the framework of the ASEAN (10+3). In November 2007 during the ASEAN  (10+3) meeting, the leaders of China, Japan and Korea held their eighth meeting,  and decided to strengthen political dialogue and consultations between the three  countries, eventually deciding on the regular meeting to be held in 2008. Since  2008 China, Japan and South Korea have held trilateral summit talks annually.  The summits talked about maintaining strong international relations, the global  economy, and disaster relief etc. (China View, December 13, 2008).  

- 135 -    Table #9 East Asia Summit      Host  country  Host  Leader  Host  City  Date  1 st   Japan    Taro  Aso  Fukuoka  13 Dec  2008  2 nd   China    Wen  Jiabao  Beijing  10 Oct  2009  3 rd   South  Korea  Lee  Myunng- bak  Jeju  29  May  2010  4 th   Japan  Naoto  Kan  Fukushima  21-22  May  2011  5 th   China  Wen  Jiabao  Beijing  13-14  May  2012      Table #10 East Asia Foreign Minister Talks      Host  Country  Host  Minister  Host  City  Date  1 st     South  Korea  Song Min- soon  Jeju  3 Jun.  2007  2 nd   Japan  Masahiko  Komura  Tokyo  14  Jun.  2008  3 rd    China  Yang  Jiechi  Shanghai  28  Sep.  2009  

- 136 -    4 th   South  Korea  Yu  Myung- hwan  Gyeongju  15  May  2010  5 th   Japan  Takeaki  Matsumoto  Kyoto  19  Mar.  2011  6 th    China  Yang  Jiechi  Ningbo  8  April  2012      About the Japan issue, Chinese participants revealed several opinions.    In the free debate session of the 1 st  forum, Yan Xuetong, the Dean of the  Institute of Modern International Relations, said that, while it is believed that  there are no feasible ways to counterbalance tight relations between the US and  Japan, one of the most possible solutions, if any, is to achieve military  cooperation between South Korea and China. As much as it has military ties with  the US, SK can also build military ties with China. Once South Korea-China  military relations are established, South Korea can serve as the axis of these two  military ties, thereby playing a proactive part in facilitating military exchanges  between South Korea and China. (KRIMA 2002)    A member of Board of Directors, the China Arms Control and  Disarmament Association, said that the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute  located north of Tokyo produces nuclear energy at large processing plants in six  areas. By the end of 2004, the country possessed 43 tons of plutonium – 1 ton is  enough to develop 120 nuclear warheads. If all of this plutonium were used to  develop nuclear weapons, Tokyo could have 5,000 such warheads. Experts  estimate that Japan can possess 60 tons of plutonium by 2010. The amount of  plutonium and military industry and technology possessed by Japan make it a  

- 137 -    nuclear power within a short period of time. Ten years ago, Tokyo admitted that  she could build nuclear weapons within 183 days, but by now the production time  may have shortened. (KRIMA 2005)    About Japan issue, South Korean participants also said their opinion.    At the 3rd forum, a visiting professor from Seoul National University, said  that the role that Japan plays in Northeast Asia is important as well. You hope that  the rise of conservative wing in Japan will not go in a wrong direction. Whether  we can overcome increasing distrust between China and Japan; and South Korea  and Japan will be a key to regional peace and prosperity. (KRIMA 2004)    A professor from the Korean National Defense University said,  historically China-Japan relations have made a tremendous influence on the order  in Northeast Asia. Their relations have deepened more than ever before in terms  of mutual cooperation and mutual dependence, while China and Japan have a  mixed loading of conflicts and oppositions over the expansion of their influence  power in the region and international community. (KRIMA 2005)    Participants from both countries at the Forum completely agreed with  Japanese historical evil deed and its future threat. Many innocent lives from both  countries have been sacrificed during the Japanese domination. China suggested  the cooperation between South Korea and China to counterbalance tight relation  between the US and Japan. It is quite clear that the amount of plutonium, military  industry and technology possessed by Japan make it possible for a nuclear power  within a short period of time. But Korea expressed that mutual cooperation and  mutual dependence among East Asian countries are valuable for the security of  the people in this region.        

- 138 -      Ⅲ. Analysis of the papers presented at Forum     During the period of 2002-2009 China-South Korea Security Forum has  been held seven times in Beijing and Seoul. At seven forums more than 60 papers  were presented. Basically the main topic has been always ‘Cooperation between  China and South Korea for peace in North East Asia’ but sub-titles are always  different at each forum. In the beginning, participants from both countries were  very much cautious and hesitating to say their frank opinion. But later they were  bold to express what they have had in their mind during the Cold War and now.  Here some presentations will be introduced and commented if it is needed.    1) The 1 st  China-South Korea Security Forum    The first China-South Korea Security Forum was held in Beijing on the  2 nd  of June 2002. Because the terror attack in New York took place on the 11 th  of  September 2001, the topic naturally was decided with, ‘The September 11 Terror  and the Security Situation in East Asia’. There were three or four sub-titles such  as, ‘The Impact of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks on Security in East Asia,  ‘China’s Policy to South Korea Reflected in China-North Korea Relations’ and  ‘Security Dialogue between China and South Korea and Future Direction of  Development in Military Exchange’. Hereafter some presentations will be  summarised and criticised briefly.    China:    The September 11 Terrorist Attacks and the Security Situation in Northeast Asia  (Researcher, Strategy Research Institute, the Chinese National Defense  University)    In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the  American soil, North Korea signaled a very cooperative attitude toward  

- 139 -    international coordination on anti-terrorism issues. The Bush  administration, however, didn’t proactively respond to North Korea.  Rather, they showed an inflexible stance towards it. By the end of  November 2001, Washington once again demanded that North Korea  should accept inspections of its alleged possession of weapons of mass  destruction (WMD). In early December 2001, US political leaders as well  as media outlets started to leak information that North Korea would be  highly likely to be the next target for the US to attack after the invasion of  Afghanistan. Although disagreeing with the US on the alleged claim,  North Korea responded to it in a rather rational manner. In November  2001, Nam Soon Paik, Minister of Foreign Affairs, signed five anti- terrorism treaties, which specify that signatories are responsible for  prohibiting terrorists from launching violent attacks and securing nuclear  materials. North Korea took the initiative to join two additional anti- terrorism treaties binding member signatories not to provide financial  funding to terrorists and to prevent terrorists from engaging in kidnapping  and hostage-keeping. Such cooperative initiatives by North Korea were  well received by the international community. But they didn’t garner  positive support from the US. Rather, President Bush went so far as to  single out North Korea as a part of the “Axis of Evil.” This assertion was  neither fact-based nor logical. Further, such a claim was irresponsible and  went against what is right, which would not help muster international  cooperation on anti-terrorism. Also, the claim neither helped to improve  relations between both the countries, nor did it help to reduce tension in  the Korean peninsula.    President Bush had singled out North Korea as a part of the ‘Axis of Evil’  when North Korea was very much affirmative to negotiation but he changed his  attitude in the end of his Presidency when North Korea returned again to the  strong rigid attitude toward US. They were always untimely miss-harmonised and  related countries have exploited the situational relations between North Korea and  US for their own national interests. Because of North Korea factor for China and  US factor for South Korea the Governmental level cooperation between China  and South Korea could not go deepen or quickly and the outcomes have been  failed. Even though both the countries had shared a wide range of interests they  could not exert their efforts to promote their security interests.    

- 140 -    New Characteristics of the Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula in the  Aftermath of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks (Researcher, Chinese Academy  of Military Science)  In the aftermath of the Al Qaeda attacks, first and foremost  America defined North Korea as included in the “Axis of Evil” and  designated it as a target for nuclear attack, thereby further strengthening  the hawkish policy on North Korea. Nevertheless, the South Korean  government incessantly maintains a conciliatory policy on North Korea  and takes new measures to improve inter-Korean reconciliation.  First, the South Korean government was opposed to the American  labeling of its neighbor and assessed that North Korea wants dialogue.  Seoul also maintained that there are burgeoning precursors to change and  reform. When President Bush visited South Korea in February, President  Kim Dae Jung told him that North Korea wants dialogue with the US and  that it would make efforts to comply with the Geneva Nuclear  Conventions, while improving relations with Western countries.  Second, South Korea does not agree with the view that North  Korea poses risks, nor does Seoul believe that Pyongyang is a threat. On  the contrary, the US assesses that North Korea is one of the world’s largest  militarized countries and its policy objective has an obvious bent in  violence. America suspects that NORTH KOREA is involved in alleged  activities associated with the delivery and proliferation of WMDs, and  believes that it is a serious threat to the security of the US and the  Northeast Asian region. But South Korea professed that it is not a “threat”  on many occasions and emphasized that the issue of WMD should be  resolved through dialogue.  Third, South Korea is trying to make progress towards peace by  sending an envoy to North Korea. The incumbent government headed by  President Kim Dae Jung is attempting to restore inter-Korean dialogue and  exchange on multiple fronts by sending Yim Dong Won in order to  prevent the Korean peninsula from facing crisis induced by changes in the  United States policy on North Korea after the terrorist attacks.  The South Korean government is undeterred by the US and holds  on to the Korean peninsula policy of pursuing reconciliation with North  Korea. This policy is increasingly enhancing Seoul’s diplomatic autonomy  from the US as its government and people determine to continue building  up diplomatic autonomy. This policy is conducive to easing the tension in  the peninsula arising from the changes in the US policy on North Korea  and to ensuring peace and stability in the Northeast Asian region.    

- 141 -     The September 11 terrorist attacks have changed the existing order of  international politics, while influencing, to a great extent, the American foreign  policy and also the international environment in Northeast Asia. Recognising the  global war on terror as an issue that affects the integrity of its own safety and  security, Japan, as an ally of the US, provides strong support for and cooperation  with US. By doing so, Japan tried to demonstrate to the international community  that the US -Japan alliance was just as strong as the US-United Kingdom alliance.  China has expressed active support for the US in waging the global war on  terror. Since the October 19 summit talks between China and the US held in  Shanghai, the estranged relations between both had been smoothly restored. In the  meantime, Russia had been establishing a new, mutually cooperative relationship  with the US. As such, the security condition in the Northeast Asia, as it stands  today, is at its best condition since the 2001 terrorist attacks.  However, as the US continues to label North Korea as a rogue state in  those days, no significant improvements had been made in relations between both  and between North Korea and Japan. The security environment in the Northeast  Asian region was still as unstable as if it were surrounded by murky clouds. Most  of all, it is imperative that North Korea should come to the table for dialogue in  order to break the shell of isolation and defuse distrust with the international  community, and in particular, with the US, while neighboring countries such as  China, Korea, Japan, and Russia should make joint efforts to enable conditions for  North Korea to take such actions.    Security Dialogue between South Korea and China and Future Direction of  Development in Military Exchange (Professor, Korean National Defense  University)  In the fall this year, China is expected to have new political  leadership during the 16 th  National Congress of the Communist Party of  China. Following the Three Represents, China is reported to admit private  entrepreneurs to the Chinese Communist Party. It is anticipated that such  

- 142 -    changes in domestic affairs will help augment economic exchange and  cooperation with its neighboring countries in concert with its admission to  the World Trade Organization (WTO) as well as to further expedite  friendly relations and cooperation with its neighboring countries. As the  civil society becomes mature, South Korea is witnessing the strengthening  right to a voice of media and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).  In particular, NGO activities are taking place beyond governmental  control. The South Korean government has long gone ahead with  diplomatic diversification and pluralism. This year South Korea has a  presidential election and a new government sets in next year. The new  government is expected to further enhance friendly relations and  cooperation with its neighboring countries based on the principles of  globalization and multi-polarization that previous governments have  established.  There is no denying that both the countries have issue-based  conflicts due to differences in national system, ideology, history and geo- political factors. However the basis of “common interest” is much broader  between Seoul and Beijing. Both should make a habit of engaging in  dialogue regarding various issues, including an outlook on the situation in  the Northeast Asian region and security-related current affairs affecting  them. They should first improve relations in areas where mutual exchange  and cooperation are rather easy, and then leverage that improvement to  shape an environment that could induce both nations to cooperate with  regard to sensitive issues for which they have conflicting national interests.  Incumbent government officials have difficulty in proceeding with  dialogue on sensitive security issues. Accordingly, 1.5 Track, an unofficial  dialogue channel developed by former government officials and scholars,  can be beneficial as it will help identify disagreements on security issues  and devise ways to defuse such disagreements. We hope that such  scholarly exchange as this will contribute to enhanced exchange and  cooperation on security issues shared by both the nations.     Among fundamental policies with respect to the Korean peninsula that the  Chinese government proclaims was a policy reflected in a statement, “China  wants stability in the Korean peninsula and provides full support for Korean  reunification based on autonomy and peace.” This policy was consistent with the  political aspiration that South Korea must prevent hostilities in the peninsula and  ultimately accomplish reunification. However, most South Koreans remembered  the role that China played throughout the Korean War, and there was no denying  

- 143 -    that from the South Korean perspective the North Korea-China alliance was a real  threat to South Korea’s security during the Cold War.  At the same time, most strategists in South Korea knew that one of the  reasons why China adopted a policy aiming at stability in the peninsula was that  China wanted to take into account the very hope for reunification desired by the  Koreans as a whole. Yet, they also knew that such a policy was situated within  strategic judgment by the leadership of China that stability in external  surrounding environments was essential for China’s national strategy. It is  imperative that in the future, China should have the boldness to avoid its current  policy in the peninsula as China is content with leveraging influence in the midst  of the divide between both Koreas. Furthermore, Beijing should pursue a policy  that allows both China and the Korean peninsula to identify and expand common  interest.  2) The 2 nd  China-South Korea Security Forum    The second Security Forum was held in Seoul Korea on the 2 nd  of June,  2004. It was supposed to be held in June 2003, but there was a contagious disease  named SARS 41  in East Asia. All the passengers are asked not to move country to  country in East Asia. In the beginning, the Forum was planned to be held in June  2003, but there was agreement with deferment to next year. The topic of the 2 nd   CSKSF was ‘Security Cooperation Regime in East Asia and China-South Korea  Cooperation’ and there were sub-titles such as ‘Review of China-South Korea  Military Exchange and Search for Future Steps, ‘Future of US-China Relations  and Outlook on Security Order in East Asia’ and ‘Impact of the North Korean  Nuclear Issue on Stability in Northeast Asia and China-South Korea Cooperation’.      41  It is the short form of the virus disease ‘Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome’ On April 16, 2003,  following the outbreak of SARS in Asia and secondary cases elsewhere in the world, the World Health  Organization  (WHO) issued a press release stating that the coronavirus identified by a number of  laboratories was the official cause of SARS.  

- 144 -    Japan Factors in the Security Situation in Northeast Asia (Former Professor,  Strategy Research Institute, Chinese National Defense University)  It seems that both China and South Korea are faced with a new real  challenge that requires mutual coordination and cooperation on security  issues to be strengthened in present times. This challenge concerns how  both Beijing and Seoul can exert joint efforts to make sure that Japan’s  policy stays away from division and antagonism and steers toward security  assurance for each country in the region and regional stability, and that the  security situation in the region works favorably towards cooperation and  trust between countries in the region. Since China and South Korea do not  have the same position, they differ from each other in terms of policy.  However as long as this objective is concerned, China and South Korea  are on the same page. Both may play a special role in curbing Japan. Seoul  is a critical link in military alliances between South Korea, the US and  Japan, and when it comes to Japan, even a single word commented by  South Korea could potentially play a critical role that other countries  cannot perform in its stead. Meanwhile, Beijing has a close historical  relationship with Tokyo judging from a realistic angle, and China’s policy  orientation will have a decisive influence on Japan’s interests and attitudes  in the region. If China and Korea strive toward overcoming any possible  passive elements, we can have an extremely positive outlook on enduring  peace and security protection as well as their further development.    Challenges Facing the South Korea-US Alliance and South Korea’s Difficult  Choice (Director of Asia-Pacific Research Unit, Foreign Military Research  Division, Chinese Academy of Military Science)  The South Korea-US alliance is a legacy of the Korean War, which  resulted from oppositions between the West and the East during the Cold  War. Since the end of the Cold War and the demise of bipolarization, the  South Korea-US alliance has been walking a difficult path of constant  changes and attempts to establish an efficient role with regard to security  and national defense in new international conditions with the emergence  of threats and actors that didn’t exist during the Cold War. However, the  military alliance has entered a new transitional phase due to such factors  as trends toward multi-polarism and regional diversification, changes in  inter-Korea relations and North Korea-US relations. The other factors  were changes in relations between South Korea and nations in Northeast  Asia as well as the US and nations in Northeast Asia, increased  oppositions between South Korea and the US as to the extent to which the  South Korea-US alliance is necessary. Release of the Global Defense  Posture Review in 2004 and the announcement that 3,600 US soldiers  stationed in South Korea are to be deployed in Iraq were other reasons of  

- 145 -    change in relations. As such, Seoul has been faced with a dual challenge to  make adjustment to her military alliance with the US and to make a series  of new and difficult choices.    At that time China-South Korea military exchange has witnessed radical  exchanges in various areas, including three diplomatic talks between the defense  ministers. Essentially, such military exchanges have touched off their military  cooperation conducive to regional security, thereby strengthening friendship and  fellowship among them. Both countries could have made an attempt to gradually  pursue exchanges of military technology based on mutual agreement within an  international multi-lateral framework, starting from less sensitive, more  comfortable and non-sensitive areas. KRIMA also suggested several ways of  tangible military exchanges at the Forum.  One among them was to exchange and cross-educate military officers and  cadets and institutionalize such initiatives. The other one was to promote military  technology cooperation such as military specialist exchanging as well as the  research on topics associated with military technology. It was desirable that future  military exchanges should be carried out in such a way that transparency might be  assured and such military exchange initiatives might be conducive to the cause of  peace in the peninsula and security in Northeast Asia.    The Future of US-China Relations and the Roles of the USFK (Professor, In Ha  University from South Korea)  Expanding economic growth since Deng Xiao Ping implemented  economic reforms and open-door policies; China has enhanced its  diplomatic and economic status in the Northeast Asian region, thereby  adding a new element of change to the alliance between Seoul and  Washington. South Korea should consider two strategic aims in order to  serve both of its national interests – emphasizing the traditional South  Korea-US alliance and furthering South Korea-China trade – in a  harmonious manner. First, South Korea, as one of the maritime and trade  

- 146 -    powers, including Japan and the US would reorganize and update the  alliance to one that supports regional peace even after a peace system is  established in the peninsula. Second, it should be made sure that the roles  of USFK are redefined as a regional balancer so that China may be  assured that a new direction of the alliance doesn’t suppose it as an enemy.  The roles of USFK based on the realignment of the South Korea-US  alliance should not be focused on serving as a means to put pressure on  Beijing. Rather, the role should encompass objectives: to deter the WMD  build-up, including nuclear weapons, to secure access to sea lines of  communication, to contain territorial dispute, and to promote multilateral  security cooperation in order to prevent and peacefully resolve regional  disputes with regards to race and religion in the Pacific region.    Future of US-China Relations and Outlook on Security and Order in Northeast  Asia (Researcher, Se Jong Institute from South Korea)  The most important thing that factors in future relations between  South Korea and China is the US policy on China and Beijing’s reaction  to it. The US will continue to pursue an engagement policy on China in  order to achieve its stated goal to realign for new world order, as long as  Beijing does not infringe upon its critical national interests. In the short- and mid-term, China is likely to focus on recognizing and cooperating on  the role of the US as a stabilizer rather than challenging its hegemony,  while building a multi-lateral security system. However, a precondition for  China pursuing such cooperative policy is that Washington does not  intrude China’s critical national interests. One of the top priorities for  China with respect to security interest is to deter Taiwanese independence  and to resolve Taiwan issues in its own way. Beijing does not want the  status quo with respect to Taiwan issues, nor does it want to dramatically  disrupt the status quo. In that regard, China can cooperate, to some extent,  with the US which prefers the status quo. Thus, cooperation between  Washington and Beijing is to be viewed as a temporary cooperative  relation aimed at strategic cooperation under the framework of a new  international order, and yet allows contradictory positions to exist between  them regarding Taiwan issues.    At the 2 nd  Forum both agreed that China and South Korea should engage  in consultation and cooperation as well as close exchange of information and  intelligence on the basis of broad common understanding and interest to reach a  peaceful resolution of the NORTH KOREA’s nuclear problem. First, China and  

- 147 -    South Korea should put forth joint efforts to continue six-party talks. Second, both  should devise ways to connect the dismantling of NORTH KOREA’s nuclear  facilities with the defusing of North Korean security concerns and make efforts to  induce the US, North Korea, and other affected countries to reach a consensus.  Third, both should exert joint efforts to dissuade and contain North Korea from  worsening current nuclear problems or disrupting stability in the Korean  peninsula. China and South Korea should utilise diplomatic wisdom to translate  such bilateral alignment to positive force towards a peaceful resolution of the  nuclear issue. Besides, both should continue to respect each other’s interests and  diplomatic autonomy. Lastly, a non-nuclear peninsula serves the common interest  between China and South Korea only when it is peacefully resolved under the  conditions of stability in the peninsula.    3) The 3 rd  China-South Korea Security Forum    The 3 rd  Security Forum was held in Beijing again on the 25 th  April, 2005.  From the 3 rd  Forum, General Tang Tian Pyao headed Chinese delegation. General  Tang was recommended as the Representative for Chinese team by the then  Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan. The topic of the 3 rd  CSKSF was ‘Cooperation  for Peaceful Resolution of North Korea’s Nuclear Problem’ and the detailed  subjects were ‘Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula and the North Korea  Nuclear Issue’, ‘Security in Northeast Asia and the Role of the USFK (United  States Forces in Korea)’, ‘Japan Factors in the Security Situation in Northeast  Asia’, ‘Challenges Facing the South Korea-US Alliance and South Korea’s  Difficult Choice’, ‘The North Korea Nuclear Issue and Prospect of Six-party  Talks’ and ‘Direction for Comprehensive Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia’    China-South Korea Relations and the Security Situation in Northeast Asia  (Researcher, Chinese Academy of Military Science)  

- 148 -    The heads of People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic  of Korea met in Bali, Indonesia, on October 7, 2003, and announced the  Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation among the  three nations. The leaders agreed to cooperate in 14 areas of common  interest including economic and trade cooperation, cultural and human  exchange, politics and security. They also agreed to carry out research,  planning, coordination and supervision on tripartite cooperation. On  November 27, 2004, the Three-Party Committee adopted the Progress  Report of the Trilateral Cooperation in Viang Chan, Laos. The three  countries presented accomplishments made in areas such as economic and  trade cooperation, cultural exchange, human exchange, and politics and  security, and entered into Cooperative Action Strategy of China, Japan,  and South Korea. Overall, China and South Korea are the two most  vibrant countries in Northeast Asia. They are expected to fulfill  themselves in leading progress in regional cooperation, given that they are  complementary to each other in terms of economy and have both strong  desire and favorable conditions to strengthen cooperation and promote  prosperity in the region.    The North Korean Nuclear Issue and Prospect of Six-party Talks (Researcher,  The Chinese People’s Institute of International Affairs)  While the six-party talks were at an impasse, on February 10, 2005,  North Korea announced for the first time that it already possessed nuclear  weapons and that it would indefinitely stop participating in the six-party  talks. This announcement made the prospect of the fourth six-party talks  even gloomier. Nevertheless, despite this difficult situation, most  participants still have high hopes that six-party talks will resume and have  deep trust that ultimately their stated objectives will be achieved through  six-party talks. Given such high hopes and deep trust, diplomatic efforts to  resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through six-party talks continue to  be relatively optimistic. Therefore, in so far as the countries concerned  continue to discuss real issues with a more earnest and flexible attitude,  they will have an absolute possibility to achieve the ultimate objectives of  a non-nuclear peninsula and peace and stability in the Korean peninsula in  the near future.    The Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula and the North Korean Nuclear  Issue (Researcher, Chinese Academy of Modern International Relations)  It is an important way for North Korea to improve relations with  western countries led by the US in order to ensure her own survival and  

- 149 -    prosperity. At the same time, under the continued stalemate in relations  with the US, the nuclear issue is the only way for North Korea to induce  the US to open the door and improve her survival environments. When it  comes to North Korea’s intentions behind the development of nuclear  weapons, there exist a variety of speculations. However, the first and most  important intention is to defend external threats, including those posed by  the US by leveraging asymmetric deterrents. The war in Iraq caused  NORTH KOREA to learn that the US was able to attack Iraq because she  had confirmed beforehand that Baghdad didn’t have nuclear weapons. The  second intention is to gain diplomatic, security and economic benefits as  needed by leveraging “nuclear” as political bargaining chips against the  US. Since North Korea is limited in terms of available resources,  “nuclear” is the only capital it possesses in negotiation with US.    Since China and South Korea normalised their diplomatic relations, their  bilateral relations have made significant progress in all areas. In particular,  economic and trade cooperation has deepened rapidly and the countries have  become important trading partners for each other. In addition, when it comes to  human exchange between them, there was a huge difference between the present  and the situation during the time of normalisation. One example was the persistent  “China Boom” in Korea and “Korean Wave” in China. However, this did not  mean that there was no conflict between China and Korea. Both agreed that each  side cannot help but face opposing opinions in some areas. Nevertheless, bilateral  relations will further improve undamaged, insofar as both countries cherished a  higher-level spirit of China-Korea friendship and adopt consensus of opinion and  temporarily excluding differences.    Search for Peaceful Resolution of North Korea’s Nuclear Problem (Retired  General, Advisory Member, Korea Research Institute for Military Affairs)  The North Korean nuclear issue should be resolved in a peaceful  manner through dialogue and concession. A pivotal point is that either  NORTH KOREA or the US should make partial modifications to difficult- to-accept preconditions for talks and come forward to the dialogue table.  The international community should serve as a mediator between them to  

- 150 -    ensure that bilateral trust will help North Korea to be free of anxiety about  threats to security and that the US will be convinced of nuclear non- proliferation and a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, thereby, setting  conditions for resuming six-party talks. One of the key variables in  fostering such conditions is the role of China, which should take  responsibility for making sure that no disruptions to security and order in  the peninsula and in Northeast Asia are caused by the nuclear issue.  Making an example of a successful, simultaneous execution of diplomatic  appeasement and pressure during the first North Korean nuclear crisis,  Beijing should draw out such influential power as demonstrated in the first  nuclear crisis to resolve the issue. A non-nuclear Korean peninsula is a  status that five countries – Korea, the US, Japan, China, and Russia –  sympathize with. As such, they should engage in dialogue aimed at  achieving a common interest in Northeast Asia, that is, North Korea’s  abandonment of nuclear programs, rather than focusing on extremely  nation-centric calculations of interest. The five countries should activate  staff-level working groups that will facilitate quick progress in resumed  six-party talks in case North Korea comes back to the dialogue table.    Security in Northeast Asia and the Role of the USFK (Retired General, Advisory  Member, Korea Research Institute for Military Affairs)  Since the Bush administration began in February 2001 and  terrorists attacked the US on September 11, same year, Washington has  implemented the Global Defense Posture Review (GPR) of the US  military forces around the world based on changes in security  environments and basic strategy. The primary purpose of the GPR is to  maintain a posture to rapidly project and concentrate available forces in  preparation for terrorist threats and localized conflicts rather than large- scale wars. The GPR is closely related to the outcomes of US military  transformation, which has been underway for the past several years. Such  US military policy applies, without exception, to the USFK. It is very  meaningful that, at this juncture, we evaluate the realignment of the USFK  and review how it interrelates with security in Northeast Asia. The  ongoing realignment of the USFK has become a driving force to make the  South Korea-US alliance a more comprehensive and dynamic one . A  strong alliance and the USFK are tremendous contributors to defusing  tension and maintaining peace in the peninsula. In the future, Seoul should  further solidify a tripartite relationship among South Korea, China, and the  US by leveraging South Korea-US alliance as a basic axis.    

- 151 -    Direction for Comprehensive Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia (Professor,  Seoul National University)  It seems that domestic politics in Northeast Asian countries tends  towards nationalism. Two good examples are the rise of Japan’s right  conservative wing and China’s emphasis on national prosperity and  military power. The rise of nationalism, which has domestic political  implications, can have detrimental blow to neighboring countries and  impede future-centric prosperity. Seoul and Beijing have an absolute  common understanding of peace management in the peninsula. Managing  smooth relations between South Korea and the US, South Korea and  China, and China and the US plays a decisive role for regional peace. The  role that Japan plays in Northeast Asia is important as well. We hope that  the rise of conservative wing in Japan will not go in a wrong direction.  Whether we can overcome increasing distrust between China and Japan  and South Korea and Japan will be a key to regional peace and prosperity.    It was important to note that tensions between the US and China and  potential discord would become direct and indirect causes that should delay the  establishment of a peace system in the peninsula and that if hostile relations  between China and Japan persist, this could also become a source of tensions  affecting security conditions in the peninsula. However, the inter-Korean summit  talks in 2000 demonstrated that the destiny of Korea is not always determined by  Northeast Asian regional dynamics. Therefore, since South Korea was the only  country in Northeast Asia that has maintained amicable and cooperative relations  with all the countries in the region through carrying out her northward policy and  engagement policy with North Korea which started in the late 1980s, it served as  a mediator for cooperation among countries in the region and thereby played a  role in shifting toward a security order promoting reconciliation and cooperation.    4) The 4 th  China-South Korea Security Forum    The forth Security Forum was held in Seoul on the 20 th  of June, 2006.  From the 4 th  Forum, KRIMA was sponsored by government as well as civilian  companies. The expense of hosting institute was almost 4 times as much as one of  

- 152 -    visiting institute. According to MOU hosting country were supposed to pay all the  expenses of conference including lodging of visiting scholars. The topic of the 4 th   CSKSF was ‘The US Strategy with Asia and Strategic Repositioning of the  USFK’ and Detailed subjects were ‘South Korea-China Security Cooperation in  the Emergence case’, ‘Chance of US-Japan Involvement in China-Taiwan  Conflict and Its Impact on Security on the Korean Peninsula’, ‘Japan’s Recent  Military Trend and Its Impact on Security in Northeast Asia’, Taiwan  Independence as Serious Threat to Security in Northeast Asia’, ‘Roles of China  and South Korea for North Korea’s Constructive Reform and Open-door Policy’  and ‘Implications of Development in China-Japan Relations for Security in  Northeast Asia’.      Taiwan Independence as Serious Threat to Security in Northeast Asia (Executive  Secretary, Association of Chinese Culture Promotion)  China and Taiwan have been in stand-off since the 1950s and have  both professed a “One China Policy.” However, circumstances changed  dramatically towards the end of Li Deng Hui’s reign and after the takeover  of the government by Taiwanese independence supporters led by Chen Sui  Bien. In particular, after Chen Sui Bien was reelected as the President,  Taiwanese independence separatists attempted, in earnest, to derail  Taiwan from “Becoming China” and sever historical, cultural, and blood  relations between China and Taiwan by pushing ahead with the “Name  Rectification Campaign” the “Correct Taiwanese Name Initiative” and  “Taiwanese Cultural Independence Policy.” Besides, Taiwan has  maintained commitment to “gradual independence”, established  “Taiwanese independent time”, took “legal measures to support  Taiwanese Independence” such as “a national referendum” and  “constitutional amendments,” thereby intending to gradually separate  herself from China.  Taiwanese independence separatists have often utilized radical  means as used by Germany’s Nazis to launch provocations and instigated  emotional conflict between Taiwanese and Chinese people. Besides, these  people have been attempting to disrupt exchanges between China and  Taiwan in various areas and to sever economic and cultural relations  between them including impeding the three links - direct trade, transport  and postal ties. The independence movements have become the main  

- 153 -    source of tensions as they destroy foundations for promoting peace and  pose threats to China’s critical interests of national sovereignty and  territorial integrity.    As with her stance on terrorism, China, as one of the world’s superpowers,  has the obligation to contribute to establishing peace in Northeast Asia. Although  special relations between the US and China are to be understood, if Beijing first  proactively takes measures to ease military confrontation between China and  Taiwan under the banner of economic cooperation, she will not only enhance  amicable and cooperative relations with Taiwan and the West, but also receive  huge benefits favourable to her economy. The Chinese economy has grown up in  a position to influence the global economy. While China-Taiwan issues are  important to China, economic issues should also be a higher priority over such  issues at a time when the Chinese economy goes through over-expansion. China  and Taiwan should further economic exchange and cooperate to resolve issues  resulting from the “bubble” economy. As a matter of course, both China and  Taiwan should refrain from excessively introducing costly state-of-the-art weapon  systems, but channel their energy into economic issues.    Japan’s Recent Military Trend and Its Impact on Security in Northeast Asia  (Member of Board of Directors, China Arms Control and Disarmament  Association)  In 1997, the Japanese government declared the principle to the  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Japan will not process  excess plutonium. However, as plutonium materials separated from the  nuclear manufacturing industry accumulated, Japan readjusted her nuclear  policy and rapidly enhanced her capability to produce and accumulate  plutonium. When it is separated and processed, Plutonium is known to be  a very sensitive material in the area of nuclear proliferation, and can be  used as a material to produce nuclear weapons. The Japan Atomic Energy  Research Institute located north of Tokyo produces nuclear energy at large  processing plants in six areas. By the end of 2004, Tokyo possessed 43  tons of plutonium – 1 ton of plutonium is enough to build 120 nuclear  warheads. If all of this plutonium were used to build nuclear weapons, the  

- 154 -    country could have 5,000 nuclear warheads. Experts estimate that Japan  can possess 60 tons of plutonium by 2010. The amount of plutonium and  military industry and technology possessed by Japan make it a nuclear  power within a short period of time. Ten years ago, Japan admitted that  she could develop nuclear weapons within 183 days, but by now the  production time may have shortened.    Historically, China-Japan relations have made a tremendous influence on  the order of Northeast Asia. Their ties have deepened more than ever before in  terms of mutual cooperation and dependence, while they have a mixed loading of  conflicts and oppositions over the expansion of their influence power in the region  and international community. In particular, close economic cooperation exists  between both with respect to trade, investment, and aid. But with the emergence  of exclusivist nationalism in China and the implementation of unilateral foreign  policy in Japan, bilateral relations have rapidly worsened. This harbours a great  potential to escalate into a dangerous and strategic conflict relationship that may  negatively influence not only Korea but also Northeast Asia and international  order.  In the meantime, Korea has been greatly influenced, due to its geopolitical  location, by power dynamics involving neighbouring countries including China  and Japan. In such power dynamics, the fate of Korean people has been  determined by external forces regardless of their will and intent. With the advent  of the information and technology age and globalisation, South Korea has  broadening latitude in determining her own fate. Such a change means that South  Korea is growing to become a dynamic country strong enough to play an  influential role in transforming a hostile order in Northeast Asia, including China- Japan relations, into a cooperative order. Depending on the direction in which  relations among South Korea, China, and Japan progress in the future, Northeast  Asia will be a determining factor in shaping the history of human civilisation.    

- 155 -    The US Strategy with Asia and Strategic Repositioning of the USFK (Researcher,  Korea Research Institute for Military Affairs)  In contrast, the US is trying to respond to terrorism and new  security threats in a more effective manner through realignment of her  military forces overseas. While on one hand the US is using such military  measures to curb China’s challenge to the US hegemony in some degree,  she may, on the other hand, take the initiative at diplomatic and military  exchanges so that China may be encouraged to act as a responsible  member in the international community. The US is reported to take  China’s emergence for granted and put a new weight on the fact that  military confrontation with Beijing does not necessarily correspond to her  national interest. In particular, it is expected that US will prevent “China  standing at strategic crossroads” from posing disruptive challenges to the  US, while strengthening US-China joint efforts to respond to terrorism and  21 st  century security challenges such as natural disasters, including  earthquakes, tsunami and bird flu.    South Korea-China Security Cooperation Issues in the Event of a Sudden Change  (Professor, Kyung Ki University from South Korea)  In military terms, South Korea and China should seek a possibility  to coordinate directions and means to deter war by discussing differences  and similarities between South Korea’s OPLAN 5029 (the combined  South Korea-US operation plan that deals with sudden change in North  Korea) and China’s emergency response plan in the peninsula to the extent  that those plans are made to go public. More specifically, both countries  need to review various issues to include regular exchanges of military  information and intelligence, military officials’ educational visits, China’s  notification of and invitation to joint military exercises such as last year’s  China-Russia joint military exercise, strong demand and pressure on North  Korea military leadership to abandon nuclear development, condition- based aid of strategic assets to North Korea (such as oil, grains, and  cocoastan), and a buffering zone (along the old Korea-Manchuria  borderline) to prevent military conflicts between the South Korea-US  combined forces and Chinese military in the case of a civil war in North  Korea. The current OPLAN 5029 directs that if civil war in North Korea  escalates into collision with SK-US combined forces, the military alliance  will “go north.” This makes it evitable for Chinese military and the SK-US  combined forces to engage in a military collision if Chinese military “goes  south”, unless a buffer zone has been established in advance to recognize a  South Korea-led war for reunification.    

- 156 -    Because South Korea and China have already formed a bond of sympathy  to a certain higher degree, and have improved their relations miraculously, they  will be able to convince and cooperate with each other to ensure that North Korea  may implement a constructive reform and an open-door policy in concert with  stability in the Korean peninsula. Both countries have common areas of  cooperation when it comes to relations with North Korea. Since they have already  been cooperating on various areas for a significant period of time, they will need  to proactively implement cooperation on each area in a concrete manner.    Officially North Korea has not abandoned her hostile reunification  strategy, and continued to engage in “United Front Strategy” by demanding the  withdrawal of US Forces in Korea. Only after North Korea gains trust from the  Korean government and Korean people, North Korea-US and North Korea-Japan  relations should be normalised through restored trust and six-party talks can  resume. If North Korea does not act on the basis of trust, but rather continues to  use brinkmanship as a bargaining chip, demand economic aid to maximise  rewards and pursue the possession of nuclear weapons as fact, it will be difficult  to make progress in six-party talks. North Korea nuclear issue can be determined  by the logic of international power politics and requires sophisticated diplomatic  strategy and negotiation skills.    Time table #11 Six Party Talks and Agreements    Rounds  Period  Agreements      27 Aug - 29    no agreement  

- 157 -    1 st   round  Aug 2003      2 nd   round      25 Feb - 28  Feb 2004    Denuclearization of the Korean  Peninsula, Peaceful Coexistence of  Participating States, stressing the use of  mutually coordinated measures to  resolve crises and holding the third  round of talks with full participation  during the second quarter of 2004        3 rd   round      23 Jun - 26  Jun 2004    Reconfirming the commitment to  denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula,  stressing specification of the scope and  time, interval (between steps of),  method of verification and holding  fourth round of talks in Beijing before  September 2005.      4 th   round(1)      26 Jul - 7  Aug 2005    No agreement. U.S. and North Korea  have not agreed upon the ‘peaceful’ use  of nuclear energy      - Verifiable denuclearization of the  Korean Peninsula, observe and realize  

- 158 -      4 th   round(2)    13 Sep - 19  Sep 2005  the 1992 Korean Peninsula  Denuclearization Declaration, North  Korea to agree to abandon all nuclear  weapons and nuclear programs and  return to the NPT as soon as possible.  However, the states still respect North  Korea’s stated right to peaceful use of  nuclear energy.  - The issue of the light water reactors  will be discussed “at an appropriate  time”  - The US and the South Korea formally  declare that they have no nuclear  weapons on the Korean Peninsula.  - The US affirmed it has no intention to  attack or invade North Korea and will  provide a security guarantee to this  effect.  - The US and North Korea will work to  normalize ties, respect each other’s  sovereignty and exist peacefully  together.  - Japan and North Korea will work to  normalize relations, in accordance with  the Pyongyang Statement by settling  historical disputes.    

- 159 -      5 th   round(1)    9 Nov - 11  Nov 2005    ‘Words for words’, ‘actions for actions’  for ‘commitment for commitment’        5 th   round(2)      18 Dec - 22  Dec 2006    Separate bilateral talks were made  concerning the freezing of overseas  North Korean financial assets between  the US delegation led by the US  Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary  for Terrorist Financing and Financial  Crimes, Daniel Glaser, and the North  Korean delegation led by the President  of the DPRK’s Foreign Trade Bank, O  Kwang Chol.        5 th   round(3)      8 Feb - 13  Feb 2007    North Korea will shut down and seal  the Yongbyon nuclear facility,  including the reprocessing facility and  invite back IAEA personnel to conduct  all necessary monitoring and  verifications. In return, the other five  parties in the six-party talks will  provide emergency energy assistance to  North Korea in the initial phase of  50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, to  

- 160 -    commence within 60 days.        6 th   round(1)      19 Mar - 22  Mar 2007    The parties restated their commitment  to the Joint Statement of 19 September  2005 and the agreement of 13 February  2007 and undertook to fulfill their  respective obligations under those  agreements in line with the principle of  ‘action for action’ and five working  groups to meet before August to discuss  plans for the implementation of the  general consensus      6 th   round(2)    27 Sep - 30  Sep 2007    Reports from working groups heard and  endorsed and Implementation of initial  actions of 13 February 2007 Agreement  confirmed. List of Second Phase  Actions for Implementation of Joint  Statement issued 2 October 2007.      7 th   round    10 July - 12  July 2008    3 principles related to the system of  inspection which are facility visitation,  document review and interview with  

- 161 -    technicians      8 th   round    08 Dec 2008    No agreement because of North  Korea’s rejection for sampling test    5) The 5 th  China-South Korea Security Forum    The 5 th  Security Forum was held in Beijing China on the 21 st  of April,  2007. The then Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan has invited all the Korean  delegations to his hometown Zhengzhou, the capital city of Henan province. All  the participants from both countries have toured together almost a week from  Beijing through Zhengzhou to Changsha, the capital city of Hunan province,  which was the hometown of General Tang Tian Pyao, the Representative of  Chinese delegation. The topic of the 5 th  CSKSF was ‘North Korea Problems and  its Impact on Security Situation in East Asia’ and the detailed subjects were ‘New  Trends in North Korea Nuclear Issue and Policy of the U.S.A. for them’,  ‘Security Situation in East Asia and South Korea-China Cooperation’, ‘Impact of  Strengthening South Korea-US Alliance on Security in Northeast Asia’ and  ‘North Korean Nuclear Diplomacy and Six-party Talks’.    Security Situation in Northeast Asia and South Korea-China Cooperation  (Professor, Military Strategy Research Division, Chinese National Defense  University)  In order to establish a strategic security relationship between Korea  and China for the 21 st  century, they should strengthen their bilateral  cooperation on security issues in the peninsula on the foundation of their  mutual security interest. They should discuss a solution to current issues  resulting from their bilateral relations in a mature manner without hostile  

- 162 -    actions to each other. Both the countries should also build mature military  relations. In order to achieve this goal, they should exchange noteworthy  military intelligence, and understand each other’s military strategy and  power, and solidify military exchange. Although at present a hotline has  been established between their navies, both Korea and China should make  efforts to set up a hotline between their defense ministries. Further, they  will be able to open a hotline between their military leaderships as they  resolve technical issues. Seoul and Beijing are relatively stable, and  comparatively speaking, North Korea is unstable. Korea and China should  put together their joint efforts to work on unstable factors in North Korea  and help each other to respond in a joint manner to contingency situations  to include a sudden change of circumstances in North Korea.    New Trends in North Korean Nuclear Issue and South Korea-China Cooperation  (Chief Manager, Inter-Korean Issues Research Team, Fudan University)  As the nuclear issue is going the way that North Korea has  intended and planned and the US has made a great turn-around in her  policy principle regarding the issue, Korea and China are faced with a new  challenge. The US has partially abandoned the multi-lateral principle and  restored a bilateral dialogue, which will inevitably result in the worsening  and marginalization of six-party talks. North Korea has already fulfilled  strategic change in terms of nuclear abandonment. That is, North Korea  has moved from realizing security while sticking to nuclear development  to exchanging “nuclear abandonment” with security and compensation.  When it comes to her nuclear issue, historically NORTH KOREA has  been using both hands. One hand involves establishing nuclear  development as a strategic objective and utilizing “nuclear possession” as  the most important guarantee to obtain national security. The other hand  involves acquiring security and material gains through dealing with the US  by leveraging “nuclear abandonment” as a nuclear bargaining chip. If the  US and North Korea were to normalize their relations while admitting to  North Korea’s limited possession of nuclear weapons, China would face  the serious issue of worsening circumstances, and as for security  conditions Korea would be challenged by security-related asymmetry  between North and South Korea and would have to live under NORTH  KOREA’s nuclear clouds. Korea-China cooperation has to focus on  responding both to the US and North Korea and should prevent North  Korea and the US from renouncing six-party talks. Korea and China  should also correctly evaluate the situation through more dialogue, and  make joint efforts to respond to new issues resulting from a non-nuclear  peninsula.    

- 163 -    Impact of Strengthening South Korea-US Alliance on Security in Northeast Asia  (Researcher, Chinese Academy of Military Science)  The Korea-US alliance with Cold War coloring may be an  impediment to maintaining peace and stability in the region. It is because  this alliance runs counter to a general trend oriented toward “peaceful  cooperation and development and coexistence in the region, which is at  present prevalent on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Both the  Korean and US governments are applying a strong ideological coloring  and a Cold War way of thinking in selecting in selecting their security  policies. Hence, the Korea-US alliance that should have been weakened  and even ceased to exist in the aftermath of the Cold War, rather shows  signs of further reinforcement and expansion. Besides, as the Korea-US  military alliance expands its scope beyond its current military sector,  including non-military sectors and regions outside the peninsula, it is  highly likely that this move will become a barrier to peace and stability in  the Northeast Asian region. Due to the expansion of the alliance and its  potential danger, all neighboring countries in the region may be situated in  an unfavorable position. Such a ripple effect will manifest itself more  prominently for Korea, who is the party to the alliance, than for any other  countries concerned. Eventually, this will not only deliver a blow to  strategic mutual trust and advance in long-term relations between Korea  and her neighbors, but also make uncertain the achievement of a non- nuclear Korean peninsula and self-reliant and peaceful reunification that  the Korea government is pursuing.    One of Chinese scholars said that foundations for a stable order to come in  Asia include the following: first, establishing peaceful coexistence and co- prosperity; second, canceling overseas military alliances and military bases; third,  achieving a non-nuclear Korean peninsula and resolving the issue of North  Korea’s security assurance; fourth, resolve disputes in a peaceful manner through  dialogue; finally, providing no support for Taiwanese independence by any means.  These were typical Chinese arguments. That scholar said only when these  objectives are met, enduring peace can be ensured in Northeast Asia. Actually  South Korea was also very cautious about strategic flexibility of the USFK. That  was very welcomed to Chinese friends. President Roh expressed that the USFK  should not be involved in conflicts that may take place in Northeast Asia without  

- 164 -    South Korea’s consent. They wanted it could be a firm principle that is not  concessible in any case.    North Korea Problems and Their Impact on Security Situation in Northeast Asia  (Retired General, Advisory Member, Korea Research Institute for Military  Affairs)  The nuclear issue is an important factor in the Northeast Asian  region. Pyongyang aims at achieving a normal relationship with the US by  delaying her nuclear abandonment. North Korea’s decision to abandon her  nuclear activities will be influenced by progress made in relations with the  US. How can we establish a security mechanism in the peninsula and  prevent a sudden change of circumstances in the peninsula? This can be  achieved through dispelling North Korea’s concerns about system  transition to reduce unstable factors and emphasizing to and convincing  North Korea’s political and military leadership that China-style reforms  and open-door policy are the “best option” to ensure advance in her own  system. Both Korea and China should jointly participate in providing  positive support to North Korea for her reforms and open-door policy and  economic development.    Factors that affect stability in the Korean peninsula and the Northeast  Asian region include not only the nuclear issue, but also intense military  confrontation between the two Koreas, severe economic hardship in North Korea,  territorial disputes among countries in Northeast Asia, different views of history  in the region, and fierce competition among superpowers in the region. Both  China and South Korea have a common interest, that is, stability in the region,  and share a broad range of mutual cooperation as they have either similar or  identical positions on several important issues. Through discussion at the Forum  both side agreed with that; First, both the countries should take joint initiatives  towards a peaceful resolution of the North Korea nuclear issue. Second, they  should make joint efforts to help North Korea revive her economy. Third, they  should jointly suppress Japan’s distortions of history and remilitarisation. Fourth,  they should establish multilateral dialogue and negotiation mechanisms in the  

- 165 -    region. Finally, they should build a multi-lateral economic cooperation system in  the region.    6) The 6 th  China-South Korea Security Forum    The sixth Security Forum was held Seoul Korea on the 28 th  of October,  2008. The sixth Forum was culminated by the Han River boat dinner. At that  boat party which was hosted by the then defense minister Lee Sanghee was  attended by all the experts from both countries. They talked, drunk and sung  together travelling at night on Han River which flows through the Seoul city. The  topic of the 6 th  CSKSF was ‘South Korea-China Strategic Cooperation  Partnership (Direction and Challenges)’ and the detailed subjects were ‘Current  Status of North Korea Nuclear Issue, Its Outlook, and Impact on Regional  Security’, ‘Inter-Korea Reconciliation and Cooperation Conducive to the Security  and Stability in East Asia’ and ‘South Korea-China Cooperation in Non- Conventional Security Areas’.      Current Status of North Korean Nuclear Issue, Its Outlook, and Impact on  Regional Security (Former Attaché, The Chinese Embassy in South Korea)  Six-party talks are the ways that all the participants sympathize  with. Also, the baseline has been determined that rewards North Korea  according to shutdown of its nuclear programs, or “North Korea’s nuclear  shut-down in exchange of rewards.” The participants also strongly  sympathize with and adopt the principle of “action for action” and the  “verifiable” way, both of which the six-party talks are pursuing. The  roadmap for resolving the nuclear issue will continue to progress within  the six-party talks framework. As they get into next phases, the six-party  talks will face more difficulties and increased uncertain factors. Given the  lack of trust between North Korea and the US, either party is likely to drag  their feet or run out the clock by artificially controlling the pace of talks.  Factors that affect progress in the North Korea nuclear issue are North  Korea’s willingness to disable its nuclear programs, US strategy on six- 

- 166 -    party talks, a change of government in the US and changes in inter-Korean  relations in the peninsula.    South Korea-China Cooperation in Non-Conventional Security Areas (Professor,  Chinese National Defense University)  For the past 20 years China has noticed and researched on the  importance of non-conventional security matters, and integrated into the  framework of national security in the aftermath of the September 11  terrorist attacks and the SARS events. Non-conventional threats include  terrorism, natural disasters and catastrophes, energy security, protection of  diplomatic functions and Korean nationals in foreign countries,  environmental issues, intelligence threats, international organized crime,  proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and refuge issues. Since  non-conventional security issues complement conventional security issues,  studies on non-conventional security issues will help not only expand a  viewpoint on comprehensive security issues but also to have accurate  judgment on such issues at national, regional and global levels. As for  non-conventional security issues, Korea and China share common  interests: 1) preventing sovereignty disputes arising from non- conventional security elements, 2) preventing non-conventional security  issues that pose threats on economic development and the stability of the  people’s living, 3) preventing unexpected situations, 4) establishing a  system that handles crisis and ensures security cooperation.    Impact of Strengthening South Korea-US Military Alliance and Its Impact on  Security in Northeast Asia (Researcher, Chinese Academy of Military Science)  While the Lee Myung Bak government emphasizes the  strengthening of the Korea-US alliance, the strengthening and expansion  of the alliance will have minuscule influence on security in Northeast Asia  given the reality that overall advance in Korea-China relations, progress in  the complicated North Korea nuclear issue, general stabilization of  security conditions in Northeast Asia, and pursuit of peaceful co- development are becoming the mainstream of the regional situation.  Although both Korea and China elevate their relationship status to a  strategic partnership and open up space for more broad long-term  development, the Korea-US military alliance may interfere with China’s  internal affairs if the USFK’s strategic flexibility is strengthened so that  the USFK, which has focused only on defending Korea within the region,  is readjusted to the status of rapid task forces capable of intervening in  regional conflicts. While the inauguration of the Northeast security  

- 167 -    cooperation system is not based on a precondition of the dissolution of  bilateral military alliances, the stronger the Korea-US alliance becomes,  the more difficult it may become to maintain mutual trust between  countries concerned in the region as well as regional peace and stability. It  is because the Korea-US alliance is deeply rooted in a bilateral military  alliance during the Cold War era and a particular country among the  parties to the multi-lateral security cooperation system is assumed to be a  potential enemy. The expansion of the alliance not only strikes a blow to  strategic mutual trust and long-term development in relations among  Korea and its neighboring countries, but also makes it uncertain to realize  the objective of a non-nuclear peninsula and self-reliant peaceful  reunification that the Korean government has been pushing ahead with.     China argued at the 6 th  Forum much about the impact of Strengthening  South Korea-US Military Alliance on Security in Northeast Asia. South Korean  delegation suggested the role of China in case of a sudden change of events in  North Korea. Pan-China Centrism which includes China’s Northeast Asian  Project and Southwest Project is often mistaken for Chinese ambition for  territorial expansion. It is also claimed that in the case of a sudden change of  events in North Korea, China will engage in military intervention, and that China  needs North Korea as a buffer zone to avoid direct conflict with the US. In case of  a sudden change of events in North Korea, South Korea should be allowed to take  the lead in handling the issue since in all respects it is an internal matter within the  peninsula, while mass refugee problems, WMD control and international food aid  should be dealt with reasonably within an international aid framework including  the United Nations.    Progress in North Korean Nuclear Issue and Its Impact on Regional Safety  (Researcher, Korean Institute for Defense Analysis)  The external measures that North Korea took on October 3, 2008,  after agreeing to the Second Phase Actions for the Implementation of the  Joint Statement created changes in three aspects: first, to delay the  disabling of North Korea’s nuclear programs that Pyongyang promised to  implement by December 31; second, for North Korea to report its nuclear  

- 168 -    programs and to dismantle its cooling towers; third, to announce the  cessation of nuclear disablement and to gain assurance from the US to  clear North Korea of the terrorist-supporting country status. As of October  28, 2008, participants of six-party talks including North Korea have  reached a consensus on the principle that the North Korea nuclear issue  should be resolved peacefully through six-party talks and are satisfied with  the current progress. However, there is uncertainty as to whether North  Korea will dismantle its nuclear programs completely beyond the  “disablement phase.” Three scenarios can be contrived: first, a scenario  where the North Korea issue will be resolved completely in a peaceful  manner; second, a scenario where a “third implementation discussion” will  be at a deadlock, while the parties concerned are satisfied with the  “disablement implementation phase”; third, a scenario where six-party  talks will end in a rupture and peaceful-resolution efforts will be stranded.  If the North Korea nuclear issue goes ahead according to the first scenario,  there is a strong chance that China’s foreign influence power will increase  and inter-Korea relations will move towards a rapid transition to a peace  system, reconciliation and cooperation. If the nuclear issue proceeds  according to the second scenario, the US will be able to strengthen its  influence on the structure of power dynamics in Northeast Asia. If the  nuclear issue proceeds as expected by the third scenario, Northeast Asia  will be thrown into chaos. The nuclear issue is likely to face a turning  point depending on North Korea’s foreign policies and decisions by a  post-Kim regime. The first scenario will be possible only when a single  position in the nuclear issue is adopted by all the six-party participants.    South Korea-China Strategic Cooperation Partnership (Cooperation Direction and  Challenges) (Researcher, Korean Institute for Defense Analysis)  China should play a leading role for regional and world order in  the mid-term and long-term, and collaborate with South Korea to maintain  the security order in the region and promote peace. The summits of Korea  and China proclaimed that they would work towards development in inter- Korean relations and have an understanding of peaceful reunification. The  two summits agreed to make a joint effort to achieve stability and peace in  the peninsula, focus on plans to enhance trust between the two countries,  and consider the nuclear issue, the security issue for South Korea, as an  important area of cooperation that requires mutual understanding. It is  extremely essential to have a mutual understanding of various discussions  including high-level talks between Korea and China and to conceive  cooperation plans for current issues. In determining plans on military  exchange and cooperation, Korea and China should try to improve the  level of cooperation in a gradual manner while understanding each other’s  situation and position.  

- 169 -      With the end of the Cold War era the situation in the Northeast Asian  region has treaded the path of dialogue and reconciliation, avoiding the state of  confrontation and tension. However, the peninsula as the vestige of the Cold War  system still has complex conflict relations between North Korea and the US, both  Koreas, and North Korea and Japan. The peninsula, which has long been in  armistice, has become an important area which makes a huge impact on the  region’s security and its future development. In order to resolve the North Korea  nuclear issue, it is necessary to bring together all the countries in the region, and  establish a multi-lateral security cooperation mechanism enabling countries in the  region to achieve their security interests, thereby strengthening cooperation which  considers each country’s security situation. Then, China and South Korea should  strengthen cooperation in the future according to a new trend towards strategic  cooperation.    7) The 7 th  China-South Korea Security Forum    The seventh Security Forum was held in Beijing China on the 3 rd  of  November, 2009. The topic of the 7 th  CSKSF was ‘Inter-Korea Relations and  Outlook for Korean Peninsula’ and detailed subjects were ‘Direction for Future  Development of Inter-Korean Relations’, ‘Non-Conventional Korean Peninsula  Security Issues and Inter-Korean Relations’, ‘South Korea-US Strategic Alliance  and Stability in Northeast Asia’, ‘The Obama Administration’s North Korea  Policy Coordination’ and ‘South Korea-US Alliance Strengthened in the Obama  Administration’.    Current Status of and Outlook for North Korean Nuclear Issue (Former Attaché to  the Chinese Embassy in South Korea)  

- 170 -    On October 5, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il conveyed to  Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao who was visiting his country that Pyongyang  had already modified its position on denuclearization and defined his  position to the international community on the denuclearization of the  peninsula, while calling for dialogue between North Korea and the US.  This was a very important progress towards denuclearization. Such a  change of position made by North Korea not only matched the strategy  that the US adopted to resolve the nuclear crisis but also concretely  revealed the need for China’s responsible and important role. The US has  made a policy of carrying forward its dialogue with Pyongyang within the  framework of six-party talks and fulfilling “complete, (verifiable) and  irreversible denuclearization” through six-party talks. North Korea has  clearly acknowledged the Maginot line of the US policy that “NK-US  dialogue is possible only within the six-party talks framework.” Yet, North  Korea still emphasizes and insists that the purpose of its nuclear  development is to deter threats from external forces and to fulfill nuclear  balance. Hence, it is expected that many difficulties lie ahead for the  process of denuclearization.    Comments on North Korean Nuclear Issue (Retired General, Strategy Research  Division, Chinese Academy of Military Science)  China’s basic position on the nuclear issue is to promote  denuclearization and maintain peace and stability in the Korean peninsula.  However, the true meaning of a non-nuclear region is diluted because it is  claimed even in South Korea that Seoul should set out processing nuclear  fuels and assert nuclear sovereignty. The bottom line is that  denuclearization is not only an inter-Korean issue but also a concern for  the international community that advocates and respects the  denuclearization of the peninsula. It should be noted that as for its method  and process, denuclearization cannot be achieved through using any non- peaceful, threatening, or violent means, but only through political  negotiation within the framework of multilateral and bilateral talks. In  addition, it is imperative to establish a new peace system that will replace  the Korean War armistice agreement as soon as possible so that a  fundamental solution can be reached to the nuclear issue. It is also  imperative to abandon hostile relations through the normalization of inter- Korean and North Korea-US relations under such a peace system and  establish a new security relationship.    

- 171 -    Inter-Korean Relations and Outlook for Korean Peninsula (Deputy Director,  Korean Peninsula Research Team, Chinese Academy of Modern International  Relations)  Since August this year, North Korea has been sending  reconciliation messages to South Korea while assuming a peaceful posture  towards the neighbor by using a series of appeasement gestures. It is  because Pyongyang is hoping to free itself from the sanctions pressured by  the international community and see improvements in its external  environment. Besides, North Korea must overcome severe economic  difficulties to achieve its goal to build “a strong, prosperous and great  nation 2012”, which requires close cooperation with Korea and the  international community. As a result, Korea is also hoping to break the  stalemate by using appeasement gestures. After the end of the Cold War, a  bond of sympathy started to develop between two Koreas that neither of  them could achieve reunification by force. However, the nuclear issue and  constraints caused by the Korea-US alliance have perpetuated regime  competition and a struggle for leadership between the two Koreas. Seoul  demands Pyongyang to make a promise to abandon its nuclear programs,  but North Korea emphasizes that its nuclear issue is not between the two  Koreas but between North Korea and the US. President Obama, aiming at  a non-nuclear world, flatly professed that one of the preconditions for the  improvement of North Korea-US relations is that “North Korea should  never develop a nuclear program and engage in further provocations no  more.” Accordingly, unless Pyongyang presents a crucial point of  compromise, the US will not decrease sanctions on it, nor will it consider  normalizing relations with Pyongyang. If South Korea makes a drastic  improvement in inter-Korean relations and pushes ahead with bilateral  exchanges and cooperation without bearing in mind North Korean’s  position and attitude with respect to its nuclear issue, it is inevitable that  Seoul will face opposition from the US and see the alliance waver between  Korea and the US.    Possible Non-Conventional Korean Peninsula Security Issues and Inter-Korean  Relations (Professor, Chinese National Defense University)  Non-conventional security issues are important factors in ensuring  stability in the peninsula, and as such, their influence on security  environments should not be underestimated. Idiosyncratic political and  military environments and natural and physical conditions can potentially  cause a few problems as follows: first, contamination from nuclear,  biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons; second, large-scale contagious  diseases; third, food shortage and finally, displaced civilians. Korea and  China can ensure their cooperation in non-conventional security areas  

- 172 -    while solidifying inter-Korean relations, through strengthening  cooperation and dialogue on NBC contamination, enhancing cooperative  response systems against large-scale contagious diseases, exchanging  expertise, technology and equipment, and providing humanitarian aid.  Effective cooperation between Korea and China on non-conventional  security issues will help reduce tension in the peninsula, prevent crises and  humanitarian disasters, and secure peace and stability at the border and the  inland areas, thereby, promoting stability in the region and improving  inter-Korean relations.    The Obama Administration’s North Korea Policy Coordination (Deputy Director,  Peace Development Research Center, China Association for International  Friendly Contact)  The Obama administration’s North Korea policy faces up to the  reality that the previous Bush administration didn’t obtain good results,  and tries to handle issues with great agility. Yet, denuclearization is still  the central objective of President Obama’s North Korea policy. In  particular, while with President Obama’s vision for “a world without  nuclear weapons,” the U.S. objective of achieving denuclearization in  North Korea is highly unlikely to falter, it is acknowledged that the  denuclearization is a difficult objective to achieve. Hence, the US seeks to  normalize Washington-Pyongyang relations by adhering to the framework  of six-party talks and establishing a direct dialogue channel between them,  while targeting the denuclearization as a long-term objective. At the same  time, the US intends to push ahead with multilateral cooperation while  establishing security order in Northeast Asia through building a hybrid  mechanism with other countries.    South Korea-US Alliance Strengthened in the Obama Administration (Deputy  Director, US Research Team, Chinese Academy of Modern International  Relations)  As the US has professed its commitment to providing “extended  deterrence” by using all possible military means, the Korea-U.S. alliance  is moving toward an exclusive, bilateral military alliance that targets as a  possible enemy a specific member country of a future multilateral security  mechanism for Northeast Asia. This movement may worsen military  confrontations between both Koreas and the tension existing in Northeast  Asia. Moreover, it influences the efficiency of multilateral security  cooperation in Northeast Asia and the prospect of a multilateral security  mechanism for Northeast Asia, as it may further destroy trust among a few  

- 173 -    countries concerned. The U.S. has made it public that it will continue to  provide a “nuclear umbrella” for South Korea, which contradicts its  intention to achieve the objective of the denuclearization. This  contradiction forces North Korea to assert as a precondition for disbanding  its nuclear program the withdrawal of the USFK from South Korea.    The most pressing task that faces South Korea and China in promoting  growth and peace in Northeast Asia is that both countries should earnestly  cooperate and honestly exchange ideas regarding North Korea’s nuclear  abandonment and the establishment of peace in the peninsula in time of  emergency. While the establishment of a peace system should be discussed in  conjunction with the resolution of the nuclear issue, differences in opinions  regarding its conditions and directions can be reconciled and discussed among  Korea, China, and the US either at the civilian level or through the government  level. The promotion of friendship among Korea, China and the US is conducive  to security and peace in Northeast Asia, and can serve as a lasting foundation for  building a multilateral security system which ensure each country’s safety and  growth.    Outlook Analysis of North Korea Nuclear Issue (Senior Researcher, Korean  Institute for Defense Analysis)  It is foremost necessary that Korea understand China’s role at the  international level and sympathize with Beijing’s Asia policy focused on  “stability in the adjacent region” and “a non-nuclear Korean peninsula.”  China needs to understand the security situation that Korea is faced with  due to the continuing military confrontation with North Korea and  Pyongyang’s adherence to nuclear ambition as well as the necessity that  Korea maintains the alliance with the US. Through such mutual  understanding, both Korea and China should deepen the depth and width  of their dialogue on the nuclear issue. Cultural proximity and economic  interdependence between Korea and China will serve as an excellent  foundation for extensive dialogue on the nuclear issue.    

- 174 -    Direction for Future Development of Inter-Korean Relations (Professor, Korea  University)  To ensure the future development of inter-Korean relations, it is  imperative that policy, legal and institutional frameworks should be  established to realize three objectives -- the denuclearization of the  peninsula, North Korea’s reforms and open-door policy, and the proper  advance of such relations, all of which are required to improve ties and  achieve peaceful reunification. It is necessary to adopt a sophisticated  approach that organically integrates the reunification objective and the  improvement of relations, while making it a higher priority to gradually  improve such ties. At the same time, it is necessary to garner  understanding and active support from neighboring countries, while  pursuing a gradual and stepwise approach to establish conditions for  peaceful reunification.     China as a chairman country tried to mediate and find middle ground  between North Korea and other countries participating in six-party talks, because  the nuclear issue had several dual characteristics such as nuclear possession  versus denuclearisation and dialogue and nuclear deterrence. But North Korea  was stupefying China by making fruitless such efforts made by Beijing since  Pyongyang behaved unexpectedly so that it was not perceived to be manipulated  by China’s position. Hence, the most desirable plan for both the countries is to  cooperate on future changes in the North Korean system, including hereditary  succession and to establish a basic cooperation system that prepares against a  probable sudden change of events in North Korea. Such efforts could enable more  practical and realistic exchanges between the neighbors.   If both Korea and the US together with all the countries in the region serve  as driving force in accomplishing the missions of the times, that is, to build a  peace system in on the Korean peninsula, establish a Northeast Asian security  community and institutionalise an organisation that facilitates joint responses to  supra-national threats, the Korea-US strategic alliance will contribute not only to  stability and peace in the Northeast Asian region but also to China’s national  interests.  

- 175 -    The China-US Strategic Economic Dialogue as well as tripartite dialogue  among the US, China, and Japan led by Washington may have negative influence  on the security and fate of the peninsula, if relations become uncomfortable  between the US and China or China and Japan. South Korea has no reason to  oppose such bilateral or multilateral dialogue among countries in Northeast Asia  in that such dialogues promote mutual understanding and improve transparency  with regard to military buildup in the region. But considering a historical lesson  that the fate of the Korean people was determined by superpowers, such dialogues  can also engender negative effects.  So, it is desirable that in order to make up for such a shortcoming, the  countries directed involved, namely Korea, US and China should pursue a  tripartite strategic dialogue. For Korea and the US as well as China, the best  strategy is to prevent the occurrence of a sudden change of events in North Korea.  However, if for each scenario with respect to a sudden change of events in North  Korea, Korea and China had not discussed and agreed to their roles and  responsibilities before the occurrence of a sudden change in North Korea, a great  chaos and sacrifice would ensue during the actual occurrence of the sudden  change of events. Therefore strategic dialogue between China and South Korea is  much more needed.    Ⅳ. Debates at Security Forum 2002-2009    Each Forum had free debates after presentation. At the debates  participants from both countries could talk just freely without themes. In the first  Forum Korean participants were very passive to express their opinions. It should  be recalled that the Chinese Army and South Korean Army have fought each  other at Korean War. Around 400,000 soldiers from China and around a million  people in Korea were killed in the Korean War. Almost 50 years, each state has  indoctrinated its own people blaming each other’s country bad cruel enemy. So it  

- 176 -    was just like talking to enemy at the 1 st  Forum. It could not be done to have this  sort of free debates between China and South Korea at the governmental level.  Therefore, free debates were a good symbolisation to practice the purpose of  initiating non-governmental security talks like CSKSF.      1. The 1 st  China-South Korea Security Forum  China:  In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, many factors  have surfaced that tremendously impact the international and regional  situations. However, since those factors are not yet clear-cut, it remains to  be seen how they may influence the stability situation in Northeast Asia.  Nevertheless anti-terrorism efforts led by the US have strained inter- Korean relations and caused the emergence of unstable factors. As for  South Korea’s engagement policy with North Korea, inter-Korean  relations should not be economic transactions, namely, exchanges based  on the expectation that money is given in one way and goods are received  in another way. Rather, inter-Korean relations should be improved under  the notion that we will reap what we sow in the long term, for example,  three years. (At the debate of 1 st  Forum)  It can be understood the circumstances North Korea is situated in.  However, when it comes to exchanges with Pyongyang, South Koreans  can understand North Korea better than the Chinese. It is because the two  Koreas have shared the same culture and wished for reunification for a  long time. Seoul has long pursued a “sunshine” policy with Pyongyang,  but thinks that North Korea has not reciprocated with expected rewards as  a response to South Korea’s “sunshine” policy. It is expected that South  Korea will be more understanding to its neighbor instead of changing  expectations on or perspectives. In this context, peace and stability in the  peninsula can be anticipated only when countries in the region have  mutual understanding and make efforts to resolve problems that exist  among them in a peaceful way. (At the debate of 1 st  Forum)    The first Security Forum was hosted by CAIFC (China Association for  International Friendly Contact) from China in Beijing. Therefore, Chinese side  took part in the masters in conference. At free debates of the First Forum, Chinese  

- 177 -    participants led the discussion and expressed their opinions much. Korean  participants were not ready to talk and mainly listened to their perspectives. China  and South Korea have been involved in cultural and diplomatic exchanges based  on the foundation of their mutual cooperation. In particular, economic exchanges  and dialogues between both the countries have much grown up than the security  talk at that time.  South Korea expected that China should pressure North Korea into  opening the door to the outside world. South Korea has thought that China can  have a unique influence on North Korea, and its uniqueness could have worked  effectively. The uniqueness has derived from China’s ability to present realistic  proposals based on respect for North Korea’s sovereignty, but it has been slowly  discovered by Korean participants through the Forums that it was not so easy for  China to tell North Korea what to do. Still US and other Korean specialists are  having wrong belief that China can influence North Korea. It was discovered that  this perception was wrong. North Korea was too much independent to be  influenced even by China.    China:    Would the US wage a war in the name of anti-terrorism in the  Northeast Asian region which has been free of hostilities for the last 10  years? Unless the US ordered a military attack in the region, no hostilities  would take place in this region. Seventy-five percent of the Gross  Domestic Product (GDP) of the US comes from services, which are non- physical and derive not from production, but from trust in US Dollars. For  this trend to persist, continued trust in USD is needed. The US attracts  funding from Asia. When the US remains a formidable force in the region,  the USD can have enhanced value. At this juncture, diversification can be  an important variable in securing stability in Northeast Asia. (At the  debate of 1 st  Forum)  While it is believed that there are no feasible ways to  counterbalance tight relations between the US and Japan, one of the most  possible solutions, if any, is to achieve military cooperation between South  Korea and China. As much as it has military ties with Washington, Seoul  can also build military ties with Beijing. Once the military relations are  established, South Korea can serve as the axis of these two military ties,  

- 178 -    thereby playing a proactive part in facilitating military exchanges between  South Korea and China. This would lead to the following outcomes. First,  trust between China and the US would be solidified. Second, the  likelihood would be reduced that the US may resort to military force  against North Korea. Third, the US could be prevented from attempting to  place Japan as a major country. Fourth, economic diversification effects  could follow as a result. Fifth, economic and military conflicts would be  less likely if such an international system as founded upon a European  alliance, an East Asian alliance, and a North American alliance should  emerge. Sixth, an economic cooperation system in East Asia could  decrease military and economic problems. If a meaningful improvement  were not made in establishing a stable security environment in Northeast  Asia, maintaining the status quo could be a second-best option. Enhanced  military cooperation between South Korea and expanded free economic  zones would help to reduce tensions. (At the debate of 1 st  Forum)    China wanted South Korea to divert from US ties to China ties in military  cooperation and they have shown in some way to maintain their perspectives the  mindset of Cold War. Even in civil talk like this Security Forum the mindset of  Cold War from both sides was serious barriers to exchange the real security  interests. It was needed to refresh all the participants from mindset of Cold War  and respective government perspectives. There was common ground for  criticising Japan, but when it comes to its relations with US there existed big  differences. China was much feared from US-Japan ties rather than US-South  Korea ties. It was just because of Taiwan involvement with it.    China:    Neither do we want the US to pursue militarism, nor do we want  anti-terrorism to spread to Northeast Asia. Rather, we want the Korean  peninsula to be denuclearized. Given that regional conflicts tend to be  viewed differently depending on values, it is important to approach them  through mutual understanding rather than military engagement. In realistic  terms, we can understand and respect Seoul’s strategic decisions to ally  with the US in order to ensure its own survival. This strategic position of  South Korea should be factored into pursuing military exchanges between  South Korea and China. We want South Korea to get involved in military  exchanges with China as well as to continue to maintain its alliance with  the US, thereby becoming more self-existent. We want China to help  

- 179 -    smooth South Korea’s possible initiatives from a larger point of view. (At  the debate of 1 st  Forum)  Progress in inter-Korean relations has tremendous positive effects  on the advancement of military relations between Seoul and Beijing. The  US pressure on North Korea could also have influence on China’s policy  on North Korea. It appears that for several reasons inter-Korean relations  have been at a stalemate since the inter-Korean summit talks. We start to  have doubt about whether the sunshine policy will persist. It is because the  opposing party in Korea is demanding that an amendment be made to the  second article of the declaration adopted during the 15 June 2000 inter- Korean summit talks. (At the debate of 1 st  Forum)  These problems between the two Koreas have undermined China’s  influence on the peninsula. Both Koreas are exploiting China as a  stronghold to battle over North Korean refugee issues. The North Korean  defector problem is causing a stir in China. It is not good to attempt to  reduce the influence that the two Koreas can exert by capitalizing on the  North Korean defector issue. Rather, Seoul and Beijing should reach  solutions to this issue through much negotiation. A dialogue channel is  needed to address difficulties that may arise between them. Summit talks  between them can increase mutual trust and allay distrust. In addition, the  two countries should identify areas of improvement through continuing to  provide opportunities for academic exchanges and making sure to engage  in a broad range of contacts through exchanging new ideas and  perspectives as well as through conducting academic meetings. (At the  debate of 1 st  Forum)     As Chinese participants said, China-South Korea relations, which started  off in economic areas, should spread in all directions. The representative of  Korean delegation; former Defense Minister Cho Sung Tae laid the foundation for  military exchanges between the two countries and in particular, military  exchanges in the areas of naval warships were the evidence that military  exchanges between South Korea and China have entered a new level of  relationship. This Security Forum could become a role model for countries who  want to develop relations with all different systems and ideologies. When two  countries develop a relationship, this affects all other communities in the countries  because it has much to do with each community’s interests. While one should  

- 180 -    consider another’s interest based on one’s own interest, at the same time one  should not cause harm to another’s interest to further one’s own interest.    China:  In the early 1950s, China crossed the Aprok River as she  committed her army to prevent the invasion of the Korean peninsula by  the US. From a geographical and historical point of view on the peninsula,  stabilization of peace and building a strong Koryeo race for the future has  a lot to do with China. For this reason, China has maintained a consistent  position on a peaceful Korean reunification, which is beneficial not only to  the Western nations but also to Beijing itself. Both Koreas have been  facing a great deal of military confrontation since the Armistice  Agreement in the 1950s. Although a 50-year-long Cold War era has ended,  there have been no significant changes. (At the debate of 1 st  Forum)  Yet, some regular changes are observed: in particular, there have  been great changes in human exchanges between the two Koreas and  economic aid provided by Seoul to Pyongyang. Also, inter-Korean summit  talks have made huge influences on relations between the two Koreas.  Another difference is that there have been many changes since the  solidarity of the Cold War on the peninsula. Especially, China and Korea  normalized diplomatic relations and Beijing has secured a unique position  with respect to inter-Korean issues by maintaining friendly relations with  both Koreas. This was inconceivable during the Cold War. Either from a  historical or realist point of view, it is highly unlikely that there may be  military conflicts between the two Koreas irrespective of neighboring  superpowers. (At the debate of 1 st  Forum)  It appears to me that for the sake of its interest-seeking, Seoul will  not want military conflict with North Korea. At the same time, North  Korea is not capable of coping with military conflict by itself. Hence  confrontations between the two Koreas should be best understood as a  corollary of the Cold War and as a consequence of distrust and  misunderstanding resulting from a long division between them. The  “sunshine policy” spearheaded by President Kim, Dae Jung is a great way  to ameliorate estranged inter-Korean relations and build mutual trust.  Human exchanges between them as well as outcomes resulting from South  Korea’s economic aid to North Korea will help them deepen mutual trust.  (At the debate of 1 st  Forum)  

- 181 -    It is unlikely that the US will launch military operations against  North Korea without negotiation with or support from South Korea.  Personally, we are optimistic when it comes to military conflicts in the  process of reunification in the peninsula. It will take a long time for one  race, which has been separated into two countries and faced with  confrontations over half a century, to resolve unfamiliarity between each  other with respect to their positions and to build trust with each other. (At  the debate of 1 st  Forum)  Since they normalized their diplomatic relations, China and South  Korea have gradually established deepened relations in the context of  mutual understanding in the area of politics and much complementariness  in the area of economy. Traditionally, both the countries have maintained  friendly relations and have signed and upheld the 1961 Sino-North Korean  Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. This treaty is  unique in that it is the only treaty of such a nature established by two  countries among neighboring countries in the region. China’s aid to North  Korea of food and energy as well as mutual exchanges of materials are  favorable to improving inter-Korean relations and to easing relations  among countries in Northeast Asia. (At the debate of 1 st  Forum)    Does China want Korea to be reunified? Yes, they are expressing their  formal position that way. But many Korean scholars were suspicious of that.  Because Korean scholars think that Korean reunification will not be benefiting the  Chinese security interest. At the debate of the first Forum Chinese scholar said ‘I  believe that ultimately the two Koreas will be able to realise inter-Korean  reconciliation and national victory through establishing relations based on mutual  respect, understanding and exchange. The Korean race, which is united through  reunification, can contribute much to peace and advance in Northeast Asia and the  Asian Pacific region as well as make a big contribution to changes in the picture  of the region. Eventually, this will benefit China’s safety to a great extent.’    China:  I would like to address how the US affects the region as it pursues  its own absolutism. Currently, those opposed to President Clinton’s policy  

- 182 -    on North Korea are leading U.S. policy and implementing its absolutism  in East Asia. Also, all countries around the world are keeping abreast with  such a policy. In this respects, the security condition in Northeast Asia can  be viewed as stable. However, it can be viewed as unstable in other  respects. U.S. policy on East Asia is inaccurate. In the aftermath of the  September 11   terrorist attacks, the US has wielded its power, transforming  from a military superpower to a political superpower. From a short-term  perspective, the US appears to have changed its policy. However, judging  from its long-term policy, the US has not changed at all. (At the debate of  1 st  Forum)    Chinese side worried about that the Korea-US alliance would seek and  achieve reunification with North Korea through absorption. Minister Cho said  ‘South Korea and China are on an equal footing in pursuing stability in the  peninsula, China and South Korea will work together to handle the US move  towards shaping its TMD policy’ Talking to US strategy in Korean peninsula,  Korean participants now started opening their mouth. Because they felt that there  was a need to explain Chinese participants about the fact.    South Korea:  The core of US security strategy is centered on its policy on China.  Washington believes that from now on it has to set up its policy on China  because Beijing is likely to outstrip the US in 20 to 30 years not only  militarily but economically. How does China evaluate this position and  what kind of counter-measures can she take against such a perception as  demonstrated by the US? (At the debate of 1 st  Forum)    China:  While other countries predict that China will outstrip the US,  China will not have enough time to do so. It will take a long time for such  a prospect to be realized, as evidenced by the fact that China only recently  made it to the FIFA World Cup. China is a country which is still  developing. Although it appears that the core parts of China have made a  great advance, visits to the interior and western parts of China would give  

- 183 -    you an impression that China is still developing. In my opinion, China,  with 1.3 billion people, will not be a country which is most advanced in 20  to 30 years and even in 50 years, but a country which is a little more  advanced than are other developing countries. China will have to do its  best to continue its advancement, but it also has to ensure close relations  with neighboring countries. The US is building a policy that will prevent  China from growing to be stronger and increasing its influence in  Northeast Asia. As far as we know, instead of waiting to implement such a  policy until China becomes a little stronger, which is a more desirable  option, Washington is trying to drain China’s energy beforehand by  proactively shaping an international environment that will exhaust China’s  influence. (At the debate of 1 st  Forum)    There were always controversies on China growth. China always said that  it would take a long time for such a prospect to be realised. They always argued  China is a country which is still developing. The Theory of China Threat was  discussed within the context that as Japan built up its military forces, China would  do the same. They say China as a threat based on the assessment made by the  United States. There were also other opinions about that. It was out of concern  that military superpowers among neighbouring countries surrounding the Korean  peninsula might make false judgments that might create a situation in which the  Korean peninsula could be implicated in. In that sense, balance was needed and  should be promoted surrounding the Korean peninsula.  It was true that China has made a great advance and gave Westerners the  strong impression. China argued that she is one of developing countries but she is  going totally different speed than other developing countries. Lately, China has  shown the incredible speed of advancement in economic and social welfares after  2008 Olympic Games. South Korea was told by US frequently that they would  prevent China from growing to be stronger and increasing its influence in  Northeast Asia. Both were afraid each other and waste defense expenditure  together. South Korea could play some role for that respect. South Korea might  have both China and US find the real fact of fear and facilitate the cooperation  between both countries.  

- 184 -      South Korea:  Prior to German reunification, West Germany exerted great efforts  to promote amicable relationships with neighboring countries, garnering  support from them regarding the necessity of German reunification. One  outcome was that Hungary opened its border for the mass exodus of East  Germans, and this provided a good opportunity for the two Germanys to  achieve reunification. Could China, like Hungary, take a comprehensive  and embracing position on North Korean defectors? (At the debate of 1 st   Forum)  China:  North Korean defectors are an issue about which the Chinese  government is cautious because three elements intersect, namely, its  relations with other countries, its internal stability and international  humanitarian significance. Beijing has one relationship with North Korea  and another with South Korea, respectively. The question is whether Seoul  can accept North Koreans defecting to China in a situation where  Pyongyang does not recognize them as displaced and if it did, North  Korea would collapse? The increase in the number of defections is  attributed to the degree of tolerance by (China’s) policy. The policy is that  since defectors are those who had problems in the country, they should be  “left alone to go to South Korea if they want to.” As in the past Mr.  Hwang Jang-Yup left North Korea defectors alone, China does not bother  to arrest defectors. For North Korea, it is not always a bad thing to have  defectors, but rather it could be a good thing. (At the debate of 1 st  Forum)  Therefore, China, while being cautious about this issue, is trying to  take proactive actions. If North Korean defectors wanted to go to South  Korea and the headcount reached 100,000 or 200,000 people, all of whom  wanted to go to Korea in a situation where China didn’t actively prevent  them, Beijing could let them go. However we are not certain if South  Korea would have enough capacity to accommodate all such defectors.  Although Seoul is said to build North Korean refugee centers to  accommodate them, we believe that this is not possible. Currently,  defectors are smuggling themselves into China due to the economic  hardships that they are faced with. Since their primary reasons for  defection are money-making and subsistence, Pyongyang doesn’t consider  it as a societal problem, and waits for them to come back. Rather, many  problems are caused by NGOs in Korea. If we were Chinese government  officials, we would tell all North Korean defectors to “go if they want to.”  (At the debate of 1 st  Forum)  

- 185 -       It has been 20 years since China and South Korea established diplomatic  relations. It seemed that the relations have grown such that there was no issue that  the two countries could not discuss. Given that they were at war in 1950 and  military exchanges were limited to North Korea and China on one hand and South  Korea and the US on the other hand, it was extremely meaningful that both the  countries have gathered together to discuss security issues at this 2.0 track.  Now venue has been prepared so that both countries did not need to cover  up, but open up to consult each other on any issues of mutual interests. At the first  Forum Chinese and Korean incumbent and retired officers convened at the  academic conferences to discuss issues on the regional area. Scholars from both  South Korea and China have put forth many ideas ranging from military, politics  and economics affecting both nations. These scholars’ expertise was conducive to  comprehending each other and improving the relations between both.    2. The 2 nd  China-South Korea Security Forum    At the second Security Forum, 15 papers were presented from China and  South Korea. The first theme was the North Korean nuclear issue. Many of them  had addressed issues with respect to the nuclear status, i.e., ‘North Korea herself  insists that she is a nuclear state and the CIA has made it public that North Korea  does possess nuclear weapons.’ Whether or not to recognise North Korea’s  nuclear possession was an important foundation for mapping out appropriate  measures. And the second theme pertained to China’s role. An increasingly  greater perception was spreading across the world that Beijing was playing the  most outstanding and biggest role at the six-party talks. After all, it has begun to  propose and implement aggressive policies different from the past. So debates  between both side’s participants were mainly the role of China for North Korea  

- 186 -    Nuclear. Six party talks have pursued a solution to the nuclear issue through the  on-going, peaceful dialogues. Though they were nearing a feasible solution, they  had not yet discovered a clue to the resolution of the problem.  South Korea:  We understand China’s roles and hopes when it comes to a  peaceful resolution of the issue. If this nuclear issue should not be  resolved peacefully and hence North Korea should conduct nuclear tests or  possess nuclear weapons, what kind of North Korean policy would China  pursue? It would be appreciated to hear from Professor Ban Jin Kang or  others that have thoughts on this possibility. (At the debate of the 2 nd   Forum)  China:  First, we would say that such a negative assumption might not be  very desirable. Rather, we would promote a resolution of the issue in a  positive direction. The North Korean nuclear issue should be resolved  under the principle of concession based on equality and mutual respect.  The resolution has to be made gradually and the timing has to be  determined professionally. That is, there are problems to pursing a  resolution modeled after Libya’s nuclear case. Efforts should be made to  resolve the North Korean issue in a positive direction under the principles  of joint efforts, mutual equality, and mutual respect. (At the debate of the  2 nd  Forum)    China:  The nuclear issue is something that everyone is paying attention to  at present. There are three big questions. First, will North Korea possess  nuclear weapons? Second, what will be her intention and purpose if she  possesses nuclear weapons? Third, will it truly declare the renunciation of  the nukes if terms and conditions of mutual benefit are reached? The  current estimate by South Korea and American experts is that North Korea  has already produced early-stage nuclear weapons or possesses technology  to produce such weapons. However, many military experts around the  globe question whether it was able to produce nuclear weapons without  nuclear tests or sophisticated technology.  Since there is no compelling evidence that North Korea possesses  nuclear weapons, i.e., there is no evidence that it has accumulated nuclear  

- 187 -    technology through simulation games or mock tests, or conducted nuclear  tests, we are skeptical about possession of nuclear weapons.  The second thing that we are wondering about is what North Korea  wants from possessing nuclear weapons. It is a bargaining chip for the  country to use on the negotiable table as a part of the brinkmanship tactics.  In other words, its nuclear development or possession means the pursuit of  her strategic interest.  The third question is what conditions it is demanding with the  development of nuclear weapons. North Korea desires economic gains,  regime assurance and neighboring powers’ approval as a reward of giving  up nukes or suspending nuclear development. We suspect that it may  abandon such weapons if she thinks that strategic benefits arising from  such demands in exchange of nuclear development abandonment are  bigger than those from maintaining the nuclear program. (At the debate of  the 2 nd  Forum)    Chinese scholars feel that there was inequality between US and North  Korea. Frankly speaking they were saying US did not respect North Korea. They  esteemed that those inequalities was the main reason for producing nuclear  weapon by North Korea. As the chair-state China was uneasy for no progression  on Six-party talks. So they said it has to be made gradually and the timing has to  be determined professionally. There was also controversy on whether North  Korea had nuclear weapons or not. Most of Chinese participants were suspicious  about North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons. They said it was not able to  produce nuclear weapons without nuclear tests or sophisticated technology. But  both sides agreed with that North Korea nuclear was a bargaining chip for the  country to use on the negotiable table as a part of the brinkmanship tactics. North  Korea developed nuclear weapon because of economic support and regime  assurance approved by neighboring powers. It could be solved easier by flexible  civilian channel rather than by rigid governmental channel.      

- 188 -     China:  Why does China play proactive roles at the six-party talks? Why is  China helping to resolve the nuclear issue? There are a few reasons as  follows:  First, the coming 21 st  century is a very important time for China’s  modernization in the next 50 years. And Beijing observes that the years  between 2001 and 2020 provide strategic opportunities to achieve national  development. For China to capture such strategic opportunities, various  internal measures should be pursued, including economic development,  reforms and open-door policies. Second, external conditions such as stable  and peaceful international environments need to be established for it to  facilitate internal development. This strategic interest is a whole aim  China has been pursuing in the course of her national development  processes. Establishing economy and shaping international conditions are  long-term objectives, and other foreign policies are subordinate to its  national development policy.  China’s policy to shape peaceful and stable international  environments can be summarized as follows - it takes root in the Asian  Pacific region, while stabilizing her surroundings. This again is the key  tenet of Beijing’s foreign policy. One of the fundamental reasons that it  participates in six-party talks and is anxiously engaged in resolving the  nuclear issue goes along with the same line. There is one question for the  Korean side.  The US claims that it wants to continue to get ahead with the  missile defense plan because of North Korea’s nuclear threat, but this is  nothing but an excuse. In my opinion, the US-led missile defense plan  purports to place Taiwan under the influence of the US. Hence, if such a  motive persists, China’s roles in six-party talks should be considered to a  certain extent. Many of you shared your thoughts on the South Korea-US  alliance and US-Japan alliance. China maintains the principle of a  peaceful reunification as a mode of reunification and the One China policy.  However, if circumstances are such that a peaceful reunification principle  is not feasible, China is willing to resort to a method of reunification by  force.  In any case a peaceful reunification of Taiwan and China is most  desirable and most beneficial to both countries. However, if the separation  movement which is currently taking place in Taiwan should spread any  further, this would inevitably force China to pursue a reunification by  force. My second question pertains to how Japan and Korea as allies of the  US would respond to a situation where the US should get involved in an  unfortunate war in the Taiwan Strait. (At the debate of the 2 nd  Forum)  

- 189 -    South Korea:  First, we would like to elaborate on South Korea’s position  regarding the missile defense program. It was stated that although China  would not think of North Korean nukes as a threat, that could work as an  actor that provokes the US to establish the defense program, something  that would include not only Korea, the US and Japan but also Taiwan. As  far as we know, Japan has clearly relayed its official position to the US  that it will participate in the defense program, and the two countries are  putting forward joint efforts. As far as we know, Taiwan’s position is yet  to be important.  We want to emphasize that Beijing should not put a light on Seoul  in the light of its forward-looking attitude towards the One-China policy.  We are telling this to you because we heard it mentioned that South  Korea’s participation in the missile defense may be connected with the  enhancement of China’s constructive roles in six-party talks. The roles  that Beijing is playing in the talks certainly benefit South Korea to a large  extent, but they also give benefits to China. A while ago, a good point was  raised that stability in the neighboring countries is one of the most  important things conducive to the maintenance of China’s national power.  Someone has also made a comment on South Korea’s position with  respect to a potential military conflict between China and Taiwan. First of  all, we need to lay out one major premise. You have mentioned that since  China perceives the Taiwan issue as an internal affair, it would be set to  wage a war against Taiwan by using force. But that is just China’s position.  If we take a realist international perspective on this issue rather than  viewing it as a legal matter, we need to pay attention to a provision  stipulated in the US domestic law and the relevant Taiwanese law that  Taiwan will receive support if it comes under attack in time.  Japanese National Defense officers asked “in case of emergency,  which side will Korea be on?” This proves that Japan perceives China- Taiwan relations as an international matter and considers them as related  to its national interest. This is completely my opinion, but in case of  emergency involving, Seoul’s policy decision will have to consider two  aspects: on one hand, in accordance with the South Korea-China  diplomatic normalization declaration ‘Taiwan is part of China’ and on the  other hand, the policy decision requires coordination with the USFK  within the framework of the alliance with the US. This is my personal  opinion, but South Korea is unlikely to strongly devise plans against this  issue. (At the debate of the 2 nd  Forum)    

- 190 -    In a joint statement for China-South Korea diplomatic normalisation in  1992, South Korea not only recognised the One-China policy but also included in  the statement ‘Taiwan should recognise China’ a phrase that even the US did not  endorse. With respect to the Tibet issue, US, Japan and even Taiwan invited the  Dalai Lama for visits. However, South Korea has not extended invitations to the  Dalai Lama because of China’s earnest request. South Korea and US differed  from each other regarding the status of the defence programme within the South  Korea-US combined defence system. Seoul’s basic position on the missile  defence programme was that it was to be carefully approached in a way that  enabled not only stability and peace in the peninsula but also Northeast Asian  stability and peace including peace in China. South Korea’s basic position on the  Taiwan issue has focused on supporting One-China policy more earnestly than  any other country in the region.    South Korea:  I have one question. It is desirable that the armistice system be  upgraded to a peace system. In the course of transition to a peace system  53 years since the Korean War, it is important to note that China is a  signatory of the Korean War Armistice Agreement. Recently, North Korea  has begun approaching a peace agreement with the US and Korea, but it  has not included Beijing in this conversation. As we are moving from an  armistice system to a peace system, what is China’s position? We would  like to hear some thoughts on this. (At the debate of the 2 nd  Forum)  China:  The Korean War broke out within the context of the then- international circumstances way before the Armistice Agreement was  signed. As a signatory to the Agreement, China has an important role to  play in moving from the Agreement to a peace agreement. When it comes  to changing it to a peace system, Beijing’s major position is that it will  surely respect the strategic interests of all the countries concerned and the  transition should take place in such a manner that ensures long-term and  enduring peace. In what manner should enduring peace be ensured? First  of all, efforts to ensure enduring peace began at the Geneva Conference in  1954.  

- 191 -    Attempts were made to ensure peace at the Geneva Conference,  but in vain. Recently, similar attempts were put forth through the  framework of talks. These attempts may make it possible to ensure peace.  By engaging in the talks, China will continue trying to change the  Agreement to a peace treaty in one way or another. Either through talks or  a multilateral framework, Beijing will definitely play certain roles. It was  mentioned that China does have roles to play in the transition to a peace  treaty. Such attempts to upgrade the Agreement to a peace agreement have  been continuously made since the Geneva Conference, but have not been  successful. Discussion on transition to a peace treaty seems possible  within such frameworks as six-party talks or multi-lateral arrangements.  (At the debate of the 2 nd  Forum)     Both China and Taiwan, and South Korea and North Korea are truly  unfortunate countries because of the tragic division. Chinese scholars made a  consistent claim that China would play a leading role in ensuring peace in the  Northeast Asian region and resolved issues in a peaceful manner. However, when  it comes to Taiwan, China avoided talking about peace and goes, so far, as to say  that it would achieve reunification by force, if required. This claim was anything  but different from South Korea saying that it would reunify the two Koreas by  force as necessary, if North Korea did not listen and behave, although the only  difference was that North Korea is a larger country than Taiwan and is more equal  to South Korea than Taiwan is equal to China. Nobody was sure whether there  will be reunification or not. It sounded like China interpreted the situation to her  own advantage. China side asked a question as to how South Korea would  respond to a war between China and Taiwan. Korean side also asked a similar  question as to how China would respond if it resorted to a war in order to achieve  reunification in Korean peninsula. Korean participants argued China could rightly  assess North Korean regime in the current status of inter-Korea relations.        

- 192 -    China:   We want to reemphasize that there are two aspects of China’s  solution to the Taiwan problem. First, its principle is not to use force right away,  but to resolve it in a peaceful manner. The second aspect is that Beijing intends to  attempt at peaceful reunification, but if it doesn’t work, i.e., Taiwan seeks  independence; it will not exclude an option to use force. It will be good to  understand this principle to mean that China gives the highest priority to the  peaceful resolution with a focus on peaceful reunification rather than to mean that  China intends to mobilize force as a solution to the problem. (At the debate of the  2 nd  Forum)  China:  As far as the provision that China will not give up the use of force  in resolving the Taiwan problem is concerned, much can be inferred from  Chinese leaders’ comments on Taiwan’s recent presidential election. First,  China will make her best efforts to reunify with Taiwan in a peaceful  manner. Second, if Taiwan intends to seek independence, Beijing will  make sure that the other will pay the price for it. Two remarks are  noteworthy.  Currently, the US is pressurizing China not to use. This is an  interference with domestic matter. The ultimate decision to resolve the  issue peacefully or by force is up to the Chinese leadership. We don’t  think the US has the right to intervene or comment on the domestic issue.  For the same matter, using force could be an option to reunify the two  Koreas.  When it comes to reunification with Taiwan, China’s constitution  stipulates that the People’s Liberation Army of China has the obligation to  defend the country and its territory. It also stipulates that if Taiwan tries to  go independent, China has the obligation to deter the move. (At the debate  of the 2 nd  Forum)    As for the US-Japan alliance, Chinese side said that its nature was  changing as Japan has established a Surrounding Areas Law – a country which  has a history of invasion in Asia. But they said South Korea-US alliance has not  gone through such functional changes as to establish laws like that law. Given that  experiences with invasions by Japan, both China and South Korea had a common  

- 193 -    understanding in many respects and were likely to have a high chance of mutual  cooperation in the future.    3. The 3 rd  China-South Korea Security Forum   Starting the debate of the 3 rd  Forum, one of Chinese scholar asked whether  it is possible that the USFK (US Forces in Korea) can be deployed without the  permission of the South Korean government in the event of military conflicts  surrounding the Taiwan issue. It was a very provocative and meaningful question.  All the Korean participants thought there were serious misunderstanding on  strategic flexibility of USFK but Chinese participants were very sincere on this  issue.  South Korea:  The US has spearheaded a new strategic initiative, and realigned  the USFK in accordance with this initiative. This change has made it  possible for some portion of the USFK to be deployed in Iraq. However,  South Korea did not agree to the commitment of the USFK in the event of  conflicts in Northeast Asia, including those between China and Taiwan.  The South Korean government doesn’t approve of the strategic flexibility  of the USFK. This is an issue that SK and the US should consult each  other as the role of the USFK changes. Our president has said that South  Korea cannot accept a new role of the USFK deploying to an area beyond  the Korean peninsula if it doesn’t serve South Korea’s national interest. It  is true that our congress and people have concerns about issues affecting  China, including the Taiwan problem. The primary focus of the South  Korea-US alliance is on deterrence against North Korea’s threat. (At the  debate of the 3 rd  Forum)  China:  It makes sense that President Roh wants South Korea to be a  balancer in the Northeast Asian region. But this seems to contradict the  fact that the country has no alliance relationship with other US allies or is  not an ally of China, doesn’t it? (At the debate of the 3 rd  Forum)    

- 194 -    South Korea:  The South Korea as a regional balancer perspective is being  questioned in the country as well. The two central questions are whether  South Korea has the actual capability to serve as a balancer in Northeast  Asia and whether it can play a neutral role by running the risk of the South  Korea-US alliance. The regional balancer neither implies that Seoul will  weaken the SK-US alliance nor suggests its neutral role. Rather, it will  pursue dynamic security relationships with neighbors in an amicable way  and in the long-term perspective, thereby serving as a regional balancer  not militarily but diplomatically. Also, South Korea serves as a regional  balancer to proclaim the commitment to ensuring stability and maintaining  peace in the peninsula (At the debate of the 3 rd  Forum).     The regional balancer perspective was proposed due to combined effects  of South Korea’s historical background and strategic vision for the future. This  perspective reflects its strategic vision that the peninsula will not be left  subordinate to other neighboring countries and will play preventive roles in the  future. To achieve this, South Korea will shape conditions to enable this vision  not as a force-based balancer but as a role-based balancer. Contrary to the way  how superpowers in Europe maintained the balance of power, South Korea, while  maintaining the fundamental framework of its alliance with the US, will garner  public opinion and consult neighbours.  Hypothetically speaking, should tensions escalate in the peninsula due to  conflicts and confrontations between China and Japan, deterrent power greater  than the South Korea-US ties would be needed because the alliance itself could  not be enough for a deterrent. In the 1980s, China and the US forged a cozy  relationship to execute a joint strategy against Russia. South Korea did not  normalise diplomatic relations with North Korea because China as an ally of  North Korea was considered a potential threat, but desired to be on good terms  with China because a friend of the US could be South Korea’s friend as well.  In order to maintain the South Korea-US alliance while improving South  Korea-China relationship, South Korea should serve as a balancer facilitating the  

- 195 -    strategic common understanding between China and US. There should be some  strategic leverage that South Korea can utilize in achieving the role of balancer  between China and US. South Korea anyway should keep alliance with US  without hampering China-South Korea relationship and develop China-South  Korea relationship without undermining South Korea-US alliance (Kim 2005:  130).  China:  The root cause of the nuclear issue lies in misunderstanding of the  North Korean system. North Korea is a reunification partner and the  people are compatriots. We would like to ask Korean participants to share  the Korean military’s assessment of North Korea’s internal conditions  based on the SK-US combined Operations Plan to the extent that it is not  confidential. (At the debate of the 3 rd  Forum)  South Korea:  Professor Chang mentioned that as one who has tied a knot must  untie it, North Korea holds the key to resolving the nuclear issue. It is  imperative that Chairman Kim Chong Il take a bold measure. No countries  participating in the six-party talks are sympathetic with Pyongyang, and  all of the five countries agree upon the grand principle of a nuclear-free  peninsula. Under no circumstances is the possession of nukes favorable to  North Korea. North Korea’s declaration that she possesses nukes runs  counter to what is considered to be common sense and militates against  her. We would like to hear from Chinese partners who may have visibility  on the inside story of North Korea through regularized contact as to why it  runs counter to common sense, which South Korea does not understand.  (At the debate of the 3 rd  Forum)    South Korea has a complete assessment of North Korea’s military threat,  and has the perfect preparedness against it. Inter-Korea exchanges are flourishing,  but reduction of military tension through building confidence measures is  insignificant. If South Korea provides energy assistance, North Korea may divert  that assistance to strengthen her military power. South Korea cannot allow that  possibility to happen. While the military authorities of both Koreas, including the  

- 196 -    Defense Ministers, agreed on confidence-building measures, they have not been  implemented.    China:  North Korea as a Cho-sun style socialist country based on Juche  idea has responded to international pressure not by succumbing to  international game rules but by developing nuclear weapons so that she  will ensure security. In the post-Cold War era North Korea’s economy  collapsed, and has been confronted with natural disasters and economic  system limitations. Given such circumstances, Pyongyang has been trying  to convince the US, Japan, and South Korea to lift their economic  sanctions and let it receive assistance from the international community.  Since North Korea desires to employ talks to receive economic aid, she is  likely to return to the framework when she is sure that economic aid will  be certainly provided. (At the debate of the 3 rd  Forum)  South Korea:  The South Korean government has a hard time devising a clear  North Korean policy guideline with respect to the nuclear issue. Seoul  expects that if it relied on a US approach, Pyongyang would be strongly  opposed to that, but if it considered the North Korea’s position, it would  be criticized for not understanding North Korea’s South Korean policy.  China should dissuade North Korea from taking SK hostage and convince  it to give up its strategy to communize SK. (At the debate of the 3 rd   Forum)    4. The 4 th  China-South Korea Security Forum    The dynamic structure of East Asia can be best described as a two- superpower or multipolar system. It is partially because there seem to be much  bigger misunderstandings with regards to each other’s perspectives between  China and US. The misunderstanding manifests itself as overestimation or  exaggeration of the threat from each other. Experts should meet face-to-face to  share assessments and opinions through flexible dialogues. Military exchange and  

- 197 -    cooperation between the countries has not yet got on the right track. There also  existed some sources of misunderstanding regarding USFK strategic flexibility,  which can be resolved through dialogues.  The lack of reciprocity is a big problem. It is imperative that strategic  dialogues between China and the US, between China and South Korea should be  regularised. Stability and peace in East Asia is a national objective and strategic  objective for all the countries in the region. In order to achieve this, they should  create opportunities to keep the same pace with one another. At the debate of the  Forth Forum the emergency happenings in North Korea and how to manage it was  sincerely discussed.  Basic assumptions surrounding the case of emergency were that it follows not  because of North Korea’s provocations but because of the collapse of its regime,  civil uprisings or political upheaval. Both sides agreed with that the surrounding  countries should focus their objectives on stabilising North Korea or putting it  back to order, but not on trying to exploit those situations as opportunities for  their national selfishness. Should they try to exploit those opportunities for the  sake of reunification or interference, they would eventually hurt their own  security interests. The perspective of neighboring countries should direct towards  stability and peace on the peninsula.    South Korea:  Chinese scholars have mentioned that the stabilization of North  Korea is important and nobody is opposed to a stabilized nation. Neither  the South Korean government nor its people want a war. No one wants a  mass flux of North Korea defectors into South Korea. Should the defectors  pass across Yap-Rok and Doo-Man Rivers, what would you do about it?  South Korea is in the same shoes. When it comes to what is North Korea’s  stability, we think that there are two things that need to be made clear.  First, stability differs depending on whether we view it as a peacetime  concept or as a contingency concept. What is a peacetime stabilization  concept? Literally speaking, this means change in North Korea. Why do  

- 198 -    you guess Kim Chong Il went to China early this year? Why did China  show him around special economy zones, Guang Dong province, and  Shinchen region? Wasn’t it because China wanted to show him that even  if his country could not implement reforms and an open-door policy as  China did, it should no longer continue the way things have been done in  North Korea. Wasn’t it because Beijing wanted to tell him that the  neighbor could not be sustained anymore? Didn’t China want to tell him  that Pyongyang also had to sustain itself to enable stability? In that sense,  stability refers to autonomous change by North Korea, not assistance to it.  Assistance has limitations. North Korea has been helped and now what are  the outcomes? Nuclear capabilities have been developed and missiles  launched.  Accordingly, the true meaning of what North Korea means by  stability is its system security. Could regime security be the same as  system security?  If we regard the Kim Chong Il regime’s internal reforms and open- door policy as signals of instability, it eventually is not North Korea’s  system security. For this reason, the South Korean and Chinese  governments made it clear that they wanted North Korea’s system security.  In that regard, the regime has to change. The regime, although not  pursuing a Chinese-style or a Soviet Union Perestroika-style change,  should not be the way it has been for long. Such current problems as  defectors, economic devastation, foreign currency forgery, drug export,  missile launches, and nuclear tests will drag North Korea into self- destruction. All these problems deserve attention for the interest of China  as well.  Stability is a peacetime concept as well as an emergency concept.  A scenario may arise in North Korea, which neither China nor Korea has  anticipated. For example, an incident may take place similar to the  December 6 Incident and December 12 Incident in South Korea 25 years  ago, or China’s Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989. Or it may be like the  Ceausescu Incident in Romania in 1991 or the Fall of the Berlin Wall in  1989. Such incidents can happen without warning. What are we supposed  to if they happen so? Now, China and South Korea may have conflicting  interests over this type of issue, and the latter may consider making an  unwanted intervention. It is highly likely that chaos in the North Korean  army will eventually cause accidental conflicts between the Koreas. If it  happens, South Korea, the US, China, and other countries concerned need  to find ways to make sure that no damage is made to the national interests  of each country. We also need to cooperate so that all countries concerned  may have a joint system in place. (At the debate of the 4 th  Forum)    

- 199 -    Every country establishes and implements its own security policy and  deterrence against war and preparedness is of primary importance. More  substantially, turning an international environment that can be threatening to  security into a peaceful condition can be another principle. From this viewpoint,  South Korea is a country which has experienced many misfortunes throughout  history. With unsolved Cold War problems, it yearns to find solutions to the  problems in the 21 st  century. China’s national policy is to make it emerge as a  Great China by 2025. Likewise, South Korea wants to achieve reunification as  fast as it can, and as China emerges as a Great China, South Korea wants to be a  reunified, peaceful country, if not a great country, that coexists side by side with  China.   The controversial issue of the debate at the forth Forum was the concept of  strategic flexibility of the USFK. It emerged as part of comprehensive alignment  of the US global strategic repositioning, which was also known as global force.  The concept derived from the US strategic requirement exploit its military forces  in a flexible manner to respond to any possible threats, because the security  coverage of the US has widened, while its forces stationed abroad available for  contingencies have reduced with the global war on terrorism.  Issues surrounding the USFK have been raised as it was not an exception  to the US global strategic requirement. In the past, the USFK principally  responded only to threat from North Korea. In the post-Cold War era, things have  changed. For example, some 3,500 soldiers were deployed for the War in Iraq. So  the concept of strategic flexibility allowed for flexible options where the USFK  might be deployed to areas of crisis other than North Korea or the US forces other  than the USFK might be deployed in the peninsula should events occur  surrounding it. It seemed that there was no reason that South Korea should be  opposed to this initiative to implement strategic flexibility. This initiative was a  necessary consequence for the US. The question was whether the USFK might be  deployed to Taiwan should crisis take place? That was a critical area of interest  for China.  

- 200 -    South Korea:  Seoul has interest in and concerns about the way the USFK and  South Korea-US alliance become a source of conflict in its relationship  with China. Against this backdrop, President Roh has officially relayed  this situation to the US. The US has a clear sense of South Korea’s  position. The US also knows how issues regarding the USFK are causing  tension in South Korea-China relations and that South Korea is very  concerned about and opposed to such possible tension. That is why  personally to believe that never will the USFK be committed to Taiwan in  the name of strategic flexibility. If the USFK were committed, this would  be used politically, or would amount to an excuse for political attacks.  From a political perspective, this would be a kind of concern, but in  actuality there is a slim chance that it would be an actual concern.  Generally speaking, the South Korea-US alliance is not geared towards  issues surrounding China or Taiwan, but is designed to ensure stability  through the balance of powers in the peninsula and Northeast Asia. (At the  debate of the 4 th  Forum)    South Korea:  China-Japan relations date back to the Meiji Reform in 1868, the  Sino-Japanese War, the Greater East Asia War and the First World War.  China is expected to outsmart Japan in terms of economic power by 2015  or 2020. In five to ten years, the Sino-Japanese ties may have the biggest  turning point in its history. Because of this reason, it is natural that Japan  keeps strict watch on China.  It is such a big deal for Japan in 100 or 150 years. This is what  Japanese people are talking about. Beijing may as well understand why  Tokyo has concerns about China and perceives it as a potential,  competitive and absolute enemy. Many of you spoke about strategic  transparency. What we would desire for China and Japan is that both  countries meet face to face and engage in dialogue with Korea in the  middle.  Japan raised such concerns about China and strengthened its  alliance with the US. These actions are not related to the Taiwan issue, but  purport to make the China-Japan relationship favorable to Japan’s national  interest when it comes to dealing with China. We Koreans, located  between China and Japan, can understand both sides, but China and Japan  themselves seem to have different positions. (At the debate of the 4 th   Forum)  

- 201 -      5. The 5 th  China-South Korea Security Forum    At the debate of the 5 th  Forum North Korea nuclear test and economic  relations between China and South Korea were discussed on the table. For the  past 20 years China and South Korea have become new friends. However, North  Korea is older friends with China. From Beijing’s perspective, South Korea has  promises for development and hence China has to maintain friendship with it.  China has known North Korea as a friend for a long time, but has become a real  friend who will sincerely give advice. Therefore, China should not only  contemplate important advice to give to North Korea so that stability in the  peninsula is ensured, but also should devise ways to grow side by side with South  Korea.  South Korea has severed relationship with Taiwan as an old friend since  the 19 th  century and established diplomatic relations with China. China should  also reconsider about its relations with both the Koreas. The triangular alliance  among China, Russia, and North Korea was one of military aid. However, with  qualitative changes since in the post-Cold War era, an economic alliance was a lot  more important than a military alliance. South Korea and the US entered into an  FTA. China also wants an FTA with South Korea. Both need to have a critical  discussion as to whether moving back to a military alliance present in the Cold  War era or moving towards an economic alliance helps to maintain stability in the  Korean peninsula.    South Korea:  The first appearance of the writing in terms of the history of the  China-Korea relation dates back over 2,000 years ago. Each time the  ZhongYuan of China and the Korean peninsula were mentioned important.  

- 202 -    The stability of the Korean peninsula, although its influence was not very  strong, including Japan would have relatively big influence on the stability  of the ZhongYuan of China.  Historically speaking, since the Han dynasty many Chinese  dynasties such as the Sui, Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties,  have approached the Korean peninsula, either with conciliatory or  confrontational attitudes. The fiercest confrontation was present when  Chinese minority tribes occupied the ZhongYuan of China. The Yuan, Jin,  and Kara Khitan dynasties and the Qing dynasty established by the  Mongol gentile were good examples. Korea had both amicable and  antagonistic relationships with the Sui, Tang, Song, Ming dynasties, all of  which were established by the Han race. When speaking of the eastside of  the ZhongYuan of China, the world itself is equated with the great China  system. In this condition, when there are problems in the back of the  ZhongYuan, or in the Korean peninsula, the ZhongYuan is likely to go  through instability.  One may use the phrase, “wait for the other shoe to drop” to speak  of the Northern Triangular Alliance and Southern Triangular Alliance  since the 18 th  century. This ultimately means that stability in the eastern  side of China, or the Korean peninsula, is a critical factor for the stability  of China. Since the 19 th  century, both China and South Korea experienced  the same agony under the colonial rule of Japan. South Korea and China  had an antagonistic relationship during the Korean War. Stability factors  in the peninsula before the Cold War were characterized by the Southern  Triangular Alliance (the US, Japan, and South Korea) and the Northern  Triangular Alliance (China, Russia, and North Korea). To put it differently,  for China the status quo in the peninsula means stability in Northeast Asia.  We need to think differently about post-Cold War stability issues  in the peninsula. China needs to realistically assess in what form stability  in the peninsula should take and in what direction it has to go so that  China ensures internal stability as well.  China:  General Hwang made good comments on the history of South  Korea-China relations based on his experience as an Assistant Defense  Minister. We agree with General Hwang that China and South Korea  should promote strong trust with each other. For the sake of mutual  interest and trust promotion, both countries should handle even the  slightest problem as well as the most sensitive issues. This type of issue is  something both countries can work on as a good starter. A Chinese  proverb says, all those little steps do add up. In a similar manner, a small  leak will sink a great ship.  

- 203 -      Most of the experts and the scholars think that China can influence or  control North Korea very much. That was totally wrong. China cannot influence  or control North Korea. North Korea is a very strong independent country and  does not want be influenced by China. Through the China-South Korea Security  Forum China was clearly discovered that she never interfere in the internal affairs  of North Korea. China said US and North Korea are the ones that hold the key to  the resolution of the nuclear issue. They said although China and North Korea  have friendly relations, China, in principle, does not interfere with another  country’s internal matters.  They thought South Koreans who are truly familiar with North Korea’s  condition would not pose a demand on China about North Korea nuclear issue.  They have explained to the South Korean participants that China showed North  Korea both types of areas – areas which have well implemented reforms and  open-door policies. This signals to North Korea that China cannot provide more  economic aid to it because China also has poor regions that need to be taken care  of. Hence, if South Koreans demand that China should do this or that with respect  to North Korea, this will be contrary to China’s policies. They say this would also  create hostility among North Koreans.    China:  I believe that there have been many changes in conditions in the  Northeast Asian region. In particular, after the North Korean nuclear tests,  there have been drastic changes in security conditions in the region. Some  changes were not what we had anticipated. Much of this assessment came  after the nuclear tests: the security conditions in the peninsula will worsen,  trust between North Korea and the US will become weakened, the regional  security balance will be disrupted and neighboring countries will exploit  this occasion as an opportunity to expedite their militarization and  nuclearization. It is assessed that things are becoming more and more  difficult for six-party talks and uncertainty surrounding the nuclear issue is  looming larger and larger. Yet, the tension-ridden situation in the region  

- 204 -    eased due to intentional efforts by the countries in the region at least for a  short period of time.  First, a nuclear domino effect did not happen. There were concerns  that the nuclear tests would lead to an arms race and a nuclear competition  in the region as well as to a worsened security condition and the condition  is now under control. However, in actuality tension was rather reduced as  the countries made realistic efforts and there was no nuclear domino effect.  Second, the possibility for a war on the peninsula is under control.  The countries concerned have speedily tuned their positions and adopted  an effective and appropriate sanctions resolution in the United Nations  Security Council. Since the countries were cool-headed in handling the  nuclear issue, we were able to avoid seeing armies marshalling on the  peninsula and Northeast Asia as well as the escalation into an explosive  situation.  Bilateral talks between North Korea and the US within the fifth  six-party framework talks resumed after the nuclear tests. The talks were  raised to the next level with great substance in such a way that instead of  word for word or promise for promise, action for action became the norm.  While Pyongyang has not discarded its nuclear program and relevant  facilities, an explosive tension has been reduced due to the international  community’s expectations. The current condition shaped after nuclear  tests was not entirely unexpected, and this has also affected the nuclear  issue and uncertainty factors regarding security in Northeast Asia.  In particular, it has become obvious from the fifth talks that  Washington and Pyongyang hold the key to the nuclear issue. In the past  many neighboring countries believed that the key to the nuclear issue is  China, but this is not a realistic perspective. The US, SK, Japan and their  friends think that China is trying to stand up for North Korea due to the  long-lasting traditional friendship between them. Yet, China has shown a  tough attitude upon and taken measures against North Korea for action.  After the nuclear tests, none of the countries – SK, Japan and the  US – demanded China to stop providing aid to North Korea. In other  words, this type of relationship has to be well managed to achieve  denuclearization, nuclear abandonment and stability in the peninsula. The  question is whether the abandonment of nuclear facilities will lead to rapid  stability in the peninsula. The key clue to the solution of this problem is  how we achieve nuclear abandonment and denuclearization. Dr. Hong has  proposed several models and there is an appropriate model among the  proposals. The model should include an expectation for denuclearization  and stability in the peninsula. We currently feel that the attitude of the US  is very important. So are North Korea’s attitudes.  

- 205 -      Cho Sungtae the Representative of Korean delegation has asked Chinese  side to arrange North Korean observer at this Security Forum. After asking for  several times, China has expressed affirmative attitude to invite North Korean  scholars at this Security Forum. Actually, the members of CAIFC (China  Association for International Friendly Contact) have maintained meetings with  North Korean friends. Sometimes South Korean participants could get very fresh  information happening in North Korea from Chinese friends. One of participants  from China introduced at the debate what he has interviewed with officials of  North Korean Embassy in China just after the first North Korea nuclear test.  He said, “we were invited to be present at a meeting held in the North  Korean Embassy in China right after North Korea nuclear test. In our private  meeting with a North Korean diplomat we raised five questions, to which the  diplomat responded with great certainty. First, we asked, ‘How did the nuclear  tests go?’ The diplomat responded, ‘The nuclear tests were successful, but caused  no nuclear contamination.’ Second, we asked, ‘How did the North Korean people  receive North Korea’s nuclear tests?’ The diplomat responded, ‘The North  Korean populace was very pleased and uplifted about North Korea’s nuclear  capability.’ Third, we asked, ‘How did you think about China speaking in the  United Nations and casting a vote of yes to the United Nations sanctions?’ The  diplomat responded, ‘North Korea had known in advance that China would do  that.’ Fourth, we asked, ‘What is the next step?’ The diplomat responded, ‘It all  depends on what the US will do.’ Fifth, we asked, ‘How do you expect that the  US will handle issues with North Korea?’ The diplomat responded, ‘The US and  North Korea will have dialogues together.’        

- 206 -    China:  In 1992, China assessed the impact of the “Chinese Cultural Area”  on the Asia-Pacific region for the next 10 years in the Chinese Periodicals.  From ZhongYuan’s perspective, China encompassed the Chinese  Character Cultural Area representing an agricultural civilization. This  surely served as the cultural background of relationships in Northeast Asia.  At that time the agricultural civilization characterized by the Chinese  Character Cultural area of ZhongYuan of China originated from both  North and South areas.  We had the Huns during the Han dynasty, the Kok-Turks during  the Tang dynasty and the Mongols during the Ming dynasty. At that time,  the Han, Tang and Ming dynasties had close relationships with the  peninsula. Historically speaking, China as an agricultural society had  delicate relationships with the Northeast Asian region. The region was a  strategic preparation area for the nomad people to come down to the  Zhong Yuan of China. Hence, the Chinese history shows that the Kara  Khitan dynasty and Qing dynasty maintained delicate relationships with  the peninsula. A strategic preparation process by nomad people moving  down south is well recorded in the history of the Ming dynasty.  During the Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1592, Admiral Lee, Sun  Shin resolved threats in the East Asia region through the maritime  civilization, and the stability of the region was achieved through efforts on  the waters. After that time, Northeast Asia was divided by the military  force of the West. As a result, the peninsula was completely colonized and  China was partially colonized. As history evolved, East Asia started to  play traditional geopolitical roles after the end of the Cold War.    It is very true in order to create a security composition in Northeast Asia,  it is important to understand the history as well as establish a new awareness of  the history that promotes a new perspective on nations and security mechanisms.  Northeast Asia historically, which nomads used as a strategic station to advance  onto the ZhongYuan of China, can be the hub of the Asia-Pacific region.  China:  While China-South Korea cooperation is much discussed with  respect to security in Northeast Asia, the role played by the US is  extremely critical. Washington has not taken the responsibility of the  

- 207 -    nuclear issue as it has deepened until today. It is mainly because the US  has not implemented a consistent North Korean policy in coping with the  nuclear issue. That change has been huge. From this standpoint, we cannot  blame Pyongyang for not trusting the US. While during the Clinton  administration the US and North Korea agreed upon the General  Framework, the Bush administration reversed it. It is because when a new  administration sets in after the incumbent administration’s tenure is  finished, partial changes to the strategy and policy, if not national-level  changes, are bound to take place.  Another observation is that there is not a consensus over the  current policy of the US within the House of Representatives and the  Senate as well as among different factions. Therefore, there are a lot of  uncertainty factors. It is natural that under such circumstances a country  which doesn’t believe its security is guaranteed is likely to not trust  Washington. When it comes to security issues in Northeast Asia, China,  South Korea and the US think differently. Basically, the US thinks in  terms of an alliance system. It has bilateral alliances with South Korea and  the Philippines. Based on the existing relations, it pursues a Northeast  Asian security cooperation system with China and Russia.    It cannot be neglected the inconsistent policy toward North Korea from  US and South Korea. In South Korea and US when Presidency was changed, the  policy was changed at the same time. They say state foreign policy never changes  according to the regime change but it is perceived to free voting political system  country not to North Korea. Through the debate it was discovered that North  Korea has some consistency of their policy. Of course sometimes North Korea  has exploited this voting system politically in South Korea and US but they were  much unsatisfied with this policy inconsistency of US and South Korea.    From China’s perspective, all the countries are equal within a  Northeast Asian security cooperation system. China thinks that no alliance  should be established within the system. This is where Beijing and  Washington differ. South Korea, while forging an alliance with the US,  asserts a Northeast Asian balancer. The formation of this type of policy  suggests that South Korea’s view is getting closer to China’s view. In  reality, a big dilemma that faces Seoul is that it cannot discard a mutual  

- 208 -    relationship with the US. Alliances are major stumbling blocks to ensuring  security cooperation in Northeast Asia. Hence, the issue that we are faced  with is how we view the South Korea-US and US-Japan alliances.  Currently, China doesn’t have the power to improve the situation.  It only has the power to influence the basic context of cooperation system.  Under the prevailing circumstances Beijing does not have the power to  change the current phenomenon. Nor does it have the power to oppose the  US-Japan and US-South Korea alliances. The reality is that while China  doesn’t approve of such military alliances, it doesn’t have the power to  change the situation. China’s realistic policy today is to tolerate these  alliances, while maintaining the context of multilateral cooperation and  upholding the principle that every country is equal. In other words, the  policy is gradually establishing a true security cooperation system through  accepting one area and changing another area. The fact of the matter is  that there are alliance systems in Northeast Asia, and while these alliances  are not favorable to a Northeast Asian security cooperation system, China  has no choice but to accept this.    China:  I would like to hear from Korean experts. What does strategic  flexibility between South Korea and the US mean? How do strategic  flexibility and Northeast Asian security issues affect both countries? More  specifically, to what extent will the strategic flexibility of the USFK  influence the North Korean nuclear issue and the Taiwan issue?    South Korea:  These questions seem to be difficult, but in fact they are easy once  you know their nature. What is the strategic flexibility of the US? Some  are concerned that this strategic flexibility which the US advances is a way  to divert the USFK to an armed conflict with China. However, it is not  true. There is no chance of an armed conflict. It is not common sense to  believe that the grand strategic changes of the US will influence what is  not even likely to happen. If so, where does this strategic flexibility come  from?  With the September 11 terrorist attacks the US was engulfed in  huge shock and waged a global anti-terrorism war against Afghanistan and  Iraq. While the US won the wars, terrorist threats have persisted. This  situation forced it to change its strategy from a Win-Win one that prepares  

- 209 -    it against two simultaneous wars in two regions to a global war on  terrorism. Washington was confronted with a possible scenario where a  767 airplane loaded with nuclear and chemical weapons might attack the  WTO building or the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. The top strategic  priority of the US is the global war on terrorism. While it won the wars in  Iraq and Afghanistan, the US had to implement a huge change because it  failed to prevent terrorism. This is the strategic flexibility of the US.    The major idea behind the strategic flexibility of USFK was that US will  not operate a built-in military force, but maintain flexibility and in the worst case  respond immediately to an identified terrorist threat through marshaling a force in  an area where terror is likely to happen. Some people who have an intention to  drive a wedge between China and South Korea could be trying to speculate that  should an armed conflict take place between China and Taiwan, the strategic  flexibility of the US will involve the commitment of the USFK in the affected  area. In the worst case scenario, this might happen. There is almost no chance in  Taiwan. It is the worst choice to make if we allow for this type of issue to worsen  South Korea-China and South Korea-US relations. Therefore, a broad  interpretation about the strategic flexibility issue is extremely inappropriate.    6. The 6 th  China-South Korea Security Forum    At the free debate of the 6 th  Forum, participants from both countries have  discussed the South Korea-US strategic alliance as well as stability in Northeast  Asia. China said the alliance was very important for the South Korea-China  strategic cooperation partnership. And it needs to be changed dynamically as  circumstances change and should develop in a way that it is consistent with the  common interests of all the countries concerned. They argued China and South  

- 210 -    Korea should prepare for the future and play appropriate roles for peace and  prosperity on the Korean peninsula.     China:  Objectively speaking, the international condition sometimes  changes beyond our recognition as any circumstances constantly change.  In my opinion, the South Korea-US alliance is very complex and profound,  and has its own history. Under this condition, the alliance is bound to set  in a positive direction. Whenever it meets with the US, China has  consistently emphasized that it does not have any military alliance with  any neighboring country. It means that China doesn’t have such military  alliances as foreign scholars conceive of. We hope that Koreans will  understand this fact as well. When it comes to the security policy of the  US with China, it is different from what is understood by South Koreans.  South Korea:  Strategic partnership between South Korea and China was adopted  by the heads of the two countries who had a shared vision, but not as a  result of the meeting. Sometimes some communication as 1.5-Track  Dialogue is needed to implement issues addressed in the statement. We  have been wondering about the nature of the strategic cooperation  partnership between Beijing and Seoul. For example, China has a big  interest in the Missile Defense. We must think about how South Korea’s  MD policy would affect our bilateral strategic cooperation partnership. In  that sense it is imperative that feasible proposals be discussed for policy  recommendation and 1.5-Track coordination is made between them over  suggested ideas and opinions. Any country has changes in perceptions  about circumstances. When researching the modernization of China back  at the RAND Institute in the late 1980s, relations between China and the  US were very good to the point that they were viewed as strategic  cooperation. Their cooperation back then was targeted against Russia. As  such, these types of meetings are opportunities to resolve differences in  opinions as new issues come into existence with the change of  circumstances.    China and South Korea have made significant progress through sharing  candid opinions with each other at the Security Forum. Security implies survival  or how a nation can survive and prosper or how a nation can live better. Both  

- 211 -    participants have gathered together to upgrade their mutual existence and mutual  prosperity between South Korea and China. China seemed to have less trust about  the South Korea-US alliance. There were issues including the Missile Defense  that made China uncomfortable. The USFK has roles in the peninsula, in  Northeast Asia, and in the globe. In particular, deterrence against war in the  peninsula is the primary purpose of the USFK.  On a global scale, the USFK can contribute to efforts at the  denuclearisation of the peninsula. During the Minster-level talks between South  Korea and China, both sides agreed on three big items. Those same items  explained why the USFK has to be stationed in the Korean peninsula. Then, this  issue has to be approached from a broader point of view, where China and South  Korea share the same values. They share universal values such as freedom,  equality, peace, and prosperity which they should aspire to advance, and if so, the  countries could solve many issues from a broader point of view.  Strategic dialogue and cooperation would enable the US and China to  resolve the Missile Defense issue and issues associated with the strategic  flexibility of US. China could benefit from a peninsula policy based on the  assessment that should reunification follow a sudden change taking place in North  Korea, this would benefit China both politically and economically. Partners  cannot exist if either side becomes superior or exclusivity is at play. The future  direction should be pursuing universal values. All the countries in Northeast Asia  should make joint efforts to realise universal values for the sake of stability in the  region and world peace.  South Korea:  Relations between countries by nature have elements of ambiguity.  As relations between China and South Korea improve, diverse opinions  are being expressed. In Korea, there are voices that evaluate the  relationship between South Korea and the US rather positively in the  midst of the relations between China and Seoul. There are other voices  that view China as negative, threatening and dangerous. Geographically  speaking, South Korea is in between China as a continent and Japan as an  

- 212 -    ocean, and has become a battlefield throughout history. Considering this,  China’s growth since the reforms is partially attributable to stability in the  peninsula. Could Beijing have focused on growth had the peninsula not  been stable?  One Chinese government official says that the Korean War  delayed China’s economic development by over 10 years. This highlights  the fact that instability in the peninsula is a stumbling block to China’s  growth. If we could assume that stability in the peninsula for the last 60  years is the cause of China’s prosperity, what would be the source of  stability? The South Korea-US alliance could be one source of stability,  and China should admit that. North Korea has maintained a hereditary  communist system, trying to achieve the reunification of the two Koreas  by force. Under this circumstance, China’s growth would have been  impossible without the existence of the South Korea-US alliance. In this  regard, China’s further growth may be determined by how stability is  ensured until the reunification comes or even after the reunification is  achieved. History is teaching this to us. Namely, if the Korean peninsula is  stable, Northeast Asia is stable. Each time we meet with US officials, we  try to convince them that the South Korea-US alliance is a key factor in  achieving stability in the peninsula, thereby ensuring stability in Northeast  Asia.  However, China thinks that the alliance is hegemonic and  dangerous. A more realistic assessment is that the alliance is an important  source of stability on the Korean peninsula, thus ensuring continued  economic development. Reflecting on presentations by the Chinese side,  we realize that Beijing thinks with negativity and hostility that the alliance  is to deter against China or pose threat to China. China has to recognize  the South Korea-US alliance because it is needed for the prosperity of  China. The future goal of the alliance is to contribute to stability in  Northeast Asia. This is an absolute goal that both South Korea and the US  are trying to achieve. The alliance is laying the foundation for the  achievement of this goal. Under this condition, what is the relationship  between South Korea and China? The heads of the countries have agreed  upon a strategic cooperation partnership for various areas including  overall security areas. South Korea and China need to further develop this  strategic cooperation partnership and run this relationship in parallel with  the relationship between South Korea and the US. How long do we have  to attempt to gain supremacy and challenge each other, not being able to  get over our history where we pointed a gun at one another during the  Korean War? Over time the meaningfulness of an alliance is becoming  weak. Now partnership, a partnership relationship or a combined  relationship is becoming more important.    

- 213 -    China:  Beijing and Seoul cannot make a complete consensus in a few  perspectives. First, from South Korea’s strategic point of view its national  strategy cannot replace the Northeast Asia strategy of the US, and one of  the key components of the strategy is targeting at China. The US doesn’t  explicitly express its alliance relationships in the Northeast Asian region.  Although South Korea’s is not targeting at China, the forward positioning  of the USFK suggests that the US is still targeting at China. The South  Korea-US alliance has gone through a lot of changes, but those changes  came from the change in the Northeast Asia strategy of the US. No one  questions the fact that the alliance is to ensure peace and stability in the  peninsula, but one cannot readily say that the alliance is to deter Japan’s  remilitarization or to secure stability in the region. From a broader  perspective, the alliance can be seen as deterrence against Japan.  However, the alliance is moving away from its traditional focus on  deterrence against North Korea’s threat. Rather, it is experiencing changes  on global and practical dimensions and is included in various areas. As  such, China cannot help but pay attention to the alliance. South Korea is  adjusting to the strategy of the US on a different dimension, but South  Korean government officials’ comments inform us that the alliance has to  be the basis of a mechanism to build peace in Northeast Asia. Last May, a  high-level government official from South Korea gave a lecture to Chinese  graduate students, in which the US military is suggested as a source of  stability. China and South Korea differ over such issues as addressed  above.    Why the strategic South Korea-US alliance? The alliance has become less  strong in terms of common threat factors since the end of the Cold War. In 2006,  the alliance was redefined as a post-Cold War, comprehensive, dynamic, and  reciprocal non-military alliance, remote from the military alliance earlier. The  alliance is reestablished as a strategic one that promotes new values, trust and  peace. It also means an expanded scope of mutual cooperation. Therefore, it is not  logically sound to say that the military alliance has become stronger. At the  debate it was mentioned that it moved from a cooperation limited to the peninsula  to one expanded to be a regional alliance. A retired Korean high official said, ‘As  relations between China and South Korea improved in the 1990s, problems were  raised regarding the regional alliance concept. This stopped further discussion on  

- 214 -    the alliance. Rather, global cooperation was emphasised to respond to terrorist  states such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, the strategic flexibility of the  USFK doesn’t represent the characteristic of the South Korea-US alliance, but  that of the USFK. The alliance should not get engaged in military involvement in  regional issues.’    7. The 7 th  China-South Korea Security Forum    The discussion of the 7 th  Security Forum was very candid and convinced  the participants from both countries that although the circumstances in the East  Asia were complex, there should surely be a cue to the solution of those problems.  They were strongly motivated to make the solutions and two hosting institutes  CAIFC from China and KRIMA from South Korea were very much satisfied with  the results. At the debate, North Korea nuclear weapon and some structural  problems of East Asia such as China’s permission of North Korea’s possession of  nuclear weapons, the possibility of North Korea’s nuclear abandonment, conflicts  between South Korea and North Korea and South Korea-US military alliance etc.  were discussed.  South Korea:  Dr. Wang mentioned that the nuclear umbrella of the US has a  negative effect on the denuclearization of the peninsula, but this is  contrary to the nuclear strategy theory. If the US didn’t provide a nuclear  umbrella for South Korea, its people would definitely call for South  Korea’s nuclear armament. This is not congruent with the purpose of the  non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The NPT is designed to achieve the  objective that countries don’t need to possess nukes because they will be  covered by the US. Therefore, it doesn’t make sense, both in theory and  practice, to assert that the deterrence of nuclear proliferation provided by  the US for South Korea has a negative influence on the denuclearization of  the peninsula.  

- 215 -    There seems to be a misunderstanding about the Missile Defense  discussed at the 41 st  annual South Korea-US Security Consultative  Meeting (SEM). The Missile Defense includes the nuclear umbrella  provided by the US, missile defense capabilities and deterrence against  proliferation through the application of conventional offensive forces. This  Missile Defense is not one South Korea is participating in, it only refers to  the system that the US possesses. In other words, if North Korea uses  nuclear weapons to attack South Korea, the US will take retaliatory  measures. Through this, a message has been sent to North Korea that  Pyongyang should not attack South Korea. This is how we can assure  safety and security for the South Korean people and prevent the  occurrence of bad nuclear situations in the peninsula. South Korea, which  values good relations with China, wants to participate in the Missile  Defense, but at the same time doesn’t want to.    China:  North Korea differs from South Korea and the US in terms of  preconditions for nuclear disarmament as well as North Korea’s opening  the door. According to the Chinese media, a Korean media outlet had  reported that an operation plan had been written in preparation against a  sudden change in North Korea. The report mentioned that the plan began  during the Kim, Dae Joong administration and became visualized since the  Lee, Myung Bak administration. This plan is reported to contain five  possible scenarios. We wonder how operational control will be at play  between South Korea and the US. Given this, we are questioning whether  South Korea and the US have the desire to resolve the North Korean  nuclear issue in a peaceful manner. In particular, we would like to know  how the United States administration is assessing a sudden change in  North Korea, what response plans the United States has, and what other  plans the United States has.    Currently South Korea has twenty nuclear reactors. She has 700 to 800  tons of spent nuclear fuels per year from the twenty reactors. By now, the  inventory of spent fuels amounts to 10,000 tons. Spent fuels are extremely  dangerous and need to be permanently treated. If they are not reprocessed, they  cannot be permanently treated. Therefore, South Korean experts are asking for the  reprocessing of the spent fuels. International community thinks that the  proliferation of reprocessing means an expansion of capability to build nuclear  

- 216 -    weapons. Many countries such as Korea, which produce nuclear energy in a  peaceful manner, are not able to reprocess spent fuels because of environmental  concerns. To solve this problem, some people claim that a consortium should be  organised at an international level. It is important to cope with the spent nuclear  fuels issue as soon as possible in such a way that plutonium is not separated and  reprocessing does not involve the production of nuclear weapons. By the end of  2016, South Korea’s spent nuclear fuels are projected to be fully saturated.  Actually this is a very urgent issue for the country.    South Korea:  I would like to share the policy direction of the US with respect to  the Korean peninsula as well as some of my personal thoughts. The South  Korea-US alliance began with the three-year-long Korean War that started  in 1950. Sixteen countries under the flag of the United Nations including  the US restored the pre-war borderline and the war stopped with the  establishment of the Military Demarcation Line. In order to prepare  against North Korea’s reinvasion, the US and South Korea signed the  Mutual Defense Treaty. This system has successfully deterred war for the  past 60 years as well as ensured peace and safety in the peninsula.  Consequently, we were able to overcome the calamity of the war. During  the 1960s, Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world. However,  after updating the national organization into a modern system through war  deterrence, South Korea became the 13 th  largest economy in the world. For  the past 60 years, safety in the peninsula has played a positive role in  promoting security in Northeast Asia and has helped China to emerge.  The region with China and Japan at its center has become a key  player in the 21 st  century Asia-Pacific era. Nobody doubts that in the  future South Korea, China, and Japan will play a central role in the world.  The economy of the US is closely related to that of South Korea, China,  and Japan. Since any deviation from the framework by any country among  the four will affect the whole, the four countries have no other choice but  to consider mutually complementary interests for further development. As  such, China-South Korea relations have tremendously contributed to  regional stability and the improvement of the regional economy. In other  words, the most important purpose of the US policy with the Korean  peninsula is to ensure war deterrence and peace and stability there and the  growth of the regional economy, whether the approach is to take a firm or  soft stance.  

- 217 -    China:  I have a comment on the nuclear umbrella. The question is whether  the Joint Statement specifies the application of the nuclear umbrella in the  event of a crisis in the peninsula and under what conditions it will be used,  or whether it will be provided in the event of a nuclear weapon threat, or  in the case of the loss of control over nuclear weapons. According to  media reports and other information regarding the missile defense system,  we understand that South Korea is building its own C41 system. We  wonder if this system is a missile system that South Korea is building  independently. We think that is why South Korea is actively participating  in the US missile defense system. We wonder how its participation in the  defense system will influence safety in Northeast Asia.    What would happen if there were a sudden change in the midst of the  possession of nukes? These problems need to be resolved in any way possible  because they are urgent issues not only for the peninsula but also for Northeast  Asia. The biggest current issue of the US peace policy on the peninsula would  focus on how to stably manage a potential sudden change in North Korea in a  non-military, super-national, and comprehensive manner. Accordingly, a  fundamental step needs to be taken to establish peace and safety. What will those  steps be? Korean participants argued that China should play a decisive role not  only as a geopolitical neighbour but also as a leading power in the world economy.  They said the problems cannot be solved without China.  Feasible options such as the six-party talks and multilateral coordination  were proposed, and these options should develop into more realistic and  practicable options. Quite many on the Chinese side proposed that Koreans  themselves should resolve the problem. The basis of Eastern philosophy which  both China and South Korea espouse highly values the ways of the world; ‘Wars  beget fire, and long-lasting conflicts beget attrition.’ Peace and stability ensure  production. Only when peace and stability continue, economics can be improved  and culture can be promoted, thereby improving the quality of people. It is  desirable to end confrontation and distrust and to envision a big picture for the  

- 218 -    sake of future-oriented development through dialogue and cooperation based on  mutual trust.    China:  Korea and China have different perspectives. How are we going to  solve the North Korean nuclear issue? Are we going to wait passively? Or  are we going to proactively respond to it? What thoughts do South Korea  and the US have about this issue? How is it going to correspond with the  nuclear disarmament objective? How are certain countries going to  respond after the two Koreas are reunified? Most Chinese scholars think  that North Korea is an autonomous sovereign state. If problems occur in a  sovereign state, that is dealt with according to international law. As  Professor Chung mentioned, one race is living in the Korean peninsula,  but according to international law two countries composed of one race  exist. Each country has an opinion as to how other countries should  behave when a country has its own internal problems.  We can think of different situations that face different countries.  Let’s take an example of Afghanistan, which is a sovereign state. This  country has many problems. So do Pakistan and Somalia. The interim  government in Somalia is totally dysfunctional at present. Yet, Somalia is  a sovereign state. Under this condition, it has to solve its problems. We all  need to seriously ponder whether the DPRK’s problem is limited to North  Korea’s problem alone. When we see a problem in North Korea, we need  to think whether the problem is a problem North Korea should be left to  solve or a problem that foreign countries intervene in. A unified nation- state is a choice that the people need to make for themselves. The  reunification of Germany was a choice that both East Germans and West  Germans made. Hence, more deep research is needed about the Korean  reunification issue. All the countries, including China, have a sudden  change in North Korea in mind, but China’s research interest lies in how  China can maintain the safety of Chinese people along the China-North  Korea borders. The major factor is under what conditions the least threat  will be posed to Chinese people.  I think that the same is true of South Korea. Those issues need to  be taken into account as most important factors. From the international  law perspective, it is necessary to come up with ways to deal with  problems in other countries. There must be lots of problems. The Afghan  government, the Pakistani government and the Somali interim government  are not doing anything, but they should try to solve their problems on their  own like the West and East Germans did. North Korea should solve its  

- 219 -    national problems, but we need to think whether they have the capability  to do so.  When it comes to reunification, the US also respects South Korea’s  principle of self-determination. This principle has been emphasised by the South  Korean government over and over again. Nobody questions the grand premise  that the two Koreas should be reunified in a gradual and peaceful manner. The  future of the South Korea-US alliance in the post-reunification days depends on a  reunified Korean government’s intention. Should the USFK be withdrawn from  the peninsula, there could be a power vacuum. This situation will invite  interventions by neighboring countries which desire to exert influence. This will  result in armed conflicts to gain regional supremacy. Therefore, the alliance might  be needed to achieve stability and peace. The only problem is when the USFK  physically advances onto the northern part of the peninsula. Since such a move  could pose a threat to the security of China, as long as the USFK remains south of  the Military Demarcation Line, no threat will be posed to China.    South Korea:  Joint Statement was not clear on the conditions under which the  nuclear umbrella or deterrence will be provided and what kind of event  may justify such actions. But this can be answered if we look at the  process in which the NPT was made. Nuclear states provided the NSA and  the PSA. NSA means that nuclear states will never attack non-nuclear  states. This sends a message to non-nuclear states that they should not  possess nukes. This was declared in the process of maintaining the NPT.  Although this promise was made to unspecified countries, there was a  question whether that promise will be implemented. Hence, in order to  complement the NSA, the PSA was in place. This is the nuclear umbrella.  It is an official declaration that a nuclear state retaliates against a third  country that attacks the nuclear state or its allies using nuclear weapons  and that the nuclear state will never attack a non-nuclear state. However,  due to suspicion on group promise, the PSA was provided. Yet, since this  applies to nuclear attacks, no concerns should be raised as to the nuclear  umbrella. It’s fair to say that international law has to be respected in the  event of a sudden change in North Korea. Korea is not the exception.  

- 220 -    Some scholars speculate that there are five or six scenarios, but it  is likely that there are over 100 scenarios. Scenarios differ depending on  the gravity of an event. As for an event of low importance, there are a little  cautious scenario and an extremely serious scenario. An event of low  importance refers to an event where North Korea has a sudden change, but  can resolve it without foreign intervention. In this case, neighboring  countries can assist it in recovering stability as fast as possible. A more  serious change includes mass casualties, large-scale human rights issues,  disaster or security danger among neighboring countries, in which case  foreign countries may intervene according to international law. This is  when we can start our discussion on intervention. This doesn’t mean that a  sovereign state can cross another country’s border without permission.  Intervention is possible to the extent that the US specifies the scope in  accordance with the international agreement. In this case Seoul will have  to do a lot of costly things. As for refugees in North Korea, South Korea  will have to voluntarily provide emergency aid or other assistance. The  problem takes place when the refugee situation is most serious. The most  serious situation involves no organized army, no control of nuclear  weapons and absolute collapse. In this case, if a majority of North Koreans  want reunification, we need to support it based on the principle of self- determination. This only applies to the most serious situation.  China:  The North Korean regime has survived both the Clinton  administration and the Bush administration. A while ago, former president  Clinton had met Chairman Kim Chong Il in North Korea and briefed  President Obama about the visit. The US is making a realistic assessment  regarding the collapse of North Korea. When it comes to the North Korea  policy of the US, there seems to be some difference in positions between  South Korea and the US. In my personal opinion, we should not focus on  the change or the collapse of the North Korean regime, but on how the  nuclear possession will affect other countries’ ambition for nuclear  possession. For example, if NK possesses nuclear weapons, will South  Korea follow suit and then Japan also want to possess nuclear weapons? If  North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, Japan will. So will Korea. If  North Korea does not possess nuclear weapons, Japan won’t. Neither will  South Korea.     Should a sudden change take place due to structural inconsistency  followed by a civil war, a mass exodus of refugees, and the occurrence of people  dying of hunger, this will affect South Korea, China, and Japan, thereby causing  instability in Northeast Asia. The focus is on how to resolve this situation using  

- 221 -    non-military measures, but not on military action. This has to be understood  within the context of preparation against contingencies. In the event of emergency  in North Korea while it possesses nuclear weapons, what is likely to happen?  There seems to be a concern about the US entering North Korea, but this has to be  understood in the context of leading nations with nukes taking safe and swift  measures to prevent the transfer of a country’s nuclear weapons to another  country.  There are many different approaches toward resolving the North Korean  nuclear issue. The nuclear issue is not an issue that will be resolved if the six- party talks have successful outcomes, South Korea successfully persuades North  Korea, or if the US pushes North Korea in a high-handed manner. It is because  the nuclear issue originates from the regime problem. From the perspective of the  North Korean leadership, they have maintained dictatorship for the past 60 years.  They think that protecting the regime is their survival. The last bastion of the  protection of the regime is nukes. Hence, it is difficult to resolve the issue unless  neighbouring countries cannot resolve or improve various problems implicated in  the regime instability of North Korea. Simply resorting to the six-party talks and  South Korea’s North Korean policy using both carrots and sticks is not the  ultimate solution. The focus should be put on how neighboring countries can  gradually help North Korea to improve its system to resolve the North Korean  issue definitely and permanently, because the issue cannot be resolved at a time.  China:  I have a few comments pertaining to the South Korea-US alliance.  The US makes environments in Northeast Asia complex by pursuing  strategic intents either bilaterally or individually through forging alliances  with countries such as Thailand, New Zealand, and Singapore. This way  of alliance-building by the US needs to be understood in the context of its  global strategy. South Korea and the United States are military alliance  partners and security issues are an important aspect of the relationship  between Seoul and Washington. Currently, the US is attempting to  globally transform its military positioning, including expansion toward the  Asia-Pacific region. From a strategic perspective, the South Korea-US  alliance was forged in consideration of the military relationship between  

- 222 -    Koreas. Also, the US has a military alliance with Japan. This makes the  US positions very complex. As such, the US has two military alliances,  which is part of its seamless global strategy. For the US, the alliance is on  a global dimension, while for South Korea it is on a security dimension.  Therefore, the relationship should not be considered to be a general  alliance. As military positioning by the US is swiftly moving in the Asia- Pacific region, the US is not only maintaining strategic relations with  Singapore and Australia but also is maintaining and consolidating its  strategic initiatives in the Pacific, thereby containing China.  South Korea is strengthening its positions in the Asia-Pacific  region for the sake of the alliance. However, South Korea should consider  a broader and deeper alliance as long as that effort is not to cause conflict  with North Korea. The US has a position whose dimension is broader,  more global and more strategic. It is necessary that the alliance should be  strengthened in such a way that it strikes a strategic balance so that South  Korea’s strategic interest is not hurt. Of course this means that South  Korea’s strategic intent should be respected within the context of the  strategic intent of the US in Asia. An excessive alliance, if established by  the US in the front doors of China, cannot help but make China feel that  the US is containing China. Unless South Korea mediates between the US  and China regarding this issue, this can have significant effects on  strategic relations between SK and China. Yet, China wants to have a  continued relationship with the South Korean government. Seoul cannot  help but bear costs for the sake of the alliance. The US has made  impractical promises that it will provide a nuclear umbrella or missile  defense system for South Korea, which is induced to bear tremendous cost  and human-power commitment. It appears that the Washington has  inevitably chosen the alliance to achieve its strategic intent, rather than  simply paying attention to the resolution of the nuclear issue, which South  Korea has demanded.  South Korea:  I have one question for the Chinese side regarding its non-nuclear  objective. The two objectives of no nuclear weapons and stabilization in  North Korea play both positive and negative roles in China implementing  its policy on North Korea, which makes things difficult. What is China’s  position on this down the road? Every time we have discussions with the  US, people point out that China has to be more honest about this issue. In  other words, China takes the stabilization of North Korea over its  denuclearization. How is China intending to make both stabilization and  denuclearization objectives coexist? Many good points were raised  regarding the future of the alliance, but this is a relatively structural issue.  Also, some of you mentioned various roles of the US, and we want to add  that Washington has led efforts to maintain both world order and  

- 223 -    denuclearization order. China has agreed on those efforts. Therefore,  China has to take responsibility along with the US. It was mentioned that  the entry into Afghanistan and Iraq by the US is an internal interference.  But who would take responsibility of the global chaos should it hands-off  on this issue? This is the reality of today’s international politics. China, as  it becomes stronger and stronger, has to produce public goods with respect  to this issue and contribute to regional stability and global safety. It was  mentioned that the USFK and South Korea-US alliance is targeting at  China, but let’s look at the history. The Nixon-Zhou Enli joint statement in  1972 and the memoir of Kissinger reveal an appropriate story where the  US withdrew its forces from the Taiwan Strait and severed diplomatic  relations with Taiwan. At that time, Kissinger said, “The USFK is never  targeting at China” and the Chinese side said that “Chairman Mao will  never harass South Korea as an ally of the US.” This illustrates the  importance of intentions when it comes to relations between China and the  US. International politics scholars describe this as an example of  constructivism. Judging from South Korea who does not perceive China’s  numerous nuclear weapons as a threat, but takes issues with North Korea’s  nukes, and Japan who perceives China and Russia as threats, yet doesn’t  perceive the nuclear weapons of the US as a threat, such must have taken  into account territorial issues rather than nukes themselves or possible  future threats. Therefore, it is important to communicate intentions to  generate transparent policies. In order to do this, these kinds of meetings  have to be convened more often and their outcomes need to be reflected in  policymaking.     At the debate of the 7 th  Forum participants from both countries have had  lively discussions about nukes. Some claimed that South Korea has to possess  nukes and some discussed the issue of nuclear sovereignty, if not nuclear  possession. The general sentiment and policy direction involves the calculation of  benefits of nuclear development and possession and burden of no nuclear  possession. The current understanding seems to be that if North Korea ends up  developing nuclear capabilities, inevitably the nuclear umbrella of the US or  proliferation deterrence will follow. Even if North Korea ends up further  developing nuclear capabilities, South Korea will be better off making sure that  North Korea disarms nuclear capabilities under the nuclear umbrella instead of  possessing deterrence by way of nuclear military power.  

- 224 -      Ⅴ. The effect of CSKSF (China-South Korea Security Forum)    The first hypothesis of this thesis is ‘China-South Korea Security Forum  has contributed to the improvement of the bilateral security relations between  China and South Korea to the extent that both countries exchange military  personnel in their training academy and regular minister level– meetings.’ Since  1992 normalisation between China and South Korea, Korean military attaché was  installed at Beijing in 1993 and Chinese military attaché at Seoul in 1994. As  CSKSF started in June 2002 military exchanges between the two countries  became more activated. Military exchanges between the two countries before and  after CSKSF can be tabled up as follows.    Table #12 Minister Level– Meetings and Personnel Exchange in Training    Meetings  1992~2002  (before  CSKSF)  2002~2009  (since  CSKSF)  Remarks  Defence  Minister  Meetings  3  5    Chairman of  the Joint  Chiefs of Staff  1  5  5 times  Army, Navy,  Air force  Chief of Staff  4  8  Twice  Military  Personnel in  2  8  4 times  

- 225 -    Training    The Representative of Korean delegation for the first CSKSF 2002, Ex- Minister Cho Sung-tae has opened the first Defence Minister talk with the then  Chinese Defence Minister Chi Haotian in July 1999. Chinese Minister Ch'ih Hao- t'ien visited Korea in January 2000 for the reciprocal visit. While before CSKSF  the then minister Kim Dong-shin visited China in December 2001 once more  which totaled up to 3 times of reciprocal visits but since CSKSF 2002 Defence  Minister Yoon visited China in March 2005, Minister Cao Gangchuan visited  Korea in April 2006, Xu Caihou; Vice-Chairman of Central Military Commission  visited South Korea in September 2006, Minister Kim Jang-soo to China in April  2007 and Minister Lee Sang-hee to China in May 2009 which totaled up to 5  times of reciprocal visits. Mutual visits of Defence Ministers have contributed  greatly to improve military relations between both countries.    Before CSKSF, visits of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was only  once which was the Chairman Cho Yeong-gil’s visit to China in August 2000 but  since CSKSF, the visits of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was 5 times  which were the Chinese Chairman Fu Quanyou to South Korea in August 2002,  then the Chairman Liang Guanglie (incumbent Defence Minister) to South Korea  in November 2003, the South Korean Chairman Kim Jonghwan to China in May  2007, incumbent Defence Minister then the Chairman Kim Kwanjin to China in  November 2007 and the Chinese Chairman Chen Bingde to South Korea in March  2009.    Referring to meetings of Army, Navy, Air Force Chief of Staff between  China and South Korea, before CSKSF there were 4 times which were Lee Su- yong, the Naval Chief of Staff to China in April 2000, Liu Shunyao the Chinese  Air force Chief of Staff to Korea in March 2001, Kil Hyung-bo, the Korean Army  

- 226 -    Chief of Staff to China in March 2001 and Lee Uk-soo the Air Force Chief of  Staff to China in February 2002 but from CSKSF to year 2009 there increased  double times of visits which were Moon Jung-il, the Naval Chief of Staff to China  in October 2004, Lee Han-ho, the Air Force Chief of Staff to China in July 2005,  Nam Hae-il, the Naval Chief of Staff to China in August 2006, Song Yong-mu the  Naval Chief of Staff to China in August 2007, Kim Hung-ryul, the Army Chief of  Staff to China in February 2008, Kim Un-ki, the Air Force Chief of Staff to China  in April 2008, Wu Sheng Li, the Chinese Naval Chief of Staff to South Korea in  November 2008 and Jung Ok-gun, the Naval Chief of Staff to China in April  2009. Chinese and South Korean military structure differ each other. Army, Air  Force and Naval Chiefs of Staff in South Korea are more powerful and  independent compared to Chinese Chiefs of Staff which are just a member of  Joint Chiefs of Staff, so you can notice Korean side is more active to visit than  Chinese side.    Now exchange of military personnel in training before CSKSF were twice  which were Korea’s first visit of naval vessels to Shanghai in October 2001 and  Chinese first visit of naval vessels to Inchon Seaport in May 2002 but since  CSKSF to 2009 Korean naval vessels visited Chinese harbor in 2003, 2005, 2007,  2008 and 2009 such as to Qingdao and Zhanjiang. In September 2002 Korea Air  Force aircraft visited to China, China Air Force aircraft visited to Korea in 2003  and especially Air Force aircraft carrying the Air force Academy cadets visited to  China in June 2005 which improved far better mutual military relations.    The second hypothesis of the study is ‘China-South Korea Security Forum  has provided alternative 1.5-track policy process to existing 1.0-track level  relation.’ The paper was actually written to clarify how much CSKSF forum as  the 1.5 Track dialogue contributed to the promotion of 1.0-track level relations  between China and South Korea. There could be a lot of ways to analyze the  

- 227 -    correlation between CSKSF forum and 1.0-track level relationships of both  countries. It is probably a good way how government agencies or policy makers  as the indirect customers for this Forum evaluate this dialogue. And the analysis  and calculation of the performance of each forum itself will be helpful; how they  made contribution to the development of security relations could also be a good  idea.    First of all, the former and the incumbent defense ministers of both the  countries as well as senior policy-makers at military area deem this forum a  critical dialogue process to promote bilateral security relations. They are much  interested in how this dialogue can be maintained and developed for the think- tank of both the countries. The fact that former defense ministers recognize the  achievement of this forum is the best evidence for contribution of this forum to  the promotion of security relationship.    Secondly, the achievement and contribution of the Forum can be  explained by how much scholars and experts as well as policy makers and  practitioners of both the countries are taking advantage of it. Party members and  workers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Defense Policy  from China and practitioners of National Information Agency, members of  Department of Policy and Information from the Ministry of National Defense are  listening to the discussions. Sometimes they are utilizing this mechanism to solve  the problem which is not facilitated at the official level. A joint statement of  agreement between Korea-China summits in August 2008 has included a lot of  contents discussed and refined on the forum.    Third, it is the evidence to determine the contribution of a forum to  convince the government of both countries each year to sponsor the forum budget.  This forum is not a government activity and all the projects are completely led by  civilian agencies. The cost basically is being procured from private sector and  accepted sponsorship of government agencies. As the years go by, the forum has  

- 228 -    grown and the increased costs are funded by government agencies to a great  extent. Due to the sufficient budget structure the forum, in addition to the regular  forum, there projected occasional additional personnel exchanges, academic  scholars’ exchanges and non-periodic discussions on certain topics in expansion.    1. The effect of the first Forum  1) China is offensive to accept itself as a friendly country to the world for  achieving the national policy on economic revival placing CAIFC (China  Association for International Friendly Contact) under the Chinese Foreign  Ministry covering up the political, business, arts and military. The Party and  Government support its activities positively. In order to increase the dimensions  of the interview, the government's senior officers actively participate in the  activities of CAIFC meeting and entertaining guests to visit China.  2) KRIMA (Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs) visited China on June 1,  2002 for the first China-South Korea Security Forum. With the status of  Representative for Korean delegation Cho Sungtae; ex-Defense Minister, Defense  Minister Ch'ih Hao-t'ien has invited Korean delegation to 8.1 Building and hosted  a dinner. This is the symbolic gesture for Chinese government's strong  commitment to increase friendship with South Korea. The receiving side doesn’t  have the reason to refuse such a welcoming courtesy and therefore friendly  relationship naturally can be formed as China has intended.  3) At the first Forum, there was no direct criticism against South Korea or the  United States from the Chinese side. Perhaps, they were not refusing to recognize  that Korea delegation came to China for friendship with Beijing. China was quite  aware that political propaganda is a violation of this meeting focusing only on  human exchange and tried to develop the private diplomatic exchanges in terms of  MOU.  

- 229 -    4) The Chinese side has shown Korean delegation a deep affection and has tried  to show the consensus with Korean participants citing people who have a deeper  understanding about Chinese situation. It is their mission and also a major role for  the Forum. When we see the procedure of Chinese welcoming the Korean  delegation, it was not just the one of normal seminars and meetings, it was a very  high level of courtesy which even the former Minister Cho Suntae; the chief of  Korean delegation, has not yet expected.  5) South Korea has expressed that it supports Chinese government’s 'One China'  policy. China looked like arguing that because it was one originally, it has to  become one. About returning Hong Kong back to China, it was not because China  is greedy with ownership to Taiwan as you would think from outside the United  States or Korea to promulgate 'one China' policy. Perhaps that outsider remarks to  support 'One China policy' as if they were granted main China’s ownership to  Taiwan, so those expression seemed to feel for them what so called external  interference in Chinese internal affairs.  6) Since the 2008 Beijing Olympics, per capita income of China is equivalent to  800 US Dollars and it is predicted to rise up to 5000 through 7000 $ in the mid- 21 st  century by many scholars. Chinese side itself has never seen such a good  reaction to that estimate. There could be two explanations for that Chinese  attitude. One is that while China has tried to keep economic stability as the  conservative National Phase formulation for the future, it wants to eliminate the  perception recognized by the relative countries that China has the intent to raise  the Northeast another supremacy. Another reason is the consciousness that  increasing income of the people up to 5000-7000 Dollars as a Communist society  may create crisis and may be difficult to maintain vigilance to collapse by the  people.  7) While we may accept China's reform and opening-up policies easily and that  they are focusing on economic growth; they take quite an open gesture to the  international stage. But we still know that they are showed to be organized and  

- 230 -    move in accordance with the instructions of the Party. When we visit the Buddhist  temple, party executive members, instead of monks, have received us and they  mobilized outside chef to provide us food.    2. The effect of the second Forum    1) The relations between South Korea and China are growing rapidly tending to  form a partnership, which looks good. But the fact is that to understand and access  each other strategically is not easy. Views on China’s forecasts for the current and  future changes are a huge variety among Chinese scholars. They can be seen as a  different inside of China and outside of China; but at certain points they are  common and say together.    2) There has to be a different conceptual change about the relationship between  South Korea and China to understand each other correctly and access strategic  approach rather than emotional approach.    3) The majority of 44 people elected for the military leadership of the 16th  Central Committee and 24 candidates for the members of the Central Committee  are the military commanders and young professionals, who are trained in the  military. It is also true that there is a concern that Jiang Zemin did not step away  retaining post of Chairman of the Central Military Commission while the newly  elected Hu Jintao is still Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission. A  lot of people predicted Chairman quitting at the Third Plenary Session of the 17th  Central Committee of the Central Military Commission, but it did not come up on  the agenda and Jiang Zemin continued to seize the military for some more time.    4) Because people did not understand the guidance system of China's national  leaders following their national strategy, they thought that Jiang Zemin would  pass on the Chairman of the Central Military Commission to Hu Jintao  

- 231 -    immediately. It is a good example that after two years, Deng Xiaoping has taken  the Chairman of the Central Military Commission and continued for several years  after passing on the leadership to Jiang Zemin. People think that Hu Jintao being  Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission would create confusion for a  national emergency command system because they do not understand the unique  linkages between the Chinese Party and the military.    5) China is the country which is ruled mainly by human relationship. Informal  human network influences policy-making system of the country's foreign affairs  directly rather than formal and external organization. China's decision-making  system in foreign affairs by human network shows us the possible approaches to  develop relations directly or indirectly. KRIMA has tried to take full advantage of  these characteristics of Chinese foreign policy making through indirect  relationship. While maintaining steady relationships between many, including  military officials such as former Minister Cho Sungtae from Korea and Ch'ih  Hao-t'ien from China who has inaugurated the military relations between both  countries, it tries to build up extraordinary route when disagreements and conflicts  occurred.    6) China's foreign policy shown at the 10 th  National People's Congress and the  10 th  National People's Political Consultative Conference is to improve Chinese  international position representing a practical approach towards the world over the  next five years. China's diplomatic principles are to upgrade the international  status in the complex international situation keeping the route of self-reliance,  independence and peace through multilateral diplomatic activities extensively  engaged in participating in international exchanges.    7) Chinese Army has established a strategic plan for the military modernization  even under the leadership of Jiang Zemin following the global trends of  international strategies of the complex. National defense and army modernization  construction is included to the entire plan of the country to promote national  

- 232 -    development strategies. Survival and development of the country are depending  on the defense and military construction and with the conclusion that military  modernization is based on economic development. Military buildup goes along  with the economic development strategy. Therefore, Chinese Army's  modernization becomes an important part of construction of China's socialist  modernization construction.    8) We can predict Chinese Army's military diplomacy from the direction of their  military strategy. China's military strategy is active defensive military strategy.  China's leadership require the construction of military struggle for communism  and army buildup. Taking into account China's security situation, national  interests, social system and internal and external policies the military strategy of  active defense must be carried through. They are convinced that it would be  consistent with China's national situation and the military situation so that active  defense attitude should be the fundamental military strategy for national security.    9) Economic and social relations between South Korea and China have improved  much but military and security ties are quite low at institutional level. In the event  South Korea faces threat from North Korea and Pyongyang maintains security  relationship with Beijing, Seoul’s diplomatic system is poorly determined for  changing the security environment and engaging with China to recognize its  importance in getting out of the reality in the long term. High-level talks and  exchanges between South Korea and China as well as the Defense Ministers’  regular talk are required to activate security cooperation.    10) South Korea’s high-level personnel visit to China can be done without great  difficulty. Chinese Army's current and retired high-ranking personnel’s visit to  Korea would require the permission of the party's central committee. To promote  bilateral personnel exchanges in which the systematic scheme are different from  each other, it is necessary to exert political or national diplomatic coordination  

- 233 -    with the other ministry considering the differences of the characteristics on  decision making.    3. The effect of the third Forum    1) China-South Korea Security Forum promotes the density of military exchanges  of official channels establishing a close relationship among former and current  highest ranking military personnels. The continuous flow of high-level personnel,  which was responsible for the military diplomacy, raises the efficiency of military  exchange activating the so-called1.5 Track network.    2) Both the institutions try to maintain the relationship between high-ranking  retired personnel, who have played a key-role especially in the area of military  diplomacy in Korea and China by inviting them to the Forum frequently. Both the  hosts try to prevent the disconnect between personnel of the two countries so that  they keep their promise.    3) Through the 3rd CSKSF Forum in Seoul, both the countries recognize that they  have to have the patience to solve the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully.  Besides discussions on security cooperation between South Korea and China,  Forum discussed Northeast Asia security cooperation to contribute to peace and  stability in the area. Participants from both countries agreed with each other to  develop this Forum to the enlarged security dialogue among Northeast Asian  countries.    4) In addition, through the meeting and highly refined discussions with former  Chinese Defense Minister such as Cao Gangchuan and Ch'ih Hao-t'ien, both  participants could have a chance for improving the current issue of North Korea’s  nuclear issue and military confidence-building between both Koreas.    

- 234 -    5) Considering that there is North Korean military leadership at the center of  peace settlement in Korean peninsula, KRIMA proposed the constructive role of  China to its military leadership, which is very influential to Pyongyang’s military  leadership. Chinese side accepted the proposal and offered to persuade the  neighbor to work for peace and stability in the peninsula and contribute to  creating favorable conditions towards confidence building.    6) CSKSF Froum will provide a foundation on buildup the region's intellectual’s  league in Northeast Asian the future expanding the participants to include foreign  dignitaries and high ranking security professionals. Both parties shared the  recognition on the role for CSKSF Froum to contribute the transitions from the  order of conflict, confrontation and hostilities to the order of cooperation, peace  and common prosperity in the Northeast Asia.    4. The effect of the forth Forum    1) On June 5, 2006 when Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan visited South  Korea, KRIMA with Cho Sungtae; former defense minister invited him and his  party for a breakfast meeting. Cho Sungtae; counselor of KRIMA, requested Cao  Gangchuan, representative Director of the Chinese side of CSKSF Forum who  was possibly in a position to intimate to North Korean military high ranking  officers. As soon as Minister Cao Gangchuan came back to China, he quickly  recommended General Tang Tian Pyao (唐天标), who has good friendship with  North Korea's senior military personnel as the representative Director of Chinese  side.    2) Participants from both sides analyzed challenges that impact Northeast Asian  security at the 4th Forum and sought what cooperation could be possible between  Korea and China. As regards the security situation in Northeast Asia, there has  been cited various challenges and concerns that threaten peace in the area such as  the nuclear issue, bilateral issues between China and Taiwan, Japan affairs and  

- 235 -    US-Korea alliance.  3) Participants from both the sides evolved a consensus on the importance of  balanced security awareness in East Asia and agreed with each other that security  cooperation should start by removing the element which might have undermined  peace in the region. To thwart military conflict between both Koreas and enhance  confidence between China and South Korea on North Korea's reform and  changing situations, the joint research effort is essentially required.  4) There were discussions on persuading North Korea to embrace reform and  openness through North Korean military by the Chinese military and also on  possibilities that USFK's strategic flexibility and its ground forces’ intervention to  Taiwan cause war between China and Japan. And additionally, there were  explanations from the Chinese side on its emphasis on international norms for  Security and Cooperation by China's military and legislation for anti-nation law to  oppose Taiwan’s independence.    5. The effect of the fifth Forum    1) The 5 th  CSKSF Forum has been recognized as the root of human networks for  military contact between South Korea and China to maintain the retired and  incumbent's leadership. It has founded 1.5 Track channel for informal  conversation to promote mutual understanding and trust between the two  countries and promote peace and security in Northeast Asia. General Tang Tian  Pyao was nominated as the representative director of Chinese side who was the  vice director of the political bureau of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and  now acting as a member of Chinese representative parliament.    2) The presentation and the discussions were not in the government level, but  participants from both the sides have discussed the subject fully as if they were  representing both governments. Political, military and economic positions of both  the sides and contradictions had been discussed and they had tried looking for a  

- 236 -    realistic alternative. The real debate was induced to evolve consensus on  situations and productive conclusions between the two countries.    3) The consensus on the strategic interests of both the countries formed at 1 st   defense Ministers’ meeting in 1999 is reaffirmed. From 2002, 1 st  CSKSF Forum  to the 5 th  Forum in 2006, both institutes had been constantly seeking ways to  develop the relationship of cooperation between China and South Korea through  defense ministers while reaffirming mutual strategic interests. The 5 th  Forum has  discussed additional agendas such as regional cross-border arms race in Northeast  Asia and denuclearization of Korean peninsula.    6. The effect of the sixth Forum    1) The 6 th  CSKSF Forum was the platform to practice the Joint Statement  signed during the South Korea-China summit in August, 2007. Security Forum  activated the opportunities of military cooperation above existing social network  between Beijing and Seoul and had upgraded military personnel exchanges  between them. The Forum was able to build military personnel network route  continuously through senior leaders of both the countries. The Forum could be  adapted well to the environment of improved bilateral military changes.    2) Though the Forum was free from both the governments as the form of a  private presentation, in terms of the output the discussions were activated to be  realistic and practical. The discussions had been focused on the topics of realistic  and practical affairs in terms of various perspectives for peace and stability of  Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. Despite that there was an unspoken rule  between Korea and China not to talk about political and military affairs each other,  the Forum was trying to access viable alternatives for resolving the discrepancies  among other systems. Consensus on complex nuclear issue in the peninsula,  cooperation between Korea and China following improved relations between US  

- 237 -    and North Korea and the peace regime in Northeast Asia were formed through  various discussions of the Forum.    3) Because it was the first forum since declaration of the strategic  cooperative partnership between both the countries, all the issues between Korea  and China immobilized during the Cold War were fully reviewed and there was a  future-oriented discussion over the practical ways to overcome the challenges.  Participants from both the sides realized that there was a need for broadening the  positive correlation between South Korea-US and South Korea-China for new  understanding of the joint role. They have expanded perception that efforts for  strategic partnership between Korea and China directly affect peace and stability  in Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. Understanding North Korea from the  basis of the immediate interests of both the countries, sought the practical  approaches to find the joint role for solving the North Korean problems.    7. The effect of the seventh Forum    1) There is the feature in China that their participation of Chinese scholars  and officials are selected and controlled according to the theme of the forum.  Due to the nature of a free system, scholars and officials from South Korea are  easily accessing various forums sometimes indiscreetly. South Korean military  veterans enjoy free activities compared to the non-free activities of Chinese  military retired personnel so that the reckless inadvertent actions from South  Korean personnel are likely to have an adverse effect in the future development of  ties between Korea and China relations.    All outreach activities of Chinese personnel are under the control of the party and  partners with them and their speech contents are being managed by the Party  unlike free-system countries. China's characteristics should be considered when  exchanging with China. It should be borne in mind that the result of all the  

- 238 -    outreach activities of the Chinese personnel are reported to Chinese Government  and reflected on their policies.    Systematic step-by-step cooperation and coordination should be taken to promote  future-oriented development of relations between the countries’ different systems.  According to the systematic roadmap, all the exchanges and cooperation between  both the countries at the government level and the private sector should be  managed so that it could create a multiplier effect for the development of bilateral  relations.    2) Liang Guanglie; Chinese Defense Minister said Chinese military wants to  promote military exchanges and cooperation actively for the future development  of relations between China and South Korea. It is required to execute the strategic  research for military exchanges to find direction and scope of the expansion of the  field and there is a need for research about efficient operation of 1.0 Track and 2.0  Track.    Chinese Military has focused on building the information structure on the level of  modernization. They will have significant improvements on mechanization and  informatization of Chinese Military so that since 2020, Chinese Army will make a  great progress especially on local campaigns. It is also necessary for Korean  experts to have interests in the process of modernization of Chinese Military. The  experience of informatization from Korean military can be expected to give  technical support for Chinese Military. The institutional research for bilateral  Software development is needed for the possibility of a strategic cooperation.    3) Since the establishment of Obama government, security alliance between  South Korea and the US became more strengthened, China became alert and  concerns much about the change of security situation in East Asia. South Korea  should develop countermeasures to eliminate concerns of China.. Expanding the  scope of the alliance between South Korea and the US brings in obstacles for the  

- 239 -    strategic cooperative partnership between China and South Korea so that they  have to clarify the relevance between the development of the alliance of the  United States and South Korea and the practical relationship between China and  South Korea and evolve consensus between both the countries.    4) Presently strategic dialogue between China and the US as well as triple  dialogue among China, the US and Japan are being operated. If relationships  among the three nations are not going well, it may adversely affect the security  situation in Korea. So strategic dialogue among directly interested parties in  Korean peninsula; South Korea, China and U.S.A. is required to promote  understanding. Through strategic dialogue, South Korea, China and the US can  play the roles and the responsibilities on the scenario-specific consultation for  contingency situation in North Korea. It will yield a positive impact for the  relations between China and South Korea.    5) China supports peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula, but due to  the change of geopolitical strategy towards China after the unification, it is being  threatened in the security concern. They are describing that after the unification if  USFK moves northward to the Yalu River is as the same context as Chinese  Army moves down to the 38th parallel border region of Korean peninsula. China  is very much interested in the role of the USFK forces after the unification of  Korea and they are saying that strategic consensus between both the countries is  needed. China considers that the initiative of the reunification may be in South  Korea; however it also considers that the accessibility of USFK to China border  increases in case South Korea initiatesunification so that they need to talk about  some rearrangement of concept and the nature of the USFK.    6) Liang Guanglie (梁光烈), defense minister, said that military has  forwarded for the national disaster and stressed that there is a need for military  cooperation and coordination between South Korea and China for the case when  one faces national disaster. The Chinese side is concerned about illegal refugees  

- 240 -    crossing the border between China and North Korean in contingency which will  cause mass confusion and it argues to seek the solutions and initial response  measures to be resolved. Besides the case of refugees, it suggests a number of  non-traditional security issues as well as various aspects of the possibility of  disasters and asks coordination of research between South Korea and China.  China also argues that they should be prepared to take adequate measures in the  event of massive food shortages in North Korea in contingency.    7) Once Kim Jeongun regime is set up in North Korea, it will announce to  the world a strong start of hereditary systems of North Korean so that it is  concerned about the possibility of expressing a collective action for showing their  military power. China predicts that North Korea most likely provokes a military  campaign in local level in its most confident areas to inform the world that  regime's succession has been completed depending on support of the military.  While the actual transfer is not completed yet, it is predicted that it will arise  NLL-related issues driving the world's attention unilaterally in the direction which  they want to go. South Korea must be equipped with the ability to respond to  North Korea's military regime power transfer.    8) China and North Korea have been determined that the discussions of  denuclearization between the US and South Korea only emphasize  denuclearization of North Korea. As regards fuel retreatment for South Korean  nuclear reactor and some controversy on nuclear sovereignty in South Korea, the  misunderstanding on South Korea's nuclear weapon ambitions has occurred  among China and North Korea. The concept of denuclearization claimed by South  Korea and the US is the entire denuclearization of the peninsula. Between Korea  and China, the concept of denuclearization has to be clarified.    9) Both the sides have been rewarding that they have developed CSKSF  forum and had debates seven times. The two countries hope to maintain the  tradition of this security forum between South Korea and China and they judge  

- 241 -    that this forum contributed to support the exchange of official channels as the  effective communication of 1.5 Track.    Graph #1 Comparing the Reciprocal Visits before and after CSKSF  0 2 4 6 8 10 Defence Minister Meetings Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army, Navy, Air Force Chief of Staff Military Personnel in Training 1992~2002 (before CSKSF) 2002~2009 (since CSKSF)   In this extensive chapter five, all the presentations and debates presented  at the Forums were analysed. And the researcher tried to prove the first hypothesis  of the thesis ‘China-South Korea Security Forum has contributed to the  improvement of the bilateral security relations between China and South Korea.  The researcher firstly introduced the main stream of the Forum 2002-2009. And  key arguments depending on the countries by the subjects were classified. Both  countries have shown clear differences on each subject. Without knowing the  differences of the interests you cannot go even one step more to improve the  relations. CSKSF has played a role in finding the differences and understanding  them each other. As analysed in this chapter, after CSKSF military exchanges  between the two countries became more activated. You see the graph as follows  that the reciprocal visits for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has increased  five times, Army, Navy, Air Force Chief of Staff double times and Military  Personnel in Training four times.  

- 242 -    On July 15, 2011 South Korean Defence Minister Kim Kwan-jin and  Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie met together in Beijing to agree with  military educational exchanges between the two countries. Minister Kim Kwan- jin has participated at the 6 th , 7 th  and 8 th  CSKSF as the member of Korean  delegation and met Minister Liang Guanglie again at the 7th CSKSF in Beijing  since their meeting when they were Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under  the recognition that exchange of young officers between both countries could  contribute to promoting mutual trust, two Ministers decided to start military  educational exchanging programme from the short-term training courses and  gradually strengthen exchanges to the long-term academic courses in the other  country. The formation of warmer ties between military officers of both countries  will be a big turning point and an intangible asset for the development of bilateral  security relations.    

- 243 -      CHAPTER 6    CONCLUSION    China-South Korea Security Forum (CSKSF) was evaluated as the  effective mechanism through the process of overcoming government malfunction  in the realm of security relations between China and South Korea at certain period.  The researcher has tried to find out whether CSKSF contributed to the  improvement of the bilateral security relations between China and South Korea  and provided alternative 1.5 track (Half government and half Civilian track)  policy process to existing 1.0 track (Governmental track) level relation.    It is argued here that governments in China and South Korea are obsessed  with the past and the order of the Cold War to make rigid policy decisions, the  violations of people’s security interests could be getting serious. Not only political  instability in both countries but also a new type of instability which violates the  security interests of the people will be increasing. Further this thesis emphasizes  that if the governments had the structural and fundamental limits to ensure the  security interests of the people, then other mechanisms will have to do something  to complement the limits.    There are many researches on NGOs activities but the researches of NGO  on people’s security interest are few. The thesis basically concerned about  government failure in people’s security area and analysed CSKSF for one of the  mechanism to overcome that failure. Since Adam Smith’s invisible hand the  research of market failure has been main topic in public administration school.  The role of government could have been justified through the study of various  market failures. This thesis studied government failure differently from that of  market failure which justifies the role of NGO. So the thesis might bring up a new  scope of the failure on people’s security and the way to solve it.  

- 244 -      In Chapter two of this thesis, we analysed the historical background of the  China-South Korea security relations before and after 1992 normalization  particularly in the military respect. And in the chapter three, the concepts and  models for the analysis of 1.5 track channel meetings were introduced and it  compared the difference between roles of Government and NGO (Non- governmental Organization), NPM (New Public Management). After viewing  general theories and practices about NGO and NPM, it delved into non- governmental activities between China and South Korea and described that NGO  activities could be more effective in pursuing the practical interest at certain  stages between the both countries and how to be coordinated and co-operated  them.    In chapter four, the researcher introduced the detail of the hosting  institutes of China-South Korea Security Forum; Chinese People’s Association for  Friendly Contact (CPAFC) and Korea Research Institute of Military Affairs and  the evolution of CSKSF. CSKSF was planned cooperatively to keep in close  contact with government level talks. So the interviews with retired or incumbent  high ranking officers of governments from both countries were also styled to find  the relevance of Governmental activities and Civilian activities. In chapter five  around 60 papers and six debates were analysed and it traced the improvement of  the relations between China and South Korea and tried to find out the relevance  and causal relationship between the improvement of China-South Korea relations  and CSKSF itself.     CSKSF organized dozens of meetings and seminars so far where more  than 100 experts from both countries have participated. Participants debated on  various topics regarding to security dynamics in East Asia. It has actually  contributed a lot to the promotion of security relations between China and South  Korea. Policy-makers in the security area from the both countries estimated that  the Forum is a valuable one to stimulate security relations between China and  

- 245 -    South Korea. They have been frequently utilized this mechanism to solve their  various issues.    Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, China and South Korea  endeavored a lot for removing the inconveniences between the both. China  opened the door not only for South Korea but also for all free market countries  which had detached themselves from China during the Cold War and it also tried  to facilitate the trade towards free market economy 42 . Since 1990, Korea has also  been adapted itself to the changes of the new world order and actively extended  the diplomatic relations with many other communist countries including China.    China and South Korea has enthusiastically propelled exchanges not only  for economic interests but also at security front. China has had the most important  strategy to stabilize the Korean peninsula by eliminating the excessive war  expenses on unexpected security affairs and focus on her own economic  development. On the other hand, South Korea has had a strategic intention to fix  the problems caused by the division of Peninsula and North Korea’s affairs by  engaging with China.    In fact the normalization of the relationship between China and South  Korea would positively affect to enhance the relationship among other  neighboring countries such as Japan, North Korea and Taiwan in Northeast Asia  and even with the US. Since the middle of 1940s, the two countries have been  influenced and used in the security structure of the Cold War era than the other  countries. The relationship between the two countries epitomized the  confrontation of the Eastern and Western blocks in the East Asia. The policy- makers, security experts and scholars of the two countries were dominated by the  antagonistic mentality of the Cold War blocks.    42  China has shifted her state-directed or planned economy to the free market economy slowly.  In a free market economy, the prices of goods and services are determined in a free price  system instead of the centralized planning system of the state.    

- 246 -      Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the vestige of the Cold War  was still left in the case of China and South Korea. Two countries took different  sides in every international affair. The traces of the same mentality have been seen  in the relations with the US and North Korea. Both countries have incurred losses  and sabotaged their interests for the sake of belligerent attitudes of the USA and  North Korea. While there was wider common ground for meet the interests of  China and South Korea, the relations with North Korea and the US have been  more sensitive issues for both countries respectively which they cannot simply  store up.    In retrospect, after the World War II, the decision making in the security  front in the Korean Peninsula has been directed by the interests of the great  Powers rather than the interests of the Korean people. As a result, the security  policy and implementation in the peninsula were severely distorted. The failure of  government’s policy in security sector in Korea was a reflection of internal and  external factors which has been the common character in the Third world  countries. Such distortion in the security policy, guided by the external Powers,  resulted not only in oppressing the Korean people but also spoiled the concept of  security in Korean peninsula, which the people actually aspired to be part of the  decision making process of sovereign country.    In fact, there was no so much diversity in the language, culture and  religion, Korea remained unified country for last more than 1000 years. In  contrary to the will of the people, the country was divided into two by the external  forces, viz. the United States and the Soviet Union. The leadership of Korea was  used by the outside powers. If there had not been external influence on Korean  Peninsula after liberation, the Korean people could have built a unified country by  themselves.    In the theory of International Relations, the realists say there were  

- 247 -    different hidden interests of major external powers in dividing the Korean  peninsula at that particular time. The interest of the external power has apparently  caused to break out the Korean War where millions of innocent people were lost  their lives. There were ‘Kim Il Sung’ in North Korea; a hero made by the Soviet  Union, ‘Rhee Syngman’ in South Korea embraced by the United States. And at  the same time there were ‘Kim Koo’ a social activist like Gandhi in India who had  been supported popularly by the people opposing the division of Korean  peninsula.    Initially, Kim Koo had strongly opposed to such provisions as trusteeship  and division. Despite desperate efforts, the South and North Korea were divided  officially then Kim Koo accepted the trusteeship from the Powers. With regards to  protect people’s security interest Kim Koo changed his mind on deteriorating  conflicts among political factions in the North and the South Korea. Political  leaders criticized for changing Kim Koo’s attitude but it was necessary now to  look at closely what factors which led him to conclude such decision.    He had met North Korean leader Kim IL Sung and South Korean leader  Rhee Sung Man to try founding one state in the Korean peninsula but failed. He  has recognized the security failure in the Korean peninsula by the factional  conflicts; the failure of the peninsula's peace and the security benefit of the people.  Therefore he judged if division in the Korean peninsula would be inevitable, the  concept of trusteeship could be better-represented for security interests of the  people of Korea.    Kim Koo was not a government-oriented leader but society-oriented leader,  who considered the matter of trusteeship or division as one of the means. What is  the most important thing to him at that time was how people of Korea can live in  peaceful environment which is so called security interests of the people. Kim Koo  took a flexible attitude depending on the circumstances by recognizing the  peoples’ security interest. What he cherished the most was neither the political  

- 248 -    system nor the unification of the peninsula but the concern of protecting people  that there should not be any more bloodshed in the Korean peninsula. What he has  pursued was the pure patriotism, the value of the emphasis on security interests of  the people not based on partisan governmental interests.    He differentiated the goal itself from the means for the goal finely. What is  the goal and what is the means for the goal? The goal is definitely people’s  interest. Ideology such as communism or capitalism and political systems are just  means for people’s interest. Means can be changed for the goal. Because of  partisans such as Kim IL Sung in the North Korea and Rhee Sung Man in the  South Korea, the goal was lost by means at Korean War. The goal; peoples’ real  security interest was lost with a million killed to protect their ideologies and  political systems which were just one of the means for the goal. It was a serious  security failure and distortion.     China-South Korea Security Forum was born through the process of  overcoming these partisan government failures in the realm of people’s security  interest. If the partisan governments are obsessed with the past and the order of  the Cold War to make a rigid policy decisions, the violations of people’s security  interests would be getting more serious. This also results serious security breach  of the countries in the region. If the governments had the structural and  fundamental limits to ensure the security interests of the people, non- governmental organizations will have to take/play an initiative role to  complement these limitations of the Sate for protecting the security interest of the  people.    The CSKSF has been a channel which has been trying to improve the  security relations between China and South Korea for the people’s interest. The  Forum has discussed various security issues which are beyond the Cold War  security regime and rigid structure of governmental decision-making. The Forum  initiated by the civilians of both countries has organized annual seminars since  

- 249 -    2002 where the members of incumbent and former government agencies have  been taking part.    The recent events of torpedo of Cheonan ship 43  and the bombardment in  Yeonpyeong Island are likely to make the countries around Korean peninsula  return to Cold War situation. In these circumstances the security relations between  South Korea as a member of the axis of Southern triangle 44  and China that of  Northern triangle are very important for peace and development in East Asia. The  CSKSF has created the important people’s network between China and South  Korea for exchanging the information among security professionals and building  confidence among policy-makers. It has grown up to a valuable ‘Think Tank’  discussing the important security issues between the two countries. The CSKSF  has become a very unique and useful mechanism.    With the advent of the 21st century one of the most remarkable changes in  East Asia is the unexpected economic upsurge of South Korea with the rise of  China. South Korea has become a new economic power employing western free  economic systems in a short period of time and made an active democracy in  every aspect of society since the liberation from Japanese domination in 1945.  With the emergence of economic expert; President Lee Myung-bak 45  who has  assumed office at the 25 th  of February 2008 South Korea takes part in world  economic problems devotedly. Its role as an economic leader was acknowledged    43  On 26 March 2010, an explosion occurred near the rear of the Cheonan of South Korea,  causing the ship to break in two.   The cause of the explosion was not immediately ascertained.  The 1,200 ton ship started sinking about 1.9 km away from the south-west coast of South  Korea. The ship had a crew of 104 men at the time of sinking, 58 crews were rescued, and  46 crews were killed. On 17 April 2010, North Korea denied any involvement in the sinking  of Cheonan ship.  44  The Cold War security regime in East Asia, Southern triangle was consisted of U.S.A.,  South Korea and Japan, Northern triangle comprised China, North Korea and then Soviet  Union.  45  Prior to his presidency, he was the CEO of Hyundai Engineering and Construction.When he  started at Hyundai in 1965, it had 90 employees; and when he left as chairman after 27 years, it  had more than 160,000. After leaving Hyundai at the end of a 27-year career, he decided to enter  politics. Under Lee, South Korea has been increasing its visibility and influence in the global  scene, resulting in the hosting of the 2010 G-20 Seoul summit.  

- 250 -    by holding the G20 summit talks in 2010.    South Korea has emerged from aid receiving country to highly developed  state and became an OECD member in 1996 with in a stipulated time. It has also  experienced the military conflict as the divided nation. If the world's economic  problems and security issues can be solved with participation and cooperation of  all the countries of under-developing and developing countries together rather  than by only some developed countries, South Korea will be able to perform some  special role as the unique country of having both of the experiences in the short  period.    China and South Korea, two major countries located in Northeast Asia, the  formal conversation between them was difficult in the past era because of North  Korean factor for China and US factor for South Korea as well as the ideological  barriers. The limitations of the communications in the official channels found a  new outlet and it was the birth of the China-South Korea Security Forum  (CSKSF). They are still having many potential conflicts such as Ieo Island,  Claiming over Arirang, Distortions of Great Wall etc. Some conflicts can be  solved through the other mechanisms rather than the governments’. So the more  studies on this area can be expected to ease rigid decision making of the  governments. CSKSF has played a significant role for improving the relationship  between both countries.      

- 251 -    Appendix #1  Casualties and losses during the Korean War    Country  Killed Wounded MIA POW Remarks  South Korea 137,899 450,742 24,495 8,343    North Korea 215,000  (est.)  303,000  (est.)  79,900  (est.)  40,100  (est.)  Not clear  USA  36,940 92,134 3,737 4,439    China  152,000 383,500 450,000 14,190    England  1,078 2,674 179 977    Turkey  741 2,068 163 244    Australia  339 1,216 43  26    Canada  312 1,212 1  32    France  262 1,008 7  12    Greece  192  543    3    Colombia  163  448    28    Thailand  129 1,139    5    Ethiopia  121  536        Netherland 120  645        Philippines 120  645        Belgium  99  336  4  1    South Africa 34  9        New Zealand 23  79    1    Norway  3          Luxemburg  2  13        Soviet Union 282          Civilian (S.K.) 373,599 229,625 387,744    Civilian (N.K.)        Not clear  Total  919,458 1,471,572 946,273 68,401    * MIA : Missing in Action  * POW : Prisoners of War  

- 252 -    Appendix #2  High level Exchanges between China and South Korea  From China to the ROK      2000 October Premier of State Council Zhu Rongji  2001 May  Chairman of NPC Standing Committee Li Peng  2003 September Chairman of NPC Standing Committee Wu Bangguo  2004 August  Chairman of National Committee of the Chinese People's  Political Consultative Conference Jia Qinglin  2005 November President Hu Jintao  2007 April Premier of State Council Wen Jiabao  2008 August Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi  2008 August President Hu Jintao  2009 December Vice President Xi Jinping  2010 May  Premiers Wen Jiabao    2010 November President Hu Jintao    2011 October Vice Premiers Li Keqiang      From the ROK to China      2001 June  Prime Minister Lee Handong  2002 January Speaker of National Assembly Lee Mansub 2003 July  President Roh Moohyun  2005 June  Prime Minister Lee Haechan  2006 January Speaker of National Assembly Kim Wonki  2006 October President Roh Moohyun  2008 May  President Lee Myungbak  2008 September Prime Minister Han Seungsoo  2009 October President Lee Myungbak  2010 April  President Lee Myungbak  2011 April  Prime Minister Kim Hwangsik  2012 January President Lee Myungbak  

- 253 -    Appendix #3  Outcome of the ROK-China Foreign Ministers' Meeting (2012.03.02)    1. Foreign Minister Kim Sung-Hwan had a meeting with his Chinese counterpart Yang  Jiechi, who is visiting the Republic of Korea, on the morning of March 2. They  exchanged views on major issues of mutual interest, including ways to make the "ROK- China Strategic Cooperative Partnership" more substantive, the situation on the Korean  Peninsula, and regional and global issues.  2. Marking the 20th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the  ROK and China, the two sides agreed to work to make the "Strategic Cooperative  Partnership" more substantive. They also decided to increase exchanges of high-level  officials, strengthen substantial cooperation and closely consult on the situation on the  Korean Peninsula.   ㅇ Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said Chinese President Hu Jintao's  participation in the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit in March is being reviewed, and  invited Minister Kim to the ROK-China-Japan Foreign Ministers’ Meeting to be held in  April in China.   ㅇ Both sides agreed on a slogan, a logo and an annual plan for major events to  celebrate the 20th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. They also  decided to work together for a successful opening ceremony to be held in Seoul on April  3.   ㅇ Minister Kim introduced "Good Friendship Chinese Class," operated recently to  enhance mutual understanding and friendship between Korean and Chinese youth.  Following Korean junior diplomats' visit to China last year as part of the ROK-China  

- 254 -    junior-diplomat exchange program, Minister Kim expressed his anticipation of Chinese  junior diplomats’ visit to Korea this year.     ※ "Good Friendship Chinese Class" is a free Chinese language class held for 3 months  from November 2011 to January 2012 for about 60 elementary and middle school  students from under-privileged families, run by Korean university students and Chinese  students studying in the ROK.  3. The two Ministers had a candid and in-depth discussion on the North Korean defector  issue, and agreed to closely cooperate for a smooth resolution of the issue.  4. Both sides also exchanged opinions on the current situation on the Korean Peninsula  including the outcome of the US-North Korea consultation, announced on February 29.  5. The official visit to the ROK by Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, the third after visits in  August 2008 and February 2011, is expected to contribute to deepening the "ROK-China  Strategic Cooperative Partnership."      

- 255 -    Appendix # 4  China ROK Joint Statement (2008. 05. 28)      At the invitation of President Hu Jintao of the People's Republic of China, President Lee   Myung-bak of the Republic of Korea paid a state visit to China from 27 to 30 May 2008   and was accorded a grand and warm reception by the Chinese Government and people.  During the visit, President Hu Jintao had talks with President Lee Myung-bak. Presiden t  Lee Myung-bak also met with Premier Wen Jiabao of the State Council and Chairman Jia   Qinglin of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference .  President Lee Myung-bak expressed deep condolences and sympathy to the great loss o f  life and property caused by the earthquake in Wenchuan, Sichuan Province and offered to   provide necessary help to China's disaster relief effort. President Hu Jintao and othe r  Chinese leaders expressed sincere thanks to the ROK Government and people for thei r  care and timely help such as sending a rescue team. Both sides agreed to strengthen   exchanges and cooperation on handling natural disasters such as earthquake, tsunami and   typhoon.  During the talks and meetings, the two sides had an in-depth exchange of views and   reached extensive agreement on further developing China-ROK friendly relations and   cooperation on regional and international issues of mutual interest.  I. Further Developing Bilateral Relations  The two sides applauded the rapid growth of their relations since the establishment o f  diplomatic ties in 1992. They both agreed to raise their comprehensive and cooperative   partnership to the level of strategic cooperative partnership and step up exchanges and   cooperation in the diplomatic, security, economic, social, cultural, people-to-people and   other areas.  Both sides believed that dialogue and cooperation in the diplomatic and security areas   

- 256 -    should be further strengthened and agreed to establish a high-level strategic dialogue   mechanism between the two foreign ministries and develop the existing diplomatic   security dialogue into a mechanism.  The two sides decided to increase the exchanges between their leaders, governmen t  agencies, parliaments and political parties.  The Chinese side reiterated that there is only one China in the world and Taiwan is an   inalienable part of China. The ROK side expressed its full understanding of and respec t  for China's position and reaffirmed its position that the Government of the People's   Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China and tha t  it upholds the one China principle.  II. Expanding Economic Cooperation and Trade  The two sides agreed to adjust and enrich the Joint Research Report on China-ROK Mid - to-Long Term Development Plan on Economic Cooperation and Trade issued by the   leaders of the two countries in 2005 to reflect the new progress on bilateral economic   cooperation and trade which will serve as the basis for further practical cooperation in   this field.  The two sides commended the smooth progress of the joint study on China-ROK FTA by   government agencies, industries and academia and agreed to build on past achievements   and continue the research to push forward the bilateral FTA for win-win result.  The two sides welcomed the amendment and issuance of the Treaty on Investmen t  Protection Between China and the ROK and agreed that the Treaty is conducive to   protecting and expanding two-way investment and is in line with the development of the   mutually beneficial business relations.  The two sides agreed to work together to gradually achieve balance in the bilateral trade   as it develops. The ROK side expressed its readiness to take an active part in China's   various trade and investment fairs such as the China Import and Export Fair, China   

- 257 -    International Small and Medium Enterprises Fair and continue to send to China   purchasing and investment groups. China expressed appreciation of this.  The two sides agreed to the need of strengthening concrete cooperation on mobile   communication, actively supporting further capital and technological cooperation   between the two countries' communication enterprises and expanding the cooperation on   electronics and information communication to areas such as software and radio frequency   identification.  The two sides agreed to strengthen extensive and mutually beneficial energy cooperation   such as cooperation on nuclear power, oil reserve, joint development of resources and   renewable energy in an effort to achieve concrete results in cooperation on energy   conservation.  The two sides agreed to strengthen cooperation on IPR protection, food safety and quality   inspection, logistics and labour service.  The two sides believed that closer financial cooperation is conducive to the developmen t  of the financial industry of both countries. They believed that they should learn from each   other, share experience, improve their financial systems, promote the reform and opening   up of their financial markets and step up coordination and cooperation in internationa l  and regional financial institutions.  The two sides agreed to enhance joint study and survey in areas such as polar science and   technology.  Both sides recognized the importance to strengthen environmental cooperation and   agreed to enhance exchanges and cooperation on environmental industry, sand storm   monitoring and the Yellow Sea environmental protection, etc.  The two sides agreed to actively cooperate in the preparation of the 2010 Shanghai World   Expo and the 2012 Yeosu World Expo.  

- 258 -    III. Enhancing People-to-people and Cultural Exchanges  The two sides decided to enlarge the programs of mutual youth visit and step up   exchange activities such as home stay and home visit and expand the program o f  governmental scholarship swapping.  The two sides agreed to explore ways to streamline visa procedures so as to increase   mutual personnel visit.  China welcomed the setting up of a consulate-general in Wuhan, China by the ROK.  The two sides believed that the long history of bilateral exchange is an important asset o f  China-ROK friendly relations. To enhance mutual understanding, both sides should   actively support the exchanges on history and culture between their academic institutions .  IV. Advancing Cooperation on Regional and International Affairs  The Chinese side reiterated its firm support to the improvement of relations and ultimate   peaceful reunification between the north and south of the Korean Peninsular through   dialogue. The ROK side appreciated China's efforts in maintaining peace and stability on   the Korean Peninsular and looked forward to China's continued constructive role.  The ROK side stated its positions on facilitating the settlement of the Korean nuclea r  issue and expanding exchanges and cooperation in the economic, social and other areas   between the north and the south of the Korean Peninsular. China expressed it s  understanding of the ROK's positions and hoped to see progress in the reconciliation and   cooperation between the north and the south of the Korean Peninsular.  Both sides believed that the second phase Action Plan of the September 19 Join t  Statement by the Six Party Talks should be fully implemented at an early date under the   principle of "action to action". The two sides agreed to work with other parties concerned   to look into and formulate the action plan for the next phase in a constructive effort to   fully implement the September 19 Joint Statement.  

- 259 -    The two sides recognized the importance of China-ROK cooperation to the Six Party   Talks and the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsular and agreed to continue thei r  close cooperation for achieving peace and stability on the Korean Peninsular and in   Northeast Asia.  The two sides reaffirmed the important role of the United Nations in solving issues o f  global significance and agreed to continue their close cooperation in UN affairs. The two   sides believed that the UN reform should enhance the authority, effectiveness and   efficiency of the organization so that its system, based on the consensus of the membe r  states, will be more transparent, democratic and representative. Both sides support the   UN Secretary General's efforts to enhance the efficiency and role of the UN.  The two sides believed that cooperation among China, the ROK and Japan is very   important to peace, stability and prosperity of Asia. The two sides agreed to work   together to maintain the regular meetings among the three countries, such as the talks o f  their leaders and foreign ministers that take place alternately in the three countries.  The two sides agreed to work together for the success of the 7th ASEM Summit to be   held in Beijing this year.  The two sides agreed to step up cooperation on issues of mutual interest such as climate   change, non-proliferation of WMD, combating international terrorism, financial and   economic crime, piracy and high-tech crime.  V. The two sides welcomed the signing of the Treaty Between the People's Republic o f  China and the Republic of Korea on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, the Memorandum   of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Polar Science and Technology Between   the Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China and the   Ministry of Education, Science and Technology of the Republic of Korea and the   Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Recognition of Higher Education Degrees   and Background between the Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China   and the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology of the Republic of Korea.  

- 260 -    VI. The two sides expressed satisfaction with the achievements of President Lee Myung - bak's visit to China and believed that this visit is important to the further growth o f  bilateral relations.  President Hu Jintao said he looked forward to welcoming President Lee Myung-bak a t  the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games. President Lee Myung-bak wished   the Beijing Olympic Games a complete success and a grand gathering of human harmony   and solidarity. He said he would attend the opening ceremony.  President Lee Myung-bak expressed thanks to China for the warm hospitality and invited   President Hu Jintao to visit the Republic of Korea at an early date. President Hu Jintao   thanked him for the invitation and accepted the invitation with pleasure.    

- 261 -    Appendix #5  China ROK Joint Communiqué (25 to 26 August 2008)      I. At the invitation of President Lee Myung-bak of the Republic of Korea, Preisdent Hu   Jintao of the People's Republic of China paid a state visit to the Republic of Korea from   25 to 26 August 2008. During the visit, President Hu Jintao held talks with President Lee   Myung-bak and they reached broad common understanding.  II. The two Presidents expressed satisfication with the great progress bilateral relations   have made in the political, economic, social, cultural and other areas since the two   countries established diplomatic ties in 1992, which, they believed, not only promoted the   development of their respective countries, but also contributed to the peace and   development of Asia and the world at large.  III. President Lee Myung-bak offered congratulations on China's success in hosting the   Beijing Olympic Games. President Hu Jintao thanked President Lee Myung-bak fo r  making a special trip to Beijing to attend the opening ceremony of the Games and fo r  ROK's support to the Games.  IV. They agreed that China-ROK ties are important bilateral ties for each other. The two   sides decided to promote China-ROK strategic cooperative partnership in an all-round   way on the basis of the China-ROK Joint Statement issued in May 2008 during Presiden t  Lee Myung-bak's visit to China. Committed to the fundamental goal of long-term   common development, the two sides will expand and deepen mutual cooperation   comprehensively, strengthen coordination on major regional and international issues and   work for lasting peace and common prosperity of the world and development and   progress of mankind. To this end, the two sides agreed to promote their bilateral ties in   the following aspects:  1. Enhancing political mutual-trust and supporting each other's peaceful development .  The two sides will maintain and strengthen bilateral high-level exchanges, expand and   

- 262 -    deepen exchanges and dialogues between their governments, parliaments and politica l  parties, and strengthen defense dialogue and exchanges.  2. Deepening mutually beneficial cooperation. The two sides will continously explore   new areas of cooperation and expand the scope and depth of cooperation based on   complementarity and mutual benefits, and promote sustainable development of the two   countries through practical cooperation.  3. Promoting people-to-people and cultural exchanges. The long history of mutua l  exchanges and profound cultural links between the two countries should be used to   promote exchanges and deepen mutual understanding and friendship between the two   peoples.  4. Strengthening coordination and cooperation on regional and global issues. The two   sides are committed to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and Northeas t  Asia. They will actively participate in regional cooperation of Asia, strengthen dialogue   and cooperation in international multilateral arena and earnestly engage in cooperation in   major issues vital for mankind's survival and development.  V. The ROK side stated that it will develop South-North relations of mutual benefit and   common prosperity through reconciliation and cooperation. The Chinese side reiterated   its continued support to the efforts of the South and the North to promote the   reconciliation and cooperation process, improve relations and ultimately achieve peacefu l  reunification. On the Taiwan question, the ROK side reaffirmed its position in the China - ROK Joint Statement issued in May 2008 and continued adherence to the one-China   policy.  VI. In order to develop bilateral relations, the two sides agreed to give priority to the   following cooperation areas:  1. Political Area  

- 263 -    (1) Top leaders of the two countries will maintain regular exchange of visits and contact.  (2) The foreign ministries of the two countries will hold the first high-level strategic   dialogue within 2008 to launch the strategic dialogue mechanism for exchanging views   on major issues concerning the two countries' shared interests. The two foreign ministries '  working-level consultation will be institutionalized to strengthen communication on foreign policies and the international situation.  (3) Experts and scholars of the two countries will conduct a joint study and submit a   report to the two governments on how to comprehensively promote China-ROK   exchanges and cooperation.  (4) Defense ministries of the two countries will have high-level exchange of visits ,  strengthen contact and liason mechanism and conduct multi-tier exchanges and   cooperation in various areas.  (5) Consultation will be expedited on the maritime delimitation issue between China and   the ROK, an early solution of which will be important to the long-term, stable   development of their bilateral relations.  2. Economic and Trade Area  (6) The two sides will make joint efforts to increase bilateral trade volume to US$200   billion by 2010. To this end, they will strengthen cooperation in trade and investmen t  facilitation, quality inspection and quarantine, trade remedy and intellectual property   rights.  (7) The two sides will continue working on the adjustment and supplement to the Join t  Research Report on China-ROK Mid-to-Long Term Development Plan on Economic   Cooperation and Trade, in accordance with the agreement reached by the two Presidents   in May 2008.  (8) The two sides will further strengthen the mechanism of trade and economic   

- 264 -    consultation and practical trade cooperation to expand bilateral economic and trade   cooperation.  (9) The two sides will further strengthen cooperation in key areas such as environmenta l  protection, information technology, telecommunication, finance, logistics and energy.  (10) Since an increase in mutual investment can promote mutually beneficia l  development of the two economies, the two governments will strengthen cooperation and   support for a better investment environment.  (11) The two sides will find ways to actively advance the China-ROK FTA process in a   mutually beneficial way on the basis of the joint study on China-ROK FTA involving   government agencies, industries and academia.  (12) The two sides will sign the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation and   Exchanges between the 2010 Shanghai World Expo in the People’ s Republic of China   and the 2012 Yeosu Expo in the Republic of Korea so as to ensure the success of both   expos by strengthening cooperation and sharing experience and information.  (13) The Employment Permit System will be launched in labor service cooperation   according to agreement between the two governments to protect the legitimate rights and   interests of labor from both sides.  (14) The two sides welcome the outcome of their mutually beneficial cooperation in the   financial sector and will strengthen cooperation in mutual market access for financia l  institutions from each other’s countries.  (15) Competent government departments and companies from the two countries will sign   the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in IT Technology Innovation so as to   strengthen and develop IT technology cooperation.  (16) The two sides will cooperate actively in building an environment-friendly and   resource-conserving society.  

- 265 -    (17) The two sides will strengthen exchanges and cooperation to cope with natura l  disasters such as earthquake, tsunami and typhoon.  (18) The two sides will sign the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in   Energy Conservation, so as to enhance cooperation in energy conservation consulting ,  personnel exchange and technological development.  (19) The two sides are aware of the importance of protecting global ecosystems and agree   to sign the Memorandum of Understanding on Scientific and Technological Cooperation   for Desertification Prevention, which will promote and strengthen such cooperation   through joint studies, expert exchanges and information sharing.  (20) The two sides will sign the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the   Operation and Maintenance of the China-ROK Economic and Trade Cooperation   Website. The website to be launched will offer the latest information on trade and   investment.  (21) The two sides will sign the Memorandum of Understanding on Hi-Tech Cooperation   and will cooperate in IT, telecommunications technology and new energy, and actively   explore new hi-tech cooperation programs in the next five years.  (22) The two sides will sign the Agreement on the Sanitary Management of Export and   Import of Aquacultural Products, so as to strengthen cooperation in inspection and   quarantine, legal information sharing and mutual visits by aquacultural produc t  quarantine personnel.  3. Cultural Exchanges  (23) The two sides will expand the present scale of people-to-people exchanges of six   million visits per year and provide all necessary facilitation, including the study of visa   facilitation measures.  (24) The two sides have designated 2010 the Visit China Year and 2012 the Visit Korea   

- 266 -    Year and will host tourist events and other bilateral exchanges to enhance people-to - people exchanges between the two countries.  (25) The Chinese side has announced the upgrading of the Consular Office in Gwangju o f  the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China to a Consulate-General, which the ROK   welcomes.  (26) The two sides will sign the Agreement on Educational Exchanges and Cooperation   Between 2008 and 2010 and increase the number of annual government scholarship   exchange students from 40 to 60. Young people will be invited to make mutual visits   under the youth exchange program.  (27) The two sides will promote exchanges and mutual understanding between the   cultural sectors, media, sister cities, academia and private organizations and suppor t  exchanges between private organizations in culture and media and exchanges between academic institutions in history and culture.  (28) The two sides will sign the Memorandum of Understanding on the Gift of Crested   Ibises from China to the ROK and Cooperation in Crested Ibis' Breeding and Population   Rebuilding. China will make a gift of a couple of Crested Ibises to the ROK, which the   ROK appreciates. The two countries agree to strengthen cooperation in the rescue o f  Crested Ibis, an endangered species.  4. Regional and International Affairs  (29) The two sides will continue to strengthen communication and cooperation under the   framework of the Six-Party Talks, promote the implementation of the second phase   actions in a comprehensive and balanced manner at an early date and make constructive   efforts for the comprehensive implementation of the September 19 Joint Statement.  (30) The two sides will maintain coordination and cooperation in ASEAN plus three   (China, Japan, the Republic of Korea), China-ROK-Japan, the East Asia Summit, the   ASEAN Regional Forum, APEC, the Asia Cooperation Dialogue, ASEM, the East Asia - 

- 267 -    Latin America Forum, the Asia-Middle East Dialogue and the Asia-Africa Summit.  (31) The two sides will establish a consultative mechanism on UN affairs between thei r  foreign affairs departments to strengthen mutual understanding and cooperation in UN   affairs.  (32) The two sides will advance dialogue and cooperation in international human rights.  (33) The two sides will strengthen cooperation in the prevention of the proliferation o f  weapons of mass destruction and the cracking down on international terrorism, drugs ,  financial and economic crimes, hi-tech crimes and piracy.  (34) The two sides will work unremittingly with the international community to address   climate change, a common concern of the world.  VII. The two sides agree to make full use of bilateral mechanisms such as the strategic   dialogue between foreign affairs departments, the joint economic and trade committee   and the tourism ministers’ meeting to make specific arrangements for and effectively   promote the implementation of the above mentioned agreements in various areas.  VIII. China appreciates the warm and friendly reception given to President Hu Jintao   during the visit by the ROK.    

- 268 -    Appendix #6  Goguryeo Issue :  Official Point of View of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK    The Course of Events Which Led to the Verbal Agreement between the ROK and  the PRC    In April 2004, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China put up  distorted interpretation of Goguryeo(Koguryo)'s history on its web site. In July 2004, the  Chinese government registered Goguryeo's relics in China (a part of the Korean history)  as 'World Cultural Heritage', and published articles on Goguryeo's history with distorted  interpretation ("Goguryeo was an ethnic local government of ancient China") in the  government and political party's magazines. Since then, the history of Goguryeo has  become a diplomatic issue between the ROK and the PRC.    * Prior to this, China began a project called 'A Series of Researches on the History and  Current Status of Northeast Borderland', which is also known as the 'Northeast Project'.  This five-year project, which began in February 2002, included researches on, but not  limited to, the region's history from ancient to modern time, China-Russia relations, as  well as the history of Goguryeo.    · In June 2003, China's Guangming Daily and China Daily introduced the  overall outline of the Northeast project, claiming that "Goguryeo was an ethnic  local government of ancient China".    Our Government considers the Goguryeo history issue as "an overriding task that is  directly related to the roots and identity of our nation", and has been taking firm and  decisive diplomatic measures against China consistently, urging China to correct its  distorted interpretation of the history of Goguryeo.  

- 269 -    As a result of such efforts made by our Government, the vice foreign ministers of the two   countries reached the verbal agreement on the Goguryeo's history issue in August 2004,  which can be summarized as follows :  · There will be no additional distortion of interpretation of Goguryeo's history  made by the PRC government. The PRC government will make efforts to  correct existing distortions: and  · The academic circles of history of the two countries will make efforts to hold a  joint academic conference at an early date, etc..    Diplomatic Measures for the Implementation of the Verbal Agreement    Our Government urged the Chinese side to take corrective measures according to the  verbal agreement on various occasions of high-level consultations between the presidents,  prime ministers and foreign ministers of the two countries.    Furthermore, our Government has been urging China consistently to make corrections  through various diplomatic channels such as the ROK-China Vice Foreign Ministers'  Talks, various working-level consultations, our Embassy in China and the Chinese  Embassy in Seoul.    The PRC Government's Corrective Measures    Ever since the verbal agreement was made in August 2004, there have been no additional  distortions made by the central government, political party, and government-managed  media (People's Daily, Xinhua News Agency, etc.) of China, and China's corrective  measures thus far were as follows:  · Central Government  1. Alteration of the Foreign Ministry web site's distorted contents (August  2004)  

- 270 -    2. Deletion of the People's Education Press web site's distorted contents  (September 2004)  3. Correction of Xinhua News Agency web site's "Cultural Heritage of  China" introductory section's distorted contents (January 2005)  4. Deletion of Xinhua News Agency internet edition's distorted article  (July 2005)  5. Holding back of official adoption of the "test version" middle school  history textbooks (September 2005)  6 & 7. Addition of a map with Goguryeo as a part of the Korean Peninsula  to middle school history textbooks (Chinese History)/ addition of Korean  history(with Goguryeo's history included) to middle school history  textbooks (World History) (July 2006)  8. Deletion of the distorted introduction of Ji'an City on the State  Administration of Cultural Heritage web site (January 2007)  9. Deletion of distorted contents in Xinhua News Agency Web site  (October 2010)  10. Deletion of distorted contents in China Radio International(China  Broadcast) (November 2010)  · Local Government  1. Deletion of Chinese media (Dalian Daily, Jiangxi TV, etc.) web sites'  distorted articles about 'O-nyo(Wunu) Mountain Fortress' in Huanren  City (August 2005)  2. Removal of 4 sign boards(out of 6) with distorted facts about  Goguryeo's history at 'Yongdam(Longtan) Mountain Fortress' (August  2005)  

- 271 -    3. O-nyo(Wunu) Mountain Fortress in Huanren Perfecture Historic  Museum Closed(June 2006)  4. Deletion of Huanren County web site's distorted contents (July 2006)  5. Removal of a sign board with distorted interpretation of Goguryeo's  history at 'Bonghwang(Fenghuang) Mountain Fortress' in Liaoning  Province (October 2006)  6. Removal of 2 white stone plaques at 'Yongdam(Longtan) Mountain  Fortress' (presumably around December 2006)  7. Deletion of distorted contents of Goguryeo's history in World Cultural  and Natural Heritage Expo Shenyang China (June 2007)  8. Deletion of distorted contents of Goguryeo's history in Benxi City,  Liaoning Province Government web site (May 2010)  9. Deletion of distorted contents of Goguryeo's history in O-nyo(Wunu)  Mountain Fortress' Museum (May 2010)  10. Deletion of Distorted Contents of Goguryeo's history in Introduction of  Jian City, Jilin Province Museum (May 2010)  11. Deletion of Distorted Contents of Goguryeo's history in Dalian City,  Liaoning Province Foreign Affair Office Web site(November 2010)  * 4 out of 6 in total were already taken down in August 2005    Meanwhile, we are urging China continuously to make prompt corrections to the matters  that the Chinese side is still reviewing, such as the distorted contents of the explanatory  stone plaque at the Ji'an City Museum.    Based on our stern position that we will take decisive measures against any attempt to  distort our history, our Government will continue efforts to prevent such distortions and  make corrections with regard to Goguryeo's history. At the same time, we will actively  pursue or provide support for various other efforts such as strengthening academic  capacity for countermeasures, promoting Korea-China and international academic  exchanges, reinforcing overseas publicity activities, discovering core historical  

- 272 -    materials(sources), and excavating and preserving Goguryeo's relics in both South and  North parts of the Korean Peninsula.    

- 273 -    Appendix #7  Agreement on the Establishment of the trilateral Cooperation Secretariat among the   Governments of the People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea   (2011 01 25)    The Governments of the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea   (hereinafter jointly referred to as the "Parties"),  Desiring to establish a secretariat for the efficient promotion and management of trilatera l  cooperation among the Parties and to enhance existing dialogue mechanisms and   contribute to the further promotion of their cooperative relations as decided at the Third   Trilateral Summit held on May 30, 2010, in Jeju island, the Republic of Korea,  Have agreed as follows:  Article 1  1. The Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as the "Secretariat") is   hereby established.  2. The Secretariat shall be located in the Republic of Korea (hereinafter referred to as the   "host country").  Article 2  The objective of the Secretariat is to contribute to the further promotion of cooperative   relations among the three countries by providing support for the operation and   management of the trilateral consultative mechanisms among the Parties and by   facilitating the exploration and implementation of cooperative projects.  Article 3  

- 274 -    1. In order to achieve the objective referred to in Article 2, the Secretariat shall carry ou t  the following functions and activities:  (a) provide administrative and technical support for the operation and management o f  such trilateral consultative mechanisms among the Parties (hereinafter referred to as the   "consultative mechanisms") as the Trilateral Summit Meeting, the Trilateral Foreign   Ministers' Meeting, the Three-Party Committee and other ministerial meetings, and the   Trilateral Senior Foreign Affairs Officials' Consultation and send, if necessary, its   representatives to attend major consultative mechanisms;  (b) communicate and coordinate with the Parties, and if necessary, with othe r  international organizations, particularly with other East Asian cooperation mechanisms;  (c) explore and identify potential cooperative projects among the Parties, and report those   projects to the relevant consultative mechanisms for adoption;  (d) evaluate the cooperative projects and draft reports on them, compile necessary   documents into database, and submit annual progress reports to the Three-Party   Committee or the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting for approval; and  (e) conduct research on important issues related to the trilateral cooperation, manage the   Secretariat's website, and promote understanding of the trilateral cooperation.  2. The Secretariat shall carry out its functions and activities within its mandate authorized   by and under the supervision of the Parties through the Trilateral Foreign Ministers '  Meeting or in a manner decided by the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting.  Article 4  In the host country, the Secretariat shall have the legal capacity:  (a) to contract;  (b) to acquire and dispose of movable and immovable property; and  

- 275 -    (c) to institute legal proceedings.  Article 5  1. The Secretariat shall be comprised of a Secretary-General, two Deputy Secretary - Generals and Professional Staffs (hereinafter jointly referred to as the "officials") and   General Services Staffs to be nominated and appointed, or employed, in the following   ways:  (a) The Secretary-General shall be appointed at the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting   upon nomination of a Party on a rotational basis in the order of the Republic of Korea ,  Japan and the People's Republic of China. The tenure of office shall be two years.  (b) Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, each Party other than the Government of the   country of the Secretary-General shall nominate a Deputy Secretary-General respectively   who shall be appointed at the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting. The tenure of office   shall, in general, be two years. The appointment of the Deputy Secretary-General may be   renewed once for an additional period of up to two years with the approval of the   Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting.  (c) The Secretary-General shall appoint the personnel seconded by the Parties as the   Professional Staff.  (d) The Secretary-General may employ the General Services Staff as needed to carry ou t  the functions and activities of the Secretariat.  2. The Secretariat shall have the Consultative Board comprised of the Secretary-Genera l  and the Deputy Secretary-Generals. The Consultative Board shall consult and make   decisions by consensus on matters submitted for its consideration. The Consultative   Board shall consult with the Parties on matters of importance in accordance with   paragraph 2 of Article 3.  3. Subject to the approval of the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting, the Secretary - General may establish the departments of the Secretariat to efficiently carry out the   

- 276 -    functions and activities of the Secretariat with a view to facilitating trilateral cooperation   in various areas.  Article 6  The Secretary-General shall represent the Secretariat and be responsible for the function s  and activities carried out by the Secretariat. The Secretary-General shall also be   responsible for the administration of the Secretariat, in particular as follows:  (a) prepare annual and, where necessary, ad-hoc reports on the functions and activities o f  the Secretariat, as well as an annual budget of the Secretariat, and submit them, with the   approval of the Trilateral Senior Foreign Affairs Officials' Consultation, to the Trilatera l  Foreign Ministers' Meeting for approval;  (b) establish and amend internal rules and regulations of the Secretariat subject to the   approval of the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting;  (c) establish the basic terms and conditions of the officials' secondment, including thei r  salary matters, subject to the approval of the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting, and   suggest the termination of the appointment of the Professional Staffs to the Party which   seconds them after the consultation with the Deputy Secretary-Generals;  (d) establish General Services Staff positions, and terms and conditions of employment ,  including salaries, subject to the approval of the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting ,  and employ qualified personnel for the General Services Staff positions and dismiss the   General Services Staff, as necessary, in accordance with the rules and regulations referred   to in sub-paragraph (b) of this Article; and  (e) enter into contracts required for the operation of the Secretariat.  Article 7  

- 277 -    1. The Deputy Secretary-General shall assist the Secretary-General in carrying out his/he r  functions and activities. In this connection, the Deputy Secretary-General shall conduct ,  in particular, the following duties:  (a) provide advice to the Secretary-General on the future direction of the progressive   development of trilateral cooperation;  (b) represent the Secretariat at conferences, ceremonies, and other occasions as   authorized by the Secretary-General;  (c) provide support for research activities of the Secretariat; and  (d) perform other functions and activities that may be mandated by the Secretary-Genera l.  2. The Deputy Secretary-General shall act for the Secretary-General in case of his/he r  absence or inability to perform his/her duties in accordance with the rules and regulations   referred to in sub-paragraph (b) of Article 6.  Article 8  1. The Government of the host country shall be responsible for providing and arranging   the premises for the operation of the Secretariat.  2. The operational costs of the Secretariat shall be met from equal contributions of the   Parties to be made subject to their respective national laws and regulations.  Article 9  1. In the host country, the Secretariat and the officials shall enjoy privileges and   immunities in accordance with the provisions of Articles 10 and 11, as appropriate for the   achievement of the Secretariat's objective and the carrying out of its functions and   activities.  2. The Parties other than the Government of the host country may grant, in thei r  respective countries and to the extent permitted by their respective national laws and   

- 278 -    regulations, such facilities as may be deemed necessary for the proper operation of the   Secretariat.  3. The privileges and immunities from jurisdiction of the host country in respect of civi l  or administrative proceedings shall not be granted in relation to a contract, or a civi l  action for damages arising from an accident caused by a motor vehicle, vessel or aircraft ,  used or owned by the Secretariat and the officials where those damages are no t  recoverable from insurance.  4. The Secretariat shall cooperate at all times with the appropriate authorities of the hos t  country to prevent the occurrence of any abuse in connection with the privileges ,  immunities and facilities granted under this Agreement.  5. If the Government of the host country considers that there has been an abuse of a   privilege or immunity granted under this Agreement, consultations shall be held between   the Government of the host country and the Secretariat to determine whether any such   abuse has occurred and, if so, to ensure that no repetition of such abuse occurs.  Article 10  1. The Secretariat, its property and assets shall enjoy immunity from legal process excep t  where it has expressly waived its immunity. Any waiver of immunity from jurisdiction in   respect to civil or administrative proceedings shall not be held to imply waiver o f  immunity in respect to the execution of the judgment, for which a separate waiver shal l  be necessary. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, in case the Secretariat initiates a   legal process, waiver of immunities in respect not only of that legal process but also o f  the execution of a judgment thereof is presumed.  2. The premises of the Secretariat shall be inviolable. The archives of the Secretariat and ,  in general, all official papers and documents belonging to the Secretariat shall be   inviolable.  

- 279 -    3. The Secretariat shall enjoy for its official communications, treatment not less favorable   than that accorded by the Government of the host country to foreign diplomatic mission s  or any international organizations in the host country. The Secretariat shall have the righ t  to dispatch and receive correspondence and other official communications by courier o r  in sealed bags, which shall have the same privileges and immunities as diplomatic   couriers and diplomatic bags.  4. Without being restricted by financial controls, regulations or moratoria of any kind, the   Secretariat may:  (a) hold funds or currency of any kind and operate accounts in any currency; and  (b) freely transfer its funds or currency to and from the host country or within the hos t  country and convert any currency held by it into any other currency.  5. In exercising the rights referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article, the Secretariat shal l  comply with the national laws of the host country, and shall pay due regard to any   representation by the Government of the host country in so far as it is considered tha t  effect can be given to such representation without detriment to the interests of the   Secretariat.  6. The Secretariat, its property and assets shall be:  (a) exempt from all direct taxes except those which are, in fact, no more than charges fo r  public utility services;  (b) exempt from customs duties and from prohibitions and restrictions on imports and   exports in respect of articles imported or exported by the Secretariat for its official use. I t  shall be understood, however, that articles imported under such exemption shall not be   sold in the host country except under conditions determined by the Government of the   host country; and  (c) exempt from customs duties and prohibitions and restrictions on imports and export s  in respect of its publications.  

- 280 -    7. While the Secretariat will not, as a general rule, claim exemption from excise duties   and from taxes on the sale of movable and immovable property which form the part o f  the price to be paid, nevertheless, when the Secretariat is making important purchases fo r  official use of property on which such duties and taxes have been charged, the   Government of the host country may, whenever possible, make proper administrative   arrangements for the remission or return of the amount of duty or tax.  Article 11  1. The officials shall:  (a) be exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid to them by the   Secretariat;  (b) be immune, together with their spouses and relatives dependent on them living in the   host country, from immigration restrictions, alien registration and national service   obligations;  (c) have the right to import free of duty furniture and household goods for their persona l  use or for use by their spouses and relatives dependent on them at the time of their initia l  posting at the Secretariat; and  (d) be accorded, in respect of exchange facilities, treatment not less favorable than tha t  accorded to officials of comparable rank of any other international organizations posted   in the host country.  2. The Government of the host country shall not be obliged to grant the privileges and   immunities referred to in this Article to the officials who are nationals or permanen t  residents of the host country.  3. Privileges and immunities are granted to the officials in the interests of the Secretaria t  only, and not for their personal benefit. The Secretary-General has the right and duty to   waive the immunity granted to the officials under this Agreement through consultation   with the Deputy Secretary-Generals in any case where the Secretary-General considers   

- 281 -    that the immunity would impede realization of justice and can be waived withou t  prejudice to the interests of the Secretariat. The immunity granted to the Secretary - General and Deputy Secretary-Generals may be waived, as and when necessary, at the   Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting.  Article 12  The working language of the Secretariat shall be English.  Article 13  The financial affairs of the Secretariat shall be audited annually and shall be reported to   the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting. The Secretary-General shall establish the   auditing procedures subject to the approval of the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting.  Article 14  Any Party may propose amendments to this Agreement. This Agreement may be   amended by written agreement of the Parties.  Article 15  Each Party shall notify all other Parties in writing through diplomatic channels that thei r  respective internal procedures necessary for the entry into force of this Agreement have   been completed. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when the las t  notification thereof is issued.  IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective   Governments, have signed this Agreement.  

- 282 -    Appendix #8  Trilateral Cooperation VISION 2020 (2010. 05. 30)      We, the Leaders of the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea ,  convened in Jeju, Korea on May 29, 2010, on the occasion of the 3rd Trilateral Summi t  Meeting.  We express our satisfaction with the visualization of substantial outcomes derived from   the past decade of our cooperation, in the field of political  affairs, economy, culture, and people-to-people exchanges. We will continue to uphold   and fully implement the common views enunciated in the Joint Declaration on the   Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation, Joint Statement for Tripartite Partnership and the   Joint Statement on the Tenth Anniversary of Trilateral Cooperation among the People's   Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea.  We confirm that there still remains great room for the development of trilatera l  cooperation in promoting the exchange of people, goods, services and capital, and in the   field of regional and global issues led by the world's trend in globalization. In the spirit o f  facing history squarely and advancing towards the future, we will unswervingly continue   to push the trilateral relations forward in the direction of good-neighborliness, mutua l  trust, comprehensive cooperation, mutual benefit and common development.  We share the common recognition that by presenting specific goals and visions to be   achieved through cooperation by 2020, when the next decade ends, we need to combine   our capacities and enhance trilateral cooperation to a higher level so that our future - oriented comprehensive cooperative partnership will be more solid, cooperation to ou r  mutual benefit in all areas will be more fruitful, the sentiments of friendship among ou r  peoples will be more profound, and the trilateral cooperation will serve common interests   of the three countries and contribute to peace, stability and prosperity of the East Asian   region and the world at large.  

- 283 -    With this in mind, we have decided as follows:  I. Institutionalization and Enhancement of Trilateral Partnership  1-1. We envision the advancement of building solid strategic mutual trust among the   three countries by stepping up high-level contacts and the development of friendship and   amity among the peoples of the three countries, while deepening and expanding trilatera l  exchange and through inter-governmental cooperative mechanisms such as the Summi t  Meeting, Foreign Ministers' Meeting, other Ministerial Meetings, Senior Foreign Affairs   Officials' Consultation, etc.  1-2. We will establish the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in the Republic of Korea in   2011 in order to promote and strengthen trilateral cooperation. The Secretariat wil l  provide support for the operation and management of the trilateral consultative   mechanisms such as the Trilateral Summit Meeting, the Foreign Ministers' Meeting, othe r  Ministerial Meetings, and the Senior Foreign Affairs Officials' Consultation, and   facilitate the exploration and implementation of cooperative projects.  1-3. To jointly respond to natural disasters effectively and contribute to disaster risk   reduction in Northeast Asia, we will endeavor to fully utilize existing institutions and   organizations in sharing disaster-related information, policies, and technologies including   Japan-China-Korea Trilateral Head of Government Agency level Meeting on Disaste r  Management.  1-4. We will explore the possibility to establish the 'Trilateral Defense Dialogue' in orde r  to strengthen security dialogue and facilitate exchange and cooperation among the   defense or military personnel of the three countries.  1-5. We will establish a close cooperative mechanism among the police authorities of the   three countries in order to jointly respond to international crimes and enhance the   trilateral policing cooperation.  1-6. We envision the advancement of exchanges among the local governments of the   

- 284 -    three countries as we strengthen cooperation in administrative, economic, and cultura l  areas by expanding the sisterhood relationship among the three countries  II. Sustainable economic cooperation for common prosperity  2-1. By the year 2012, we will endeavor to complete the Joint Study for an FTA among   China, Japan and Korea, which was launched in May 2010. Through the Joint Study, we   will pursue a common understanding among the three countries on issues involved, for a   practical reference for the future negotiations of a possible FTA among China, Japan and   Korea. Furthermore, we will continue to work towards further economic integration o f  the three countries in the long-term, including the establishment of a common market in   the region.  2-2. Aiming to increase the volume of trilateral trade by 2020, which is vital for furthe r  regional economic growth and integration, we will continuously improve the trilatera l  trade environment through greater trade facilitation efforts.  2-3. We recognize that establishing a coordinated and efficient transport and logistics   system among the three countries will benefit the reduction of product costs and the   improvement of international competitiveness. Therefore, we advocate continuing to take   full advantage of China-Japan-Korea Transport and Logistics Ministerial Conference and   bilateral policy dialogues to push forward the development of transport logistics network   in Northeast Asia, for the purpose of a seamless logistics system.  2-4. We reaffirm the importance of customs cooperation, which will contribute to trade   facilitation and supply chain security not only among three countries but also in the   region. In this regard, we will further enhance customs cooperation through the   implementation of 'the Action Plan of the Tripartite Customs Cooperation' under the   framework of Tripartite Customs Heads' Meeting (TCHM).  2-5. We will make efforts towards concluding the Trilateral Investment Agreement, with   a view to actively promoting regional investment of enterprises within our respective   countries and also provide a favorable legal, institutional and procedural environment fo r  

- 285 -    investment in order for regional investors to manage successful businesses. Moreover, we   will endeavor to provide the necessary infrastructures to facilitate the free movement o f  investment capital of the region.  2-6. To respond to the changes in international financial markets, we will further enhance   coordination among financial authorities, and endeavor to strengthen financia l  cooperation by encouraging financial institutions in China, Japan and Korea to advance   into each other's markets. We welcome the successful launch of the Chiang Mai Initiative   Multilateralization and the substantial progress under the Asian Bond Markets Initiatives ,  and will make further efforts to enhance financial cooperation in East Asia, including   enhancement of the effectiveness of CMIM. We will actively contribute to the   discussions led by the G20 on strengthening international financial system including the   work to improve global financial safety nets.  2-7. We share the view that an open, fair and liberalized multilateral trading system is   essential to the economic prosperity not only in China, Japan and Korea, but also the   world as a whole. It is imperative for us to fight against protectionism in any form in   order to preserve and reinforce such system. In this regard, we are determined to seek a   prompt, ambitious and balanced conclusion to the Doha development round, consisten t  with its mandate, based on the progress already made, including with regard to modalitie s  and strengthen the trilateral cooperation for the continuous advancement of the   multilateral trading system in the era beyond the Doha Round.  2-8. We share the view to enhance the cooperation in science and innovation to improve   our research capacity, strengthen the competitiveness of the industrial technology of the   three countries, and address the common regional and global issue, explore ways o f  contributing to the long-term goal of developing an East Asia community. For this   purpose, we will continue to provide financial support to the Joint Research   Collaboration Program and the Asia 3 Foresight Program and explore possibility o f  further expansion of the investment in light of actual circumstances. In addition, we wil l  explore the possibility of establishing a new joint fund program to support joint research   with common interest in the fields, and by the means which are decided through   

- 286 -    discussion among the three countries.  2-9. We will further continue to consult on policy cooperation and consultation in such   areas as industry, energy, energy efficiency, resources, ICT, hi-tech, cultural industry ,  transportation, health, agriculture, fishery, tourism and intellectual property rights.  2-10. We affirm that cooperation on standards is a key tool by which to facilitate trade   through the elimination of unnecessary technical barriers to trade. In this regards, we wil l  further enhance cooperation on standards through researching harmonization o f  standards, proposal of harmonized international standards and the Northeast Asia   Standards Cooperation Forum.  2-11. We recognize that more coordinated trilateral economic cooperation is a key to   promoting economic activities in the region, and we are committed to furthe r  strengthening our cooperation through such measures as the ones stipulated above .  Furthermore, recognizing the important role played by the three countries in regional and   the global economy, we should act together to generate strong, sustainable and balanced   global growth, in multilateral fora especially including G20 and APEC. To this end, we   will actively participate in the initiating a cooperative and consultative process of mutua l  assessment of our policy frameworks.  III. Cooperation in environmental protection  3-1. We welcome the outcome of the COP15/CMP5 and support the Copenhagen Accord   thereof. Based on the positive outcome of the COP15/CMP5, we will strengthen ou r  cooperation to contribute to the successful outcome of COP16/CMP6, including the   establishment of an effective post-2012 international cooperation framework on climate   change, consistent with the principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on   Climate Change (UNFCCC), in particular common but differentiated responsibilities.  3-2.We believe it is necessary to strengthen cooperation in environmental protection. In   this regard, we endorse the environmental ministers to implement the tripartite join t  action plan of 10 priority cooperation areas consisting of 1) Environmental Education ,  

- 287 -    Environmental Awareness and Public Participation, 2) Climate Change, 3) Biodiversity   Conservation, 4) Dust and Sandstorms, 5) Pollution Control, 6) Environment-Friendly   Society/3R/Sound Resource Recycle Society, 7) Transboundary Movement of E-Waste ,  8) Sound Management of Chemicals, 9) Environmental Governance in Northeast Asia ,  and 10) Environmental Industries and Technology, which was adopted at the 12th   Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting (TEMM) in May 2010, taking concrete actions   in cooperation with appropriate regional or international framework as necessary.  3-3.We will cooperate closely for the success of the 10th meeting of the Conference o f  the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP10) scheduled to be held in   Nagoya City, Aichi, Japan in October 2010, and support the International Union fo r  Conservation of Nature (IUCN) World Conservation Congress, which will be held on   Jeju Island, Korea, in 2012.  3-4. We will strengthen cooperation in protecting marine environment in the region, and   make efforts to enhance the public awareness on reducing marine litter generation ,  reiterating the importance of implementation of 'the Regional Action Plan on Marine   Litter' (RAP MALI) under the framework of the Northwest Pacific Action Plan   (NOWPAP) to prevent marine litter.  3-5. We take note the frequency and intensity of dust and sandstorms. We will strengthen   the cooperation on dust and sandstorms monitoring methodology, prevention technology ,  and capacity building.  3-6. We will enhance cooperation on hazardous wastes, especially E-Waste. We share the   view that the three countries should enhance cooperation on E-Waste management on   exchanging information and making joint efforts to combat the illegal transboundary   movement, as well as the capacity building on legislation and enforcement.  3-7. We reaffirm our commitment to the exploration of the establishment of a China - Japan-ROK circular economy model base.  Ⅳ. Promotion of friendly relations through the expansion of human and cultura l  

- 288 -    exchange and cooperation  4-1. We will enhance China-Japan-Korea friendship and amity through expanding and   developing active people-to-people exchanges among the three countries.  4-2. We are convinced that culture, as a bridge connecting minds, plays a significant role   in enhancing the understanding and trust among the peoples of our three countries. In thi s  sense, we will further strengthen cooperation within the trilateral Ministerial Meeting on   Culture to further promote cultural exchange among our three countries, to make the   annual China-Japan-Korea Cultural Industry Forum a success, and to further enhance the   cooperation in various areas including intangible cultural heritage in the framework of the   UNESCO.  4-3. We will endeavor to significantly expand the current scale of people-to-people   exchanges among the three countries to promote friendly relations and mutua l  understanding as well as to further enhance regional economic and social development.  4-4. We will contribute to strengthening the competitiveness of universities and nurturing   qualified human resources through exchange programs such as credit recognition and   joint degree. To this end, we confirm that the Japan-China-Korea Committee on   Promoting Exchange and Cooperation among Universities will be convened   continuously. We will also promote cooperation among quality assurance agencies in   Japan, China and Korea, and jointly prepare a guideline in order to enhance exchange   among universities. Also, we will consider a concrete policy package to facilitate the   exchange of prospective students. Meanwhile, to further promote trilateral educationa l  cooperation, we will make full use of meetings to facilitate the establishment of a   ministerial meeting mechanism. Moreover, we will promote the exchange of teachers   among the three countries.  4-5. We will expand the current scale of youth exchange conducted by the governments   of the three countries to actively foster exchange among the future leaders of China ,  Japan and Korea.  

- 289 -    4-6. We will contribute to the realization of Vision 2020 by enhancing cooperation in   sports among China, Japan and Korea. To this end, we will encourage exchange between   sports organizations and agencies as well as among athletes, and active participation in   various types of sports events to be held in each country.  4-7. We commit ourselves to focus our attention on vulnerable groups, including women ,  children, persons with disabilities and the elderly in promoting various cooperation   programs within the social and cultural arenas among the three countries, while   strengthening trilateral exchange and cooperation with a view to realizing the ful l  advancement and empowerment of such groups.  Ⅴ. Joint Efforts for Regional and International Peace and Stability  5-1. We share the view that a denuclearized Korean Peninsula would greatly contribute to   not only enduring peace, security and economic prosperity in Northeast Asia. In this   regard, we will continue to make concerted efforts to realize the goals outlined in the   September 19 2005 Joint Statement through the progress of the Six-Party Talks.  5-2. We, recognizing that terrorism poses a grave threat to international security, wil l  continue close cooperation in eliminating terrorism. In this regard, we will convene a   trilateral meeting of experts in this field.  5-3. We, recognizing the need to effectively counter drug problems including drug - related crimes on a regional level, will strengthen trilateral cooperation in this field.  5-4. We will make efforts to improve food safety by exchanging information such as the   standards on food safety of each respective country, timely notifying authorities with   detected problems and measures to prevent their recurrence.  5-5. We will further strengthen the regional cooperation against infectious diseases   among the three countries by expanding the scope of trilateral cooperation to include   possible new areas.  

- 290 -    5-6. We will continue to share relevant information, such as disease occurrence situation   and preventive measures that each country takes, to effectively respond to and eventually   eradicate vicious animal diseases, such as Avian Flu and Foot and Mouth Disease.  5-7.We are deeply concerned about increased global poverty and hunger, and wil l  continue the trilateral cooperation in the international arena such as the United Nations ,  for sustainable global food security.  5-8. We will further strengthen cooperation in various regional frameworks, including the   ASEAN Plus Three, East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Asia - Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), so as to promote peace, stability and prosperity   of the Asian region. We support ASEAN as the driving force for cooperation in Eas t  Asia. We remain committed to the development of an East Asian community as a long   term goal.  5-9. We shared the view that in order to respond effectively to global threats and   challenges, the role of the United Nations should be further strengthened and that efforts   for the reform of the United Nations should be strengthened to enhance its authority ,  efficiency, and effectiveness as mentioned in the outcome document of the 2005 World   Summit among others.  5-10. We will continue to host, on a rotational basis, the Trilateral Policy Dialogue on   Africa with a view to sharing relevant experience and pursuing effective measures to   support peace and development in Africa.    

- 291 -    Appendix #9  Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu Remarks on China-ROK, China-Japan   Foreign Ministers' Meetings (2010. 05. 17)      On May 15, 2010, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu answered   questions related to Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi’s meetings with hi s  counterparts of the ROK and Japan on the sideline of the 4th China-Japan-ROK Foreign   Ministers' Meeting in Gyeongju.    Q: It is reported that when Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with ROK Foreign   Minister Yu Myung Hwan on May 15, the ROK side brought up the Cheonan   incident. Please brief us on that.    A: ROK Foreign Minister Yu Myung Hwan expressed his concern on Cheonan in the   meeting. Yang Jiechi said that the sinking of Cheonan was a tragic incident. Considering   the current situation on the Korean Peninsula extremely complicated and sensitive, China   hopes parties concerned could put peninsular and regional peace and stability first ,  proceed from long-term perspective, remain calm and exercise restraint and handle the   related issues properly.    Q: It is reported that when meeting with Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, Japanese   Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada complained that the Chinese marine surveillance   ship was trying to change the status quo by approaching Japanese scientific survey   vessel on the east side of the "median line". It undermined Japan's sovereign rights   and interests. He requested the Chinese side to prevent the recurrence of similar   incidents. Yang Jiechi reiterated China’s position. Please brief us on that.    A: Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi stressed that China’s position on the East China Sea is   clear-cut and consistent. China has never recognized the so-called "median line" claimed   by Japan unilaterally. The Japanese side has no right to undertake unilateral actions in the   

- 292 -    disputed sea area. Both sides agreed to deal with the relevant issues calmly to avoid   escalation of the situation and undermining the overall bilateral relations.    Q: It is reported that when meeting with Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, Japanese   Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada complained about Chinese navy’s training in the   East China Sea. He said that the surveillance by the Japanese ships and planes over   the Chinese ships follows international law, while the Chinese side took “dangerous”   action. Please brief us on Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi’s remarks.    A: Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi reiterated China’s stance. He stressed that Chinese navy   was conducting normal training which posed no threat to any country. He hoped the   defense authorities of the two countries could strengthen exchanges and communication   to promote mutual trust and avoid misunderstanding and misjudgment.    

- 293 -    Appendix #10    Joint Statement on Strengthening Science and Innovation Cooperation among the   People’s Republic of China Japan and the Republic of Korea (2010. 05. 30)    We, the leaders of the People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea   (ROK), on the occasion of the Third Trilateral Summit Meeting held on 29 May 2010 in   Jeju Island, ROK:  Recognizing that the three countries are important components of regional and globa l  economy and have the responsibility to work actively to address regional and globa l  issues;  Agreeing that economic development calls for the supportive role of science and   technology advancement and innovation and that the further development and deepening   of trilateral cooperation in science and innovation are essential to improving our research   capacity and addressing common regional and global issues, and are in the interest of the   three countries;  Reaffirming our commitments in the Joint Statement on Sustainable Development among   the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea issued on 10 Octobe r  2009;  Decide to coordinate and underpin trilateral cooperation in a spirit of mutual respect ,  mutual benefit and win-win progress in science and innovation under curren t  mechanisms, and support such collaboration in areas of common interest by means   jointly approved by the three countries:  -Continue to provide financial support to the Joint Research Collaboration Program and   the A3 Foresight Program and explore possibility of further expansion of the investmen t  in light of actual circumstances. In addition, we will explore the possibility o f  establishing a new joint fund program to support joint research with common interest in   the fields, and by the means which are decided through discussion among the three   

- 294 -    countries.  -Enhance exchanges and cooperation in epidemic control and clinical studies, and give   full play to the important role of science and technology advances in improving public   health.  -Enhance exchanges and cooperation in pollution prevention and control, hazardous   waste treatment technology and management, electronic waste treatment technology and   management, and crop research; vigorously promote trilateral cooperation on the   management of water resources, and drive the sustainable development through science   and technology.  -Deepen science and technology cooperation in information communications, especially   in sensor networks, 4G mobile communications standards and Internet security to   promote industrial formation and development through science and technology progress.    -Conduct joint research in monsoon, drought and water disasters, meteorological disaste r  and earthquake to improve the capacity of Northeast Asia to respond to natural disasters   through science and technology progress.  -Jointly organize regular workshops from 2010 among young researchers, encourage   them to be key players in science and technology development and trilateral cooperation ,  support the non-governmental organizations to engage in science and technology   exchanges and cooperation, and science communication and public understanding o f  science promote science popularization in the three countries.  In order to conduct the cooperation mentioned above, we will give full play to the curren t  trilateral mechanism on science and technology cooperation to coordinate collaboration   in various areas of science and innovation and explore new mechanism and ways o f  cooperation if considered necessary by the three countries.  Through closer cooperation, we will work hard to raise the level of science and   technology, and innovation capacity in support of socio-economic development in the   

- 295 -    three countries, jointly address regional and global issues, and explore ways o f  contributing to the long-term goal of developing an East Asian community.        

- 296 -    Appendix #11  Joint Statement on Sustainable Development among the People’s Republic of China   Japan and the Republic of Korea (2009. 10. 10)      We, the heads of the Government / State of the People's Republic of China, Japan and the   Republic of Korea, held, on 10 October 2009 in Beijing, China, the Second China-Japan - ROK Summit Meeting, where we,  Reviewed with satisfaction the progress made by the three countries in the   implementation of the Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation   among the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea on 7 Octobe r  2003, the Joint Statement for Tripartite Partnership and the Action Plan for Promoting   Trilateral Cooperation among the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic o f  Korea adopted on 13 December 2008, including our fruitful cooperation for sustainable   development;  Reaffirmed our shared vision and responsibility for creating a peaceful, prosperous and   sustainable future for the region and international community;  Stressed that sustainable development bears on the survival and development of al l  countries and peace and stability of the world, and while taking vigorous measures to   address the international financial crisis and promote economic recovery, the three   countries should work hard to develop green economy, make joint efforts to facilitate a   virtuous cycle between the social and economic system and the natural and ecologica l  system, promote balance between economic growth and social development, and   contribute to the realization of sustainable development;  Resolved to strengthen cooperation in the following areas in the spirit of seeking mutua l  benefit and win-win results, in particular of developing green economy:  ― Endorse the 10 priority cooperation areas identified at the 11th Tripartite Environmen t  Ministers Meeting (TEMM), such as biodiversity conservation, environmen t  

- 297 -    awareness,encourage the development of a tripartite joint action plan which is to be   adopted at the 12th TEMM in 2010, and take joint practical measures to facilitate   cooperation; further promote sustainable environment management;  ― Explore the establishment of a China-Japan-ROK circular economy model base in the   spirit of Reduce, Reuse and Recycle, and make joint efforts to promote resource - conserving and environment-friendly industrial structure, growth pattern, and   consumption mode;  ― Promote the China-Japan-ROK Joint Research Collaboration Program, carry ou t  diverse forms of exchanges and cooperation, and bring into play the role of scientific and   technological progress and innovation as the engine of resolution of common regiona l  issues and economic development;  ― Establish a mechanism for meeting of ministers responsible for water resources in due   course, focusing on integrated river management and water resources managemen t  adapting to climate change;  ― Promote cooperation in sustainable forest management and wildlife protection, and   work together to facilitate harmonious development between man and nature;  ― Work closely together and spearhead cooperative efforts in international frameworks   for energy cooperation, aiming to promote sustainable development through deploymen t  of clean energy and improvement of energy efficiency;  ― Explore tripartite cooperation mechanisms in agriculture;  ― Work closely together through strengthened dialogue among the three countries to   contribute to the successful achievement of the Copenhagen Conference, including the   establishment of an effective post-2012 international cooperation framework on climate   change, consistent with the principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on   Climate Change (UNFCCC), in particular common but differentiated responsibilities.  

- 298 -    We will make unremitting efforts toward sustainable development of the three countries   and the region.    

- 299 -    Appendix #12  Joint Statement on the Tenth Anniversary of Trilateral Cooperation among the  People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (2009. 10. 10)      On the occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of China-Japan-ROK Trilateral Cooperation ,  we, the heads of Government/State of the People’s Republic of China, Japan and the   Republic of Korea met in Beijing, China on 10 October 2009. We reviewed the course o f  trilateral cooperation in the past and drew up plans for its future development.  We reached the common understanding that since the launch of the trilateral cooperation   in 1999, the common interests of the three countries have continuously grown, the   mechanisms for dialogue have been further broadened and the cooperation in a whole   range of fields has been promoted, yielding highly fruitful results. The three countrie s  have enhanced political mutual trust through the forging of a future-oriented   comprehensive cooperative partnership. With the rapid increase in trilateral economic   cooperation as well as trade and investment, the three countries have emerged as   important trading partners to one another. Cultural and people-to-people exchanges were   dynamic and close, which greatly enhanced the mutual understanding and friendship   among the peoples. The three countries remained committed to the development of an   East Asia community based on the principles of openness, transparency, inclusiveness as   a long term goal, and to regional cooperation, while maintaining increased trilatera l  communication and coordination on regional and international affairs.  We expressed the common recognition that the achievements over the past decade proved   that to reinforce cooperation among China, Japan and the ROK serves the fundamenta l  interests of the three countries and peoples, and moreover, contributes to regional peace ,  stability and prosperity. In this context, the three countries also recognized the   significance of the “Joint Statement for Tripartite Partnership” issued at the first trilatera l  Summit in Fukuoka, Japan.  We believe that as the world undergoes major changes and adjustments, China-Japan - 

- 300 -    ROK cooperation will have many opportunities for development in the coming decade .  We will view and approach the trilateral cooperative relationship from a strategic point o f  view, and will constantly aim to bring our cooperation to higher levels.  We believe that mutual respect, equality, common interests, openness, transparency and   respect for our diverse cultures constitute the foundation and guarantee for trilatera l  cooperation, and these principles should be followed in future trilateral cooperation. In   the spirit of facing history squarely and advancing towards the future, the three countries   will explore the potential and expand the areas of cooperation. We will push the trilatera l  relations forward in the direction of good-neighborliness, mutual trust, comprehensive   cooperation, mutual benefit and common development. We are convinced that this wil l  contribute to world peace, stability and prosperity.  With this in mind, we have agreed to:  1. Build up mutual trust in the political field. We will step up high-level contacts and   strategic dialogues, strengthen mutual understanding, expand common ground and build   solid strategic mutual trust. We will regard one another as partners of win-win   cooperation. We will support one another's peaceful development and regard it as an   opportunity. We will respect one another's major concerns and core interests. We wil l  properly address sensitive issues and seek settlement of disputes through dialogue and   consultation. We will strengthen security dialogue and facilitate exchange and   cooperation among the defense or military personnel of the three countries.  2. Deepen mutually beneficial cooperation. We will make full use of the high   complementarities and great potential of the three economies and bring to higher levels   our cooperation in key areas such as business, trade, finance, investment, logistics ,  intellectual property, customs, information, science and technology, energy conservation ,  environmental protection and circular economy. We will step up our efforts to develop   green economy, improve the quality of economic development, oppose trade   protectionism in all forms, uphold a fair, free and open global trading and investmen t  system. We are determined to seek an ambitious and balanced conclusion to the Doha   

- 301 -    Development Round in 2010, consistent with its mandate, based on the progress already   made, including with regard to modalities. By making full use of existing fora, including   ASEAN+3, EAS, APEC and G20, we will continuously inject fresh vitality into the   recovery and stable development of the economy of Asia and the world.  3. Expand people-to-people exchanges. We will continue to conduct exchanges among al l  sectors of the three countries, particularly friendly youth exchanges and exchanges   among universities. We will consider establishing a long-term mechanism for youth and   media exchanges, encourage academic institutions and local authorities, and promote   closer trilateral cooperation in areas such as disaster management, healthcare, tourism ,  human resources, education and sports. We will carry forward the spirit of peace and   friendship and promote affinity among our three peoples while respecting each culture so   as to enhance popular support for the stable, healthy and friendly development of the   trilateral relations.  4. Promote peace, stability and prosperity of Asia. We will further strengthen cooperation   so as to promote development of regional and sub-regional cooperation of various   mechanisms such as ASEAN integration and community-building, ASEAN+3, East Asia   Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum and APEC. We will remain committed to dialogue and   consultation and continue to work through peaceful means to pursue the denuclearization   of the Korean Peninsula. We will make joint efforts with other parties for an early   resumption of the Six-Party Talks, so as to safeguard peace and stability in Northeas t  Asia, and thereby to build an Asia of peace, harmony, openness and prosperity.  5. Actively respond to global issues. We will strengthen communication and consultation   on regional and international affairs such as climate change, financial risks, energy   security, public health, natural disasters, terrorism, arms control, disarmament and non - proliferation, and UN reform. We will actively participate in reforms in the internationa l  political, economic and financial fields and join the rest of the international community to   work unremittingly for global peace, development and prosperity.  Looking ahead to the next decade, we are full of confidence and hope for the   

- 302 -    consolidation of the tripartite partnership and comprehensive cooperation. We firmly   believe that in keeping with the calling of the times and with the development of ou r  three countries, cooperation among China, Japan and the Republic of Korea will embrace   an even brighter future, benefiting not only the three countries but also indeed the world .       

- 303 -    Appendix #13  Joint Press Release of the Third Trilateral Foreign Ministers Meeting among the  People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (2009. 09. 28)      1. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the trilateral cooperation, foreign ministers   of the People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) met in   Shanghai on 28 September 2009.  2. We reviewed the fresh headway made in the trilateral cooperation and exchanged   views on the celebration activities for the tenth anniversary of the trilateral cooperation   and on future cooperation among the three countries. We also exchanged views on majo r  regional and international issues of mutual interest.  3. We expressed satisfaction about the progress of the trilateral cooperation. With ten   years of development, cooperation among China, Japan and the ROK shows good   momentum of growth. With good-neighborly friendship among the three countries high   on the agenda of our respective foreign policies, we have maintained high-leve l  exchanges and contacts, increased mutual political trust, earnestly implemented the   Action Plan for Promoting Trilateral Cooperation among the People’s Republic o f  China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, and conducted cooperation on over 30 projects   in the political, economic and social fields, science and technology, environmenta l  protection, culture and international affairs.  4. We agreed on the need for combined trilateral efforts to build on past achievements   and to deepen the partnership of comprehensive cooperation in a future-oriented manner .  To this end, we will enhance cooperation in the following aspects: continue to build   stable strategic mutual trust; deepen and raise the level of our cooperation; persist in   trilateral social, cultural and people-to-people exchanges, and work together to promote   East Asian cooperation and regional peace and prosperity. We put forward concrete ideas   and initiatives in the above-mentioned fields.  

- 304 -    5. We exchanged views on matters related to the Second Trilateral Summit Meeting   among the People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. At the crucia l  moment of the joint endeavor to tackle the international financial crisis, promote recovery   and re-launch growth, the Meeting is of great significance to enhance mutual politica l  trust, advance mutually-beneficial cooperation and promote stability and development in   Asia. We agreed to hold the Second Trilateral Summit Meeting in Beijing, China on 10   October and will keep in touch on the relevant preparations through diplomatic channels.   6. We also exchanged views on the international economic and financial situation ,  situation in Northeast Asia, East Asian cooperation, climate change, UN reform, arms   control, disarmament and non-proliferation.  7. We agreed to hold the Fourth Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in the Republic o f  Korea next year.    

- 305 -    Appendix #14  Joint Press Statement of the East Asia Summit on the Global Economic  and Financial Crisis (Bangkok, 2009. 06. 03)       1. H.E. Mr. Abhisit Vejjajiva, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand, as the  ASEAN Chair and the East Asia Summit (EAS) coordinator, has been mandated by the  EAS Leaders to issue Joint Press Statement of the East Asia Summit on the Global  Economic and Financial Crisis. Pursuant to the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East  Asia Summit in 2005, the Leaders agreed that the world is facing a global recession of  unprecedented dimensions and called for policy responses that focus on restoring  financial stability and economic growth and development.  2. Mindful of Asia's important role as a centre of growth that is open to the world, they  understand the need to take appropriate and coordinated measures against the impact of  the financial crisis and the downturn of the world's economy as well as to strengthen the  region's growth potential and expand demand. They commended the fiscal and monetary  stimulus measures and other policy actions undertaken by the EAS participating countries   and resolved to take further actions as appropriate to sustain growth and jobs, reduce  poverty, restore confidence, and support medium-to-long term macroeconomic and  financial stability. They also agreed that stimulus packages alone will not have the  desired effect without a stable financial system playing its role in economic growth.  3. They underscored the critical importance of standing firm against protectionist and  distortionary measures and refraining from raising new barriers. They agreed that a  prompt, ambitious and balanced conclusion to the WTO Doha Development Agenda  negotiations based on progress achieved to date is necessary and would inject confidence   and assist in the global economic recovery. They also agreed that further regional  economic cooperation, trade facilitation and liberalisation would contribute to making the   EAS region a more attractive market and investment destination, and to this end, they  noted that Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) Initiative could  further enhance intra-regional trade. They looked forward to the 2nd Phase study  

- 306 -    recommendation on CEPEA at the 4th EAS. As a further sign of their commitment they  pledged to minimise the trade-distorting impact of their fiscal stimulus measures and  industry support polices, and agreed to work together with other countries to this end.  4. Recognising the unprecedented international linkages demonstrated by the global  financial turmoil and economic slowdown and the strains on the EAS participating  countries, they agreed on the need to further enhance the regional financial cooperation  and integration frameworks. They commended the work of the Chiang Mai Initiative  under the ASEAN+3 cooperation framework, including efforts to expedite the  multilateralisation process, and the Asian Bond Markets Initiative, in developing and  deepening financial markets in the region.  5. They agreed that ASEAN-led consultations with other organizations and fora in Asia  and the Asia-Pacific would contribute to safeguarding the region from future regional and   global economic and financial crises.  6. They supported the agreement at the London Summit on 2 April 2009 to restore  confidence, growth and jobs, reject protectionism and promote global trade and  investment, strengthen financial regulation to rebuild trust, reform international financial  institutions to reflect greater voice and representation of emerging and developing  countries, and inject an additional US$ 1.1 trillion to enhance global financial liquidity in   particular to support growth in emerging and developing countries. In this connection,  they expressed their commitment to support the global efforts led by G20 to raise global  output by 4 percent by the end of 2010 and accelerate the transition to a green economy.  7. They emphasized the importance of international cooperation to develop concrete  measures to alleviate the impact of the crisis, including social safety-net programmes and   assistance to small and medium enterprises.  8. They expressed determination to strengthen the region's growth potential and expand  demand, including through accelerating basic infrastructure improvement, policies and  measures for expanding domestic demand, assistance to the private sector in particular  

- 307 -    SMEs, and human resources development as well as advancing regional cooperation  efforts, such as ASEAN integration, facilitation of trade and investment, promotion of  subregion-wide development and promotion of people-to-people exchanges.  9. They agreed to support efforts by export credit agencies (ECAs), international financia l  institutions and private banks to ensure that adequate finance is available to business,  including small and medium-sized enterprises, and to keep trade and investment flowing  in the region. They also welcomed ECAs to strengthen their cooperation in the areas of  re-insurance, capacity building and information exchange.  10. They reaffirmed the importance of regional financial cooperation, in particular on  strengthening the financial sector of the EAS participating countries, including financial  regulations. They commended the efforts of EAS finance officials to advance this agenda ,  and noted that the report on An Assessment of Financial Sector Capacity Building Needs   of East Asia Summit Countries could serve as the basis for ongoing work on capacity  building, which would be reviewed at the 4th EAS in October 2009.  11. In order to promote sub-regional development, they encouraged the Economic  Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), ADB and ASEAN Secretariat to  work together to prepare as soon as possible a coherent master plan, which would  contribute to coordinating, expediting, upgrading and expanding sub-regional initiatives  and promoting private sector participation. In addition, they called upon ERIA to provide   policy recommendation to stimulate economic growth in the region, deepen regional  integration and strengthen partnership in East Asia.    

- 308 -    Appendix #15  Meeting of Leaders of China, Japan and South Korea Issues an Action Plan on  Cooperation (2008. 12. 15)      On December 13, 2008, the meeting of leaders of China, Japan and South Korea issued   an action plan on trilateral cooperation in Fukuoka, Japan. The document worked ou t  specific plans of trilateral cooperation in various fields. The abstract of the plan is a s  follows:  I. Political affairs  The trilateral dialogue mechanism will be consolidated. The second and third meetings o f  leaders will be held in China and South Korea in 2009 and 2010 respectively. The three   countries will continue to make consultations on holding the meeting of leaders during   the ASEAN series of meetings. The third meeting of foreign ministers will be held in   China next year and the trilateral meeting of senior diplomats will be held annually.  The trilateral cooperation network secretariat will be set up in 2009 in order to make the   tripartite cooperation more effective.  II. Economic affairs  The joint researches on the trilateral free trade zone will be completed by the end of 2008   and further in-depth studies will kick off in 2009. The three countries will push for the   early conclusion of negotiations on promoting trade facilitation and investmen t  protection. The governments of the three countries will continue with their mutually   beneficial cooperation in the energy sector and make joint efforts to strengthen regiona l  and global energy security. They will try to enhance trade facilitation and economic   growth by building an efficient and seamless international logistics system in East Asia .  The third meeting of transportation and logistics ministers will be held in China in 2009 .  Customs cooperation will be reinforced to create an enabling environment for investmen t  

- 309 -    and facilitate trade. China will host the third meeting of customs ministers of the three   countries in 2009. China, Japan and South Korea will discuss the possibility o f  establishing the liaison system in 2009 in order to push forward their cooperation in the   industrial sector. They will continue to strengthen the financial dialogue and cooperation   among such agencies as financial ministries, central banks and financial regulatory authorities.  III. Environmental protection, science and technology  They will launch the East Asia climate partnership plan, jointly study the surveillance ,  early warning, prevention and control of sand storms and try to solve air pollution in the   region. The trilateral cooperation on managing marine waste will be strengthened and   joint efforts of protecting and monitoring migrants be made. Scientific and technologica l  cooperation should be improved. The second ministerial-level meeting of China, Japan   and South Korea on scientific and technological cooperation will be held in Tokyo in   2009 and the existing projects will be pushed forward on strengthening information and   communication technology cooperation.  IV. Social and cultural affairs  The three nations will discuss the possibility of enhancing the trilateral marine rescue   cooperation on the basis of building bilateral rescue cooperation mechanisms. The second   meeting of health ministers of the three countries was held in Beijing in November 2008 .  The three nations are committed to preventing and controlling flu epidemic by close   cooperation. They will continue to expand health cooperation to other issues related with   health. As the consulting mechanism of diplomatic and security academic institution s  among the three countries, the annual tripartite cooperation forum will be re-launched .  The friendly meetings of youth of South Korea, China and Japan will be held in South   Korea and China in 2009 and 2010 respectively. The forum of youth leaders of South   Korea, China and Japan will be held in Beijing in 2009. The three countries will discuss   the feasibility of launching the trilateral youth ministers' meeting. They will continue to   host cultural activities such as exhibitions, art performances and movies and expand   

- 310 -    cooperation in such fields as competitive sports, mass sports, sport science, medicine and   anti-doping. Their cooperation in tourism will be increased and operation of joint cruise   routes linking their major tourist destinations be broadened.  V. International cooperation  The three countries will exchange opinions on how to reach a fair and effective   international climate change arrangement oriented the year after 2012 at the UN climate   change conference to be held in Copenhagen, 2009. They will reinforce dialogue and   consultations on the African affairs. They are committed to pushing forward cooperation   with ASEAN, speeding up East Asia cooperation and supporting the leading role o f  ASEAN in East Asia cooperation. They will make joint efforts with all parties concerned   to move forward the six-party talks. The trilateral talks will be strengthened and   cooperation sought to reform the UN as soon as possible covered in the outcome of the   2005 UN Summit. Joint efforts will be made to push forward the multilatera l  disarmament process, reinforce the international non-proliferation system and maintain   peace and stability in the region and the entire world at large.    

- 311 -    Appendix #16  Joint Press Statement of the Seventh Summit Meeting among the People’s Republic  of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (Cebu, the Philippines. 2007. 01. 14)    1. The Seventh Summit Meeting among the People's Republic of China, Japan and the   Republic of Korea (ROK) was held in Cebu, the Philippines on 14 January 2007 with the   attendance of H.E. Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of China, H.E. Shinzo Abe ,  Prime Minister of Japan and H.E. Roh Moo-hyun, President of ROK. The meeting was   chaired by H.E. Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of China.  2. The three leaders expressed satisfaction with the recent development of relations   among the three countries and shared the view that, as important countries in Asia, China ,  Japan and ROK shoulder great responsibilities in maintaining peace, stability and   prosperity in Asia. They also believed that the strengthening of future-oriented trilatera l  cooperation among the three countries both serves the fundamental and long-term   interests of the peoples of the three countries, and is of great significance for peace ,  stability and prosperity in Asia. The leaders agreed, acting in the interests of overal l  stability and development of the region, to enhance political trust on the basis of mutua l  respect and understanding. As the important measures for further building confidence   among the three countries, the leaders agreed to have more frequent exchanges and   decided to set up a trilateral consultation mechanism at the level of senior foreign affairs   officials to conduct close communication and coordination on major political and   diplomatic issues involving the three countries as well as international and regional issues .  The first round of trilateral senior foreign affairs officials' consultation will be held by   China this year.  3. The leaders endorsed the 2005-2006 Progress Report of the Trilateral Cooperation   among the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea and expressed   satisfaction with the significant progress made in various areas, especially in the five   priority areas of economy and trade, ICT industry, environmental protection, human   resources development and culture. They agreed that the three countries should build on   

- 312 -    the current new momentum of growth in their relations to further promote and enrich   trilateral cooperation based on the Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite   Cooperation among the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea and   the Action Strategy on Trilateral Cooperation among the People's Republic of China ,  Japan and the Republic of Korea. To this end, the leaders decided to add six new priority   areas, namely finance, science and technology, logistics, public health, tourism and youth   exchange to their cooperation.  4. To further promote the trilateral cooperation in economy and trade, the leaders took   note of the progress and looked forward to more positive results of the joint research on   trilateral FTA by the three representative research institutes of the three countries with   the possible participation of government officials as observers. They agreed to star t  negotiations on trilateral investment agreement as soon as possible in 2007. The three   parties will continue their effort to improve the business environment in their respective   countries. The leaders agreed to promote the creation of a secure, efficient, cost-effective   and seamless logistics system among the three countries. The leaders expressed thei r  readiness to jointly work towards early and successful conclusion of the WTO DDA   negotiations.  5.The leaders agreed to enhance further cooperation in the environmental field by   tackling issues such as Dust and Sandstorm (DSS), marine litter and illegal trans - boundary movement of toxic and hazardous waste, and to intensify their cooperation   within the existing bilateral, regional and multilateral frameworks. They noted that dus t  and sandstorm along with the other issues in Northeast Asia was posing common concern   for countries in this region and agreed to work together to reduce the damage caused by   these regional environmental issues. To this end, they agreed to further explore concrete   measures through the existing frameworks, especially in the Tripartite Environmen t  Ministers Meeting (TEMM).  6. With a view to enhancing socio-cultural cooperation, the leaders welcomed China's   proposal to designate the year 2007 as the Year of Cultural Exchange among China ,  Japan and ROK. The leaders shared the view that such an idea will enhance mutua l  

- 313 -    understanding and friendship among the peoples of the three countries. China proposed to   host the 9th Asian Arts Festival in 2007 which will focus on the cultures of the three   countries. Japan and ROK welcomed and supported China's proposal.  7. The leaders shared the common understanding on the importance of energy security in   Northeast Asia and agreed to further promote energy dialogue among the three countries.   8.The leaders agreed to enhance close cooperation on countermeasures in crime areas   where trilateral cooperation is necessary, by strengthening cooperation for investigations   and coordination.  9. The leaders agreed that trilateral cooperation among China, Japan and ROK is an   important part of East Asia cooperation. Such trilateral cooperation enriches East Asia   cooperation, enhances institutional building in this regard, and plays an active role in   promoting the ASEAN Plus One (10+1), the ASEAN Plus Three (10+3), the East Asia   Summit (EAS) and the building of an East Asian community. The leaders reaffirmed   their commitment to the enhancement of cooperation with ASEAN, the promotion o f  East Asia cooperation and their respect to the leading role of ASEAN in East Asia   cooperation. They shared the view to realize an East Asian community as a long-term   goal with ASEAN Plus Three (10+3) process as the main vehicle. They reaffirmed tha t  the East Asia Summit (EAS) could play a significant role in community building in thi s  region. They also pledged to continue their work towards a dynamic and harmonious   Asia-Pacific community in the APEC.  10. The leaders expressed their concern about the situation caused by the DPRK's recen t  missile launches and the nuclear test. They also reaffirmed the need for ful l  implementation of the UNSC Resolutions 1695 and 1718 by all UN Member States as   well as their commitment to the peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue of the Korean   Peninsula through dialogue and negotiation. The leaders called for concrete and effective   steps toward the full implementation of the 9.19 Joint Statement and the denuclearization   of the Peninsula. They also emphasized the importance of addressing the issue o f  humanitarian concerns of the international community.  

- 314 -    11. The three parties supported the reform of the United Nations, including the Security   Council, to enhance its authority, efficiency, competence and accountability in meeting   various global threats and challenges, and would keep in contact on this issue. They   expressed their readiness to support Mr. Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary-General of the U.N. ,  in his work.      

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